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Re: [Sartre] is bad faith bad

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  • John Foster
    But Sarter writes in Being and Nothingness that all knowledge is intuition . If that is the case, then bad faith is not purely irrational because intuition
    Message 1 of 15 , Nov 6, 2002
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      But Sarter writes in Being and Nothingness that 'all knowledge is
      intuition'. If that is the case, then bad faith is not purely 'irrational'
      because intuition is not rational knowledge, at least in the 'concrete'
      instance of gaining knowledge via intution. Intuition is the 'consciousness'
      and 'awareness' of an entity (material and immaterial). Rationality is not
      intuitive knowledge. For instance when an inference is obtained, it is
      either a valid one or an invalid one based on governing criterion (outside
      standards of rationality).

      Inferential wisdom requires intuition by the senses and the sensibilities,
      but it is itself- that is, inferences- is a 'product' of logic which all
      animals are capable of. Bad faith may or may not arise from an invalid
      inference, and bad faith may arise from a valid inference. Having bad faith
      itself probably arises from an inability to 'realize an innate capability'.
      To reflect then, to have bad faith is not due to poor reasoning, but rather
      to a 'complex' in the sense that the subject is incapable of realizing their
      authentic capabilities, a grade of immaturity to say the least. This
      'complex' may in fact arise from social and cultural attributes of the
      'milieu' in which the subject developed his or her morality and judgement.
      The existentialist theme also indicates that 'anxiety' is the ground of bad
      faith which is itself an intuition regarding the innate capabilities of the
      subject not being realized. Thus good faith therefore is 'courage' as the
      ground of being in spite of the 'milieu' which is itself 'non-rational'
      because all value is 'felt' and known.

      Further despite the subject having knowledge, the reality is that the
      subject may not know even though the subject or self possesses knowledge.
      This should be self-evident since there are 'many experts in child care' but
      there is only one or two parents that can care for my child. This means that
      knowing and knowledge are separate ways of being in the world. Knowledge is
      a fluid, dynamic field which changes as time progresses. What was known
      about the physical world a century ago and most certainly 2 thousand years
      ago was considered 'contemporaneously' as 'adequate' has now for the most
      part been discarded by 'contemporaries' today. Still the knowledge that I
      have of my family, my son, in particularly is current as it can be, and not
      even Dr. S., who writes volumes on child care, who knows infinitely more
      than I do about child care, can know how to care for this child. The problem
      is 'epistemic' in the sense that what can be adequately expressed in
      language, special terms, and statistically is often 'generalized' and
      'abstracted'.

      The boundaries of knowledge are limited, whereas the boundaries of knowing
      are 'limitless' and 'infinite'. As Paul Tillich expressed, like Heidegger,
      non-being is 'felt' as 'anxiety', 'ultimacy' is counterpoised with
      'concreteness'. For example, I can rationally say that I will never know
      exactly what it feels like to be this 'other person' because of the obvious:
      I am not her. However I can 'empathize' and 'imagine' how it is to feel like
      this other person, and certainly can experience having the same knowlege as
      that other person when it comes to possessing knowledge of the 'exact
      sciences' and to a certain extent 'then humanities' simply because of
      language and mathematics (itself a language).

      The question of having 'interfaith' therefore is the question regarding
      being since knowing is not acquired through practice, nor through any
      technical means of approach toward the desired object (sensual, or abstract)
      but rather involves a 'new complex' of understanding (grace). To have faith
      therefore is not purely to have faith in oneself alone, but more expansive,
      and this means that faith (whether I want to predicate faith as good or bad
      is irrelevant); to have faith is to realize for the self, or for it self,
      the capacities for 'en(joi)ment'. The intuition of faith is thus an
      'exstacy' which is what happens 'concretely'. This is the 'freedom' to act
      for self only when the self is liberated from the boundage of limiting
      situations. To have faith is not to have 'mere' hope to realize the
      potential that is there in life, but to actualize this potential in self or
      for self.

      ----- Original Message -----
      From: "Christopher Bobo" <cbobo@...>
      To: <Sartre@yahoogroups.com>
      Sent: Wednesday, November 06, 2002 7:38 AM
      Subject: Re: [Sartre] is bad faith bad


      > This is an excellent point about bad faith in particular and Sartrean
      existentialism in general because it also entails the acceptance of another
      value, that is rationality. Bad faith, or lying to oneself, is only bad if
      we desire to be rational. If we are irrational, then bad faith would not be
      objectionable. Indeed, in Anti-Semite and Jew, Sartre suggests that what is
      wrong with bad faith is that it is irrational. Of course, the other
      argument is that Sartre does not mean for bad faith or rationality to
      function as absolute values. They are just the values that he has chosen.
      Everyone if free to choose for him or her self, and they can chose to live
      in bad faith and be irrational.
      >
      > Although I am no expert on post-modernism, it seems to me to go too far to
      assert that all post-modernists hold that no knowledge is possible, for not
      only do we seem to have a lot of knowledge (physics, astronomy, chemistry,
      biology, zoology, engineering, history, etc.), indeed more knowledge than
      any one person could absorb in a life time, the claim that we can have no
      knowledge is also illogical and self-contradictory. If it's true, then it's
      a piece of knowledge that we have, in which case the claim contradicts
      itself, and it also runs afoul of the problem of induction. If it's an
      empirical claim based on observation, then it can always turn out to
      unfounded and falsified by the next assertion, which may turn out to be true
      knowledge, in which case it is an overbroad generalization.
      > ----- Original Message -----
      > From: ncandau82
      > To: Sartre@yahoogroups.com
      > Sent: Wednesday, November 06, 2002 4:19 AM
      > Subject: [Sartre] is bad faith bad
      >
      >
      > I just wrote an interesting paper for a class discussing the actual
      > benefits and draw backs to Bad Faith. Sartre clearly believed that
      > Bad Faith was bad as he named it as such. However, in a system where
      > good and bad are expressly defined by the individual, how can he
      > make this call? What criteria is he using to judge what is good and
      > bad?
      >
      > Do you guys think Bad Faith is bad?
      >
      > Consider: Nietzsche, Foucault & Modern Postmodernists have asserted
      > that we can have no knowledge due to the limitations of language and
      > of our senses. Sartre agreed to some extent as he is quoted as
      > saying "My words steal my thoughts from me". Once accepted that we
      > can have no knowlege, all we are left with is beliefs, and according
      > to one of Sartre's interpretations of Patterns of Bad Faith, all
      > beliefs are examples of Bad Faith (Being and Nothingness, pp. 105-
      > 113)
      >
      > [Non-text portions of this message have been removed]
      >
      >
      >
      > To unsubscribe, e-mail: Sartre-unsubscribe@yahoogroups.com
      >
      >
      > Your use of Yahoo! Groups is subject to http://docs.yahoo.com/info/terms/
      >
      >
      >
    • John Foster
      Heidegger wrote that truth is the revelatory essence of Being , and that quote should also be easily understood. Each entity which reveals itself (the
      Message 2 of 15 , Nov 6, 2002
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        Heidegger wrote that 'truth is the revelatory essence of Being', and that
        quote should also be easily understood. Each entity which reveals itself
        (the phenomenon) is itself a truth. Thus an hallucination, just as much as
        an 'imaginary being' in the fantasy of fiction, is a phenomenon which is
        'situated' within a seperate domain of understanding: the imagination.

        In the ecology of ''truth" we thus are presented with 'disclosure' and
        'concealment' in such fashion as to reveal a 'stream of consciousness' as
        each entity is born (presents), develops (enfloresces), and finally senesces
        (absents). Each entity in fact is composed of a multitude of other enties at
        the level of life, biotically. Certainly the 'truth' is the 'witnessing' of
        a phenomenon' but it is still more than that because of 'retention' or
        'memory' which is may be either collective of singular (hence the
        imagination versus the stadia)....Can faith therefore be bad? Only if it is
        situated on shaky ground, and that is to situate faith of 'mere' hope.
        Faith without the 'recognition' is 'bad' in the relative sense....because
        the recognition of potential capabilities in self is 'good faith'.

        jf



        ----- Original Message -----
        From: "decker150" <decker150@...>
        To: <Sartre@yahoogroups.com>
        Sent: Wednesday, November 06, 2002 7:57 AM
        Subject: [Sartre] Re: is bad faith bad?


        > But Sartre wrote with a sense of certianty, he wrote as if his
        > thoughts could be attested to, and in some way, certified as valid.
        > I think the questions comes back to 'what is truth?' Is there such
        > a thing as truth? Heidegger spents some times on this subject and
        > more or less suggested that truth lies in the realm of the phenomenal
        > world as that which shows itself as itself, as a disclosure. Truth is
        > in the unconcealment, within the disclosure. The assertions,
        > statements we make in the form of discourse (logos) is not the 'place'
        > of truth. The locus of truth lies in the primordial ground of being;
        > within the phenomenon. The assertion are merely indicators and point
        > the way to that revealed truth, which shows-itself-in-itself (is
        > self-evident) as manifested. If you question the validity of this
        > source as the truth; treat it instead as if it is only some illusion,
        > then perhaps there is no reliable 'place' of truth.
        >
        > Many people today see the phenomenal world like the movie Matrix;
        > reality is just an illusion; which is just a superstituous as
        > believing the whole world is generated by hidden spiritual forces
        > behind the scenes; like some spiritual / star trek hollogram; that
        > conceals the reality of undetectable controls.
        >
        > Existentialism is a realism. Truth is 'the reality of everything
        > unconcealed'. Science and technology today demonstrates it's power
        > to disclose those truths. But philosophy as apophantic speech, also
        > works to make manifest the phenomenal structure of being. Philosophy
        > struggles to reveal truth. And I cannot imagine anyone making any
        > claims at all if they thought everything is an illusion.
        >
        > Joe
        >
        > --- In Sartre@y..., "ncandau82" <ncandau@h...> wrote:
        > > I just wrote an interesting paper for a class discussing the actual
        > > benefits and draw backs to Bad Faith. Sartre clearly believed that
        > > Bad Faith was bad as he named it as such. However, in a system where
        > > good and bad are expressly defined by the individual, how can he
        > > make this call? What criteria is he using to judge what is good and
        > > bad?
        > >
        > > Do you guys think Bad Faith is bad?
        > >
        > > Consider: Nietzsche, Foucault & Modern Postmodernists have asserted
        > > that we can have no knowledge due to the limitations of language and
        > > of our senses. Sartre agreed to some extent as he is quoted as
        > > saying "My words steal my thoughts from me". Once accepted that we
        > > can have no knowlege, all we are left with is beliefs, and according
        > > to one of Sartre's interpretations of Patterns of Bad Faith, all
        > > beliefs are examples of Bad Faith (Being and Nothingness, pp. 105-
        > > 113)
        >
        >
        >
        > To unsubscribe, e-mail: Sartre-unsubscribe@yahoogroups.com
        >
        >
        > Your use of Yahoo! Groups is subject to http://docs.yahoo.com/info/terms/
        >
        >
        >
      • Christopher Bobo
        Josh: What does Should is refuted with in order to. The nihilist position on rationality seems to be that it is favored because (ceteris paribus) it is
        Message 3 of 15 , Nov 6, 2002
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          Josh:
          What does ""'Should' is refuted with in order to."
          The nihilist position on rationality seems to be
          that it is favored because (ceteris paribus)
          it is more effective toward irrationality in
          acheiving (real) ends." mean? I think I must have missed something.
          Are you saying that rationality is favored because it is more effective in achieving ends than irrationality?

          ----- Original Message -----
          From: Josh@...
          To: Sartre@yahoogroups.com
          Sent: Wednesday, November 06, 2002 9:12 AM
          Subject: Fwd: Re: [Sartre] is bad faith bad


          As self-appointed liason with the Nihilist group,
          I should, again, mention that Nietzsche (since
          someone else brough him up this time) said
          "'Should' is refuted with in order to."
          The nihilist position on rationality seems to be
          that it is favored because (ceteris paribus)
          it is more effective toward irrationality in
          acheiving (real) ends.
          I consider it at least implicit in the existentialist
          canon that the acheivment of real ends is "good"
          at least as compared to the inability to acheive them,
          or as compared to the acheivement of unreal ends.
          Whether the ends acheived are "good" is not entirely
          the same issue.
          I suspect that this group and the nihilist group
          may diverge on this last point.

          ---- Original message ----
          >Date: Wed, 6 Nov 2002 07:38:46 -0800
          >From: "Christopher Bobo" <cbobo@...>
          >Subject: Re: [Sartre] is bad faith bad
          >To: <Sartre@yahoogroups.com>
          >
          >This is an excellent point about bad faith in particular
          and Sartrean existentialism in general because it also
          entails the acceptance of another value, that is
          rationality. Bad faith, or lying to oneself, is only bad if
          we desire to be rational. If we are irrational, then bad
          faith would not be objectionable. Indeed, in Anti-Semite
          and Jew, Sartre suggests that what is wrong with bad faith
          is that it is irrational. Of course, the other argument is
          that Sartre does not mean for bad faith or rationality to
          function as absolute values. They are just the values that
          he has chosen. Everyone if free to choose for him or her
          self, and they can chose to live in bad faith and be
          irrational.
          >
          >Although I am no expert on post-modernism, it seems to me
          to go too far to assert that all post-modernists hold that
          no knowledge is possible, for not only do we seem to have a
          lot of knowledge (physics, astronomy, chemistry, biology,
          zoology, engineering, history, etc.), indeed more knowledge
          than any one person could absorb in a life time, the claim
          that we can have no knowledge is also illogical and self-
          contradictory. If it's true, then it's a piece of knowledge
          that we have, in which case the claim contradicts itself,
          and it also runs afoul of the problem of induction. If it's
          an empirical claim based on observation, then it can always
          turn out to unfounded and falsified by the next assertion,
          which may turn out to be true knowledge, in which case it is
          an overbroad generalization.
          > ----- Original Message -----
          > From: ncandau82
          > To: Sartre@yahoogroups.com
          > Sent: Wednesday, November 06, 2002 4:19 AM
          > Subject: [Sartre] is bad faith bad
          >
          >
          > I just wrote an interesting paper for a class discussing
          the actual
          > benefits and draw backs to Bad Faith. Sartre clearly
          believed that
          > Bad Faith was bad as he named it as such. However, in a
          system where
          > good and bad are expressly defined by the individual, how
          can he
          > make this call? What criteria is he using to judge what
          is good and
          > bad?
          >
          > Do you guys think Bad Faith is bad?
          >


          [Non-text portions of this message have been removed]
        • Marc Girod
          ... JF bad faith is not purely irrational because intuition is not JF rational knowledge Is this assumption rational? Rationality can only be *bounded*
          Message 4 of 15 , Nov 6, 2002
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            >>>>> "JF" == John Foster <borealis@...> writes:

            JF> bad faith is not purely 'irrational' because intuition is not
            JF> rational knowledge

            Is this assumption rational?
            Rationality can only be *bounded* rationality, i.e. rationality which
            admits its own limits, and takes them into consideration when making
            choices. Intuition is thus not a priori irrational either.

            --
            Marc Girod P.O. Box 323 Voice: +358-71 80 25581
            Nokia NBI 00045 NOKIA Group Mobile: +358-50 38 78415
            Takomo 1 / 4c27 Finland Fax: +358-71 80 61604
          • John Foster
            ... From: Marc Girod To: Sent: Wednesday, November 06, 2002 10:38 PM Subject: Re: [Sartre] is bad faith
            Message 5 of 15 , Nov 7, 2002
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              Comments below:
              ----- Original Message -----
              From: "Marc Girod" <girod@...>
              To: <Sartre@yahoogroups.com>
              Sent: Wednesday, November 06, 2002 10:38 PM
              Subject: Re: [Sartre] is bad faith bad


              > >>>>> "JF" == John Foster <borealis@...> writes:
              >
              > JF> bad faith is not purely 'irrational' because intuition is not
              > JF> rational knowledge
              >
              > Is this assumption rational?
              > Rationality can only be *bounded* rationality, i.e. rationality which
              > admits its own limits, and takes them into consideration when making
              > choices. Intuition is thus not a priori irrational either.

              There is a difference between 'non-rational' and 'irrational'. We are
              generally in agreement about what is rational, and irrational. The
              'non-rational' however 'may be rational' but human reason is not able to
              fathom the extent of the non-rational, nor fully understand the
              non-rational. Rationality is 'bound' by 'mind forged manacles' and the
              'heart has reasons which the mind knows nothing about'. (Blake and Pascal,
              respectively).

              Intuition is prior to reason since what is intuited by sensibility and the
              senses is 'there' regardless of any inferences, and causality, and so on.
              The tree that grows in my back yard is the same tree that grew there last
              year. Reason is not 'operative' in this 'disclosure' ...only 'image' and
              'retention' mediated by the senses of sight, smell and unmediated to a large
              extent by taste is operating. The non-rational element is there suffused
              with the rational understanding about the trees being (physiology, ecology,
              culturing of the species), i.e. logos). Rationality is 'invisible' while the
              non-rational is 'visible'. So the intermediary, say a science, for instance,
              is a form of 'objectivity in parenthesis'.

              The irrational is 'counter' to rationality, something that does not make
              'sense' at least in terms of causality, inexplicable, et cetera. Irrational
              man is the 'experience' to some extent of an anxiety or non-being, and as
              the absence of presence. Camus, and others write about the 'absurd' and the
              absurd has a mathematic definition. The absurd is the 'irrational'
              'operation' the also is 'illogical'.

              The calculative intellect cannot bring into existence a real tree such as
              the tree in my back yard, even if all the scientists and tree physiologists
              in existence collaborated together to produce one. They still have to work
              with a living tree, and it's DNA. Only intuition, a primitive intuition can
              produce a real tree or even produce an image of a real tree in the memory.

              It is quite indisputable that all knowledge is 'primarily intuition'
              [Sartre, Kant, Cassirer].

              In contrast to logos there is sophia. One being the 'structure of existing
              or past forms' and the other being the 'new reality to come' which is to
              produce new forms, and this is where 'transphenomenality' enters, good
              faith, etc.

              chao

              john







              >
              > --
              > Marc Girod P.O. Box 323 Voice: +358-71 80 25581
              > Nokia NBI 00045 NOKIA Group Mobile: +358-50 38 78415
              > Takomo 1 / 4c27 Finland Fax: +358-71 80 61604
              >
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              >
              >
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              >
              >
              >
            • Marc Girod
              ... JF bad faith is not purely irrational because intuition is not JF rational knowledge JF There is a difference between non-rational and irrational .
              Message 6 of 15 , Nov 9, 2002
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                >>>>> "JF" == John Foster <borealis@...> writes:

                JF> bad faith is not purely 'irrational' because intuition is not
                JF> rational knowledge

                JF> There is a difference between 'non-rational' and 'irrational'.

                Er... well yes, so? In what does it affect my comment on your
                sentence: "intuition is not rational knowledge"?

                I was saying that in many cases, intuition *is* "rational knowledge",
                especially in the absence of other "rational knowledge".

                JF> Rationality is 'bound' by 'mind forged manacles'

                I keep getting corrected on this 'bounded', although I just use it
                after Herbert Simon, in his /The Sciences of the Artificial/, e.g.

                [The Prisoner's Dilemma game] p 46
                ...each player has a choice between two moves, one cooperative
                and one aggressive.
                ...if players are striving for a *satisfactory* rather than
                *optimal* payoff, the cooperative solution may be stable even
                for finite repetition of the game. Insofar as this result can be
                generalized, bounded rationality appears to produce better
                outcomes than unbounded rationality in this kind of competitive
                situation.

                JF> and the 'heart has reasons which the mind knows nothing about'.
                JF> (Blake and Pascal, respectively).

                But Pascal (I cannot say for Blake) definitively had a classical, and
                now obsolete, conception of "reason" and the "mind", anticipating on
                people like Laplace and Hilbert, and thus being modern in his time,
                but completely blind (not everybody can be a prophet) to the
                conclusions of Gödel and Turing (and Simon).

                However, *we* live (and Sartre lived) in post-Gödelian world, and thus
                should know about the bounds to rationality.

                --
                Marc Girod P.O. Box 323 Voice: +358-71 80 25581
                Nokia NBI 00045 NOKIA Group Mobile: +358-50 38 78415
                Takomo 1 / 4c27 Finland Fax: +358-71 80 61604
              • Christopher Bobo
                John seems to forget what Descartes pointed out--namely, that intuition is not enough. Intuition can be mistaken. Just because we have and intuition of
                Message 7 of 15 , Nov 9, 2002
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                  John seems to forget what Descartes pointed out--namely, that intuition is not enough. Intuition can be mistaken. Just because we have and intuition of something does not meant that it is true or correct. As Descartes pointed out, one's intuitions can be wrong on a monstrous scale. There are intuitions and then there are intuitions. Whether Descartes was right or wrong, he thought that intuitions that were clearly and distinctly perceived were more likely to be true and of those clear and distinct intuitions, Cogito ergo sum was the one indubitable intuition from which he could build a true philosophy. Sartre agreed with Descartes on these points. So, not only does Sartre not think that all intuitions are equal, but he clearly aligns himself with rationalists.
                  ----- Original Message -----
                  From: Marc Girod
                  To: Sartre@yahoogroups.com
                  Sent: Saturday, November 09, 2002 5:34 AM
                  Subject: Re: [Sartre] is bad faith bad


                  >>>>> "JF" == John Foster <borealis@...> writes:

                  JF> bad faith is not purely 'irrational' because intuition is not
                  JF> rational knowledge

                  JF> There is a difference between 'non-rational' and 'irrational'.

                  Er... well yes, so? In what does it affect my comment on your
                  sentence: "intuition is not rational knowledge"?

                  I was saying that in many cases, intuition *is* "rational knowledge",
                  especially in the absence of other "rational knowledge".

                  JF> Rationality is 'bound' by 'mind forged manacles'

                  I keep getting corrected on this 'bounded', although I just use it
                  after Herbert Simon, in his /The Sciences of the Artificial/, e.g.

                  [The Prisoner's Dilemma game] p 46
                  ...each player has a choice between two moves, one cooperative
                  and one aggressive.
                  ...if players are striving for a *satisfactory* rather than
                  *optimal* payoff, the cooperative solution may be stable even
                  for finite repetition of the game. Insofar as this result can be
                  generalized, bounded rationality appears to produce better
                  outcomes than unbounded rationality in this kind of competitive
                  situation.

                  JF> and the 'heart has reasons which the mind knows nothing about'.
                  JF> (Blake and Pascal, respectively).

                  But Pascal (I cannot say for Blake) definitively had a classical, and
                  now obsolete, conception of "reason" and the "mind", anticipating on
                  people like Laplace and Hilbert, and thus being modern in his time,
                  but completely blind (not everybody can be a prophet) to the
                  conclusions of Gödel and Turing (and Simon).

                  However, *we* live (and Sartre lived) in post-Gödelian world, and thus
                  should know about the bounds to rationality.



                  [Non-text portions of this message have been removed]
                • John Foster
                  Christopher and all, this depends on what type of intuition it is that is experienced. Mathematics depends on symbolic intuition , but not solely of course.
                  Message 8 of 15 , Nov 9, 2002
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                    Christopher and all,

                    this depends on what 'type' of intuition it is that is experienced.
                    Mathematics depends on 'symbolic intuition', but not solely of course. As
                    far as math is concerned then, there is that debate whether math is
                    primarily intuitive or not.

                    I think that Descartes is correct generally; however it also correct that
                    without logic, an intuition is pure data. There can be no information nor
                    knowlege without some structure to organize that data and information into a
                    coherent body of knowledge.

                    I further believe that an intuition is a complex phenomenon. An intuition is
                    very much like what might occur when Sartre refers to as
                    'transphenomenality' (albeit a higher grade of intuition than a primitive
                    intuition), where the object intuited takes on meaning, and is transformed
                    by the perceiver. The object which is perceived appears immediately as an
                    intuition (often named and classified - this could be my ideation
                    transferring meaning to the object whether it is my own feelings or moods or
                    a landscape). What is perceived as a primary illusion, in the sense of the
                    appearance of an emotion, is not a pure emotion, but rather a feeling about
                    something external or internal (perhaps the absence of my friend). What is
                    also perceived as secondary illusion is the unique sense of elation or
                    bewilderment apon listening to a jazz theme. Because the phenomenon of the
                    intuition is often 'felt' as a feeling, there can be no true transference
                    from the object which has this or that illusion for me and others. The
                    melody can thus be played differently by different instruments, different
                    arrangements and different styles depending the players, and the mood of the
                    listener.

                    For instance there is only one full moon each month ( except during blue
                    moons), and there is only one moon. There are perhaps a trillion sentient
                    creatures that have feelings about the moon, however; each creature will
                    have the same primary intuition: a circular bright object revolving in the
                    skies, but each sentient creature will also have a different secondary
                    intuition. The neolithic person will have a different intuition (or feeling)
                    than will the modern astronomist.

                    There are two features within the 'transphenomenal' object called the moon.
                    One is factual, material, and that refers to aactual image on the retina, or
                    camera lens and film, and the one that is active in the 'limbic' system
                    where emotions originate. It is when the transphenomena are retained by
                    memory or recorded somehow that further ideations occur.

                    Descartes is correct in general but there are fundamental grades of
                    intuition: the symbolic, the primitive, and many others, perhaps, such as
                    creative intuition. Reason and logic as phenomenon are rather 'invisible' in
                    that logic and reason can be exercised but it is extremely difficult and
                    probably impossible to explain or analyze what is reason and logic is. This
                    why there debate regarding the existence of mathematics is so interesting:
                    did math (formal logic) arise from intuition or was it a pure form that only
                    one species has as an inherited trait. Certainly if I was Pythagoras, I
                    would agree that math is a pure form, that could not arise from any
                    observation of nature.

                    jf

                    ----- Original Message -----
                    From: "Christopher Bobo" <cbobo@...>
                    To: <Sartre@yahoogroups.com>
                    Sent: Saturday, November 09, 2002 10:37 AM
                    Subject: Re: [Sartre] is bad faith bad


                    John seems to forget what Descartes pointed out--namely, that intuition is
                    not enough. Intuition can be mistaken. Just because we have and intuition
                    of something does not meant that it is true or correct. As Descartes
                    pointed out, one's intuitions can be wrong on a monstrous scale. There are
                    intuitions and then there are intuitions. Whether Descartes was right or
                    wrong, he thought that intuitions that were clearly and distinctly perceived
                    were more likely to be true and of those clear and distinct intuitions,
                    Cogito ergo sum was the one indubitable intuition from which he could build
                    a true philosophy. Sartre agreed with Descartes on these points. So, not
                    only does Sartre not think that all intuitions are equal, but he clearly
                    aligns himself with rationalists.
                    ----- Original Message -----
                    From: Marc Girod
                    To: Sartre@yahoogroups.com
                    Sent: Saturday, November 09, 2002 5:34 AM
                    Subject: Re: [Sartre] is bad faith bad


                    >>>>> "JF" == John Foster <borealis@...> writes:

                    JF> bad faith is not purely 'irrational' because intuition is not
                    JF> rational knowledge

                    JF> There is a difference between 'non-rational' and 'irrational'.

                    Er... well yes, so? In what does it affect my comment on your
                    sentence: "intuition is not rational knowledge"?

                    I was saying that in many cases, intuition *is* "rational knowledge",
                    especially in the absence of other "rational knowledge".

                    JF> Rationality is 'bound' by 'mind forged manacles'

                    I keep getting corrected on this 'bounded', although I just use it
                    after Herbert Simon, in his /The Sciences of the Artificial/, e.g.

                    [The Prisoner's Dilemma game] p 46
                    ...each player has a choice between two moves, one cooperative
                    and one aggressive.
                    ...if players are striving for a *satisfactory* rather than
                    *optimal* payoff, the cooperative solution may be stable even
                    for finite repetition of the game. Insofar as this result can be
                    generalized, bounded rationality appears to produce better
                    outcomes than unbounded rationality in this kind of competitive
                    situation.

                    JF> and the 'heart has reasons which the mind knows nothing about'.
                    JF> (Blake and Pascal, respectively).

                    But Pascal (I cannot say for Blake) definitively had a classical, and
                    now obsolete, conception of "reason" and the "mind", anticipating on
                    people like Laplace and Hilbert, and thus being modern in his time,
                    but completely blind (not everybody can be a prophet) to the
                    conclusions of Gödel and Turing (and Simon).

                    However, *we* live (and Sartre lived) in post-Gödelian world, and thus
                    should know about the bounds to rationality.



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                  • Marc Girod
                    ... JF Certainly if I was Pythagoras, I would agree that math is a pure JF form, that could not arise from any observation of nature. And for a more recent
                    Message 9 of 15 , Nov 11, 2002
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                      >>>>> "JF" == John Foster <borealis@...> writes:

                      JF> Certainly if I was Pythagoras, I would agree that math is a pure
                      JF> form, that could not arise from any observation of nature.

                      And for a more recent and different opinion, may I recommend:

                      /Where Mathematics Comes From/
                      How the Embodied Mind Brings Mathematics into Being
                      George Lakoff and Rafael N��ez
                      Basic Books 2000

                      --
                      Marc Girod P.O. Box 323 Voice: +358-71 80 25581
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                    • Tommy Beavitt
                      ... This is an interesting point you have pulled out of Anti-Semite and Jew, Chris. I tend to agree with Sarte about this. For this point to be true do the
                      Message 10 of 15 , Nov 11, 2002
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                        At 7:38 am -0800 6/11/02, Christopher Bobo wrote:
                        > Indeed, in Anti-Semite and Jew, Sartre suggests that what is wrong
                        >with bad faith is that it is irrational.

                        This is an interesting point you have pulled out of Anti-Semite and
                        Jew, Chris. I tend to agree with Sarte about this.

                        For this point to be true do "the Jews" not have to be a minority in
                        the specific cultural context within which the discussion is taking
                        place?

                        Tommy
                      • Christopher Bobo
                        I m sorry, but please remind me. What is the connection between bad faith, mathematics and the observation of nature. As for mathematics, I would have
                        Message 11 of 15 , Nov 11, 2002
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                          I'm sorry, but please remind me. What is the connection between bad faith,
                          mathematics and the observation of nature. As for mathematics, I would have
                          thought that it began in connection with agriculture--counting the numbers
                          of bushels of wheat, barrels of apples, etc hauled in at harvest time.
                          Isn't ancient history replete with examples of ancient Mesopotamian and
                          Egyptians accounting for dates and bottles of beer. Of course, geometry is
                          useful in building and dividing plots of land.


                          ----- Original Message -----
                          From: "Marc Girod" <girod@...>
                          To: <Sartre@yahoogroups.com>
                          Sent: Monday, November 11, 2002 12:57 AM
                          Subject: Re: [Sartre] is bad faith bad


                          >>>>> "JF" == John Foster <borealis@...> writes:

                          JF> Certainly if I was Pythagoras, I would agree that math is a pure
                          JF> form, that could not arise from any observation of nature.

                          And for a more recent and different opinion, may I recommend:

                          /Where Mathematics Comes From/
                          How the Embodied Mind Brings Mathematics into Being
                          George Lakoff and Rafael Núñez
                          Basic Books 2000
                        • Christopher Bobo
                          Well, one thing that Sartre says about Anti-X hatred is that it is something that is both false and dangerous. What s objectionable about such views is not so
                          Message 12 of 15 , Nov 11, 2002
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                            Well, one thing that Sartre says about Anti-X hatred is that it is something that is both false and dangerous. What's objectionable about such views is not so much that they are directed at minorities, but that they constitute "a doctrine that is aimed directly at particular persons and that seeks to suppress their rights or to exterminate them". Anti-X hatred is based on physical characteristics, dress, birth, "and, so they say, by his character." But what Sartre seems to emphasize is that Anti-X hatred should not be tolerated under the right to hold free opinions, is because it is not an idea--it is a passion masquerading as an idea.

                            Consider this remarkable comment from Sartre which is suggests is something that a "moderate anti-Semite" say: "Personally, I do not detest the Jews. I simply find it preferable, for various reasons, that they should play a lesser part in the activity of the nation." Today, the moderate Anti-American might say "Personally, I do not detest the Americans. I simply find it preferable, for a variety of reasons, that they should play a lesser part in the activity of the world."

                            But, Sartre points out, a moment latter, "if you have gained his confidence, he will add with more abandon: "You see, there must be something about the Jews; they upset me physically." So, too, I can easily imagine the anti-American voices the same comment. No, doubt he'll go on to say something about the American's that have also been said about the Jews--they're isolationists, greedy, arrogant, standoffish, loud, unkempt, brash, crass, lacking taste, devious and controlling. The parallels go on and on.

                            I suppose in this sense, one can see how anti-Semitism and anti-Americanism are both forms of bad faith in that those who adhere to these views end up deceiving themselves about other people or order to sustain their irrational passion.

                            ----- Original Message -----
                            From: Tommy Beavitt
                            To: Sartre@yahoogroups.com
                            Sent: Monday, November 11, 2002 1:45 AM
                            Subject: Re: [Sartre] is bad faith bad


                            At 7:38 am -0800 6/11/02, Christopher Bobo wrote:
                            > Indeed, in Anti-Semite and Jew, Sartre suggests that what is wrong
                            >with bad faith is that it is irrational.

                            This is an interesting point you have pulled out of Anti-Semite and
                            Jew, Chris. I tend to agree with Sarte about this.

                            For this point to be true do "the Jews" not have to be a minority in
                            the specific cultural context within which the discussion is taking
                            place?

                            Tommy


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