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FWD: Re: RE: "WHAT IS DASEIN REALLY", or, "The Animal in Me"

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  • Gary Moore
    ... From: Gary Moore To: heidegger@lists.village.virginia.edu Sent: May 29, 2000 5:40:39 PM GMT Subject: Re: RE: WHAT IS DASEIN REALLY ,
    Message 1 of 1 , May 29, 2000
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      ------Original Message------
      From: Gary Moore <gottlos45@...>
      To: heidegger@...
      Sent: May 29, 2000 5:40:39 PM GMT
      Subject: Re: RE: "WHAT IS DASEIN REALLY", or, "The Animal in Me"

      ------Original Message------

      From: Thom <beingthere@...>
      To: heidegger@...
      Sent: April 26, 2000 4:36:39 PM GMT
      Subject: Re: RE:" What is dasein really?"

      THIS IS FOR ANYBODY TO REPLY TO. Especially Rene de Bakker: �fiery
      cross�?�correction: �fiery sword????!!!!!!! and Henk van Tuijl. Is there
      something about the Netherlands where such gracious and fascinating people
      can live? This comes from one expert in clumsiness, and proud of it. �Call
      me Caliban.� But I do appreciate fine people. Criticisms welcomed as I may
      send this to an old professor of mine, especially anything that provides
      better quotations, or points out my obvious naivete. One discovers
      interesting things being na�ve. I love quotations, I love expanding my
      references, there is nothing too outlandish. One discovers the most valuable
      things in the strangest places. I will not be embarrassed. (Which is a
      dangerous thing to say: Someone a long time ago took me up on that literally
      and embarrassed the hell out of me�but I learned a lot.) I truly would like
      to improve this jumble.
      On Wed, 26 April 2000, Gary Moore wrote:

      > This is referring to Mr. Thom Whitby's letter of Apr.22, 1:40AM
      > You state, ". . . That Dasein may really be that which is specifically
      human about human intelligence . . ."
      >>On the one hand, it might seem you are going in the wrong direction if
      Heidegger really indicates a �higher� purpose to dasein, as when he says,
      (The) destiny (of) as ek-sisting has to guard the truth of Being. Man is the
      shepherd of Being. It is in this direction alone that Being and Time is
      thinking when ecstatic existence is experienced as �care�. (Heidegger,
      �Letter on Humanism�, trans. Capuzzi & Gray from Basic Writings ed. Krell,
      Harper-Collins, 1993 revised, pg. 234)
      So the point is that in the determination of the humanity of man as
      ek-sistence what is essential is not man but Being�as the dimension of the
      ecstasis of ek-sistence (Ibid. pg. 237)
      What counts is humanitas in the service of the truth of Being . . . (Ibid.
      pg. 254)
      But on the other hand, Heidegger seems very concerned throughout the
      �Letter on Humanism� that his rejection of humanism does not lead to the
      inhuman but to the humane:
      Where else does �care� tend but in the direction of bringing man back to his
      essence? What else does that in turn betoken but that man (homo) become
      human (humanus)? Thus humanitas really does remain the concern of such
      thinking. For this is humanism: meditating and caring, that man be human and
      not inhumane, �inhuman,� that is, outside his essence. (Ibid. pg. 223-224)
      Then, again, when Heidegger talks about �human essence�, he means �what is
      essential is not man but Being� precisely and literally. �Being�, then,
      either must be �something� very �human�, (but this still means taking
      humanitas in one direction or another, literally, and not staying where you
      are), or it is inhuman after all (in the sense that the ordinary
      understanding of the present-at-hand concept �human� falls apart completely
      and altogether). � . . . Being itself is essentially finite and reveals
      itself only in the transcendence of Dasein which is held out into the
      nothing� (Heidegger, �What is Metaphysics,� from Basic Writings, ed. &
      trans. by Krell, Harper Collins, 1993 revised, pg. 108). Are there then two
      finitudes within dasein? On the one hand there is �man�, and on the other
      hand, there is �Being�? Dasein also is finite. Would it not be simpler and
      more factual to say �Sein� and �Dasein� are simply two aspects of the same
      project, �being� and �there�, project and world, all comprehended in one?
      The word �human� merely provides a �formal indication� of a very broad
      direction in which to search with a question that may very well never
      �have�, possess an answer. That opens up what �human� is
      The necessary question for a laying of the ground for metaphysics, namely,
      that of what man is, is taken over by the metaphysics of Dasein . . . The
      Metaphysics of Dasein is not just metaphysics about Dasein, but is the
      metaphysics which occurs necessarily as Dasein. But for that reason: it can
      never become metaphysics �about� Dasein, as for example zoology is about
      animals. The Metaphysics of Dasein is no fixed and ready-for-use �organon�
      at all. It must always be built up anew amid the transformation of its idea
      in the working-out of the possibility of metaphysics. (Heidegger, Kant and
      the Problem of Metaphysics, trans. Taft, Indiana University Press, 1990, pg.
      � . . . The metaphysics which occurs necessarily as Dasein� . . . �amid the
      transformation of its idea� means �a transformation of Dasein occurs�
      Solitude ((�solitude� is �Einsamkeit�!, NOT �Vereinzelung�, i.e.,
      �individuation� which Heidegger uses most often inside the text)), trans.
      McNeill & Walker, Indiana University Press, 1995, pg. 299). �Essence� is
      defined by Heidegger as �a way to be�, and he means this literally to avoid
      any present at hand concept of ordinary understanding. And metaphysics as
      such must remain an open question if it is to retain �the working out� of
      its �possibility� as �it must always be built up anew�. It is a irrevocable
      part of the history of �each person�s� unique, ownmost dasein, and is not
      something refuted, bypassed, become out of date or fashion, superceded, or
      even outgrown because that would mean outgrowing the meaning of language
      which would also be the outgrowing of the meaning of being. Such refutation
      and oblivion would be the same as a tree without earth, without roots, and
      without trunk. Philosophy would then be meaningless branches and leaves
      scattered about.
      We have seen that logos, ratio, reason, is what has dominated the entire
      problematic of metaphysics precisely with respect to the problem of world
      which failed to come to light. If we wish to free ourselves from this
      tradition in one respect, then this does not mean somehow pushing it aside
      and leaving it behind us. Rather all liberation from something is genuine
      only when it masters and appropriates whatever it is liberating itself from.
      Liberation from the tradition is an ever new appropriation of its newly
      recognized strengths. (Fundamental Concepts, Ger. 511-512/ Eng. 352)
      The basis of this endeavor lies in wresting �the forgetfulness away from
      what is apprehended in the projection.� �Projection as the primordial
      structure of the tripartite fundamental occurrence of world-formation�
      (Fundamental Concepts, Ger. 524/Eng. 360) is the ontological difference.
      And yet�how do things stand with regard to this distinction itself? Is it a
      problem for ontological or for ontic knowledge? Or for neither of these,
      since each is already grounded upon it? (my italics) . . . We indeed have
      that which is different in its difference, but not this difference itself .
      . . This distinction . . . in each case belongs to that fundamental
      occurrence in which Dasein moves as such . . . This distinction is never at
      hand, but refers to something that occurs . . . Yet how are we to grasp . .
      . holding oneself toward the binding character of things, and originary
      completion�in their unity? Most difficult of all, however, is that
      unveiledness of the being of beings which is suppose to belong together with
      these . . . Beings�we constantly comport ourselves toward them; being�we
      constantly express it. But the being of beings? The unifying connection is
      missing . . . The distinguishing is earlier than the two terms that are
      distinguished. That is, we are missing the origin that first lets these two
      terms spring forth . . . What is the unitary character of the fundamental
      occurrence that these three moments lead us to? We can comprehend the
      primordial structure of the fundamental occurrence and its tripartite
      structure as projection . . . This occurrence of projection carries whoever
      is projecting out and away from themselves . . . removes them into whatever
      has been projected, but it does not as it were deposit and abandon them
      there�on the contrary: in this being removed by the projection, what occurs
      is precisely a peculiar turning toward themselves on the part of whoever is
      projecting. (Fundamental Concepts, Ger. Pp. 523-524, 526, 527/ Eng. 360-363)
      The tripartite structure mentioned is �holding the binding character of
      things toward oneself, completion, and the unveiling of the being of beings�
      (Ibid. Ger. 509/Eng. 350). These concepts are defined in self-reference to
      each other:
      This completion that is a holding oneself toward the binding character of
      things is furthermore . . . a being open for beings such as to make it
      possible to express oneself about beings, i.e., to speak of what-being,
      being such and such, that-being and being-true. Accordingly, the being of
      beings must also already be unveiled in a certain way in and through this
      completion we have characterized. (Ibid. Ger. 506/Eng. 348)
      When one confronts beings as such, one is always already able �to express
      oneself about beings�, that is, when one confronts even the simplest and
      most everyday of concepts, one always already knows language, world
      formation is completed, and the being of beings �in a certain way� unveiled.
      Dasein has the ontological distinction that is project because it already
      exists as logos, and logos is always already temporality oriented into the
      future while turning back on itself to retrieve its history. You have always
      already had a history, a history not only strung together by concepts,
      therefore words, but the words themselves, each word, has a history that it
      carries with it. That historical context defines it in an inexplicit way
      completely different from the rules of grammar and the definitions from the
      dictionary learned in school. �Our going back into the originary dimension
      of the logos apophantikos has thus provided a rich, intrinsically
      articulated structural context which evidently characterizes a fundamental
      occurrence in the Dasein of man, one we can record in three moments: [1.]
      holding the binding character of things toward us; [2.] completion; [3.]
      unveiling the being of beings� (Ibid. Ger. 506/ Eng. 348). The �going back�
      mentioned above describes the backward looking into the past as authentic
      dasein primarily proceeds futurally in temporality: �The moment�s authentic
      making present of the situation does not itself have the leadership, but is
      held in the future as has-been� (B&T, Ger. 410/ Stambaugh 377/ M & R 463).
      This means that one �always already� comes to one�s ownmost dasein already
      interpreted. � . . . Angst brings one back to throwness as something to be
      possibly retrieved (B&T, Ger. 343/Stambaugh 315/ M & R 394). To retrieve
      one�s throwness is to appropriate it and all it implies�history, tradition,
      memory�as structured into meaningfulness for one�s ownmost, making it one�s
      The finitude of Dasein�the understanding of Being�lies in forgetfulness.
      This [forgetfulness] is nothing accidental and temporary, but on the
      contrary is necessarily and constantly formed. All fundamental-ontological
      constructions which take aim at the unveiling of the inner possibility of
      the understanding of Being must, in projecting, wrest the forgetfulness away
      from what is apprehended in the projection. (Kant and the Problem of
      Metaphysics, pg. 159)
      >> Throughout Heidegger what you really find out about �man� is that he
      does not amount to much, a gathering of qualities like any �thing�. And then
      when you examine that gathering, everything flies apart and falls apart. You
      therefore need �being� to keep it �altogether�. Man needs being for
      coherent world formation, needs the ontological distinction as projection
      because �man� is always in the process of retrieving itself since it does
      not possess itself as something present at hand. Being is heard here through
      the conscienceless call of conscience.
      Man is that inability to remain and is yet unable to leave this place. In
      projecting, the Dasein in him constantly throws him into possibilities and
      thereby keeps him subjected to what is actual. Thus thrown in this throw,
      man is a transition, transition as the fundamental essence of occurrence . .
      . Man is enraptured in this transition and therefore essentially �absent�.
      Absent in a fundamental sense�never simply at hand, but absent in his
      essence, in his essentially being away, removed into essential having been
      and future�essentially absencing and never at hand, yet existent in his
      essential absence. Transposed into the possible, he must constantly be
      mistaken concerning what is actual (!). And only because he is thus mistaken
      and transposed can he become seized by terror. And only where there is
      perilousness of being seized by terror do we find the bliss of astonishment
      . . . (Heidegger, The Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics, trans. McNeill
      and Walker, Indiana University Press, 1995, Ger. 531-2/Eng. 365-6)
      >> Where then is the phenomenon �man� to be found? As phenomenon, it is
      either me or you, the most fundamental ontological difference, and the most
      easily ignored. �Ich oder du,� if I have the spelling right (it�s been a
      long time). Pain presents the clearest view of and one that is undeniable in
      the face of the actuality.
      � . . . When one speaks about �one�s own physical pain� and about �another
      person�s physical pain,� one might almost appear to be speaking about two
      wholly distinct orders of events . . . For the person in pain, so
      incontestably and unnegotiably present is it that �having pain� may come to
      be thought of as the most vibrant example of what it is to �have certainty,�
      while for the other person it is so elusive that �hearing about pain� may
      exist as the primary model of what it is �to have doubt�. Thus pain comes
      unsharably into our midst as at once that which cannot be denied and that
      which cannot be confirmed . . . Whatever pain achieves, it achieves in part
      through its unsharability, and it ensures this unsharability through its
      resistence to language . . . Physical pain does not just resist language but
      actively destroys it, bringing about an immediate reversion to a state
      anterior to language, to the sounds and cries a human being makes before
      language is learned . . . Its resistance to language is not just one of its
      incidental or accidental attributes but is essential to what it is . . .
      physical pain�unlike any other state of consciousness�has no referential
      content. It is not of or for anything. It is precisely because it takes no
      object that it, more than any other phenomenon, resists the objectification
      of language . . . The conclusion is that physicians do not trust (hence,
      hear) the human voice, that they in effect perceive the voice of the patient
      as an �unreliable narrator� of bodily events, a voice that must be bypassed
      as quickly as possible so that they can get around and behind it to the
      physical events themselves . . . Medical contexts, like all other contexts
      of human experience, provide instances of the alarming phenomenon noted
      earlier: to have great pain is to have certainty; to hear that another
      person has pain is to have doubt. (The doubt of other persons, here as
      elsewhere, amplifies the suffering of those already in pain.)� (Scarry,
      Elaine, The Body in Pain:The Making and Unmaking of the World, Oxford
      University Press, 1985, pg. 4).
      >> Although abstractions do not exist, using philosophical concepts as
      �formal indications� to point to where you want to graphically understand
      keeps you asking the question of being. �Man� is not quite �animal�, nor
      hierarchically �higher� than animal. Yet Heidegger seems to indicate in the
      �Letter on Humanism� that the essence of man has a �higher� purpose. Or does
      he? � Or is that answered by another question: Higher than what? What is the
      context �higher� is defined by? Raskolnikov stated his fundamental endeavor,
      his chance, his risk, was to become superman or louse. What he did not
      understand was that everything the superman is, is always already
      comprehended in the louse.
      >> I have indicated elsewhere that Heidegger can be tricky (see my
      reply to Rene de Bakker, RE: �What is Dasein Really?�, Apr.28), and though
      throughout the �Letter on Humanism� he makes it clear that though he is not
      against humaneness or ethics or God, each of these terms pivot on something
      else more basic altogether, and like the term �man� they become not much of
      anything whatsoever. It is as if he thinks most of his readers are not ready
      to hear what he really has to say.
      >> In the �Letter on Humanism� he seems palliative, as if he does not
      want to upset his readers, yet wants to get a beginning of understanding of
      what he is doing started. In The Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics there
      is a dialogue between straight forward and ironic statements that cut out
      the ground beneath �common sense�, ending the book as if asking the
      question, �Does man exist at all, and if so, where?�
      >> Heidegger states on page 350 of The Fundamental Concepts that �we never
      ever find [the tripartite structure of world formation] in any sense in the
      animal.� Then following on page 351 he says, � . . . Rather the animal does
      not have such things in and on the basis of a quite specific having, namely
      its manner of being open in the sense of captivation.� Now, captivation is a
      strange term for him to use, especially here, because he writes more and
      more of dasein �holding the binding character of things toward oneself�
      (pg.350), then brings in a much more extreme concept, �the occurrence of the
      prevailing of the world� (pg. 351) the entry into which by dasein �can only
      ever be prepared, never effected. Awakening is a matter of each individual
      human being, not a matter of his or her good will or even skillfulness, but
      of his or her destiny, whatever falls to him or her. Everything that
      contingently falls upon us, however, only falls and falls due to us if we
      have waited for it and are able to wait.� In other words simply, �prevailing
      of the world� does not just happen to you, it overwhelms you as �destiny�.
      The only thing we wait for, to make us special, to make us something
      different from the animal which every ordinary dasein absorbed in the
      everyday �They� self must logically then be, is the �awakening� to authentic
      understanding of �the prevailing of the world�. �Man� has been displaced,
      �misplaced�, once again. It has become an issue between inauthenticity and
      authenticity, not man versus animal. And this is not an accidental slip,
      because on page 353 Heidegger says, � . . . This �as a whole� is not
      tailored to any particular area nor even any particular species of beings.�
      And then shortly after he says, �If we only recall the particular animal
      realm, we already noticed there a peculiar enmeshing and intertwining of the
      rings that encircle animals, rings that in turn are incorporated in a
      peculiar way into the human world� (pp. 353-4). And then following lower
      down page 354 he says, �This �as a whole� that constantly surrounds us, and
      which has nothing to do with any pantheism, must, however, also be what
      brings with it that undifferentiatedness of the manifestness of beings
      within which we commonly move.� Heidegger states following that even in this
      state of undifferentiatedness, that human comportment still �entails that
      everything is manifest, in whatever way, i.e., precisely as a being�, and
      then explains this as a process of logos. �But the fact that every being is
      a being is all too empty and unquestionable� (pg.354). Ordinary
      understanding may have the ability to confront the authentic manifestness of
      beings, but, as ordinary, functions in a ring of captivation as the animal
      that it is.
      >> The separation between �animal� and �man� �really� occurs when dasein
      . . . removed by the projection . . . What occurs is precisely a peculiar
      turning toward themselves [in authentic retrieval] on the part of whoever is
      projecting. Yet why is the projection this turning toward that is a removal?
      Why is it not a being lifted away to something in the manner of captivated
      being taken? Why is it not a turning toward something in the sense of
      reflecting either? Because this removal that pertains to projecting has the
      character of raising away into the possible . . . (Ibid. pg. 363, Ger.
      �Raising away into the possible� removes one from ordinary understanding
      into authenticity and its infinite possibilities. Thus the conversation has
      changed from a supposedly distinct difference between man and animal which
      devolves down to merely the use of language, something which is only
      questionably �possessed� by man�or possesses man-- into a growing awareness
      that the real distinction is the authentic grasping of projection and its
      possibilities. And I have argued elsewhere that the potential structure of
      authenticity is heralded by the structures of the everyday �They� self that,
      in uncanny homelessness, knows in its fallen and thrown state it is not
      where it wants to be. And, since the difference between �animal� and �man�
      is minimal, i.e., language which chimpanzees and gorillas are learning to
      use in basic sign language�a small thing but in principle opens
      �possibilities��in essence the �superman� of authenticity is already
      enclosed as a seed in the louse.
      >> In the first set of Nietzsche lectures, The Will to Power as Art, you
      go through a dialectic where what is rejected on the one hand, affects and
      feelings (as opposed to passion) as counter-will, is, on the other hand,
      then accepted as definition: feeling is will to power, and will to power is
      �Being�. In the end, to make a statement, �Heidegger believes this is true,�
      when you are dealing with the ecstatic truth of being, becomes unstable when
      considered situationally and temporally. His logic is impeccable, though
      something almost private behind the shifting meanings. Yet, being the only
      one that knows exactly what that firm ground is, his own dasein, he
      dispenses occasional clues as to what it that �each person�s� dasein must
      fit together by themselves.
      >> In the �Letter� he never talks about �woman�, though in Fundamental
      Concepts he includes �woman� in his audience. That is important because the
      central question in Fundamental Concepts is what an animal is, and that
      subject remains totally in question. The difference between animal and man
      revolves around the question of who possesses language. The tripartite
      structure of the occurrence of dasein as projection is fundamentally
      dependent on the �always already� emplacement of language. Beings are held
      toward you through words. Completion is achieved as the context of language.
      The unveiling of the being of beings is the bringing of phenomena into the
      synthesis-diaipesis of logos.
      >> If he had brought in �woman�, a concept as fundamental as �man� ,
      then the body takes center stage. And with the body, animal again. And if
      you say, �That is not where he wants to go. Heidegger is always primarily
      interested in the question of the meaning of being,� think again. Though
      that statement is true, being is nothing ontic; ergo it is not specific
      ontically to God or man or woman or animal or plant. And yet their �essence�
      as a �way of being� is all �part� of one whole. If it is mistaken to
      consider the concept of �man� as something present at hand, then it is just
      as mistaken to consider as present at hand the concept �animal�. When monist
      thinking intrudes, distinctions of high and low, good and evil, spiritual
      and material, God and devil become meaningless. In monism, the only �valid�
      standard and purpose is honesty, not good or evil.
      >> On reconsideration, Mr. Whitby, you might be saying that dasein is
      ontologically grounded in the factical ontic situation. What is �human�,
      then, is situational human existence, which would necessarily be grounded in
      the human body. But the body is not itself what being human is �about�.
      Heidegger objects to the split of spirit (or �person�, B&T Ger.
      46-47/Stambaugh 44/M.&R. 72-73) and body (� . . . We again have to do with
      a being-objectively-present-together of a spiritual thing thus constituted
      with a corporeal thing, and the being of the beings thus compounded is more
      obscure than ever . . . a procedure motivated not ontologically, but
      �metaphysically� in the na�ve opinion that human being is initially a
      spiritual thing which is then subsequently placed �in� a space,� B&T, Ger.
      56/Stambaugh 52-53/ M&R 82-83). � . . . The �substance� of human being is
      not the spirit as the synthesis of body and soul, but existence� (B&T< Ger
      117/ Stambaugh 110/ M&R 153). What this spirit/body split obscures is, �The
      understanding of being-in-the-world as an essential structure of Da-sein
      first makes possible the insight into its existential spatiality� (Ibid.
      56/52/82). But in the discussion of spatiality, there are some
      �inconsistancies� between dasein being �not objectively in space� and yet is
      spatial �in the sense of factically entangled existing� and �it is by no
      means merely objectively present . . . �
      . . . We must remember in what way Da-sein is spatial. Da-sein can be
      spatial only as care, in the sense of factically entangled existing (M&R
      �factically falling�). Negatively this means that Da-sein is never
      objectively present (M&R �present-at-hand�) in space, not even initially.
      Da-sein does not fill out a piece of space as a real thing or a useful thing
      would do, so that the boundaries dividing it from the surrounding space
      would themselves just define that space spatially. In the literal sense,
      Da-sein takes space in. It is by no means merely objectively present (ditto)
      in the piece of space the body fills out. Existing, it has always already
      made room for a leeway (M&R �its own leeway�). It determines its own
      location (my italics) in such a way that it comes back from the space made
      room for to a �place� that it has taken over (M&R �reserved�). To be able to
      say that Da-sein is objectively present (ditto) at a position in space, we
      have to grasp (M&R �take� [auffassen}) this being beforehand in an
      ontologically inappropriate way . . . Because Da-sein is �spiritual,� and
      only because it is spiritual, it can be spatial in a way that essentially
      remains impossible for an extended corporeal thing.
      >> The making room of Da-sein is constituted by directionality and
      de-distancing (intrusion: J L Mehta would use the word �rapprochement�
      instead of de-distancing, M&R �de-severance�) . . . Being-in-the-world that
      takes care of things is directed, directing itself. Belonging-somewhere has
      an essential relation to relevance. It is always factically determined in
      terms of the context of relevance of the useful things taken care of . . .
      >> Because Da-sein in its temporality is ecstatic and horizonal in its
      being, it can factically and constantly take along space for which it has
      made room. With regard for this space ecstatically made room for (M&R �taken
      in�), the here of its actual factical location (M&R �situation [Lage bzw.
      Situation]�) or situation never signifies a position in space, but the
      leeway of the range of the totality of useful things taken care of nearby--a
      leeway that has been opened in directionality and de-distancing (ditto).
      (B&T, Ger. 368-369/ Stambaugh 336-337/M&R 419-420)
      >So dasein is �never objectively present � (�present-at-hand�) and is
      �spatial in a way that essentially remains impossible for an extended
      corporeal thing� . . . �so that the boundaries dividing it from the
      surrounding space would themselves just define that space spatially�. There
      seems to be a bit of equivocation here which becomes more evident when
      Heidegger says, �It is by no means merely (my italics) objectively present
      in the piece of space that its body fills out.� The M&R translation is not
      substantially different. What does Heidegger mean by �merely� here?
      �Purely� like Kant or �insignificantly�? If �purely�, then that goes along
      with �factically entangled existence� which means it is situational�but
      every situation is based on a materiality. It is true, existence as
      situational is immaterial, but the situation itself is defined and
      determined in its relations and location by material reality. What those
      relations are as specifically defined and measured is immaterial, but what
      is used to define and locate, and what is measured is not. �Dasein takes
      space in; this is to be understood literally� (M&R pg.419): this is true
      since dasein is being-in-the-world, the formation of the �as a whole� that
      gives space a space. But dasein is still in a particular space at a
      particular time in ordinary understanding and irrevocable everyday existence
      which it cannot escape but only detach its unperceived perceptual point
      from. Such an �unperceived perceiver� as �Existing . . . always already made
      room for a leeway (M&R< �its own leeway�), but �leeway� is not absolute
      severance, not an ontological distinction, not an existential. The �leeway�
      has boundaries which, though they are not those of �an extended corporeal
      thing� are still placed in a fashion in reality as well as existence at the
      same time and place�such as the boundary you cannot �transpose� into another
      person, and being-with is with �others�, not with other daseins. Solitude,
      in its uniqueness as dasein, is an existential situation without boundaries
      like �an extended corporeal thing� but is in a crux, a crossroads with a
      dead man buried in the center, a puzzle and aporia because it has boundaries
      not so much of space as of identity of distinction from others, especially
      the dead and the d�j� vu of knowing things you know not how as Meno�s slave
      or, worse, as seemingly out of another life. Anamnesis is alive and well ,
      and, as Heidegger said, we have always already transposed into all other
      living beings and know very well what we do to them and what they feel. �If
      you prick us do we not bleed? If you tickle us do we not laugh? If you
      poison us doe not die? And if you wrong us shall we not revenge? If we are
      like you in the rest, we shall resemble you in that.�
      >> When one tries to understand the body, you deal with forces that one
      can, at best, resist or merely retard but never control. That is with your
      body, and not an abstraction of physiology. To attempt to control your
      body, instead of being-with or going-along-with the body as someone you are
      familiar with superficially but do not �really know�, �in essence a complete
      stranger�whether through so-called self-discipline (which is like �taming� a
      wolf or a lion: it permits you to do so as long as . . .) or other entities
      like drugs/medicine or hypnosis, is to lose even the ability to resist. And
      the attempt to control and manipulate and �fix� another�s, or one�s own,
      spirit through psychotherapy is ludicrous where one must judge what is right
      or wrong for the �patient� (�Maladaptive� and �dysfunctional��which means
      �adaptive� and �functional� to whose purpose? Certainly not the �patient�s�
      until �They� are-- �cured�!). The �basis� of any kind of �social� evaluation
      has long been ripped to shreds (echoing Nietzsche when he said, �Have they
      not heard that God is dead?�, has no one heard Ivan Karamazov�s declaration,
      �If there is no God, then everything is permitted�? What is the point of
      discussing good and evil or sickness and health, especially �mental�, if
      there is no standard besides fantasy? There is a distinct need to relearn
      the lessons of Aristotle�s Nicomachian Ethics and the Politics.).�Society�
      is a word to justify arrogance and abuse by bureaucrats when they know well
      you necessarily can only deal with each individual, or ignore them at your
      peril. The psychotherapist would have to be God or the Supreme Father Figure
      like Freud himself. But psychotherapists, psychologists, and sociologists,
      like judges themselves, are just ordinary people who do not have an elevated
      �moral� knowledge. So the attempt to control your body demonstrates one more
      �thing� is not present-at-hand and therefore not possessed.
      >> As there is a going-along-with the body that �we are forced to grant�,
      there is a going-along-with �spirit�, a dangerous word, which one
      necessarily acknowledges when one grasps one�s whole situation and context
      and where being �adaptive� and �functional� to other people is no longer
      important. �Logos. ratio, reason, spirit�all these titles are disguises for
      the problem of the world� (Fundamental Concepts, Ger. 508/Eng. 350). You
      �always already� stand alone, and the process of philosophy is to discover
      that has always already been the case. It is not an extraordinary mood or
      situation, but is the ontological condition of dasein, and is the basis for
      the only real certainty there is, dasein�s holding itself in, together, as a
      creation by resolve.
      The primordial truth of existence requires an equiprimordial being-certain
      in which one holds oneself in what resoluteness discloses. It gives itself
      the factical situation and brings itself into that situation. The
      situation cannot be calculated in advance and pregiven like something
      objectively present waiting to be grasped. It is disclosed only in a free
      act of resolve that has not been determined beforehand, but is open to the
      possibility of such determination. (Ger.307/ Stambaugh 284 / Mac & Rob 355 )
      Heidegger makes a fundamental distinction between the truth of existence and
      the truth of reality. Reality is �just there�, as it is and that it is and
      can be no other way. Whereas in existence, invisible and unmeasurable, i.e.,
      not present at hand, the attunements�moods, feelings, passions, the senses
      (especially pain)�project you like a thrown stone through a glass window
      (people in unrelenting, extreme pain often describe themselves as like
      �shattered glass�). They impel the creation and passing, the irrevocable
      direction, the desire to be somewhere else of time itself. But existence is
      something made, in fact, continually being created, never in stasis,
      imagined and projected and never solid. Reality is the playing field, since
      it�s �just there�, and rationality the rules of the game and the decision
      that comes up right now is always yours.
      The definition of the structure of care has given us a basis on which to
      distinguish ontologically between existence and reality for the first time.
      This led to the thesis that the substance of human being is existence. But
      even this formal idea of existence, which is not binding in an existentiell
      way (my italics), already contains a definite though unprofiled ontological
      �content� that �presupposes� an idea of being in general�just like the idea
      of reality contrasted with it. Only in the horizon of that idea of being
      that the distinction between existence and reality be made. After all, both
      mean being. (B&T, Ger.314/Stambaugh 290/M&R 362).
      And the body constantly reassures us, that it is reality, �just there��but
      always with the possibility of intruding rudely, of being completely out of
      place in an instant and dysfunctional to one�s projects. It is the ground to
      existence, both in the sense that it lets existence exist, lets the child
      play, and is ground in the sense of being able to drag existence down to
      the ground, to sully it, to muddle all the issues of existence, to call
      everything to a screaming halt while you pay all your attention to it,
      regardless of your desires and ambitions. �Transposed into the possible,
      (man) must constantly be mistaken concerning what is actual�: the body can
      bring one back immediately to the actual. Pain has a way of doing that which
      pleasure can never even begin to achieve. Pain is more than attunement as a
      distressful situation. Pain tells you--you are not fundamentally in
      control�you are simply on parole, and maybe you�ll luck out for now�but not
      forever. �Being remains mysterious, the simple nearness of an unobtrusive
      governance,� (�Letter�, pg. 236) the kind aspect of the Janus god. Pain is
      the ultimate humiliation. And Heidegger says ridiculously little�that I know
      of! Inform me if otherwise�than this �short shrift�: �Objectively present
      things encountered in Da-sein can, so to speak, run against its being, for
      example, events of nature which break in on us and destroy us� B&T, Ger.
      152/ Stambaugh 142/ M&R 193).
      >> Elaine Scarry says, on page 23 of her book, � . . . What is quite
      literally at stake in the body in pain is the making and unmaking of the
      world.� On pages 52 through 56, she lists eight aspects of pain:
      --The first, the most essential, aspect of pain is its sheer adversiveness.
      While other sensations have content that may be positive, neutral, or
      negative, the very content of pain is itself negation . . . Pain is a pure
      physical experience of negation, an immediate sensory rendering of
      �against,� of something being against one, and of something one must be
      against. Even though it occurs within oneself, it is at once identified as
      �not oneself,� �not me,� as something so alien that it must right now be
      gotten rid of.
      Pain is the primary explicit experience of pure, wordless reality, which is
      not only completely other to any kind of subjectivity, but is something that
      �stands behind� even being-in-the-world because it is outside any positive
      manifestation or identity. It is not only wordless but works against
      A second and third aspect of pain . . . are the double experience of agency.
      While pain is in part a profound sensory rendering of �against,� it is also
      a rendering of �something� that is against, a something that is at once
      internal and external . . . It has often been observed that when a knife or
      a knife or a nail or a pin enters the body, one feels the knife, nail, or
      pin but one�s own body, one�s own body hurting one . . . (With torture)
      inside and outside and the two forms of agency ultimately give way to and
      merge with one another: confession and exercises are a form of external as
      well as internal agency since one�s own body and voice now no longer belong
      to oneself . . .
      World formation here is coming undone as the very pre-logical manifestation
      of beings is starting to lose its grasp on the bedrock ground of reality.
      --This dissolution of the boundary between inside and outside gives rise to
      the fourth aspect of the felt experience of physical pain, an almost obscene
      conflation of private and public. It brings with it all the solitude of
      absolute privacy with none of its safety (my italics), all the self-exposure
      of the utterly public with none of its possibility of camaraderie or shared
      experience . . . for the prisoner is forced to attend to the most intimate
      and interior facts of his body (pain, hunger, nausea, sexuality, excretion)
      at a time when there is no benign privacy, for he is under continual
      surveillance, and there is no benign public, for there is no human contact,
      but instead only an ugly inverting of the two.
      Do not make the mistake that this is the unusual and extreme situation of
      just political torture. Have you ever been a helpless, long term patient in
      the hospital, or in the real pit of total Hell a �nursing home�? Have you
      ever been through the induction physical for the armed services? Have you
      been in the armed services? Have you been in prison or jail? Have you been
      completely destitute and living on the street? Have you been one of the
      filthy, sticking poor in a cesspool of a slum? Have you been in a
      concentration camp? These experiences are not equal in degradation, but are
      close enough to give you some idea of where this is going. These situations
      apply to the vast majority of people in the world today, and even much more
      so throughout our shared history we continually cover up like a cat does
      shit. Even though we know what the circumstances are, we keep them apart and
      deliberately make them abstract. One of the methods used by the Nazis to
      dehumanize inmates and destroy any sympathy for them was simply�not to
      provide water for bathing even if it was abundant. How could one have
      sympathy for someone overwhelming you with the smell of shit? But all the
      inmate was allowed per day was one tea cup of water. Primo Levi says that
      those who survived drank almost none of their water, but used it instead to
      try to clean themselves in some way, and that the simple act of sharing a
      tiny bit of water, of no consequence in �everyday� life, with some one else
      was an extremely ambivalent and usually foolish act. Those who drank all
      their water and neglected themselves, soon became �musselmen� and died one
      way or another. People are far too busy counting the dead, and rarely pay
      significant attention to the far greater horror of what it did to the
      --A fifth dimension of physical pain is its ability to destroy language, the
      power of verbal objectification, a major source of our self-extension, a
      vehicle through which the pain could be lifted out into the world and
      eliminated. Before destroying language, it first monopolizes language,
      becomes its only subject: complaint, in many ways the nonpolitical
      equivalent of confession, becomes the exclusive mode of speech. Eventually
      the pain so deepens that the coherence of complaint is displaced by the
      sounds anterior to learned language. The tendency of pain not simply to
      resist expression but to destroy the capacity for speech is in torture
      reenacted in overt, exaggerated form.
      This anteriority to �learned language� is not an animal�s cry of warning or
      greeting or asking �Where are you?� or threat. The sound of an animal being
      tortured is distinctly different, it has a disturbing formlessness about it,
      and is nothing like the sounds of a healthy animal. Or maybe I just have an
      overly sympathetic, bleeding heart for the �wee beasties�. What do you
      think? I once saw a cat that just had its left rear leg ripped off by a car.
      It was absolutely enraged with everything in the world that had failed it,
      especially human beings.
      --A sixth element of physical pain . . . is its obliteration of the contents
      of consciousness. Pain annihilates not only the objects of complex thought
      and emotion but also the objects of the most elemental acts of perception.
      It may begin my destroying some intricate and demanding allegiance, but it
      may end (as is implied in the expression �blinding pain�) by destroying
      one�s ability to simply see . . . This world dissolution . . . is mimed in
      the resulting cancellation of all parts of the room as well as all parts of
      the larger world . . .
      That you are so distracted by the meaningless nothingness of pain, that is
      just there for no reason in the world, it can misplace, displace, erase the
      whole context and meaning of perception is the most disturbing thing here to
      me. Some one once told me pain was God�s way of telling you something was
      wrong. I will not repeat what I said.
      --A seventh aspect of pain . . . is its totality. Pain begins by being �not
      oneself� and ends by having eliminated all that is �not itself.� At first
      occurring as an appalling but limited internal fact, it eventually occupies
      the entire body and spills out into the realm beyond the body, takes over
      all that is inside and outside, makes the two obscenely indistinguishable,
      and systematically destroys anything like language or world extension that
      is alien to itself and threatening to its claims. Terrifying for its
      narrowness, it nevertheless exhausts and displaces all else until it seems
      to become the single broad and omnipresent fact of existence.
      At first it is disturbing that Scarry seems to be imputing intent to pain
      itself, but then when one experiences such pain, �narrowness� is exactly the
      right word. And then let�s be realistic, imputing intent to pain is no
      different to imputing intent in average, ordinary human beings in everyday
      life. You know very well it is not there. Just stop them in what they are
      doing, and watch them fumble about trying to figure out how to start up
      >> Also here Scarry becomes quite disturbing again with her references to
      the physiology of pain that is not centered in any specific part of the
      brain but encompasses the whole, and �the body quickly, effortlessly, and
      endlessly generates new pathways� after surgical intervention. And she
      quotes Antonin Artaud as saying pain �as it intensifies and deepens ,
      multiplies its resources and means of access at every level of the
      sensibility� (Antonin Artaud, The Theatre and Its Double, trans. Richards,
      Grove Press, 1958, pg. 23).
      The eighth and . . . final element . . . (is that) one of its most
      frightening aspects is its resistance to objectification. Though
      indisputably real to the sufferer, it is, unless accompanied by visible body
      damage or disease label, unreal to others. This profound ontological split
      is a doubling of pain�s annihilating power: the lack of acknowledgement and
      recognition (which if present could act as a form of self-extension) becomes
      a second form of negation and rejection . . .
      �This profound ontological split� always exists. It is pain that forces you
      to admit it or be inhuman. It is certainly not a situation of strangeness,
      an extreme or unusual place one rarely goes but is �always already� there.
      But the reasons for the refusal to �disclose� it are obvious, numerous, far
      reaching, and are extreme. It is not for Nothing that one is the �They�
      >> �Situation� as such, though not physical, is real, and reality as
      presence-at-hand is always the ground of situation. But only through the
      situation of existence can reality be present-at-hand. Therefore the being
      of both existence and reality that yet joins them in the irrevocable
      difference is always already understood. We come to the ontological circle,
      the �presupposition� �always already� made in one�s past as �the idea of
      existence and of being in general is �presupposed� and that Da-sein gets
      interpreted �accordingly� so that the idea of being may be obtained by it�
      (B&T, 314/290/362). This presupposing is an �understanding project� where
      �the interpretation developing this understanding lets what is to be
      interpreted be put in words for the very first time, so that it may decide
      of its own accord whether, as this being, it will provide the constitution
      of being for which it has been disclosed in the projection with regard to
      its formal aspect . . . Is there any other way that beings can put
      themselves into words with regard to their being at all?� (Ibid. Macquarrie
      and Robinson have, � . . . the Interpretation by which such an understanding
      gets developed, will let that which is to be interpreted put itself into
      words for the very first time, so that it may decide of its own accord
      whether, as the entity which it is, it has that state of Being for which it
      has been disclosed in the projection with regard to its formal aspects . . .
      Is there any other way at all by which an entity can put itself into words
      with regard to its Being?� pp.362-63) In other words, �putting into words�
      is a primordial decision (or resolve? Does one choose to speak? What would
      choosing then mean to be silent and nameless?) that �will provide the
      constitution of being for which it has been disclosed�. The �substance of
      human being�, then, as �existence�, resides in decision/resolve that �puts�
      understanding into the interpretation of words. The �essence� of human
      identity, continuity in time, comes to be in resolve in words.
      >> This is where dasein becomes historical, being able to resolve
      existence in words temporally in a sentence with a beginning, a middle, and
      an end. But this is also where �being-with� comes into play because language
      in its full aspect is fundamentally what other people are.
      Being-along-side-of is a very factical mode, but being-with is a fundamental
      existential of dasein in the sense that when we learn language from others
      primordially, a priori, it is not at all like learning words in school,
      i.e., �This means this�, or diagramming sentences. When you learn a word
      from others primordially you also learn the whole context the word comes
      with which is not at all like a book. You absorb the situation, and with it,
      you absorb the personality of the person who teaches you. For instance, what
      is the meaning of �No!� or �Bad!� or �Dirty!� to you? They are nothing at
      all like what you learned in the structured classroom are they? They are
      said with a certain tone and inflection with gestures that probably call up
      a hundred things you would rather not think about. And all other words in
      actuality exist in the same fashion, but fortunately not the same context.
      As being-with they have nothing to do with formal rules but possess the
      living presence of other people in your own dasein. It is also where the
      dead still live. It is one more sense in which language is not your
      >> It is not �experience� that is the ground of ek-sistence, standing
      out into the clearing of being. Experience belongs to the body and the body
      is an �animal�, but not in the sense that Heidegger rejects in �Letter on
      Humanism�, i.e., �The human body is something essentially other than an
      animal organism� -- because �the comparison with �beasts� is itself grounded
      in the essence of ek-sistence� (Heidegger, �Letter on Humanism� trans.
      Capuzzi & Gray from Krell, Basic Writings, revised ed. Harper Collins, 1993,
      pg. 228) which is words, language. It is rather in the sense of �on the
      one hand (creatures) are in a certain way most closely akin to us, and on
      the other are at the same time separated from our ek-sistent essence by an
      abyss� (Ibid. pg. 230). He then states, following, �the essence of divinity
      is closer to us than what is so alien in other living creatures, closer,
      namely, in an essential distance which, however distant, is nonetheless is
      more familiar with our ek-sistent essence than is our scarcely conceivable,
      abysmal bodily kinship with the beast� (Ibid.). * (the nearness and farness
      of being) The relationship between divinity and man is a matter of words and
      language, whereas that which is the same between man and beast is wordless
      experience, reality as presented, �just there�, opposed to existence and
      rationality/language. �In its essence, language is not the utterance of an
      organism; nor is it the expression of a living thing� (Ibid.). The last
      phrase brings up the question: �Who� or what then expresses language?
      >> In Fundamental Concepts, after making a firm distinction between
      animal behavior and human comportment (see my reply to Rene de Bakker,
      RE:�What is Dasein Really?�, April 28, 2000), Heidegger then says, �In
      principle it is also possible to reverse this linguistic usage and refer to
      animal comportment.� (Ger. 346/Eng. 237) Doctor Michael Eldred says this is
      simply a fixing of terminology, and Heidegger does go on to finish the
      paragraph essentially saying, �The behavior of an animal is not a doing and
      acting, as in human comportment, but a driven performing [Treiben].� But the
      next page of the translation has the paragraph:
      Yet here again, from a purely linguistic point of view, we can see that the
      terminology is arbitrary if we recall that we also talk about �driving� snow
      when there is no question of anything organic anouncing its specific manner
      of being. This shows that language in all this is not subject to logic, and
      that a certain inconsequentiality belongs rather to the essence (my italics)
      of language and its meanings (my italics). In other words, language is
      something that belongs to the essence (my italics) of man in his finitude.
      To imagine a god expressing himself in speech is utterly meaningless (my
      italics). (Ger. 346/Eng. 238)
      So then dasein�s ek-sistence expresses language, the �essence� of man, in
      its �inconsequentiality� �not subject (my italics) to logic�, meaning not
      that it is irrational but that the comprehension of words follows from
      their whole situation and context. But recall, �Being remains mysterious,
      the simple nearness of an unobtrusive governance. The nearness occurs
      essentially as language itself� (�Letter,� pg. 236) which means then, if
      �inconsequentiality belongs to the essence of language and its meanings,�
      then being is inconsequential.
      In-consequentiality belongs to finitude, not as a deficiency or an
      embarrassment but as an effective power. Finitude renders dialectic
      impossible and reveals its illusory character. For in-consequence,
      ground-lessness and fundamental concealment belong to finitude. (Fundamental
      Concepts, Ger. 306/Eng. 209)
      Like the Homeric gods� estimation of petty, frivolous, mortal man, brotos--
      (�Why bother with something that is only there for a moment?�)��man� is
      within consequentiality, swept up in the course of time without the ability
      to change that course, and is utterly unimportant. Yet its utter
      unimportance frees it like the little people in the criminal pitch black of
      night to be. For there is no consequence of any importance including death,
      no law of ground to violate, and concealment hides the activity of such
      insects from the divine light.
      >> One not only identifies beings with words but also one�s ownmost.
      This is the whole project of authenticity, to source decision into words as
      resolve. This is the �primal� distinction between �animal� and �man� which
      is words within language, which is ek-sistence as dasein. � . . . Being
      remains mysterious, the simple nearness of an unobtrusive governance (?).
      The nearness occurs essentially as language itself � (my italics, �Letter,
      pg.236) �From the perspective of the animal we should never take these
      other things as beings, though for us it is only possible to approach such
      things by way of naming through language� (Fundamental Concepts,
      Ger.376/Eng.259). But what exactly is encompassed in the word �language�,
      especially considering what I said about being-with?
      The extent to which Aristotle also intends in a certain sense to ascribe to
      animals logos�conversance in the sense of circumspection which knows its way
      around�can be seen in Met. A 1, where Aristotle attributes to some animals
      the possibility of phronimOterov and thus a certain phronesis (something
      like circumspection) (980b21) . . . It is not easily determined whether
      animals are alogon or logon exon. Saying that aisthesis is a relationship to
      the surroundings, a taking cognizance, does not say that what makes itself
      known there is perceived as being [Seiendes]. But the human being is zOon
      logon exon, the living being for whom language is essential; or better, the
      being for whom discourse is essential, discourse understood in its original
      sense of expressing oneself about the world and to the world in poetry.
      (Heidegger, Martin, Aristotle�s Metaphysics Theta 1-3, Trans. Brogan &
      Warnick, Indiana University Press, 1995, pg.107 & 110)
      �In poetry,� the �inconsequentiality� of language �not subject to logic� is
      for �human being . . . essential� in �its in-consequence, ground-lessness,
      and fundamental concealment�.
      >> Though the animal does not possess language clearly as such,
      Heidegger says, �We must above all adhere to what Aristotle presents as
      fact: that indeed the animal is aisthetikon, kritikon�in the manner of
      bringing out . . . For the matter surely demands that we do not deny logos
      to the animal as it now stands . . .� And then he quotes Aristotle, De an.
      gamma 9, 432a30f, �No one may easily settle, with regard to the ability to
      perceive, whether this is a capability without conversance or a conversant
      capability�. Perception as aesthesis establishes a context and situation
      through �circumspection� and �relationship to the surroundings" , that is,
      through sight per se. The visual field is the situation within which the
      animal also decides. The major difference is between words or what may be
      >> It is the situation itself resolved on which is the ontic ground for
      dasein, and the body the ground for situation. It is a being-certain out of
      nowhere, resolve made by �always already� having been made. Primordial truth
      of existence itself depends on a holding-in what resolve discloses in
      being-certain. Resolution creates situation as the ground of dasein.
      Referring to the difference between existence and reality above, there is
      this quote from the �Letter on Humanism�:
      Ek-sistence, thought in terms of ecstasis, does not coincide with existentia
      in either form or content. In terms of content ek-sistence means standing
      out into the truth of being. Existentia (existence) means in contrast
      actualitas, actuality as opposed to mere possibility as Idea. (pg. 230)
      Resolution requires the body as the reality that is the ground to the
      situation which is existence, the situation as such, which is �only in a
      free act of resolve� as disclosure not determined beforehand but, as
      disclosed, open to determination. Does the body require resolve? But
      resolve requires the body. It is identical to the �specifically human�
      which is ground for �human intelligence�. When one discourses the �human�,
      one must, in some way, discourse on the body. The primacy of the body, �the
      primacy of perception� is something we are �forced to grant�. �The real has
      to be described, not constructed or formed. Which means I cannot put
      perception into the same category as the syntheses represented by
      judgements, acts or predications. My field of perception is constantly
      filled with a play of colors, noises and fleeting tactile sensations . . .
      which I nevertheless immediately �place� in the world . . .� (my italics,
      Merleau-Ponty, Maurice, The Phenomenology of Perception, trans. Colin
      Smith, Routledge & Keegan Paul, London, 1962, pg. X). And later
      Merleau-Ponty says, reminiscent of Shankara, �Perception is not a science of
      the world, it is not even an act, a deliberate taking up of position; it is
      the background from which all acts stand out, and is presupposed by them�
      (Ibid. pp. x-xi). It is the pre-reflective cogito of Sartre and the
      unperceived perceiver of Shankara. All perceptions perceived �I . . .
      immediately �place� in the world . . .� No acts can �stand out� without
      being �placed�, i.e., situated in the project of understanding which the
      unperceived �I� of perception has �always already� situated from the space
      of the body which in its own irrevocable, intrusive, and
      disordering/distracting way encompasses and prevails over the whole either
      as attunement/mood about which one can incorporate into language, or as pain
      which applied systematically can deconstruct language, or accidentally
      destroy it, for an alien purpose.
      But does not a definite ontic interpretation of authentic existence, a
      factical ideal of Da-sein, underlie our ontological interpretation of the
      existence of Da-sein? Indeed. But not only is this fact one that must not be
      denied and we are forced to grant: it must be understood in its positive
      necessity, in terms of the thematic object of our inquiry. Philosophy will
      never seek to deny its �presuppositions,� but neither may it merely admit
      them. It conceives them and develops with more and more penetration both the
      presuppositions themselves and that for which they are presuppositions.
      (Ger.310/Stambaugh 286/Mac & Rob 358)
      If the body is just such a presupposition �we are forced to grant�, then
      what is it a presupposition for? �(Philosophy) conceives (its
      presuppositions) and develops with more and more penetration both the
      presuppositions themselves and that for which they are presuppositions.� The
      �thematic object of our inquiry� is the question about and the meaning of
      being. �Only in the horizon of that idea of being can the distinction
      between existence and reality be made. After all, both mean being� (B&T
      314/290/362). And essentially, because being is nothing ontic, the question
      of being is the meaning of being. And one becomes aware again of the
      circular nature of this endeavor, presupposing being in order to disclose
      being, and bringing the question of being to your body immediately
      rediscovers your throwness, i.e., �Why am �I� here in this body?� (consider
      Leopardi), �Why am �I� bound and delivered over to the power of other people
      whose purpose I cannot understand?, �Why was I born?� These are considered
      ridiculous questions only because everybody always already knows there are
      no answers. And because there are no answers, it is considered eccentric to
      inquire further because it brings into question what should morally, by
      custom and tradition, simply and blankly be accepted. It also strikes at the
      pre-suppositions of so-called society which, as such questions individuate
      the situation, disclose the facts of the case to be the whimsy, fantasy, and
      emotional self-indulgence of �others�. What they also display is the
      absolute contingency of throwness, i.e., dasein is an accident
      fundamentally. And that accident is an existential of being itself.
      This is called the grounding question of metaphysics: Why are there beings
      at all, and not rather Nothing? . . . The final question provokes the
      objection that a meditation that the attempts to recall Being by way of the
      Nothing returns in the end to a question concerning beings. On top of that,
      the question even proceeds in the customary manner of metaphysics by
      beginning with a casual �Why?� To this extent, then, the attempt to recall
      Being is fully repudiated in favor of a representational knowledge of beings
      in terms of beings. And to make matters still worse, the final question is
      obviously the question that the metaphysician Leibnitz posed in his Princeps
      de la nature et de la grace: �Pourquoi il y a plutot quelque chose que
      rien?� (Opp. Ed. Gerh. tom. VI, 602 n. 7). (Heidegger, �Introduction to
      �What is Metaphysics?�, trans. Walter Kaufman, from Pathmarks, ed. McNeill,
      Cambridge University Press, pg. 289)
      >> In the circumspection of perception from out of the context of the
      body, where is the animal delimited and the human privileged? Saying
      �language� is to the point, but it is far from enough. On the one hand,
      being-in language is the same as being-in-the-world. It is only through
      logos that the project of world formation as something specifically human is
      completed. On the other hand, a very ontic picture of language can be drawn
      starting from the learning and use of first words, becoming educated in a
      school structure, reading books, idle talk, and using a computer. We can
      take sentences apart and put them back together again. We can use the same
      words in a different order and say something completely different. Language
      is both the �as a whole� of being and, at the same time, a tool rack at hand
      for every purpose. And it is in the space of the body, either within the
      leeway of dasein or by the physical accident that one can speak, that
      language resides.
      >> Yet simply saying �the body� is too early and too easy of an answer,
      but must be retained, as it were, in the constant background in discussing
      existential situation. It is not the body itself that is �a factical ideal
      of Da-sein�, but the situation the body is in. The situation as such,
      situation as existence, is not a thing, it is invisible, it is not reifiable
      except in and by imagination. And yet that imagination is �objective� and
      definable in existential analysis. Resolve has �always already� resolved to
      exist as situational. But perception is also �always already� situational.
      There is always already a field of vision in which the context of existence
      is disclosed. Resolve determines the context of perception as already in
      place into an ongoing �thrown� project of existence. To repeat what I said
      above, �As disclosure it is not determined beforehand but, as disclosed, it
      is open to determination.�
      With the phenomenon of resoluteness we are led to the primordial truth of
      existence. Resolute, Da-sein is revealed to itself in its actual factical
      potentiality-of-being in such a way that it itself is this revealing and
      being revealed . . . It gives itself the actual factical situation and
      brings itself into that situation. (B&T 307/284/355)
      > Resoluteness is the truth of existence. It is the revealing, and it is
      the revealed. Resoluteness is the �cohesion and perdurance to our essential
      being� (Heidegger, Nietzsche, vol. 1: Will To Power As Art, trans. Krell,
      Harper-Collins, 1979, pg. 47). It is not an act of the moment as decision
      between this or that. There is no either/or in resoluteness. It is the inner
      core to what Heidegger describes as fate or destiny. It perdures, it is
      disclosed, but it is first �always already� covered over. It exists beyond
      memory. Resoluteness cannot be resolved as a specific decision in time. It
      is the same as Nietzsche�s misnomer �will to power�:
      . . . When (Nietzsche) makes will�s goal power instead of happiness,
      pleasure, or the unhinging of the will, he changes not only the goal of will
      but the essential definition of will itself. In the strict sense of the
      Nietzschean conception of will, power can never be pre-established as will�s
      goal, as though power were something that could first be posited outside the
      will. Because will is resolute openess toward itself, as mastery out beyond
      itself, because will is a w<br/><br/>(Message over 64 KB, truncated)
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