Hi! And thank u very much for ur reply , it was very enlightening.
But before i can say that i have fully comprehended what u are saying
i would really appreciate some questions being answered:
1. For Heidegger and/or Sartre, who is 'I'? When u use the
word 'you', who/what exactly are u referring to? What is
this 'reflecting THING'? This i think is a very important q.
2. Is it possible to attain authenticity? If so, how?
3. PLease could u explain what u mean when u say that 'freedom is
detachment'? Do u mean that the for-itself would be perfectly free
only if it were not encased within an emotion/desire-ridden body in
an everyday world of others? If so, then are u implying that we are
NOT free in our choices in this world?
4. For Heidegger and/or Sartre what creates desire?
5. Are desires to be seen as objects of consciousness?
--- In Sartre@egroups.com, "Gary C. Moore" <gottlos75@m...> wrote:
> Hello Mr. Jawwad Noor!
> I am mainly interested in Heidegger, but I essentially look
> Sartre as a very pertanent commentator, and Sartreans must regard
> Heidegger as Sartre's main progenator. I have been studying lately
> fair amount about emotion in Heidegger that is automatically
> to Sartre therefore. First, one discovers one's emotions "always
> already" as one is "thrown" into the world. So rioght at the
> beginning, however you define that, emotions are not only not
> in 'your' control, in a deeper sense they are not even your own but
> constitute part of the inheritance of 'your' tradition. The whole
> manner in which you understand the world comes to you as you
> are "thrown" into it, completely out of place and out of order
> according to any systematic notion of knowledge. Another word for
> with extra implications is the word "fallen" which means you feel
> misplaced in the world you are thrown but have NOT come from
> elsewhere and certainly not from a higher state. THAT you feel out
> place leads you to search for a more authentic state of being. That
> means you must turn away from the 'everyday' world of the 'They'
> that disperses any sense of unique identity as defined by your
> ownmost death which cannot be shared with anybody. Attaining
> authenticity through resolve means answering the call of conscience
> which has nothing to say in itself but calls you out of the
> world of the 'They" self. The "call of conscience", which
> is just 'call', does not have any standards other than honesty
> ("Honesty is the only virtue": Nietzsche). That means when you have
> attained authenticity, you are in the situation of perfect freedom
> infinite possibilities BECAUSE THERE IS NO SUCH THING AS AN
> STANDARD OR ETHICS OF ANY SORT! Choice aplies to descent back into
> the practical, everyday world of action, so that authenticity can
> only be maintained by being "guilty", making one choice and giving
> forever the other choice. Such an authentic state of, as Heidegger
> would call it, dasein or being-there (meant literally: your
> fundamental enduring reality is 'There' in the everyday world) is
> therefore grounded in nullity or "nothing" as Sartre would say.
> Becoming guilty by making a choice, grounded in nothing, is a
> into "bad faith" as Sartre would say.
> > On re-discovering your emotions from the point of view of
> authenticity, they have become strangers to your honest, authentic
> project. They have nothing to do with the "absolute goal" of
> authentic dasein which to Heidegger is death as your ownmost alone.
> Emotions are not knowledge. They identitfy with objects as desired
> not desired, but really communicate nothing about them. Which
> by reason alone, you must determine whether they are appropriate or
> not. The emotions, however, neither being knowledge nor rational,
> want what they want regardless of consequences since to understand
> consequence requires knowledge and reasoning. Therefore Sartre
> them 'magical' because essentially they want to jump to their
> fufillment regardless of how great the gulf in between.
> > I find Sartre's tradition of Cartesian rationalism quite
> refreshing after dealing with the great turbulances in Heidegger.
> An extreme but fundamental example of one such turbulance is in
> another letter I shall transfer called "Heidegger's Paen to Hate"
> its appendix.
> Dear Tommy,
> you wrote: >I think Sartre's choice of title for his work on a
> of emotions informs us that although a study of the emotions is
> central to existentialism, existentialist theory is not affected by
> the detail of any such study. They remain 'to be worked on'.
> GARY C MOORE:
> It is definitely central since it is all in one with the
> understanding of tradition, heritage, history, historiography, all
> those things into which dasein is thrown willy-nilly and yet must
> retrieve and appropriate as its own, in the process destroying and
> rebuilding them.
> JAWWAD NOOR:
> I am not so sure if existentialism is not effected by the question
> whether our emotions are a result of my choice.
> GARY C MOORE:
> > When you discover them as thrown, they are definitely not of
> your choice. But some of them do exist in a context, and when the
> context is rationalized and ordered, then they will change
> to how that relationship works. That does not mean, however, they
> a result of your choice, and are 'under your control' only in so
> as they are 'persuaded' by the context. But I think Heidegger is
> right, though I do not fully understand it, that there are
> emotions like anger, which he compares to infatuation, that are so
> fixated on their specific object they soon wear themselves out. And
> them there are emotions like hate (which he likens to love but does
> not go into) that are permanent, deep inside one's being, that are
> one day discovered as always having been there. Mersault's so-
> indifference in THE STRANGER is one such permanent emotion only it
> misunderstood because it is essentially a passion to discover
> something, he knows not what, until the morning of the day of his
> execution when paradoxically he discovers it always was a
> love of life that is only realized when confronted with his own
> JAWWAD NOOR:
> If i am not in control of my feelings,moods, emotions, then free
> will disappears in its essence (i may be very wrong).
> GARY C MOORE:
> > Very wrong, but so what? Risking being wrong requires a bit
> courage and, even more important, is a fundamental way of asking
> questions one doesn't clearly know how to put forward. I am wrong
> the time, and receive great rewards from being corrected. For one
> thing, first of all, from the newly learned point of view, YOU MUST
> SEE IF YOU CAN CORRECT THE CORRECTOR! It is your duty to yourself,
> and him, in simple honesty.
> > We have established you are not "in control" and never were
> never really can be. First of all, though, the words "free"
> and "will" do not belong together. Freedom is not an act, and
> certainly not an agressive one. Freedom is detachment, first in
> stages, then altogether. This is how the Western mystics like St.
> John of the Cross or Meister Eckhart say they find the most
> essential 'thing' of all: God. When everything that is detacheable
> taken away, only the irrevocable essential can remain. The Indian
> philosopher Shankara is by far and above the perfect master of this
> thinking in his BRAHMASUTRABASYA, and reading him could vastly
> illuminate both your Sartre and Heidegger and even St.
> especially "the will to power" of Nietzsche which I also touch on
> in "Paen" is a 'force' one participates in, the opening up of the
> history of being as Heidegger calls it. Sartre, on the other hand
> some extent (how much, or even, did he?) disliked Nietzsche many
> people say (although there is a fascination passage about Nietzsche
> in SAINT GENET!) and I do not think liked the word will either,
> refering reason and choice and the detachment of freedom.
> JAWWAD NOOR:
> If i choose to do something becuz i have a desire for it, and if
> this desire does not arise out of a choice of mine, then how is my
> choice free? It CAN be free if I determine my desires. So thats the
> issue then. And
> many other questions come up, eg do we determine our desires in
> we determine our desire, then is it becuz we desire to determine
> if so, then is it our choice to desire to determine our desire?
> GARY C MOORE:
> > Work it out for yourself now if you accept freedom is
> detachment and not a finite act, and that emotions are part of
> your 'inheritance'. Aristotle founds the whole of his ETHICS and
> POLITICS on the notion that you learn 'good' and 'evil' from your
> parents and as an immature youth that 'knowledge' grows to be
> habitual, and he has no disagreement that this is the way it should
> be done simply because it is the way things are. Then when one
> to maturity, though, one must exercise reason. The habitual
> of what is good and what is evil serve as the background of all
> decisions, but the most important thing is reason exersizing equity
> (he calls it "epiekeia") in determining BALANCED judgements taking
> all circumstances. That, for him, is the true ground of ethics and
> sound politics. The same thing for emotions: they are important but
> they must be weighed in the rational balance and judged. Aristotle
> also originated the concept of existential project in THE
> GARY C MOORE:
> I just glanced over these lower letters, made hasty comment at
> bottom. Must go.
> Dear Russel,
> U wrote:>You seem to be thinking of consciousness in terms of
> and (what
> >is not exactly the same thing) reflective consciousness. Sartre's
> >is, indeed, that our moods and emotions are choices, but that does
> not mean
> >we first explicitly deliberate over what mood we'd like to be in.
> >Sartre holds that "when we deliberate, the chips are down" meaning
> that we
> >are typically fully engaged in a purposeful direction at the
> >like to say we are still in the business of deciding. So, in
> it is
> >going to seem to us that our moods just come to us and are not of
> >choosing, but what we need to look at is how skillfully we
> >these, and how they serve us well. Then we may be more open to the
> >these moods are something we do and not just something we undergo.
> Sir, could u please tell me what proof existentialists offer for
> postulate that our emotions are skillfully orchestrated choices (is
> it the
> fact that the for-itself is not what it is and is what it is not)?
> still left uncomfortable with the idea of emotions being our
> u also kindly clarify 1) who is 'I' (this is probably a
> of my
> illiteracy!) 2)isnt choice a result of a reflective consciousness?
> If not,
> then why dont we call our instinctive actions ones of choice??
> Dear Greg,
> U wrote: >According to Sartre emotions aren't exactly a choice per
> se, but
> he does argue that there is a rational
> >reason why we have them -- they are not, as many would have it,
> things that
> >come up independently, some force that exists in our sub-
> >we can be depressed because we cannot get that which we want --
> >has certain goals (to marry someone, get a book published, etc.)
> >when that goal can't be met we get "depressed." Sometimes we even
> >cry, which Sartre describes as an attempt to magically rectify the
> >(the child doesn't get the toy he/she wants, so he/she starts to
> >if that will somehow overcome the obstacle, perhaps a recalcitrant
> >parent, in the way of he/she getting the toy). If we lose a loved
> one, the
> >we feel is natural enough and not really something we "choose"
> >extrapolating here);
> >however, the widow who then goes into extended mourning and
> >changes her life's routine, pleading she's too "depressed" or
> >"grief-stricken" to
> >do anything else, may well be choosing this mode of being not
> >and years after the death of her husband, she is incapacitated by
> >but because
> >she is using her "grief" (even perhaps convincing herself of it)
> >the fact
> >that she simply doesn't want to engage with life in the way or
> fashion that
> >is demanded by her new situation.
> Ok...so u are saying that there is a rational reason why we have
> emotions, and if u notice u pin these 'reasons' to the external
> world. Hence
> proved that these emotions are atleast in part not determined by us?
> The thing u said about the grieving widow adopting grieving as a
> life, i will agree that this is her choice. But i understand it in
> different way (which will reflect my understanding that choices are
> reflective). The widow is faced with a choice of CONSCIOUSLY
> out of the grief. The choice is available to her, and the grief can
> moulded by her choices (the initial grief was not in her hands, the
> grief increasingly became in her hands), and given that she has the
> possibility of ending the grief, her NOT taking this choice IS her
> to be in grief.
> Once again everybody, this is just me getting my faulty concepts
> cleared up.
> Ive finished half of Being n Nothingness and am trying to
> that he has said. Thanks yet again!!
> Best regards,
> GARY C MOORE:
> Compare the lower letters I just noticed to what I wrote. All
> all they seem overall to agree with me?
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> --- End forwarded message ---