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Fwd: Re: [Sartre] Digest Number 156 AGAIN

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  • exxistentialist@hotmail.com
    Dear Gary, Hi! And thank u very much for ur reply , it was very enlightening. But before i can say that i have fully comprehended what u are saying i would
    Message 1 of 2 , May 19, 2000
      Dear Gary,
      Hi! And thank u very much for ur reply , it was very enlightening.
      But before i can say that i have fully comprehended what u are saying
      i would really appreciate some questions being answered:
      1. For Heidegger and/or Sartre, who is 'I'? When u use the
      word 'you', who/what exactly are u referring to? What is
      this 'reflecting THING'? This i think is a very important q.
      2. Is it possible to attain authenticity? If so, how?
      3. PLease could u explain what u mean when u say that 'freedom is
      detachment'? Do u mean that the for-itself would be perfectly free
      only if it were not encased within an emotion/desire-ridden body in
      an everyday world of others? If so, then are u implying that we are
      NOT free in our choices in this world?
      4. For Heidegger and/or Sartre what creates desire?
      5. Are desires to be seen as objects of consciousness?

      Thanks alot!


      --- In Sartre@egroups.com, "Gary C. Moore" <gottlos75@m...> wrote:
      > Hello Mr. Jawwad Noor!
      > I am mainly interested in Heidegger, but I essentially look
      > Sartre as a very pertanent commentator, and Sartreans must regard
      > Heidegger as Sartre's main progenator. I have been studying lately
      > fair amount about emotion in Heidegger that is automatically
      > to Sartre therefore. First, one discovers one's emotions "always
      > already" as one is "thrown" into the world. So rioght at the
      > beginning, however you define that, emotions are not only not
      > in 'your' control, in a deeper sense they are not even your own but
      > constitute part of the inheritance of 'your' tradition. The whole
      > manner in which you understand the world comes to you as you
      > are "thrown" into it, completely out of place and out of order
      > according to any systematic notion of knowledge. Another word for
      > with extra implications is the word "fallen" which means you feel
      > misplaced in the world you are thrown but have NOT come from
      > elsewhere and certainly not from a higher state. THAT you feel out
      > place leads you to search for a more authentic state of being. That
      > means you must turn away from the 'everyday' world of the 'They'
      > that disperses any sense of unique identity as defined by your
      > ownmost death which cannot be shared with anybody. Attaining
      > authenticity through resolve means answering the call of conscience
      > which has nothing to say in itself but calls you out of the
      > world of the 'They" self. The "call of conscience", which
      > is just 'call', does not have any standards other than honesty
      > ("Honesty is the only virtue": Nietzsche). That means when you have
      > attained authenticity, you are in the situation of perfect freedom
      > infinite possibilities BECAUSE THERE IS NO SUCH THING AS AN
      > STANDARD OR ETHICS OF ANY SORT! Choice aplies to descent back into
      > the practical, everyday world of action, so that authenticity can
      > only be maintained by being "guilty", making one choice and giving
      > forever the other choice. Such an authentic state of, as Heidegger
      > would call it, dasein or being-there (meant literally: your
      > fundamental enduring reality is 'There' in the everyday world) is
      > therefore grounded in nullity or "nothing" as Sartre would say.
      > Becoming guilty by making a choice, grounded in nothing, is a
      > into "bad faith" as Sartre would say.
      > > On re-discovering your emotions from the point of view of
      > authenticity, they have become strangers to your honest, authentic
      > project. They have nothing to do with the "absolute goal" of
      > authentic dasein which to Heidegger is death as your ownmost alone.
      > Emotions are not knowledge. They identitfy with objects as desired
      > not desired, but really communicate nothing about them. Which
      > by reason alone, you must determine whether they are appropriate or
      > not. The emotions, however, neither being knowledge nor rational,
      > want what they want regardless of consequences since to understand
      > consequence requires knowledge and reasoning. Therefore Sartre
      > them 'magical' because essentially they want to jump to their
      > fufillment regardless of how great the gulf in between.
      > > I find Sartre's tradition of Cartesian rationalism quite
      > refreshing after dealing with the great turbulances in Heidegger.
      > An extreme but fundamental example of one such turbulance is in
      > another letter I shall transfer called "Heidegger's Paen to Hate"
      > its appendix.
      > Dear Tommy,
      > you wrote: >I think Sartre's choice of title for his work on a
      > of emotions informs us that although a study of the emotions is
      > central to existentialism, existentialist theory is not affected by
      > the detail of any such study. They remain 'to be worked on'.
      > GARY C MOORE:
      > It is definitely central since it is all in one with the
      > understanding of tradition, heritage, history, historiography, all
      > those things into which dasein is thrown willy-nilly and yet must
      > retrieve and appropriate as its own, in the process destroying and
      > rebuilding them.
      > JAWWAD NOOR:
      > I am not so sure if existentialism is not effected by the question
      > whether our emotions are a result of my choice.
      > GARY C MOORE:
      > > When you discover them as thrown, they are definitely not of
      > your choice. But some of them do exist in a context, and when the
      > context is rationalized and ordered, then they will change
      > to how that relationship works. That does not mean, however, they
      > a result of your choice, and are 'under your control' only in so
      > as they are 'persuaded' by the context. But I think Heidegger is
      > right, though I do not fully understand it, that there are
      > emotions like anger, which he compares to infatuation, that are so
      > fixated on their specific object they soon wear themselves out. And
      > them there are emotions like hate (which he likens to love but does
      > not go into) that are permanent, deep inside one's being, that are
      > one day discovered as always having been there. Mersault's so-
      > indifference in THE STRANGER is one such permanent emotion only it
      > misunderstood because it is essentially a passion to discover
      > something, he knows not what, until the morning of the day of his
      > execution when paradoxically he discovers it always was a
      > love of life that is only realized when confronted with his own
      > JAWWAD NOOR:
      > If i am not in control of my feelings,moods, emotions, then free
      > will disappears in its essence (i may be very wrong).
      > GARY C MOORE:
      > > Very wrong, but so what? Risking being wrong requires a bit
      > courage and, even more important, is a fundamental way of asking
      > questions one doesn't clearly know how to put forward. I am wrong
      > the time, and receive great rewards from being corrected. For one
      > thing, first of all, from the newly learned point of view, YOU MUST
      > SEE IF YOU CAN CORRECT THE CORRECTOR! It is your duty to yourself,
      > and him, in simple honesty.
      > > We have established you are not "in control" and never were
      > never really can be. First of all, though, the words "free"
      > and "will" do not belong together. Freedom is not an act, and
      > certainly not an agressive one. Freedom is detachment, first in
      > stages, then altogether. This is how the Western mystics like St.
      > John of the Cross or Meister Eckhart say they find the most
      > essential 'thing' of all: God. When everything that is detacheable
      > taken away, only the irrevocable essential can remain. The Indian
      > philosopher Shankara is by far and above the perfect master of this
      > thinking in his BRAHMASUTRABASYA, and reading him could vastly
      > illuminate both your Sartre and Heidegger and even St.
      Paul. "Will",
      > especially "the will to power" of Nietzsche which I also touch on
      > in "Paen" is a 'force' one participates in, the opening up of the
      > history of being as Heidegger calls it. Sartre, on the other hand
      > some extent (how much, or even, did he?) disliked Nietzsche many
      > people say (although there is a fascination passage about Nietzsche
      > in SAINT GENET!) and I do not think liked the word will either,
      > refering reason and choice and the detachment of freedom.
      > JAWWAD NOOR:
      > If i choose to do something becuz i have a desire for it, and if
      > this desire does not arise out of a choice of mine, then how is my
      > choice free? It CAN be free if I determine my desires. So thats the
      > issue then. And
      > many other questions come up, eg do we determine our desires in
      > When
      > we determine our desire, then is it becuz we desire to determine
      > desire?
      > if so, then is it our choice to desire to determine our desire?
      > GARY C MOORE:
      > > Work it out for yourself now if you accept freedom is
      > detachment and not a finite act, and that emotions are part of
      > your 'inheritance'. Aristotle founds the whole of his ETHICS and
      > POLITICS on the notion that you learn 'good' and 'evil' from your
      > parents and as an immature youth that 'knowledge' grows to be
      > habitual, and he has no disagreement that this is the way it should
      > be done simply because it is the way things are. Then when one
      > to maturity, though, one must exercise reason. The habitual
      > of what is good and what is evil serve as the background of all
      > decisions, but the most important thing is reason exersizing equity
      > (he calls it "epiekeia") in determining BALANCED judgements taking
      > all circumstances. That, for him, is the true ground of ethics and
      > sound politics. The same thing for emotions: they are important but
      > they must be weighed in the rational balance and judged. Aristotle
      > also originated the concept of existential project in THE
      > ETHICS.
      > GARY C MOORE:
      > I just glanced over these lower letters, made hasty comment at
      > bottom. Must go.
      > Dear Russel,
      > U wrote:>You seem to be thinking of consciousness in terms of
      > deliberation
      > and (what
      > >is not exactly the same thing) reflective consciousness. Sartre's
      > position
      > >is, indeed, that our moods and emotions are choices, but that does
      > not mean
      > >we first explicitly deliberate over what mood we'd like to be in.
      > Indeed,
      > >Sartre holds that "when we deliberate, the chips are down" meaning
      > that we
      > >are typically fully engaged in a purposeful direction at the
      > we'd
      > >like to say we are still in the business of deciding. So, in
      > it is
      > >going to seem to us that our moods just come to us and are not of
      > >choosing, but what we need to look at is how skillfully we
      > orchestrate
      > >these, and how they serve us well. Then we may be more open to the
      > idea
      > >that
      > >these moods are something we do and not just something we undergo.
      > Sir, could u please tell me what proof existentialists offer for
      > postulate that our emotions are skillfully orchestrated choices (is
      > it the
      > fact that the for-itself is not what it is and is what it is not)?
      > am
      > still left uncomfortable with the idea of emotions being our
      > Could
      > u also kindly clarify 1) who is 'I' (this is probably a
      > of my
      > illiteracy!) 2)isnt choice a result of a reflective consciousness?
      > If not,
      > then why dont we call our instinctive actions ones of choice??
      > Thanks!
      > Dear Greg,
      > U wrote: >According to Sartre emotions aren't exactly a choice per
      > se, but
      > he does argue that there is a rational
      > >reason why we have them -- they are not, as many would have it,
      > things that
      > >come up independently, some force that exists in our sub-
      > Thus
      > >we can be depressed because we cannot get that which we want --
      > project
      > >has certain goals (to marry someone, get a book published, etc.)
      > >when that goal can't be met we get "depressed." Sometimes we even
      > >cry, which Sartre describes as an attempt to magically rectify the
      > >situation
      > >(the child doesn't get the toy he/she wants, so he/she starts to
      > as
      > >if that will somehow overcome the obstacle, perhaps a recalcitrant
      > >parent, in the way of he/she getting the toy). If we lose a loved
      > one, the
      > >grief
      > >we feel is natural enough and not really something we "choose"
      > >extrapolating here);
      > >however, the widow who then goes into extended mourning and
      > >changes her life's routine, pleading she's too "depressed" or
      > >"grief-stricken" to
      > >do anything else, may well be choosing this mode of being not
      > because,
      > >months
      > >and years after the death of her husband, she is incapacitated by
      > grief,
      > >but because
      > >she is using her "grief" (even perhaps convincing herself of it)
      > obscure
      > >the fact
      > >that she simply doesn't want to engage with life in the way or
      > fashion that
      > >is demanded by her new situation.
      > >
      > >Greg
      > Ok...so u are saying that there is a rational reason why we have
      > these
      > emotions, and if u notice u pin these 'reasons' to the external
      > world. Hence
      > proved that these emotions are atleast in part not determined by us?
      > The thing u said about the grieving widow adopting grieving as a
      > of
      > life, i will agree that this is her choice. But i understand it in
      > different way (which will reflect my understanding that choices are
      > reflective). The widow is faced with a choice of CONSCIOUSLY
      > heself
      > out of the grief. The choice is available to her, and the grief can
      > be
      > moulded by her choices (the initial grief was not in her hands, the
      > later
      > grief increasingly became in her hands), and given that she has the
      > possibility of ending the grief, her NOT taking this choice IS her
      > choosing
      > to be in grief.
      > Once again everybody, this is just me getting my faulty concepts
      > cleared up.
      > Ive finished half of Being n Nothingness and am trying to
      > all
      > that he has said. Thanks yet again!!
      > Best regards,
      > J
      > GARY C MOORE:
      > Compare the lower letters I just noticed to what I wrote. All
      > all they seem overall to agree with me?
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      > --- End forwarded message ---
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