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Re: The nihilation of the in-itself into the for-itself

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  • james tan
    ... if i don t understand sartre wrongly. being-in-itself is the pure existence of all non-conscious being which themselves are object of consciousness. it is
    Message 1 of 3 , Dec 2, 2001
      >>>I am curious as to how being-in-itself becomes the foundation of
      >>>being-for-itself.<<<

      if i don't understand sartre wrongly. being-in-itself is the pure existence
      of all non-conscious being which themselves are object of consciousness. it
      is not a thing in the sense of kant's noumenon where the being hides behind
      things. it is the being of phenomena; that is, the "that it is" of things.
      it is sartre's way of interpreting heidegger assertion that "Being is the
      transcendens pure and simple". in "nausea", the character felt nauseous when
      confronted by the tree. it is the awareness of an consciousness of the
      fullness of being of an being-in-itself with a fullness and plenitude
      characterized by impermeabiity and infinite density (when compared with
      being-for-itself). and being-for-itself is said to be nothingness for the
      reason that all being in on the side of its object. for-itself is the
      negating of a particular being, and being negation, it must have something
      to negate; that something is the world. you go back home to realise your
      girlfriend is not there; this ability to perceive the *absence* is the
      essence of for-itself; it is the ability to 'not' something. in this sense,
      for-itself has only a borrowed existence, for sartre said in b&n: for
      consciousness there is no being except for this precise obligation to be a
      revealing intuition. unquote. without the in-itself to be revealed,
      consciousness (for-itself) cannot be self-conscious and thereby ceases to
      exist as "pure existence'. it follows hence that the in-itself is
      ontologically *prior* to for-itself and establishes the ground for it.
      for-itself (consciousness) without the in-itself (objects, world) is a kind
      of abstraction; it could not exist any more than a color could exist without
      form. but they are not interdependent. the in-itself has no need for
      for-itself to exist; without in-itself, there is no way for-itself could
      exist (or be known, revealed).

      >>>Sartre also says that the for-itself no longer has the same contingency
      >>>of the in-itself and becomes the foundation of its own being, but it is
      >>>still contingent on originally being the in-itself?<<<

      for the reason that in-itself is absolutely not subject to temporality,
      undifferentiated, uncreated, it is neither possible nor necessary, but
      rather contingent. for-itself, on the other hand, is necessary if the world
      is to be constituted or manifested. the world come into being because
      consciousness is the negation of being. here, one must differeniate between
      the concepts of 'world' and 'the undifferentiated totality of being'.
      without the for-itself, there would exist no world but merely
      "undifferentiated totality of being". and yet, for-itself depends on
      in-itself to be manifested.

      >>>I am not sure if he is saying that the in-itself qua in-itself is able to
      >>>nihilate itself into the for-itself or if there some outside nihilating
      >>>force that causes or permits the decompression of the in-self. How could
      >>>the in-itself, as total identity, be capable of self-nihilation?<<<

      it is impossible that in-itself is capable of that. that ability only belong
      to for-itsef; in fact, not as if for-itself is an entity that *possess* the
      ability to negate. rather, for-itself is wholly characterised by its ability
      to negate. for-itself is negation.

      >>>It is easy to see how the cogito can be providing its own epistemic
      >>>foundation, but doesn't it retain an ontological dependency on something
      >>>other that itself?<<<

      the way cogito is used can be ambiguous. sartre differentiate between 'i'
      and 'me', prereflective and reflective consciousness. kant refers to it as a
      set of logical condition. descartes meant it as 'i think' - did he want to
      emphasise the 'i' or 'think'? is it suppose to mean a mental substance, a
      'unifying principle' as in husserl, or consciousness. but that descartes
      used cogito as a epist foundation for the existence of the world, to
      heidegger and sartre, is mistaken. the world already exist, it can't be
      bracketed, it can't be doubted, there is no need for any foundation. 'things
      as they are' is that the world exist for consciousness to intuit it exist so
      that it can be said it is not that the world do not exist.

      james.










      From: "d w" <deividdo@...>
      Reply-To: Sartre@yahoogroups.com
      To: <Sartre@...
      Subject: [Sartre] The nihilation of the in-itself into the for-itself
      Date: Sat, 8 Dec 2001 00:40:00 -0500


      I am making my way through Being and Nothingness and I am curious as to how
      being-in-itself becomes the foundation of being-for-itself.
      Being-for-itself is a decompression of the in-itself, but how does this
      occur? Sartre also says that the for-itself no longer has the same
      contingency of the in-itself and becomes the foundation of its own being,
      but it is still contingent on originally being the in-itself? I am not sure
      if he is saying that the in-itself qua in-itself is able to nihilate itself
      into the for-itself or if there some outside nihilating force that causes or
      permits the decompression of the in-self. How could the in-itself, as total
      identity, be capable of self-nihilation? Being-in-itself does not have a
      self, per say, so how could it be capable of manifesting this fissure in its
      own being?
      Also, he says that the for-itself "is the foundation of its ... existence,
      but on no account of its presence". Is he speaking of an epistemological or
      ontological foundation? It is easy to see how the cogito can be providing
      its own epistemic foundation, but doesn't it retain an ontological
      dependency on something other that itself?
      I know that I have asked several questions, but I would kindly appreciate
      any assistance with these problems.

      David

      "It was subtle of god to learn Greek when he wished to become an author-
      and not to learn it better." -Nietzsche



      _________________________________________________________________
      Get your FREE download of MSN Explorer at http://explorer.msn.com/intl.asp
    • james tan
      ... if i don t understand sartre wrongly. being-in-itself is the pure existence of all non-conscious being which themselves are object of consciousness. it is
      Message 2 of 3 , Dec 2, 2001
        >>>I am curious as to how being-in-itself becomes the foundation of
        >>>being-for-itself.<<<

        if i don't understand sartre wrongly. being-in-itself is the pure existence
        of all non-conscious being which themselves are object of consciousness. it
        is not a thing in the sense of kant's noumenon where the being hides behind
        things. it is the being of phenomena; that is, the "that it is" of things.
        it is sartre's way of interpreting heidegger assertion that "Being is the
        transcendens pure and simple". in "nausea", the character felt nauseous when
        confronted by the tree. it is the awareness of an consciousness of the
        fullness of being of an being-in-itself with a fullness and plenitude
        characterized by impermeabiity and infinite density (when compared with
        being-for-itself). and being-for-itself is said to be nothingness for the
        reason that all being in on the side of its object. for-itself is the
        negating of a particular being, and being negation, it must have something
        to negate; that something is the world. you go back home to realise your
        girlfriend is not there; this ability to perceive the *absence* is the
        essence of for-itself; it is the ability to 'not' something. in this sense,
        for-itself has only a borrowed existence, for sartre said in b&n: for
        consciousness there is no being except for this precise obligation to be a
        revealing intuition. unquote. without the in-itself to be revealed,
        consciousness (for-itself) cannot be self-conscious and thereby ceases to
        exist as "pure existence'. it follows hence that the in-itself is
        ontologically *prior* to for-itself and establishes the ground for it.
        for-itself (consciousness) without the in-itself (objects, world) is a kind
        of abstraction; it could not exist any more than a color could exist without
        form. but they are not interdependent. the in-itself has no need for
        for-itself to exist; without in-itself, there is no way for-itself could
        exist (or be known, revealed).

        >>>Sartre also says that the for-itself no longer has the same contingency
        >>>of the in-itself and becomes the foundation of its own being, but it is
        >>>still contingent on originally being the in-itself?<<<

        for the reason that in-itself is absolutely not subject to temporality,
        undifferentiated, uncreated, it is neither possible nor necessary, but
        rather contingent. for-itself, on the other hand, is necessary if the world
        is to be constituted or manifested. the world come into being because
        consciousness is the negation of being. here, one must differeniate between
        the concepts of 'world' and 'the undifferentiated totality of being'.
        without the for-itself, there would exist no world but merely
        "undifferentiated totality of being". and yet, for-itself depends on
        in-itself to be manifested.

        >>>I am not sure if he is saying that the in-itself qua in-itself is able to
        >>>nihilate itself into the for-itself or if there some outside nihilating
        >>>force that causes or permits the decompression of the in-self. How could
        >>>the in-itself, as total identity, be capable of self-nihilation?<<<

        it is impossible that in-itself is capable of that. that ability only belong
        to for-itsef; in fact, not as if for-itself is an entity that *possess* the
        ability to negate. rather, for-itself is wholly characterised by its ability
        to negate. for-itself is negation.

        >>>It is easy to see how the cogito can be providing its own epistemic
        >>>foundation, but doesn't it retain an ontological dependency on something
        >>>other that itself?<<<

        the way cogito is used can be ambiguous. sartre differentiate between 'i'
        and 'me', prereflective and reflective consciousness. kant refers to it as a
        set of logical condition. descartes meant it as 'i think' - did he want to
        emphasise the 'i' or 'think'? is it suppose to mean a mental substance, a
        'unifying principle' as in husserl, or consciousness. but that descartes
        used cogito as a epist foundation for the existence of the world, to
        heidegger and sartre, is mistaken. the world already exist, it can't be
        bracketed, it can't be doubted, there is no need for any foundation. 'things
        as they are' is that the world exist for consciousness to intuit it exist so
        that it can be said it is not that the world do not exist.

        james.










        From: "d w" <deividdo@...>
        Reply-To: Sartre@yahoogroups.com
        To: <Sartre@...
        Subject: [Sartre] The nihilation of the in-itself into the for-itself
        Date: Sat, 8 Dec 2001 00:40:00 -0500


        I am making my way through Being and Nothingness and I am curious as to how
        being-in-itself becomes the foundation of being-for-itself.
        Being-for-itself is a decompression of the in-itself, but how does this
        occur? Sartre also says that the for-itself no longer has the same
        contingency of the in-itself and becomes the foundation of its own being,
        but it is still contingent on originally being the in-itself? I am not sure
        if he is saying that the in-itself qua in-itself is able to nihilate itself
        into the for-itself or if there some outside nihilating force that causes or
        permits the decompression of the in-self. How could the in-itself, as total
        identity, be capable of self-nihilation? Being-in-itself does not have a
        self, per say, so how could it be capable of manifesting this fissure in its
        own being?
        Also, he says that the for-itself "is the foundation of its ... existence,
        but on no account of its presence". Is he speaking of an epistemological or
        ontological foundation? It is easy to see how the cogito can be providing
        its own epistemic foundation, but doesn't it retain an ontological
        dependency on something other that itself?
        I know that I have asked several questions, but I would kindly appreciate
        any assistance with these problems.

        David

        "It was subtle of god to learn Greek when he wished to become an author-
        and not to learn it better." -Nietzsche



        _________________________________________________________________
        Get your FREE download of MSN Explorer at http://explorer.msn.com/intl.asp
      • d w
        I am making my way through Being and Nothingness and I am curious as to how being-in-itself becomes the foundation of being-for-itself. Being-for-itself is a
        Message 3 of 3 , Dec 7, 2001
           
          I am making my way through Being and Nothingness and I am curious as to how being-in-itself becomes the foundation of being-for-itself.  Being-for-itself is a decompression of the in-itself, but how does this occur?  Sartre also says that the for-itself no longer has the same contingency of the in-itself and becomes the foundation of its own being, but it is still contingent on originally being the in-itself?  I am not sure if he is saying that the in-itself qua in-itself is able to nihilate itself into the for-itself or if there some outside nihilating force that causes or permits the decompression of the in-self.  How could the in-itself, as total identity, be capable of self-nihilation?  Being-in-itself does not have a self, per say, so how could it be capable of manifesting this fissure in its own being? 
          Also, he says that the for-itself "is the foundation of its ... existence, but on no account of its presence".  Is he speaking of an epistemological or ontological foundation?  It is easy to see how the cogito can be providing its own epistemic foundation, but doesn't it retain an ontological dependency on something other that itself?
          I know that I have asked several questions, but I would kindly appreciate any assistance with these problems.
           
          David
           
          "It was subtle of god to learn Greek when  he wished to become an author- and not to learn it better." -Nietzsche
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