Speaking Into One Lautsprecher.
On the subject of the philosophy of the mind, below is
a good example of an intellectual "getting stuck in a
loop", as in his thought processes getting stuck ON
brain, rather than being OF the brain. I ask you, has
this person lost his mind? Or has he simply left it
behind somewhere, like maybe some local tavern, where,
free to relax and suss out its own nausea, it may some
day fade away, permanently, into oblivion?
Thank you for the thoughtful and errudite review of my piece. For you information you are dealing with linguistic-philosophy, not philosophy of mind - obviously you can't tell one from the other? The Routledge Encyclopaedia of Philosophy will put you on the right road. Ask you teacher if they have it in the school library. If you like it, it might be a good idea to tell your parents how much you enjoyed it - they make take the hint and buy it for you as a Christmas present? After you've read a bit of philosophy you may care to have a go at addressing some of the points that were raised in my essay? I promise that I won't may fun of you. In the meantime I'll just pop over to the Sartre archive and see if I can find anything that you have written in the past - you don't mind do you? It's only so that I can have an opportunity to gauge the quality of the stuff that you've posted in the past - have a little fun with it - you know the sort of thing?
Below is another little piece that I have written specially for you - think of it as a textual bouquet - the sort of thing you take into hospital to cheer someone up when they have '"problems up there" - you know - the buzzing - the voices you hear - your preoccupation with self abuse?
PS. You could always try wearing gloves? ;-)
To some translators Gorgias, is apparently represented as saying that
nothing exists, or if it does exist it cannot be known, or if it exists and
is knowable it cannot be communicated to another, and they often accuse him
of denying all reality and all knowledge. Others seem to think that he
wasn't denying existence at all, and that what he meant was that we cannot
speak of 'Being.'
Looking at the introductory sentence above with the words: 'Gorgias, is
apparently represented as saying that nothing exists,' could be interpreted
as meaning that he was ASSERTING that nothing exists. Who knows? It's
anybody's guess, and one thing I've learnt is that in the question of
translation from the Greek of any concepts concerning being or existence, it
is open season, with one translator insisting that 'is' or 'being' means
'this,' and another hermeneuticist protesting that it means 'that - while
yet a third avers hotly that it means 'the other.' Hence the constant
bickering concerning what Aristotle meant when he said: 'There is a science
that studies 'being as being'. It is noticeable that he deliberately
chooses to employ the present participle 'to on' which [unusually] most
scholars agree means: 'the existing being,' and to me it seems pretty
obvious that he must have been referring to the science of studying the
universal elements that constitute the make-up of entities, for otherwise he
would not have used the appellation 'science,' for if he had meant his
statement to mean the metaphysical study of 'Being' as it is conceived of by
the transcendentalists of today, he would not have ennobled the activity
with the name of 'science.' But mine is purely a personal opinion -
cavalier to some maybe, but extremely logical to others. The word 'science'
may well have included the wilder shores of speculation in those days - who
If Gorgias DID mean that we cannot speak of 'Being.' As Umberto Ecco seems
to believe, then I entirely agree with him. This maybe the reason why Allen
says that I remind him of Gorgias? Certainly 'being' is merely a mechanism
which makes it possible for us to speak of the existential modalities of
entities, [whether they be sententially real or reificantal] of the subjects
we describe in our daily discourse, and as 'being' itself has no state or
modality of its own it cannot be spoken of as Gorgias points out, although
nowadays we can describe the functions of 'is' and 'being' etc employing a
linguistic metalanguage that was not available to Gorgias at the time.
Being itself does not exist either as a gerundial reificatory metonym for
our serial experience of life, or as a blanket verbial composite to cover
the sense of that serial experience that we call 'our lives,' or indeed as
an all-encompassing term to describe cosmic-presence - rather than
cosmic-absence, but is a word used to introduce, attribute, indicate and
process a description of what is HAPPENING to an entity.
'The words 'is' and 'being' are 'usherette-words' bequeathing existential
modality upon the entities with which they are associated, and have no
modality in themselves, neither do they possess a state of their own that
can be 'handed over' to some illegitimate 'being-there' construction in
order to avoid an existentialist three-legged ontological race.
One cannot be in a state of 'BEING,' but only in a state of 'Being
Something' - being sad or being the President of the United States of
America, or even more sinisterly 'being there.'
Pascal hit the nail on the head when he said in 1665:
'One cannot begin to define being without falling victim to this absurdity,
one cannot define a word without beginning with the term 'is' be it
expressly stated or merely understood. To define being therefore, you have
to say 'is' - thus using the term to be defined in the definition.'
Aristotle reports that there is a science that studies 'being as being,' but
is careful to use the present participle: 'to on' that is: 'the existing
Heidegger although having only a tenuous grasp of the semantic significance
of the workings of the BE the 'IS' and the 'BEING' words, was at least
astute enough to realise that unless he could choreograph a route around the
road block of the continuous present, as signified by the verb 'being', with
the continuous ontological double-vision that this would automatically drag
in its wake, was forced to create a term that would conceal this semantic
trickery. His choice of words was predictable and almost inevitable: 'being
there' [das sein.]
Being there provided him with exactly the critically important mechanism he
required, for he cheekily co-opted the very function of the continuous
present function of the verb, and instaurated it in combination with a
locative predicational 'there,' which provided him with the 'ready-made'
existential modalic state which, under the guise of 'das sein,' meant that
his narrator could now proceed to rhapsodise in a state of being one person
and not some double-headed ontological monstrosity speaking into one
Whether it is 'being there' or 'being here,' it allows the unnamed everyman
to don a second hug-me-tight of existence, and stooping enter into the
mysterious world of Tolkienesque fantasy which Heidegger inhabits - a world
of lexical jocosity where initiates construct their own lexicon of levity to
suit the purpose of their transient and ephemeral world - a world of
fluttering multicoloured 'beingnesses' and sudden unexpected nymphetic
'presencings' in the bright clearings, where Delphic aesthetes drink mead
from 'ready-to-hand' goblets, and lie bone-white on a carpet of aureate 'is
leaves' under the moon reading Hölderlin from dog-eared paperbacks.
Words effervesce and foam, then fizzing into fantastic phrasings flutter
free from the folios of grammar books like chattering migrating butterflies
as they form new bright kaleidoscopic babble-patterns in the dappled
sunlight of the hidden grove, far from the gimlet eyes of the stewards of
the King's English. Elfish conjugations switch partners and dance with
stunted gerundial Hobbits from the darker shores of Lake Deception, as they
cavort in a mad barn-dance of syntactical stomping and etymological
delirium. In the centre near a tethered white stallion, garlanded with
silver is-leaves brocaded into an ontic crown of luxuriant being-fronds and
ousia grass, sits MH himself, empty-handed upon his return from ' Die Suche
nach Sein ' - the presiding garlanded Lord der Wesenheiten in a world of
metaphysical make-believe and metonymical medieval merriment.