Re: [Sartre] Re: Atheism
- Joe, thanks for your comments...your points are well taken.
You are right: intellectual dishonesty is not limited to theists. I was just
making that point within the context of the discussion on religion.
A theist once accused me of taking an ego-centric view of man, of putting man
up on a pedestal in the absence of a god. I found that amusing, because, if
anything, I was actually doing the opposite. Who is really putting man on a
pedestal: someone who claims that man is a semi-divine creature with a soul
that will exist for all eternity, or someone who claims that man is simply an
animal with a highly developed brain, who dies and ceases to exist just like
all other animals (unless you believe that animals have eternal souls too!)?
Regarding my anti-Christian militancy....Ever notice how former smokers make
the most militant anti-smokers? I guess it's that way for me, since I was
once a devout Christian.
Just as a Catholic considers protestant churches to be watered down versions
of Christianity, and Hassidic Jews consider other Jews as watered down, so
too do I believe that Judeo/Christian forms of existentialism are watered
down versions of existentialism. I guess I'm with the Sartre/Heidegger camp.
Some say that Heidegger was a theist (he certainly wasn't as vocal on the
matter as Sartre), but his silence on the matter speaks volumes. He plods
through 500 pages in Being and Time with barely a mention of God (compare
with Kierkegaard, Buber, Marcel etc). Neitzche wrote that God is dead, and I
think Heidegger picks up from there and in effect proclaims the issue as
closed, irrelevant and unworthy of discussion (now THAT'S arrogance!).
Michael Inglwood, in his book on Heidegger wrote "There is no God in, above
or below Heidegger's world."
Still, I'm reminded of the old grafitti joke: "God is dead" -- Nietzche
"Nietzche is dead" -- God
[Non-text portions of this message have been removed]
- I suppose that everything is filter through our 'perceiving'
regardless of our 'receiving' it experiencially. We not only see, but
we interpret what we experience.
--- In Sartre@yahoogroups.com, "Mary Jo" <alcyon11@y...> wrote:
> I've observed that other than regarding objects, being in reality is
> totally contingent upon how we feel about it. In otherwords, our
> emotions are the constant definer concerning reality. Some 'facts',
> not necessarily 'artifacts', can be dismissed and can be regarded
> subjectively. There is an objective reality to be observed, but it is
> extremely fundamental, and everything built upon that foundation,
> i.e. people, society, etc. evolves into subjective fantasy. Mary Jo
> --- In Sartre@yahoogroups.com, "decker150" <decker150@y...> wrote:
> > Differentiating between a 'word', it's meaning, and the thing-in-
> itself to which the word and meaning refer; it seems to me that the
> > function of meaning is to 'direct our attention'. But a curious
> feature of 'attention' is that it can be either empirical or
> > The 'ontic condition' presents itself as an 'optic' experience
> which ispartl;y what we mean when we discuss empicisim. The
> > experience I have of reality is made possible because of the eyes
> in my head. I imagine that is why Phenomenology is not merely the
> > study of 'things-in-themself', but must necessarily deal
> with 'consciousness', that is, the knower behind the knowing. The
> > dychotomy presented by Descarte was both the 'cogitos' and
> the 'sum'; namely 'thinking' and 'being'.
> > Now, the use of words and their meaning become 'something extra'
> rather than primary. Philosophy is so much about 'using words'; it
> > is a language oriented task. So, we must return again and agin
> to 'the reality of being' which is where human beings are grounded.
> > is important to stay focused upon the factual/actual real world.
> Words merely direct our attention to what is there before the eye.
> > Now contemplation presents another form of attention, since we can
> close our eyes and direct our attention to meaning. But I think it
> > is important to say that meaning is not independent of 'Being', and
> here I seems to think that 'Being' is never anything different that
> > 'reality'.
> > Joe