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Re: [Sartre] The Constitutive Good

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  • Monte Morris
    Thanks for this very informative piece of work. Very interesting. ... ===== --Monte Morris Philosopher wannabe Japan Needs to find a good quote
    Message 1 of 5 , Dec 1, 2003
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      Thanks for this very informative piece of work. Very

      --- Elaine Phipps-Earl <lizral@...> wrote:
      > Sorry i have not been responding but am flat out
      > with assignments. However,
      > thought u might enjoy reading this:-
      > Part IV - The Voice of Nature
      > Chapter 21 - The Expressivist Turn
      > While Kant had given us an understanding of
      > internalised rational agency,
      > the good defined by principles of inner motivation,
      > others, following in the
      > footsteps of Rousseau, embraced the understanding
      > that nature was our inner
      > source (p.368), the inner voice or impulse defining
      > the truth within, the
      > truth expressed in our feelings (p.369). Most
      > notably of those articulating
      > this understanding, Taylor perceives, to have been
      > Herder, Geothe and Hegel,
      > this philosophy of nature as a source, referred to
      > as 'Romanticism' (p.368).
      > Romantics fought against neo-Classicism, to affirm
      > the rights of the
      > individual, the significance of imagination and
      > feelings. While some, the
      > likes of French writers, Lamartine and Musset,
      > perceived this inner voice or
      > impulse to be the 'voice of one's self', English
      > writers the likes of Blake
      > and Wordsworth, embraced Rousseau's theory,
      > believing the inner voice or
      > impulse to be the voice of Nature herself, both in
      > us and
      > in the larger order in which we are set (pp.368-69).
      > Perceiving nature as "a great current of sympathy",
      > this current running
      > through all things in Nature, Herder proclaimed
      > "everything feels itself and
      > its like, life reverberates to life" and as man is a
      > conscious being he has
      > an awareness of this current, bringing it to
      > expression (p.369). Spinoza had
      > also embraced this notion, perceiving a cosmic
      > spirit running through the
      > whole of nature and coming to expression in mankind
      > (p.314). In proclaiming
      > man to be the steward of creation, Herder was heard
      > to echo the words of
      > Pico Della Mirandola, as he had written in 'God's
      > address to Adam', "we have
      > set thee at the world's center that thou mayest
      > observe whatever is in the
      > world", where man was to be caretaker of God's
      > creation (pp.199-200). As man
      > had an awareness of this current, Herder proclaimed
      > man to be the "organ of
      > sense of his God in all the living things of
      > creation, according to the
      > measure of their relation to him", Holderlin,
      > Schelling and Novalis also
      > embracing this understanding (p.369).
      > Taylor perceives this philosophy of nature as a
      > source, to be essential to
      > Romanticism, believing it to continue to inform the
      > vision of writers, even
      > though the likes of Geothe and Hegel had rejected
      > the notion of providential
      > order as defined in neo-Classicism (p.369). Taylor
      > suggests all these
      > writers, perceived human beings as set in a larger
      > natural order, where one
      > was to seek to be in harmony with Nature.
      > Deism had adhered to a notion of providential order,
      > where both human life
      > and fulfilment of desire were marked as significant
      > in the perfectly
      > interlocking order of God's design. In nature, God
      > had given man his
      > inclinations and desires. What man strongly valued
      > as good was the good,
      > which God proposed for man. Hence, attaining these
      > fulfilments, for oneself
      > and securing them for others, had taken on a higher
      > importance in the
      > affirmation of ordinary life. One saw the order of
      > things, which inferred
      > its divine origin. In seeing this order, one sensed
      > order and justified one'
      > s own moral sentiments (p.369).
      > As Taylor suggests, this sense of significance is
      > seen to have come from
      > within, where our inner impulses or convictions
      > define the importance we
      > place on our own natural fulfilments and our
      > solidarity with other human
      > beings, all striving for this natural fulfilment,
      > all having impulses or
      > convictions and strong evaluations, this the voice
      > of nature within us
      > (pp.369-70).
      > Herder had embraced the notion of natural order,
      > this order both harmonious
      > and providentially created. This view was not unlike
      > the view of Hutcheson.
      > However, while Hutcheson believed a perception of
      > truth was justified by
      > evidence in the divine creation of nature's design,
      > Herder believed truth
      > was grounded in our inner convictions. The
      > distinction between their views
      > was the mode of access to the truth. Herder believed
      > that in order to take a
      > proper moral stance toward natural order, one must
      > have access to one's
      > inner voice. Without having grasped the significance
      > of things inwardly, one
      > could have only a cold external understanding of the
      > world as providential,
      > a mere notion of what was observed (p.370).
      > Herder equated Rousseau's understanding of the
      > opposition between two loves
      > in the directive of will (p.356), with what he
      > perceived to be an opposition
      > between a cold external understanding of the world
      > and an inward grasping of
      > the significance of things (p.370). Rousseau had
      > perceived our Conscience to
      > be our inner guide, this guide the voice of Nature
      > herself, speaking to us
      > in the language of Nature. However, the opinions and
      > prejudice of others had
      > muffled the voice within, severing man's contact
      > with Nature (pp.357-8).
      > Rather than the opinions and prejudice of others
      > stifling the voice within,
      > Herder perceived this loss of contact a result of
      > our disengaged stance,
      > calculating reason paying no heed to the truth that
      > was grounded in our
      > inner convictions (p.370).
      > Perceiving nature as "a great current of sympathy"
      > running through all
      > things (p.369), as Rousseau, Herder proclaimed
      > nature to be a reservoir of
      > good, wherein embracing Nature, the gift of her
      > grace inspired innocent
      > desire, benevolence and love for the good. In having
      > taken a disengaged
      > stance, man had severed his relationship with
      > nature, no longer hearing the
      > voice within (p.370).
      > From a disengaged standpoint, Herder believed, one
      > failed to give
      > recognition to one's own inclinations. Instead, with
      > Enlightenment
      > naturalism, one was coerced into believing that all
      > human beings were
      > similarly motivated (p.370), as Utilitarians
      > insinuated, all human beings
      > desiring only happiness (pp.319-21; p.370). Like
      > Rousseau, Herder called
      > for the need of a transformation of will to recover
      > contact with the
      > impulses of nature within us, wherein opening
      > ourselves up to nature within,
      > the grace of nature transformed our will (p.358;
      > p.270). Schiller had also
      > reflected this understanding in proclaiming the
      > great current of life,
      > flowing through all of nature, restored us to
      > fraternity (p.371).
      > Taylor suggests this had first been addressed in a
      > 'pagan' image. However,
      > later this sense of united order in nature reflected
      > the understanding of
      > the loving father, in line with Deist standards and
      > theism, an orthodox view
      > of the world as a providential creation. Yet as
      > Taylor suggests, there had
      > been an important change. For significance was no
      > longer seen in the united
      > order of nature itself, but rather one accessed the
      > significance of things
      > by a turn within, where an inner voice defined what
      > was significant, be it
      > the voice of one's self, the voice of Nature
      > herself, or the current,
      > flowing through all of nature which emerged in the
      > voice within. Hence, God
      > was/is all of Nature and one saw God in the striving
      > of nature. However,
      > within one heard the voice of God in Nature,
      > defining the significance of
      > what one had seen. As such, true understanding of
      > nature could only be
      > grasped by having gone within (p.371).
      > With this image of Nature, Taylor suggests, it was
      > all too easy to slide
      > into Pantheism, where one identified God with nature
      > and denied his
      > existence as an entity in himself. Evidence of this
      > slide, he suggests,
      > could be seen in the Romantic generations with early
      > Schelling and later in
      > a differing sense with Hegel. This slide eventually
      > taking many beyond the
      > bounds of orthodox Christianity to embrace
      > naturalism, where the
      > significance of things is now perceived of as
      > emerging out of physical
      > nature and our own material being (p.371).
      > Where the philosophy of nature as a source, appeared
      > to have gone beyond the
      > Deism of Shaftesbury and Hutcheson, it still held
      > firm to Locke's extrinsic
      > theory, in addition to giving a central and positive
      > place to sentiments in
      > moral life, our deepest moral understanding
      > expressed in our feelings.
      > Herder perceived our passions and sensations to be
      > the operative of
      > understanding, our highest knowledge derived from
      > these, our understanding
      > of truth having grown from them. Hence, what we
      > defined as truth was
      > directly related to our passions and sensations
      > (p.371).
      > In agreement with Aristotle, Wordsworth believed
      > poetry to be the most
      > philosophic of all writings, poetry expressing
      > general and operative truth,
      > not as in truth standing in external testimony, but
      > rather as truth in
      > itself, carried into the heart by passion, this
      > truth expressing our inner
      > most sentiments (p.372).
      > In philosophy of nature as a source, the good life
      > was primarily associated
      > with opening oneself to the impulses of nature,
      > becoming in tune with nature
      > itself, where these impulses were inseparable from
      > our deepest feelings in
      > sentiment. Aristotle had associated virtue with our
      > disposition, our will to
      > do the good (p.372). Plato associated the good life
      > with the loving of the
      > good (p.372), the force of the good, which moved us,
      > the good commanding our
      > love. For in the reflection of the light of the
      > good, we perceived the
      > worthiness of our own soul as part of the order of
      > the whole, our love and
      > allegiance to the supreme good making us truly
      > virtuous (p.122). Christian
      > theology associated the good life, the good and the
      > virtuous with the love
      > of God, the supreme goodness of God commanding our
      > love, where with the
      > philosophy of nature as a source, the voice of
      > nature, which spoke to us,
      > became the good, the good that must be cherished,
      > the good which demanded
      > our love (p.372).
      > While the Aristotelian ethic associated virtue with
      > certain motivations, the
      > ethic of the philosophy of nature as a source,
      > perceived virtue in relation
      > to how one felt about the world and one's life in
      > general. The good was the
      > voice of nature, which spoke to us. In acknowledging
      > this voice, one grasped
      > the significance of the good in the larger natural
      > order, the order of
      > Nature as a whole. Our grasping of this significance
      > demanded our love.
      > However, one's love was not expressed toward some
      > transcendental object.
      > Rather, one expressed love in the manner one
      > experienced one's life. Hence,
      > the virtuous man was in tune with nature. He
      > responded to the great current
      > of life, flowing through all of nature, embracing
      > with love, his ordinary
      > desires and fulfillments and embracing with love,
      > the significance of
      > natural order wherein all human beings are set
      > (p.372).
      > Rather than perceiving the value of sentiments, as
      > had Aristotle, in
      > relation to the mode of life or actions, where in
      > light of these actions one
      > willed to do the good, actions defining one's
      > sentiments, those adhering to
      > the philosophy of nature as a source perceived
      > sentiments as values in
      > themselves, these sentiments defining one's actions
      > and way of life. Our
      > defining of the good life or any actions was
      > perceived of as being directly
      > related to certain feelings, our sensed feelings of
      > oneness with humanity,
      > our sense of awe and oneness with Nature. While
      > Plato perceived the good in
      > the cosmos, the good was not related to one's own
      > inner sentiments. Rather
      > it was the force of the good itself, which moved us.
      > The good, as the
      > transcendental object of love, had given one these
      > sentiments, these
      > sentiments forced upon us, empowering us to be good
      > (pp.372-3).
      > Without the expression of our own deepest sentiments
      > in relation to the
      > good, these sentiments forced upon us can offer no
      > deep conviction to the
      > good (p.373). Without this relation, wherein we
      > grasp the significance of
      > the good, we can, as Herder suggested, only offer a
      > cold description of the
      > good, a cold external understanding of the world as
      > providential, a mere
      > notion of what is observed (p.370). Without having
      > grasped the significance
      > of things inwardly, there can be no true commitment
      > to the command for love
      > and respect, no true sense of awe (p.373).
      > Given Plato's understanding of the force of the
      > good, which moves us, our
      > defining of what nature is as a source must
      > articulate an understanding of
      > what it is that inclines us to be moved (p.373).
      > Given as we have freedom of will, there must be
      > recognition of something in
      > this force, which inclines us to be moved. As Taylor
      > suggests, if we embrace
      > the notion of nature as a force, a great current of
      > life, flowing through
      > all of nature (p.371), this current emerging in our
      > own inner impulses, then
      > these impulses must be inseparable from our
      > understanding of this force.
      > Therefore, in the defining of what nature is as a
      > source, our articulation
      > in understanding of this force must be directly
      > related to these inner
      > impulses, our deepest sentiments, where in turn our
      > deepest sentiments must
      > be integral to our defining of the good (p.373).
      > With fulfilment in nature perceived of merely as
      > embracing one's inner
      > impulses, the opportunity existed for a slide away
      > from orthodox theology.
      > Where the good life was merely defined in relation
      > to certain sentiments,
      > Taylor suggests, once again there existed the
      > opportunity to slide away from
      > traditional ethical codes. With the moral sense
      > theory, the ethic of
      > ordinary life and benevolence was equated with what
      > was perceived of as
      > appropriate sentiments, this perception of
      > appropriate sentiments also
      > placing a limit on sexual fulfilment. Benevolence
      > and sympathy had been
      > perceived of as natural inclinations. However, given
      > the understanding of
      > natural inclinations, Enlightenment materialism
      > abandoned the limits on
      > sexual fulfilment. For sensuality in itself was
      > significant in the
      > fulfilment of one's experience of
      > being-in-the-world. In this manner, Taylor
      > suggests, there had been a fusion of the sensual and
      > spiritual. However, as
      > Taylor suggests, a heightened vibrancy of feeling in
      > one's ordinary life can
      > be detached from the inner sentiments of benevolence
      > and solidarity (p.373).
      > Taylor suggests that with a slide away from orthodox
      > theology and/or a slide
      > away from traditional ethical codes, the distinction
      > between the ethical and
      > aesthetic is dissolved. In the eighteenth century a
      > new understanding had
      > been given to natural and artistic beauty, where
      > rather than one focusing
      > upon the nature of the object, one focused upon the
      > quality of the
      > experience evoked. The term aesthetic associated
      > with a mode of experience
      > (p.373).
      > It had been easy for us to distinguish between
      > ethical and aesthetic objects
      > or issues. However, with the ethical now partly
      > defined in relation to
      > sentiments, the line between the ethical and
      > aesthetic had been fudged.
      > Taylor believed that when an ethic is founded upon
      > sentiments, yet abandons
      > the traditional virtues of temperance, justice and
      > beneficence, the line
      > between the ethical and aesthetic seems difficult to
      > draw (pp.373-4).
      > However, there was another crucial feature of this
      > new philosophy of nature,
      > which Taylor refers to as 'Expressivism'. Of this
      > great current of life,
      > which flowed through all of nature, emerging in our
      > impulses (p.371), heard
      > as the voice within, Herder had proclaimed, man as a
      > conscious being had an
      > awareness of this current, bringing it to expression
      > (p.369). In this new
      > philosophy of nature, inner realization was
      > perceived of as a form of
      > expression. The inner voice defined what was
      > significant, and this
      > significance was made manifest in our being. While
      > one's face expressed one
      > 's feeling, one's thoughts were expressed in written
      > word or speech and one'
      > s vision of things, in a work of art, novel or play,
      > wherein this medium,
      > expression would include one's formulation of what
      > one wanted to say. In
      > this manner, one took a vision or sense of things, a
      > sense or vision, which
      > was unclear, only partly formed, and with expression
      > one had given it a
      > specific shape. Hence, our expression of a vision or
      > sense of things in a
      > given medium was a manifestation of the great
      > current of life, wherein
      > having been made manifest, as in given a specific
      > shape, it had been created
      > to be (p.374).
      > The idea of nature as an intrinsic source, Taylor
      > suggests, goes hand in
      > hand with an expressive view of human life, where
      > our lives are seen to be
      > an expression of the great current of life within
      > us, this current flowing
      > through all of nature. In fulfilling one's nature
      > one adopts the inner
      > voice or impulse, which makes what is hidden
      > manifest, this manifestation
      > giving recognition of the significance of one's
      > being, manifestation helping
      > to define what is to be realized. Taylor suggests we
      > can have no clear
      > understanding of direction in life prior to
      > manifestation and in realizing
      > our nature we need to give it some sense of
      > formulation. It is recognition
      > of this formulation, which gives our lives a
      > definitive shape. As expressive
      > creatures, we make manifest this great current of
      > life within us, this
      > manifestation empowering us to become all that we
      > could be. In this manner
      > the human life is seen as manifesting potential.
      > Given this understanding,
      > as Taylor suggests, the molding of this shape is not
      > merely a matter of
      > 'copying an external model' or opening out into an
      > 'already determinate
      > formulation', but rather our being would be seen to
      > be shaped by this
      > manifestation (p.375).
      > Taylor suggests this concept reflected a return in
      > force of biological
      > models of growth as against mechanistic models of
      > association. While Herder'
      > s articulation reflected Aristotle's notion of
      > nature actualising its
      > potential, unlike Aristotle who perceived this
      > actualisation as unfolding to
      > complete form, Herder perceived this actualisation
      > as the manifestation of
      > an inner power, a striving to realize itself
      > externally. In its modern
      > sense, this notion of expression is perceive of as
      > an articulation, which
      > both manifests and defines, this understanding also
      > reflected in the notion
      > of a self, as subject. As expressive creatures,
      > humans are capable of
      > self-articulation, manifesting and defining their
      > own sense of self,
      > creating it to be. Hence as Taylor points out,
      > Expressivism had given us a
      > new and fuller sense of individualization, for as
      > each human being
      > manifested and gave shape to his or her own being,
      > each human being was
      > different and original (p.375).
      > As each and every human being was different and
      > original, in originality,
      > each human being determined how they ought to live.
      > This notion of
      > individual differences was not in itself new.
      > However, as Taylor points out,
      > with this new and fuller sense of individualization,
      > the distinction between
      > differing individuals was not a matter of differing
      > variations in basic
      > human nature. Nor was it a matter of moral
      > differences, which defined good
      > and bad individuals. Rather in originality, each
      > human being manifested and
      > shaped their own nature in being, each treading a
      > differing path, a path
      > they ought to tread in order to have an authentic
      > experience of
      > being-in-the-world (p.375).
      > This self-determining of originality in nature,
      > where one followed one's own
      > path in the experience of being-in-the-world, was
      > also sanctioned by Pico
      > Della Mirandola in his articulation of "God's
      > address to Adam". For
      > "constrained by no limits, in accordance with thine
      > own free will.thee,
      > shalt ordain for thyself the limits of thy nature" -
      > ".to the end that
      > according to thy longing and according to thy
      > judgment thou mayest have and
      > possess..what form, what functions thou thyself
      > shalt desire". "..With
      > freedom of choice and with honour, as the maker and
      > molder of thyself, thou
      > mayest fashion thyself in whatever shape thou shalt
      > prefer" (pp.199-200).
      > However, human beings, in having manifested and
      > given shape to their own
      > being, were obligated to live up to their own
      > originality (p.375).
      > The voice of nature, as the great current of life
      > within us, had given the
      > possibilities for being in nature, the individual
      > manifesting and shaping
      > this possibility, creating it to be. As the
      > individual had taken this
      > possibility and created it to be, comprehension of
      > this being in nature
      > could not be fully known until it has been
      > articulated and defined. Only in
      > having come to be, could recognition be given to the
      > depths of this nature
      > one had created. In this manner, man had become
      > co-creator of his own
      > reality (p.376).
      > This expressive view of human life took on a
      > spiritual dimension,
      > creation/expression in life given pride of place.
      > With this new
      > understanding of originality and creativity,
      > artistic works were
      > reinterpreted. Art could no longer be defined in
      > traditional terms, as art
      > imitating reality. Rather a distinction had been
      > made between the empirical
      > reality, wherein human beings were set and a higher
      > reality of the Forms,
      > where the artist's work made manifest this higher
      > reality, bringing it to
      > realization (p.376-7).
      > The new valuation given to sentiments had given a
      > higher significance to its
      > expression, the purest form of expression perceived
      > of as having come from
      > the heart, the most natural form of heart felt
      > expression perceived as
      > reflected in poetry. In the latter half of the
      > eighteenth century many
      > embraced the primitivist sentiment expressed in
      > primitive poetry. However,
      > given the notion of nature as a source, this
      > expression of sentiment was
      > seen to go beyond its being merely an expression of
      > feeling. Rather poetry
      > was perceived of as the purest expression of
      > sentiment. For poets embracing
      > the significance of sentiment in their own inner
      > nature, made manifest moral
      > ideas, as spoken of by the voice within, the great
      > current of life, which
      > flowed through all of nature. The source of
      > inspiration was not only
      > perceived of in relation to one's nature within, but
      > rather as the whole of
      > nature, the great current of life or being the
      > cosmic dimension of
      > creativity. Hence, the artist and poet did not
      > imitate nature, but rather
      > imitated the author of nature, the great current of
      > life or being (p.377).
      > Herder proclaimed the artist to "become a creator
      > god", the soothsayer or
      > seer, where through art, the hidden in nature was
      > made manifest, revealed.
      > Shelly believed poetry expressed the unchanging form
      > of human nature
      > (p.378), Montaigne having also given thought to the
      > notion of unchanging
      > form, believing our true nature to be at the very
      > core of our being, this
      > core the permanent, stable, the unchanging (p.178).
      > Compared to this
      > unchanging form in human nature, the familiar world
      > in which we are set,
      > this familiarity defined by mere impressions,
      > appears as chaos. Yet
      > recognition of this unchanging form annihilates
      > these mere impressions in
      > the mind. This unchanging form made manifest in art
      > or poetry creates anew
      > the universe before us. Hence, as Shelly proclaimed,
      > "the poet strips away
      > the veil of familiarity" to expose the "naked and
      > sleeping beauty", the
      > spirit of its form (p.378).
      > However, as Taylor has pointed out, prior to this
      > spirit having been made
      > manifest in art or poetry, the artist or poet's
      > sense or vision is unclear,
      > only partly formed. The artist or poet needs to give
      > this spirit some sense
      > of formulation. Shelly perceived the artist or poet
      > to be the mediator of
      > spirituality to humans, where as Taylor suggests,
      > the vision of things
      > expressed in the poet or artist's work also includes
      > their formulation of
      > what they felt, of what they wanted to say. Hence,
      > the artist or poet had
      > given this spirit its shape. However, only after
      > having created this form to
      > be, is the revelation of this expression made clear,
      > recognition of this
      > formulation, having given its definitive shape.
      > Manifestation required
      > articulation, and given this understanding, of
      > crucial concern to writers
      > and artists of this period was the creative
      > imagination (p.378).
      > The latter half of the eighteenth century had seen a
      > distinction made
      > between reproductive imagination, as in reproducing
      > what one had
      > experienced, and creative imagination, which
      > captured the spirit of the
      > eternal, created and defined new forms. Coleridge
      > proclaimed reproductive
      > imagination to be mere playfulness, in opposition to
      > what he perceived as
      > real imagination, the living Power of all human
      > perception. In the act of
      > creation, the finite mind of man touched upon the
      > eternal, wherein embracing
      > the eternal man became the infinite I AM.
      > This power of creative imagination was attributed to
      > man himself, for this
      > manifesting of reality, creating new forms, had been
      > as a result of man's
      > articulation of unclear visions, only partly formed
      > (pp.378-9). In light of
      > this understanding, the Romantic period developed
      > its particular concept of
      > the symbol. The symbol provided a form of language,
      > this language allowing
      > man to have direct access to what would otherwise be
      > beyond the realm of his
      > comprehension. The symbol allowed what was expressed
      > in it to enter the
      > world. Schlegel believed the spirit of the infinite
      > could only be brought
      > into the world symbolically, as pictures and signs.
      > Hence, the symbol was
      > characterized by the translucence of the eternal
      > through and in the temporal
      > (pp.378-9).
      > The symbol could not be separated from what it
      > revealed, as the external
      > sign could be from its referent. While the symbol
      > expressed the eternal, the
      > eternal in the symbol, the symbol was also expressed
      > in the finite world of
      > forms. Therefore the symbol united the finite and
      > infinite, where ideally a
      > work of art gave a finite expression of the
      > infinite. The symbol allowed for
      > a complete interpretation of matter and form in a
      > work of art. Coleridge
      > proclaimed the perfect work of art, be it a
      > painting, sculpture or poem, to
      > be one, which had completely manifested the spirit
      > of the eternal, this Kant
      > perceiving as the aesthetic object manifesting an
      > order for which no
      > adequate concept could be found (pp.379-80).
      > No longer was acceptance given to the notion of
      > order perceived in the
      > cosmos. There was no 'ontic logos' affirming the
      > paradigm purposes for human
      > existence. Belief in notions of cosmic order, whose
      > nature could be
      > specified and understood independently, was also
      > gradually fading and many
      > had refuted the notion of a perfectly interlocking
      > order in nature itself
      > (p.380). As Taylor had previously pointed out, the
      > force of anti-Panglossian
      > objection, the rise of materialist views and
      > scientific discoveries had led
      > to its demise. Scientific discoveries had given a
      > new sense of cosmic time.
      > Man having gained a "real sense of geological time",
      > the immense time scale
      > in which the universe had evolved and the
      > cataclysmic changes, which had
      > occurred over aeons, where given this evidence, man
      > perceived the universe
      > as inhospitable (pp.349-50; p.380).
      > The Romantic notion of the great current of life or
      > being, which flowed
      > through all of nature, had developed from the Deist
      > notion of order in the
      > harmony of natures (p.380), where Pope portrayed the
      > Deist model of order as
      > a "Great Chain of Love- Combining all below and all
      > above" (pp.275-6). Pope
      > had perceived this harmony of ends to be poetically
      > expressed as love, the
      > thread of this notion of love having been traced
      > back through Shaftesbury
      > and Ficino, right back to its beginning in
      > Florentine Platonism, this thread
      > now having been interwoven in the Romantic vision of
      > nature (p.380).
      > However, while Pope believed love tied together an
      > order, this an
      > harmoniously functioning order of interconnected
      > mutual service, coherence
      > of order made evident in dispassionate reason,
      > Romantics believed the
      > principle of order was not exoterically available,
      > order in itself an
      > enigma. One could only have an understanding of
      > order in having participated
      > in it and one had to be initiated into love, drawn
      > into it, in order to see
      > it. Hence, the Deist notion of rationally evident
      > harmony of interests had
      > been redefined as a current of love or life. While
      > all of nature, including
      > man, bathed in this great current of life, this
      > current itself baffled man's
      > understanding. For given its continual flow man
      > stood not in the same water
      > twice (p.380).
      > Given the perpetual movement of order, the order of
      > things was not
      > exoterically available to be imitated in art.
      > Therefore, Romantics believed
      > it must be explored and made manifest. However, with
      > the decline of old
      > notions of order, linguistic terms defining meaning
      > were now obsolete and as
      > such Romantics perceived the need to develop a new
      > poetic language, Shelly
      > believing the poet must articulate his own world of
      > reference and make these
      > references believable. Hence, the Romantic poet was
      > to articulate an
      > original vision of the cosmos (pp. 380-81).
      > Taylor suggests both Wordsworth and Holderlin gave
      > descriptions of the
      > natural world, bringing to awareness something
      > through nature for which
      > there were no adequate words. These poems found the
      > words for us, whereas
      > such Shelly proclaimed, this something was defined,
      > created and made
      > manifest. The artist, Taylor suggests, reflected
      > this same understanding,
      > Friedrich, distancing himself from traditional
      > iconography, searched for the
      > symbolic in nature. He believed the forms of nature
      > would speak for
      > themselves. Hence, meaning was not to be found in a
      > pre-existing lexicon of
      > references, rather meaning was found in the work of
      > art itself (p.381).
      > Expounding upon the eighteenth century sense of
      > affinity between feeling and
      > nature, Herder's notion of "a great current of
      > sympathy", this current
      > running through all things in Nature, "everything
      > feeling itself and its
      > like, life reverberates to life", man bringing this
      > awareness to expression
      > (p.369), Friedrich proclaimed our feelings could
      > never be contrary to
      > nature. For Romantics perceived nature as the locus
      > of a great current of
      > life, where mysterious depth and potential force
      > were given to thoughts and
      > feelings, these thoughts and feelings emerging from
      > this great current
      > (p.349).
      > Kind regards
      > Elaine

      --Monte Morris
      Philosopher wannabe
      "Needs to find a good quote"

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