Loading ...
Sorry, an error occurred while loading the content.

Re: Greetings

Expand Messages
  • Sayer Ji
    Greetings. I don t know how it is that I began to get several messages a day from this address, but owing to the fact that there are no accidents in the
    Message 1 of 10 , May 13, 2001
    • 0 Attachment

      Greetings.  I don't know how it is that I began to get several messages a day from this address, but owing to the fact that there are no accidents in the universe that I live in, I am wanting to 'respond,' or add a few perspectives into this very interesting and intelligent discussion. 

      For one, Sartre, whose personal disfigurement contributed profoundly to his ontological elaborations, had a colleague named Merleau-Ponty, who knew him, perhaps, better than anyone else.   Sartre believed that the In soui and Pour soui were diametrically opposed, and mutually exclusive substances...a very 'Cartesian' perspective, one might say, but one, nonetheless, affirmed by fundamental aspects of our experience of being in the world.  

      There are, though, many different modes of 'being in the world,' and each ontological leave is not equal.   Merleau's "Flesh," subtends, I believe, Sartre's order of analysis/experience, as well as the basic premises for most of what has hitherto been discussed.   I don't think you can even begin to touch upon the meaning of Sartre's ontology, unless we take into account Simone's and Merleau's.  This triangle I have named, is more than just academic, but Simone and Merleau once fell in love.  This is present in her own memoirs.   However, I do not wish to give the impression that one may psychobiographically deconstruct and reduce a work to its far more poetic/aesthetic/biographical subtexts.   I simply mean to interpose the possibility that we discuss all levels, even if mutually exclusive, in order to come to some sort of agreement as to what we are discussing, and what the 'aim,' or 'goal' is? 

      If anyone here is interested in pursuing this further, I thank you ahead of time, and am honored to meet you.  I would suggest, however, that before we continue, we reveal our relationships to Merleau-Ponty's work (if extant), and what our respective 'readings' are, thus far.

      Lots of love!   Mercury is smiling, even if out of breath, as of right now....

      >From: "Christopher Bobo"
      >Reply-To: Sartre@yahoogroups.com
      >To: "Sartre_yahoogr"
      >Subject: Re: [Sartre] Freedom, the Self and Sartre
      >Date: Sun, 13 May 2001 11:01:40 -0700
      >MIME-Version: 1.0
      >X-Originating-IP: [63.14.121.228]
      >Received: from [64.211.240.238] by hotmail.com (3.2) with ESMTP id MHotMailBCC8149D00334004319E40D3F0EE186548; Sun May 13 10:51:53 2001
      >Received: from [10.1.4.55] by mu.egroups.com with NNFMP; 13 May 2001 17:51:33 -0000
      >Received: (EGP: mail-7_1_3); 13 May 2001 17:51:32 -0000
      >Received: (qmail 94959 invoked from network); 13 May 2001 17:51:32 -0000
      >Received: from unknown (10.1.10.142) by l9.egroups.com with QMQP; 13 May 2001 17:51:32 -0000
      >Received: from unknown (HELO hotmail.com) (64.4.33.142) by mta3 with SMTP; 13 May 2001 17:51:31 -0000
      >Received: from mail pickup service by hotmail.com with Microsoft SMTPSVC; Sun, 13 May 2001 10:51:31 -0700
      >From sentto-222825-2246-989776293-Sayerji Sun May 13 10:52:45 2001
      >X-eGroups-Return: sentto-222825-2246-989776293-Sayerji=hotmail.com@...
      >X-Sender: cbobo@...
      >X-Apparently-To: Sartre@yahoogroups.com
      >X-Mailer: MSN Explorer 6.00.0010.0912
      >Message-ID:
      >X-OriginalArrivalTime: 13 May 2001 17:51:31.0098 (UTC) FILETIME=[579FC7A0:01C0DBD5]
      >Mailing-List: list Sartre@yahoogroups.com; contact Sartre-owner@yahoogroups.com
      >Delivered-To: mailing list Sartre@yahoogroups.com
      >Precedence: bulk
      >List-Unsubscribe:
      >
      >dpbxx wrote
      > >>Pardon me for interrupting<<
      >
      >No pardon is required. Your comments are always welcome.
      >
      > >>In other words, the original upsurge of in-itself resulting in self-awareness (the
      >reflection-reflecting) that creates a for-itself w/ specific projects in the
      >world (like adopting fashions and styles for the purpose of creating an
      >object-for-others), this is what is ordinarily adopted as the "self." It is
      >simply a way of stabilizing our experience and creating continuity between
      >past/present/future. But it is a contrivance, a secondary and not primary
      >ontological structure.<<
      >
      >You seem to say that Sartre has a very sparse conception of the self, which is certainly true, and is a charge that can be made against all Cartesians and all Marxists. This, of course, may be a mistake on his part. But what makes this new study interesting is it's implication that our choices are not free, but rather are determined by some organic structure of the brain.
      >
      >
      >----- Original Message -----
      >From: dpbxx@...
      >Sent: Sunday, May 13, 2001 12:36 AM
      >To: Sartre@yahoogroups.com
      >Subject: Re: [Sartre] Freedom, the Self and Sartre
      >
      >
      >Pardon me for interrupting, but I think this discussion is altogether off the
      >track. The interpretation of this research as somehow pointing toward
      >fundamental issues regarding Sartre's conception of self and freedom is, I
      >think, misplaced.
      >
      >First of all, that the disruption of brain function might result in the
      >disruption of such identity "accessories" as taste in jewelry or interests or
      >hobbies cannot be too surprising - after all, psychiatry has been disrupting
      >(albeit temporarily) such processes w/ ECT for decades. The research shows,
      >in my opinion, that the brain is an exceptionally accommodating organ w/ a
      >primary purpose of stabilizing the world for us by ordering perceptions,
      >preferences, behaviors, etc into gestalt-like constellations by which we
      >orient & identify ourselves. But are such self-identifications the same thing
      >as the "self" in a Sartrean sense? That's not my understanding. The self, in
      >Sartre's view, is, if anything (and I'm not so sure it is anything - other
      >than an illusion, that is; a misplacement), more about the process of
      >consciousness than it is about consciousness itself and the physiology
      >underpinning it (a special region of the in-itself). In other words, the
      >original upsurge of in-itself resulting in self-awareness (the
      >reflection-reflecting) that creates a for-itself w/ specific projects in the
      >world (like adopting fashions and styles for the purpose of creating an
      >object-for-others), this is what is ordinarily adopted as the "self." It is
      >simply a way of stabilizing our experience and creating continuity between
      >past/present/future. But it is a contrivance, a secondary and not primary
      >ontological structure.

      Get your FREE download of MSN Explorer at http://explorer.msn.com



      Get your FREE download of MSN Explorer at http://explorer.msn.com
    • dpbxx@aol.com
      And thank you for your welcome response. I am enjoying the discussion as well. I must disagree that any consideration of Sartre s personal experiences will
      Message 2 of 10 , May 13, 2001
      • 0 Attachment
        And thank you for your welcome response. I am enjoying the discussion as well.

        I must disagree that any consideration of Sartre's personal experiences will
        shed fundamental light on his philosophical system. Such considerations, as
        Sartre himself alluded to in Being and Nothingness, fall into the realm of
        psychology which he was very careful to distinguish from his more fundamental
        exploration and description of the phenomenological ontology.

        As to the opposition of in-itself/for-itself, it seems clear that both are
        necessary conditions of consciousness and, so, while describing a radically
        different "states", are not opposed in the sense of mutual exclusion (which
        seemed to be your suggestion). In several places, Sartre describes for-itself
        as having "incorporated" in-itself, though, by necessity of character,
        entirely beyond any consideration of in-itself since, by definition,
        for-itself is the being that is no longer in-itself. For-itself's "facticity"
        describes its necessary connection w/ in-itself.
      • Christopher Bobo
        Welcome Sayer Ji. I hope to hear more from you, especially your comments on Merleau-Ponty. The criticism that Sartre did not pay sufficient attention to the
        Message 3 of 10 , May 14, 2001
        • 0 Attachment
          Welcome Sayer Ji.  I hope to hear more from you, especially your comments on Merleau-Ponty.  The criticism that Sartre did not pay sufficient attention to the body was made by Heidegger, I think, before Merleau-Ponty.  In what way to you think Sartre's disfigurement influenced his philsophy?  And who is Mercury?

          ----- Original Message -----
          From: Sayer Ji
          Sent: Sunday, May 13, 2001 3:40 PM
          To: Sartre@yahoogroups.com
          Subject: [Sartre] Re: Greetings

          Greetings.  I don't know how it is that I began to get several messages a day from this address, but owing to the fact that there are no accidents in the universe that I live in, I am wanting to 'respond,' or add a few perspectives into this very interesting and intelligent discussion. 

          For one, Sartre, whose personal disfigurement contributed profoundly to his ontological elaborations, had a colleague named Merleau-Ponty, who knew him, perhaps, better than anyone else.   Sartre believed that the In soui and Pour soui were diametrically opposed, and mutually exclusive substances...a very 'Cartesian' perspective, one might say, but one, nonetheless, affirmed by fundamental aspects of our experience of being in the world.  

          There are, though, many different modes of 'being in the world,' and each ontological leave is not equal.   Merleau's "Flesh," subtends, I believe, Sartre's order of analysis/experience, as well as the basic premises for most of what has hitherto been discussed.   I don't think you can even begin to touch upon the meaning of Sartre's ontology, unless we take into account Simone's and Merleau's.  This triangle I have named, is more than just academic, but Simone and Merleau once fell in love.  This is present in her own memoirs.   However, I do not wish to give the impression that one may psychobiographically deconstruct and reduce a work to its far more poetic/aesthetic/biographical subtexts.   I simply mean to interpose the possibility that we discuss all levels, even if mutually exclusive, in order to come to some sort of agreement as to what we are discussing, and what the 'aim,' or 'goal' is? 

          If anyone here is interested in pursuing this further, I thank you ahead of time, and am honored to meet you.  I would suggest, however, that before we continue, we reveal our relationships to Merleau-Ponty's work (if extant), and what our respective 'readings' are, thus far.

          Lots of love!   Mercury is smiling, even if out of breath, as of right now....




          Get your FREE download of MSN Explorer at http://explorer.msn.com
        • Christopher Bobo
          ... shed fundamental light on his philosophical system. Such considerations, as Sartre himself alluded to in Being and Nothingness, fall into the realm of
          Message 4 of 10 , May 14, 2001
          • 0 Attachment
            dpbxx wrote:
            >>I must disagree that any consideration of Sartre's personal experiences will
            shed fundamental light on his philosophical system. Such considerations, as
            Sartre himself alluded to in Being and Nothingness, fall into the realm of
            psychology which he was very careful to distinguish from his more fundamental
            exploration and description of the phenomenological ontology.<<
             
            I, too, think philosophical-biography has its limits, and that you are probably right on this point.  However, psycho-historians think that psychology can lead to more interesting observations about human beings in general and not such eccentric claims about particular human subjects--such as Jean-Paul Sartre.  It would be unfortunate if his philosophy could be reduced to an outgrowth of some supposed disfigurement that may have troubled him.  Still, I would like to know what Sayer Ji is claiming, as well as Heidegger, when they suggest that Sartre ignored the flesh or the body.  (Of course, I suspect it is the common criticism of philosophy--that it is in the clouds rather than down to earth.)
             
            dpbxx also wrote:
            >>In several places, Sartre describes for-itself as having "incorporated" in-itself, though, by necessity of character, entirely beyond any consideration of in-itself since, by definition,
            for-itself is the being that is no longer in-itself. For-itself's "facticity" describes its necessary connection w/ in-itself.<<
             
            I agree that Sartre is not guilty of erecting a stark and inexplicable dualism--like Descartes mind-body, or Kant's phenomena-noumena.  Like Heidegger, Sartre believes that the for-itself and the in-itself form a continuum, or arise out of the same substrate--being.  The in-itself is simple being, the for-itself is being turned back upon itself, the reflected-reflecting.

            ----- Original Message -----
            From: dpbxx@...
            Sent: Sunday, May 13, 2001 7:48 PM
            To: Sartre@yahoogroups.com
            Subject: Re: [Sartre] Re: Greetings

            And thank you for your welcome response. I am enjoying the discussion as well.

            I must disagree that any consideration of Sartre's personal experiences will
            shed fundamental light on his philosophical system. Such considerations, as
            Sartre himself alluded to in Being and Nothingness, fall into the realm of
            psychology which he was very careful to distinguish from his more fundamental
            exploration and description of the phenomenological ontology.

            As to the opposition of in-itself/for-itself, it seems clear that both are
            necessary conditions of consciousness and, so, while describing a radically
            different "states", are not opposed in the sense of mutual exclusion (which
            seemed to be your suggestion). In several places, Sartre describes for-itself
            as having "incorporated" in-itself, though, by necessity of character,
            entirely beyond any consideration of in-itself since, by definition,
            for-itself is the being that is no longer in-itself. For-itself's "facticity"
            describes its necessary connection w/ in-itself.




            Get your FREE download of MSN Explorer at http://explorer.msn.com
          • Christopher Bobo
            ... But Sartre also wrote that the for-itself and the in-itself are both aspects of the same thing--being. If Darwin is to be believed, the for-itself evolved
            Message 5 of 10 , May 15, 2001
            • 0 Attachment
              Sayer Ji wrote:
              >>Sartre believed that the In soui and Pour soui were diametrically opposed, and mutually exclusive substances...a very 'Cartesian' perspective, one might say, but one, nonetheless, affirmed by fundamental aspects of our experience of being in the world.   <<
              But Sartre also wrote that the for-itself and the in-itself are both aspects of the same thing--being.  If Darwin is to be believed, the for-itself evolved out of the in-itself.
               
              Sayer Ji wrote:
              >>There are, though, many different modes of 'being in the world,' and each ontological leave is not equal.   Merleau's "Flesh," subtends, I believe, Sartre's order of analysis/experience, as well as the basic premises for most of what has hitherto been discussed.   I don't think you can even begin to touch upon the meaning of Sartre's ontology, unless we take into account Simone's and Merleau's.  This triangle I have named, is more than just academic, but Simone and Merleau once fell in love.  This is present in her own memoirs.   However, I do not wish to give the impression that one may psychobiographically deconstruct and reduce a work to its far more poetic/aesthetic/biographical subtexts.   I simply mean to interpose the possibility that we discuss all levels, even if mutually exclusive, in order to come to some sort of agreement as to what we are discussing, and what the 'aim,' or 'goal' is?  <<
               
              Please explain yourself.  Why can't Sartre's onotology "stand on its own" without being held up by Maurice and Simone?  What support do Maurice and Simone provide?  Most of my reading of Merleau-Ponty dates back some years--except for In Praise of Philosophy.
              Notwithstanding my own lack of recent study of this original and provocative philosopher, I hope you can enlighten us as to his influence on Jean-Paul Sartre's existentialism.  I always regarded them as in some sense opposites.



              Get your FREE download of MSN Explorer at http://explorer.msn.com
            • Marc Girod
              ... CB If Darwin is to be believed, the for-itself evolved out of the CB in-itself. This goes out of any concerns of Sartre, which were synchronic --not
              Message 6 of 10 , May 15, 2001
              • 0 Attachment
                >>>>> "CB" == Christopher Bobo <cbobo@...> writes:

                CB> If Darwin is to be believed, the for-itself evolved out of the
                CB> in-itself.

                This goes out of any concerns of Sartre, which were synchronic --not
                diachronic.

                Of course, I agree with you (?) that treating the in-itself/for-itself
                pair as cartesian dualism shows misunderstanding of both Descartes and
                Sartre.

                --
                Marc Girod P.O. Box 320 Voice: +358-9-511 23746
                Nokia Networks 00045 NOKIA Group Mobile: +358-40-569 7954
                Hiomo 5/1 Finland Fax: +358-9-511 23580
              • Christopher Bobo
                ... diachronic.
                Message 7 of 10 , May 16, 2001
                • 0 Attachment
                   
                  Marc wrote:
                  >>This goes out of any concerns of Sartre, which were synchronic --not
                  diachronic.<<
                   
                  That's an interesting comment.  What exactly do you mean by "synchronic" and "diachronic"?  Sartre acknowledged the existence of past, present and future.  I don't think Sartre ever purported to deny or refutre any scientific theories or truths, I take it that well supported scientific theories that are accepted as true provide a reasonably backdrop for Sartre's philosophy.
                  ----- Original Message -----
                  From: Marc Girod
                  Sent: Wednesday, May 16, 2001 2:17 AM
                  To: Sartre@yahoogroups.com
                  Subject: Re: [Sartre] Re: Greetings

                  >>>>> "CB" == Christopher Bobo <cbobo@...> writes:

                  CB> If Darwin is to be believed, the for-itself evolved out of the
                  CB> in-itself.

                  This goes out of any concerns of Sartre, which were synchronic --not
                  diachronic.

                  Of course, I agree with you (?) that treating the in-itself/for-itself
                  pair as cartesian dualism shows misunderstanding of both Descartes and
                  Sartre.




                  Get your FREE download of MSN Explorer at http://explorer.msn.com
                • Sayer Ji
                  Sorry for not responding sooner. There is a comparison to be drawn between Cartesianism and Sartrean ontology insofar as the in-itself/for-itself is described
                  Message 8 of 10 , May 18, 2001
                  • 0 Attachment

                    Sorry for not responding sooner.

                    There is a comparison to be drawn between Cartesianism and Sartrean ontology insofar as the in-itself/for-itself is described as mutually exclusive....right?   What does the transphenomenality of Being mean to you?  Don't get me wrong. I love and appreciate what Sartre has to offer, but I think a careful reading of Hegel, Husserl and Heidegger is a prerequisite to understanding just what Sartre's limitations and contributions are.

                    >From: Marc Girod
                    >Reply-To: Sartre@yahoogroups.com
                    >To: Sartre@yahoogroups.com
                    >Subject: Re: [Sartre] Re: Greetings
                    >Date: 16 May 2001 08:45:50 +0300
                    >MIME-Version: 1.0
                    >Received: from [64.211.240.234] by hotmail.com (3.2) with ESMTP id MHotMailBCCB5EAE00714004324D40D3F0EA1C80169; Tue May 15 22:46:08 2001
                    >Received: from [10.1.4.53] by f19.egroups.com with NNFMP; 16 May 2001 05:46:06 -0000
                    >Received: (EGP: mail-7_1_3); 16 May 2001 05:46:05 -0000
                    >Received: (qmail 87922 invoked from network); 16 May 2001 05:45:54 -0000
                    >Received: from unknown (10.1.10.142) by l7.egroups.com with QMQP; 16 May 2001 05:45:54 -0000
                    >Received: from unknown (HELO mgw-x2.nokia.com) (131.228.20.22) by mta3 with SMTP; 16 May 2001 05:45:53 -0000
                    >Received: from esvir02nok.nokia.com (esvir02nokt.ntc.nokia.com [172.21.143.34]) by mgw-x2.nokia.com (Switch-2.1.0/Switch-2.1.0) with ESMTP id f4G5k2m07625 for ; Wed, 16 May 2001 08:46:02 +0300 (EET DST)
                    >Received: from esebh12nok.ntc.nokia.com (unverified) by esvir02nok.nokia.com (Content Technologies SMTPRS 4.2.1) with ESMTP id for ; Wed, 16 May 2001 08:45:52 +0300
                    >Received: from stybba.ntc.nokia.com ([131.228.178.21]) by esebh12nok.ntc.nokia.com with SMTP (Microsoft Exchange Internet Mail Service Version 5.5.2652.78) id JW3TS51B; Wed, 16 May 2001 08:45:52 +0300
                    >Received: from farin.ntc.nokia.com (farin.ntc.nokia.com [131.228.58.132]) by stybba.ntc.nokia.com (8.9.1a/8.9.1/Goodi) with ESMTP id IAA00776; Wed, 16 May 2001 08:45:40 +0300 (EET DST)
                    >Received: (from girod@localhost) by farin.ntc.nokia.com (8.9.3 (PHNE_18546)/8.8.6) id IAA16150; Wed, 16 May 2001 08:45:50 +0300 (EETDST)
                    >From sentto-222825-2260-989991966-Sayerji Tue May 15 22:47:53 2001
                    >X-eGroups-Return: sentto-222825-2260-989991966-Sayerji=hotmail.com@...
                    >X-Sender: girod@...
                    >X-Apparently-To: Sartre@yahoogroups.com
                    >X-Authentication-Warning: farin.ntc.nokia.com: girod set sender to girod@... using -f
                    >Sender: girod@...
                    >References:
                    >X-Attribution: MGi
                    >In-Reply-To: "Christopher Bobo"'s message of "Tue, 15 May 2001 11:25:55 -0700"
                    >Message-ID: <1yr8xp3kz5.fsf@...>
                    >Lines: 16
                    >User-Agent: Gnus/5.0802 (Gnus v5.8.2) Emacs/20.5
                    >Mailing-List: list Sartre@yahoogroups.com; contact Sartre-owner@yahoogroups.com
                    >Delivered-To: mailing list Sartre@yahoogroups.com
                    >Precedence: bulk
                    >List-Unsubscribe:
                    >
                    > >>>>> "CB" == Christopher Bobo writes:
                    >
                    >CB> If Darwin is to be believed, the for-itself evolved out of the
                    >CB> in-itself.
                    >
                    >This goes out of any concerns of Sartre, which were synchronic --not
                    >diachronic.
                    >
                    >Of course, I agree with you (?) that treating the in-itself/for-itself
                    >pair as cartesian dualism shows misunderstanding of both Descartes and
                    >Sartre.
                    >
                    >--
                    >Marc Girod P.O. Box 320 Voice: +358-9-511 23746
                    >Nokia Networks 00045 NOKIA Group Mobile: +358-40-569 7954
                    >Hiomo 5/1 Finland Fax: +358-9-511 23580


                    Get your FREE download of MSN Explorer at http://explorer.msn.com
                  • Marc Girod
                    ... SJ There is a comparison to be drawn between Cartesianism and SJ Sartrean ontology insofar as the in-itself/for-itself is described SJ as mutually
                    Message 9 of 10 , May 20, 2001
                    • 0 Attachment
                      >>>>> "SJ" == Sayer Ji <Sayerji@...> writes:

                      SJ> There is a comparison to be drawn between Cartesianism and
                      SJ> Sartrean ontology insofar as the in-itself/for-itself is described
                      SJ> as mutually exclusive....right?

                      Well, no. In the introduction to Being and Nothingness, Sartre makes a
                      point against the kind of dualisms typical of Descartes. Surely he
                      didn't intend to replace cartesian dualism (mind/body) with yet
                      another, and in-itself/for-itself is not to be taken as anything like
                      that. They are not "domains" of any kind.

                      SJ> What does the transphenomenality of Being mean to you?

                      Phenomena can only be identified (discriminated) by a for-itself.
                      In-itself is flat and meaningless, indiscriminate. Transphenomenality
                      is autopoiesis (creation of oneself --a term used by Maturana).

                      SJ> I think a careful reading of Hegel, Husserl and Heidegger is a
                      SJ> prerequisite to understanding just what Sartre's limitations and
                      SJ> contributions are.

                      His contribution is mainly to overcome their limitations, especially
                      in the direction of the Other, i.e. in the contractual commitment to
                      shared meaning. Hegel and Heidegger (I don't know for Husserl)
                      remained stuck with an illusion of universality (cartesian solipsism).

                      --
                      Marc Girod P.O. Box 320 Voice: +358-9-511 23746
                      Nokia Networks 00045 NOKIA Group Mobile: +358-40-569 7954
                      Hiomo 5/1 Finland Fax: +358-9-511 23580
                    • John Foster
                      ... From: Marc Girod To: Sent: Sunday, May 20, 2001 1:05 AM Subject: Re: [Sartre] Re: Greetings ... SJ
                      Message 10 of 10 , May 20, 2001
                      • 0 Attachment
                        ----- Original Message -----
                        From: Marc Girod <girod@...>
                        To: <Sartre@yahoogroups.com>
                        Sent: Sunday, May 20, 2001 1:05 AM
                        Subject: Re: [Sartre] Re: Greetings


                        >>>>> "SJ" == Sayer Ji <Sayerji@...> writes:

                        SJ> There is a comparison to be drawn between Cartesianism and
                        SJ> Sartrean ontology insofar as the in-itself/for-itself is described
                        SJ> as mutually exclusive....right?

                        Marc:
                        Well, no. In the introduction to Being and Nothingness, Sartre makes a
                        point against the kind of dualisms typical of Descartes. Surely he
                        didn't intend to replace cartesian dualism (mind/body) with yet
                        another, and in-itself/for-itself is not to be taken as anything like
                        that. They are not "domains" of any kind.

                        JF:

                        They are not domains, but the one is a 'realm' because it is still a locus
                        for something coming to presence later. Not all phenomenon are present, some
                        are concealed, so the 'in-itself' is not something that is without meaning,
                        nor is it incapable of supplying meaning entirely. I am alluding somewhat to
                        the Greek (_aletheia_) to denote that which is concealed in nature versus
                        that which come to presence. The idea of the 'for-itself' is circumscribed
                        by 'perspectivism' at any rate. A unitary consciousness cannot perceive all
                        that exists at any time...

                        Marleau Ponty

                        "In order that we may be able to move our body towards an object, the object
                        must first exist for it, our body must not belong to the realm of the
                        'in-itself'. [Phenomenology of Perception]

                        and

                        "Consciousness is being towards the thing through the intermediary of the
                        body." [Phenomenology of Perception]

                        jmf
                      Your message has been successfully submitted and would be delivered to recipients shortly.