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Re: Moral Psychology

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  • rlhigginsjr
    The Haidt video was quite interesting. As a conservative, it was an interesting perspective on why liberals and conservatives view the world the way they do.
    Message 1 of 12 , Jan 2, 2008
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      The Haidt video was quite interesting. As a conservative, it was an
      interesting perspective on why liberals and conservatives view the
      world the way they do. Typical of such presentations, Dr. Haidt
      felt it important to demonstrate just how far left he is of center
      by using an example that is sure to offend and infuriate not only
      most conservatives, but many liberals as well.

      That said, his work does have application to the conduct of RCA from
      a human performance perspective. Some people do behave in "atom"
      manner, even in nuclear operations. If they don't hurt anyone
      (Harm/Care) or lie, cheat, and steal (Fairness/Justice), then some
      will justify their actions as OK. The other three pillars are not
      as important and may not even be considered by those in this group.
      People need to behave in a "lattice" fashion while involved in
      hazardous operations. Compliance with expectations (In-Group
      Loyality), procedural compliance (Authority/Respect), and alignment
      with company principles (Purity/Sanctity) are at least equally
      importance.

      Those working in a regulated hazardous industry need to be
      conservative in the way they approach their work. There is no room
      for liberal thinkers when it comes to safety. Of course, it is
      possible to be a conservative thinker when performing hazardous work
      and still want to vote for Obama....

      Regards,

      Rich

      --- In Root_Cause_State_of_the_Practice@yahoogroups.com, "James R
      \(Randy\) Fromm" <jrfromm@...> wrote:
      >
      > Bill, I finally got around to viewing the Haidt video. Very
      interesting, heady stuff.
      >
      > As for application to RCA work, in terms of "direct" application,
      I am not sure there is anything there that many of us don't already
      know and practice. This is borne out in aphorisms and adages we
      bandy about, like: the man who is good with a hammer sees everything
      as a nail, the problem of the color of the bikeshed, etc. I would
      hope we all know that too tight a focus on one perspective tends to
      blind us to others from which the same event can be viewed. And,
      the best answer is the one that "walks around" the event and views
      it from as many sides as possible within the time constraints
      imposed.
      >
      > On the other hand, are there "5 pillars" or "5 foundations" on
      which an approach to RCA activities can be grounded? Haidt's
      foundations were (if I got them right): Harm, Fairness, In-group,
      Authority, and Purity (as in free of contaminating elements). Are
      there analogous "foundations" for developing causal analyses which,
      if I get Haidt's argument right, appeal to all sides in a given
      situation rather than just one or two?
      >
      > Or, were you considering Haidt's argument in terms of the relation
      between the RCA lead/team (usually seen as "liberal" in its
      approach) and the Mangement "team" (usually seen as "conservative"
      in its approach)?
      >
      > Randy
      > ____________________________
      > James R (Randy) Fromm
      > Senior Operations Consultant
      > The Westwind Group, Inc.
      > "Changing the Climate Through Training"
      >
      > (575) 405 9945
      >
      > rfromm@...
      > jrfromm@...
      >
      >
      > ----- Original Message -----
      > From: Dr. Bill Corcoran
      > To: Root_Cause_I
      > Sent: Thursday, December 20, 2007 8:23 AM
      > Subject: [Root_Cause_State_of_the_Practice] Moral Psychology
      >
      >
      >
      > If you view this video please let us know how you think this
      work can affect root cause analysis
      >
      >
      > http://www.newyorker.com/online/video/conference/2007/haidt
      >
      > Take care,
      >
      > Bill Corcoran
      > Mission: Saving lives, pain, assets, and careers through
      thoughtful inquiry.
      > Motto: If you want safety, peace, or justice, then work for
      competency, integrity, and transparency.
      >
      > W. R. Corcoran, Ph.D., P.E.
      > NSRC Corporation
      > 21 Broadleaf Circle
      > Windsor, CT 06095-1634
      > Voice and voice mail: 860-285-8779
      >
      > ROOT CAUSE INVESTIGATION HELP LINE 860-285-8779
      >
      > Join the on-going discussion of Root Cause Analysis problems,
      puzzles, and progress at
      http://groups.yahoo.com/group/Root_Cause_State_of_the_Practice/
      >
      > Subscribe to "The Firebird Forum" by sending an e-mail to
      TheFirebirdForum-subscribe@yahoogroups.com
      >
    • Dr. Bill Corcoran
      Rich, I am answering your last message on this topic. The slide below is my summary of Haidt s article in SCIENCE. I see all five categories of moral behavior
      Message 2 of 12 , Jan 2, 2008
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        Rich,
         
        I am answering your last message on this topic.
         
        The slide below is my summary of Haidt's article in SCIENCE.
         
        I see all five categories of moral behavior among the people involved in events as well as those investigating them.
         
        It is the trade-offs/ prioritizations that seem to cause problems.
         
        For example, people who place safety (constraints on harm to others) ahead of Ingroup-Outgroup Dynamics (Concealment of transgressions and vulnerability) are rare enough that safety problems do not get raised up, as in the case of the S-102 spill.
         
        It is hard to envision that lots of people did not pick-up on lots of obvious and subtle safety transgressions and vulnerabilities.
         
        I have seen people hide safety problems out of loyalty to the organization.
         
        Sometimes it is not intentional. It is just their morality.
         
        How many people report safety problems and transgressions?
         
        What is driving that behavior?
         
        I think that it goes deeper than the reward structure.
         
        Take care,
         
        Bill Corcoran
        Mission: Saving lives, pain, assets, and careers through thoughtful inquiry.
        Motto: If you want safety, peace, or justice, then work for competency, integrity, and transparency.
         
        W. R. Corcoran, Ph.D., P.E.
        NSRC Corporation
        21 Broadleaf Circle
        Windsor, CT 06095-1634
        Voice and voice mail: 860-285-8779
         
        ROOT CAUSE INVESTIGATION HELP LINE 860-285-8779
         
        Join the on-going discussion of Root Cause Analysis problems, puzzles, and progress at http://groups.yahoo.com/group/Root_Cause_State_of_the_Practice/  
         
        Subscribe to "The Firebird Forum" by sending an e-mail to TheFirebirdForum-subscribe@yahoogroups.com
      • Rich Higgins
        Bill - Over emphasis on In-Group Dynamics is an interesting phenomena, as it fosters the development of a mini-culture that could be at odds with that of the
        Message 3 of 12 , Jan 3, 2008
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          Re: [Root_Cause_State_of_the_Practice] Re: Moral Psychology Bill -

          Over emphasis on In-Group Dynamics is an interesting phenomena, as it fosters the development of a mini-culture that could be at odds with that of the company.  An “us versus them” mentality emerges when the group feels that they are being unfairly constrained by the expectations of the larger group.  The workers in the group may not intentionally hide transgressions, they simply do not recognize them as such because “that is the way WE do business”.  

          Individuals want to be accepted by the group and not viewed as outsiders, so they “go along to get along”.  While anyone would stop work in the face of an obvious and imminent safety hazard, minor transgressions are accepted as a cost of doing business.  

          “Risky Shift” is another phenomena I observe occasionally.  People in a work group get together to plan a hazardous job, and end up accepting more risk than any one of them would individually.  After an event, they are at a loss to explain why it made sense to them at the time.

          It does go deeper than the formal rewards structure.

          Rich

          On 1/2/08 1:54 PM, "Dr. Bill Corcoran" <williamcorcoran@...> wrote:


           
           

          Rich,

          I am answering your last message on this topic.

          The slide below is my summary of Haidt's article in SCIENCE.

          I see all five categories of moral behavior among the people involved in events as well as those investigating them.

          It is the trade-offs/ prioritizations that seem to cause problems.

          For example, people who place safety (constraints on harm to others) ahead of Ingroup-Outgroup Dynamics (Concealment of transgressions and vulnerability) are rare enough that safety problems do not get raised up, as in the case of the S-102 spill.

          It is hard to envision that lots of people did not pick-up on lots of obvious and subtle safety transgressions and vulnerabilities.

          I have seen people hide safety problems out of loyalty to the organization.

          Sometimes it is not intentional. It is just their morality.

          How many people report safety problems and transgressions?

          What is driving that behavior?

          I think that it goes deeper than the reward structure.

          Take care,
           
          Bill Corcoran
          Mission: Saving lives, pain, assets, and careers through thoughtful inquiry.
          Motto: If you want safety, peace, or justice, then work for competency, integrity, and transparency.
           
          W. R. Corcoran, Ph.D., P.E.
          NSRC Corporation
          21 Broadleaf Circle
          Windsor, CT 06095-1634
          Voice and voice mail: 860-285-8779

          ROOT CAUSE INVESTIGATION HELP LINE 860-285-8779

          Join the on-going discussion of Root Cause Analysis problems, puzzles, and progress at http://groups.yahoo.com/group/Root_Cause_State_of_the_Practice/   

          Subscribe to "The Firebird Forum" by sending an e-mail to TheFirebirdForum-subscribe@yahoogroups.com

           
              

        • bruce.hart@srs.gov
          Bill and Rich, My favorite quote is Behavior is Sustained by Consequences. The consequences can be all the way from self-gratification, through peer
          Message 4 of 12 , Jan 3, 2008
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            Bill and Rich,
            My favorite quote is "Behavior is Sustained by Consequences."  The consequences can be all the way from self-gratification, through peer prestige, up to a "President's Award" or a big paycheck bonus.  A "risky shift" is being perpetuated through some kind of consequences.  The only way they'll change is for a change in consequences.

            Thanks,
            B.





            Rich Higgins <rich_higgins@...>
            Sent by: Root_Cause_State_of_the_Practice@yahoogroups.com

            01/03/2008 08:10 AM

            Please respond to
            Root_Cause_State_of_the_Practice@yahoogroups.com

            To
            <Root_Cause_State_of_the_Practice@yahoogroups.com>
            cc
            Subject
            Re: [Root_Cause_State_of_the_Practice] Re: Moral Psychology





            Bill -

            Over emphasis on In-Group Dynamics is an interesting phenomena, as it fosters the development of a mini-culture that could be at odds with that of the company.  An “us versus them” mentality emerges when the group feels that they are being unfairly constrained by the expectations of the larger group.  The workers in the group may not intentionally hide transgressions, they simply do not recognize them as such because “that is the way WE do business”.  

            Individuals want to be accepted by the group and not viewed as outsiders, so they “go along to get along”.  While anyone would stop work in the face of an obvious and imminent safety hazard, minor transgressions are accepted as a cost of doing business.  

            “Risky Shift” is another phenomena I observe occasionally.  People in a work group get together to plan a hazardous job, and end up accepting more risk than any one of them would individually.  After an event, they are at a loss to explain why it made sense to them at the time.

            It does go deeper than the formal rewards structure.

            Rich

            On 1/2/08 1:54 PM, "Dr. Bill Corcoran" <williamcorcoran@...> wrote:





            Rich,


            I am answering your last message on this topic.


            The slide below is my summary of Haidt's article in SCIENCE.


            I see all five categories of moral behavior among the people involved in events as well as those investigating them.


            It is the trade-offs/ prioritizations that seem to cause problems.


            For example, people who place safety (constraints on harm to others) ahead of Ingroup-Outgroup Dynamics (Concealment of transgressions and vulnerability) are rare enough that safety problems do not get raised up, as in the case of the S-102 spill.


            It is hard to envision that lots of people did not pick-up on lots of obvious and subtle safety transgressions and vulnerabilities.


            I have seen people hide safety problems out of loyalty to the organization.


            Sometimes it is not intentional. It is just their morality.


            How many people report safety problems and transgressions?


            What is driving that behavior?


            I think that it goes deeper than the reward structure.


            Take care,

            Bill Corcoran
            Mission: Saving lives, pain, assets, and careers through thoughtful inquiry.
            Motto: If you want safety, peace, or justice, then work for competency, integrity, and transparency.

            W. R. Corcoran, Ph.D., P.E.
            NSRC Corporation
            21 Broadleaf Circle
            Windsor, CT 06095-1634
            Voice and voice mail: 860-285-8779


            ROOT CAUSE INVESTIGATION HELP LINE 860-285-8779


            Join the on-going discussion of Root Cause Analysis problems, puzzles, and progress at
            http://groups.yahoo.com/group/Root_Cause_State_of_the_Practice/  

            Subscribe to "The Firebird Forum" by sending an e-mail to TheFirebirdForum-subscribe@yahoogroups.com



               


          • Rich Higgins
            Bruce - You are right on. Consequence, or lack thereof, drive behavior. Poor behavior is also sustained by a lack of consequences, which results in
            Message 5 of 12 , Jan 3, 2008
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              Re: [Root_Cause_State_of_the_Practice] Re: Moral Psychology Bruce -

              You are right on.  Consequence, or lack thereof, drive behavior.  Poor behavior is also sustained by a lack of consequences, which results in “
              normalization of deviance”, a termed coined by Diane Vaughan in her book The Challenger Launch Decision: Risky Technology, Culture, and Deviance at NASA, in which she analyzes the interactions between various cultural forces within NASA that contributed to the Challenger disaster. Vaughn used this expression to describe the gradual shift in what is regarded as normal after repeated exposures to “deviant behavior” (behavior straying from correct [or safe] operating procedure). Corners get cut, safety checks bypassed, and alarms ignored or turned off, and these behaviors become normal—not just common, but stripped of their significance as warnings of impending danger. A related term is “a culture of low expectations”.  When a system routinely produces errors (sloppy paperwork, major miscommunications about important aspects of the work) those in the system become inured to malfunction. In such a system, what should be regarded as a major warning of impending danger is ignored as a normal operating procedure.  This same behavior was evident in events preceding the Columbia disaster.

              Rich


              On 1/3/08 5:32 AM, "bruce.hart@..." <bruce.hart@...> wrote:


               
               


              Bill and Rich,
              My favorite quote is "Behavior is Sustained by Consequences."  The consequences can be all the way from self-gratification, through peer prestige, up to a "President's Award" or a big paycheck bonus.  A "risky shift" is being perpetuated through some kind of consequences.  The only way they'll change is for a change in consequences.

              Thanks,
              B.





              Rich Higgins <rich_higgins@...>
              Sent by: Root_Cause_State_of_the_Practice@yahoogroups.com 01/03/2008 08:10 AM

              Please respond to
              Root_Cause_State_of_the_Practice@yahoogroups.com

              To

              <Root_Cause_State_of_the_Practice@yahoogroups.com>

              cc
              Subject

              Re: [Root_Cause_State_of_the_Practice] Re: Moral Psychology




              Bill -

              Over emphasis on In-Group Dynamics is an interesting phenomena, as it fosters the development of a mini-culture that could be at odds with that of the company.  An “us versus them” mentality emerges when the group feels that they are being unfairly constrained by the expectations of the larger group.  The workers in the group may not intentionally hide transgressions, they simply do not recognize them as such because “that is the way WE do business”.  

              Individuals want to be accepted by the group and not viewed as outsiders, so they “go along to get along”.  While anyone would stop work in the face of an obvious and imminent safety hazard, minor transgressions are accepted as a cost of doing business.  

              “Risky Shift” is another phenomena I observe occasionally.  People in a work group get together to plan a hazardous job, and end up accepting more risk than any one of them would individually.  After an event, they are at a loss to explain why it made sense to them at the time.

              It does go deeper than the formal rewards structure.

              Rich

              On 1/2/08 1:54 PM, "Dr. Bill Corcoran" <williamcorcoran@...> wrote:


               
               

              Rich,

              I am answering your last message on this topic.

              The slide below is my summary of Haidt's article in SCIENCE.

              I see all five categories of moral behavior among the people involved in events as well as those investigating them.

              It is the trade-offs/ prioritizations that seem to cause problems.

              For example, people who place safety (constraints on harm to others) ahead of Ingroup-Outgroup Dynamics (Concealment of transgressions and vulnerability) are rare enough that safety problems do not get raised up, as in the case of the S-102 spill.

              It is hard to envision that lots of people did not pick-up on lots of obvious and subtle safety transgressions and vulnerabilities.

              I have seen people hide safety problems out of loyalty to the organization.

              Sometimes it is not intentional. It is just their morality.

              How many people report safety problems and transgressions?

              What is driving that behavior?

              I think that it goes deeper than the reward structure.

              Take care,
               
              Bill Corcoran
              Mission: Saving lives, pain, assets, and careers through thoughtful inquiry.
              Motto: If you want safety, peace, or justice, then work for competency, integrity, and transparency.
               
              W. R. Corcoran, Ph.D., P.E.
              NSRC Corporation
              21 Broadleaf Circle
              Windsor, CT 06095-1634
              Voice and voice mail: 860-285-8779

              ROOT CAUSE INVESTIGATION HELP LINE 860-285-8779

              Join the on-going discussion of Root Cause Analysis problems, puzzles, and progress at http://groups.yahoo.com/group/Root_Cause_State_of_the_Practice/
              <http://groups.yahoo.com/group/Root_Cause_State_of_the_Practice/>  

              Subscribe to "The Firebird Forum" by sending an e-mail to TheFirebirdForum-subscribe@yahoogroups.com


                  



                  


            • Bob Latino
              Is this similar to the Groupthink video put out about Challenger launch discussion (CRM Films)? I think the other one was an old one called The Abilene
              Message 6 of 12 , Jan 3, 2008
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                Is this similar to the Groupthink video put out about Challenger launch discussion (CRM Films)?  I think the other one was an old one called “The Abilene Paradox” which also focused on the Groupthink concept.

                 

                Bob L.

                 


                From: Root_Cause_State_of_the_Practice@yahoogroups.com [mailto:Root_Cause_State_of_the_Practice@yahoogroups.com] On Behalf Of Rich Higgins
                Sent: Thursday, January 03, 2008 8:10 AM
                To: Root_Cause_State_of_the_Practice@yahoogroups.com
                Subject: Re: [Root_Cause_State_of_the_Practice] Re: Moral Psychology

                 

                Bill -

                Over emphasis on In-Group Dynamics is an interesting phenomena, as it fosters the development of a mini-culture that could be at odds with that of the company.  An “us versus them” mentality emerges when the group feels that they are being unfairly constrained by the expectations of the larger group.  The workers in the group may not intentionally hide transgressions, they simply do not recognize them as such because “that is the way WE do business”.  

                Individuals want to be accepted by the group and not viewed as outsiders, so they “go along to get along”.  While anyone would stop work in the face of an obvious and imminent safety hazard, minor transgressions are accepted as a cost of doing business.  

                “Risky Shift” is another phenomena I observe occasionally.  People in a work group get together to plan a hazardous job, and end up accepting more risk than any one of them would individually.  After an event, they are at a loss to explain why it made sense to them at the time.

                It does go deeper than the formal rewards structure.

                Rich

                On 1/2/08 1:54 PM, "Dr. Bill Corcoran" <williamcorcoran@ sbcglobal. net> wrote:


                 
                 

                Rich,

                I am answering your last message on this topic.

                The slide below is my summary of Haidt's article in SCIENCE.

                I see all five categories of moral behavior among the people involved in events as well as those investigating them.

                It is the trade-offs/ prioritizations that seem to cause problems.

                For example, people who place safety (constraints on harm to others) ahead of Ingroup-Outgroup Dynamics (Concealment of transgressions and vulnerability) are rare enough that safety problems do not get raised up, as in the case of the S-102 spill.

                It is hard to envision that lots of people did not pick-up on lots of obvious and subtle safety transgressions and vulnerabilities.

                I have seen people hide safety problems out of loyalty to the organization.

                Sometimes it is not intentional. It is just their morality.

                How many people report safety problems and transgressions?

                What is driving that behavior?

                I think that it goes deeper than the reward structure.

                Take care,
                 
                Bill Corcoran
                Mission : Saving lives, pain, assets, and careers through thoughtful inquiry.
                Motto: If you want safety, peace, or justice, then work for competency, integrity, and transparency.
                 
                W. R. Corcoran, Ph.D., P.E.
                NSRC Corporation
                21 Broadleaf Circle
                Windsor , CT 06095-1634
                Voice and voice mail: 860-285-8779

                ROOT CAUSE INVESTIGATION HELP LINE 860-285-8779

                Join the on-going discussion of Root Cause Analysis problems, puzzles, and progress at http://groups. yahoo.com/ group/Root_ Cause_State_ of_the_Practice/   

                Subscribe to "The Firebird Forum" by sending an e-mail to TheFirebirdForum- subscribe@ yahoogroups. com

                 
                    

                 

              • Dr. Bill Corcoran
                Rich, Can you help me understand what is meant by atom and lattice? Thanks. Take care, Bill Corcoran Mission: Saving lives, pain, assets, and careers
                Message 7 of 12 , Jan 3, 2008
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                  Rich,
                   
                  Can you help me understand what is meant by "atom" and "lattice?"
                   
                  Thanks.
                   
                  Take care,
                   
                  Bill Corcoran
                  Mission: Saving lives, pain, assets, and careers through thoughtful inquiry.
                  Motto: If you want safety, peace, or justice, then work for competency, integrity, and transparency.
                   
                  W. R. Corcoran, Ph.D., P.E.
                  NSRC Corporation
                  21 Broadleaf Circle
                  Windsor, CT 06095-1634
                  Voice and voice mail: 860-285-8779
                   
                  ROOT CAUSE INVESTIGATION HELP LINE 860-285-8779
                   
                  Join the on-going discussion of Root Cause Analysis problems, puzzles, and progress at http://groups.yahoo.com/group/Root_Cause_State_of_the_Practice/  
                   
                  Subscribe to "The Firebird Forum" by sending an e-mail to TheFirebirdForum-subscribe@yahoogroups.com
                  ----- Original Message -----
                  Sent: Wednesday, January 02, 2008 12:09 PM
                  Subject: [Root_Cause_State_of_the_Practice] Re: Moral Psychology

                  The Haidt video was quite interesting. As a conservative, it was an
                  interesting perspective on why liberals and conservatives view the
                  world the way they do. Typical of such presentations, Dr. Haidt
                  felt it important to demonstrate just how far left he is of center
                  by using an example that is sure to offend and infuriate not only
                  most conservatives, but many liberals as well.

                  That said, his work does have application to the conduct of RCA from
                  a human performance perspective. Some people do behave in "atom"
                  manner, even in nuclear operations. If they don't hurt anyone
                  (Harm/Care) or lie, cheat, and steal (Fairness/Justice) , then some
                  will justify their actions as OK. The other three pillars are not
                  as important and may not even be considered by those in this group.
                  People need to behave in a "lattice" fashion while involved in
                  hazardous operations. Compliance with expectations (In-Group
                  Loyalty), procedural compliance (Authority/Respect) , and alignment
                  with company principles (Purity/Sanctity) are at least equally
                  importance.

                  Those working in a regulated hazardous industry need to be
                  conservative in the way they approach their work. There is no room
                  for liberal thinkers when it comes to safety. Of course, it is
                  possible to be a conservative thinker when performing hazardous work
                  and still want to vote for Obama....

                  Regards,

                  Rich

                  --- In Root_Cause_State_ of_the_Practice@ yahoogroups. com, "James R
                  \(Randy\) Fromm" <jrfromm@... > wrote:
                  >
                  > Bill, I finally got around to viewing the Haidt video. Very
                  interesting, heady stuff.
                  >
                  > As for application to RCA work, in terms of "direct" application,
                  I am not sure there is anything there that many of us don't already
                  know and practice. This is borne out in aphorisms and adages we
                  bandy about, like: the man who is good with a hammer sees everything
                  as a nail, the problem of the color of the bikeshed, etc. I would
                  hope we all know that too tight a focus on one perspective tends to
                  blind us to others from which the same event can be viewed. And,
                  the best answer is the one that "walks around" the event and views
                  it from as many sides as possible within the time constraints
                  imposed.
                  >
                  > On the other hand, are there "5 pillars" or "5 foundations" on
                  which an approach to RCA activities can be grounded? Haidt's
                  foundations were (if I got them right): Harm, Fairness, In-group,
                  Authority, and Purity (as in free of contaminating elements). Are
                  there analogous "foundations" for developing causal analyses which,
                  if I get Haidt's argument right, appeal to all sides in a given
                  situation rather than just one or two?
                  >
                  > Or, were you considering Haidt's argument in terms of the relation
                  between the RCA lead/team (usually seen as "liberal" in its
                  approach) and the Management "team" (usually seen as "conservative"
                  in its approach)?
                  >
                  > Randy
                  > ____________ _________ _______
                  > James R (Randy) Fromm
                  > Senior Operations Consultant
                  > The Westwind Group, Inc.
                  > "Changing the Climate Through Training"
                  >
                  > (575) 405 9945
                  >
                  > rfromm@...
                  > jrfromm@...
                  >
                  >
                  > ----- Original Message -----
                  > From: Dr. Bill Corcoran
                  > To: Root_Cause_I
                  > Sent: Thursday, December 20, 2007 8:23 AM
                  > Subject: [Root_Cause_ State_of_ the_Practice] Moral Psychology
                  >
                  >
                  >
                  > If you view this video please let us know how you think this
                  work can affect root cause analysis
                  >
                  >
                  > http://www.newyorke r.com/online/ video/conference /2007/haidt
                  >
                  > Take care,
                  >
                  > Bill Corcoran
                  > Mission: Saving lives, pain, assets, and careers through
                  thoughtful inquiry.
                  > Motto: If you want safety, peace, or justice, then work for
                  competency, integrity, and transparency.
                  >
                  > W. R. Corcoran, Ph.D., P.E.
                  > NSRC Corporation
                  > 21 Broadleaf Circle
                  > Windsor, CT 06095-1634
                  > Voice and voice mail: 860-285-8779
                  >
                  > ROOT CAUSE INVESTIGATION HELP LINE 860-285-8779
                  >
                  > Join the on-going discussion of Root Cause Analysis problems,
                  puzzles, and progress at
                  http://groups. yahoo.com/ group/Root_ Cause_State_ of_the_Practice/
                  >
                  > Subscribe to "The Firebird Forum" by sending an e-mail to
                  TheFirebirdForum- subscribe@ yahoogroups. com
                  >

                • Dr. Bill Corcoran
                  Rich, You said: It does go deeper than the formal rewards structure. And that, I think, is what Haidt is saying, i.e., the five pillars of morality are
                  Message 8 of 12 , Jan 3, 2008
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                    Rich,
                     
                    You said:
                     
                     "It does go deeper than the formal rewards structure."
                    And that, I think, is what Haidt is saying, i.e., the five pillars of morality are hard-wired into the psyche and are only tweaked by the reward structure.
                     
                    The five pillars are part of our evolutionary legacy.
                     
                    The influence of built in morality is not reflected in root cause analysis yet.
                     
                    It is exploited as second nature by insightful managers on both sides of the ethics boundary.
                     
                    It is what keeps knowledgeable insiders from squealing at places like Enron, BP, Davis-Besse, and some rogue religious institutions.
                     
                    It is also what keeps Marines at their guns at Chosin Reservoir, for example.
                     
                    Scroll down for a table from one of Haidt's writings.
                     
                    Notice that every pillar virtue can be distorted to support a vice.
                     
                    I would imagine that experienced employee concerns program professionals will pickup on this very quickly.
                     
                    Take care,
                     
                    Bill Corcoran
                    Mission: Saving lives, pain, assets, and careers through thoughtful inquiry.
                    Motto: If you want safety, peace, or justice, then work for competency, integrity, and transparency.
                     
                    W. R. Corcoran, Ph.D., P.E.
                    NSRC Corporation
                    21 Broadleaf Circle
                    Windsor, CT 06095-1634
                    Voice and voice mail: 860-285-8779
                     
                    ROOT CAUSE INVESTIGATION HELP LINE 860-285-8779
                     
                    Join the on-going discussion of Root Cause Analysis problems, puzzles, and progress at http://groups.yahoo.com/group/Root_Cause_State_of_the_Practice/  
                     
                    Subscribe to "The Firebird Forum" by sending an e-mail to TheFirebirdForum-subscribe@yahoogroups.com
                     
                     
                     
                     
                    ----- Original Message -----
                    Sent: Thursday, January 03, 2008 8:10 AM
                    Subject: Re: [Root_Cause_State_of_the_Practice] Re: Moral Psychology

                    Bill -

                    Over emphasis on In-Group Dynamics is an interesting phenomena, as it fosters the development of a mini-culture that could be at odds with that of the company.  An “us versus them” mentality emerges when the group feels that they are being unfairly constrained by the expectations of the larger group.  The workers in the group may not intentionally hide transgressions, they simply do not recognize them as such because “that is the way WE do business”.  

                    Individuals want to be accepted by the group and not viewed as outsiders, so they “go along to get along”.  While anyone would stop work in the face of an obvious and imminent safety hazard, minor transgressions are accepted as a cost of doing business.  

                    “Risky Shift” is another phenomena I observe occasionally.  People in a work group get together to plan a hazardous job, and end up accepting more risk than any one of them would individually.  After an event, they are at a loss to explain why it made sense to them at the time.

                    It does go deeper than the formal rewards structure.

                    Rich

                    On 1/2/08 1:54 PM, "Dr. Bill Corcoran" <williamcorcoran@ sbcglobal. net> wrote:


                     
                     

                    Rich,

                    I am answering your last message on this topic.

                    The slide below is my summary of Haidt's article in SCIENCE.

                    I see all five categories of moral behavior among the people involved in events as well as those investigating them.

                    It is the trade-offs/ prioritizations that seem to cause problems.

                    For example, people who place safety (constraints on harm to others) ahead of Ingroup-Outgroup Dynamics (Concealment of transgressions and vulnerability) are rare enough that safety problems do not get raised up, as in the case of the S-102 spill.

                    It is hard to envision that lots of people did not pick-up on lots of obvious and subtle safety transgressions and vulnerabilities.

                    I have seen people hide safety problems out of loyalty to the organization.

                    Sometimes it is not intentional. It is just their morality.

                    How many people report safety problems and transgressions?

                    What is driving that behavior?

                    I think that it goes deeper than the reward structure.

                    Take care,
                     
                    Bill Corcoran
                    Mission: Saving lives, pain, assets, and careers through thoughtful inquiry.
                    Motto: If you want safety, peace, or justice, then work for competency, integrity, and transparency.
                     
                    W. R. Corcoran, Ph.D., P.E.
                    NSRC Corporation
                    21 Broadleaf Circle
                    Windsor, CT 06095-1634
                    Voice and voice mail: 860-285-8779

                    ROOT CAUSE INVESTIGATION HELP LINE 860-285-8779

                    Join the on-going discussion of Root Cause Analysis problems, puzzles, and progress at http://groups. yahoo.com/ group/Root_ Cause_State_ of_the_Practice/   

                    Subscribe to "The Firebird Forum" by sending an e-mail to TheFirebirdForum- subscribe@ yahoogroups. com

                     
                        

                  • jrfromm@comcast.net
                    Bill, Atoms and Lattices are metaphors that Haidt used to characterize the elements of the binary or dyadic opposition that he has observed. He associated
                    Message 9 of 12 , Jan 3, 2008
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                      Bill,
                       
                      Atoms and Lattices are metaphors that Haidt used to characterize the elements of the binary or dyadic opposition that he has observed.  He associated liberal tendencies with "atoms" or an "atomist" perspective on the world; that is, we are all individuals living together but independently and so long as we do not harm one another or cheat one another we should feel free to do whatever it is we want and we should commensurately allow others the same freedom.  The freedom aspect is crucial to the metaphor and its relation to those with liberal tendencies.  Lattices refer to those who band together in societies or guilds or unions or cliques or "family" units who in order to do so give up certain freedoms for other beneficial aspects of group or collective living.  Haidt associates that lifestyle and behavior with those with conservative tendencies.
                       
                      I think it was somewhat disingenuous of him to make the extension to political alignment.  We, all of us, have both atomist and collectivist tendencies.  The first row of the table from Haidt and Johnson shows that, I think.
                       
                      In terms of the other issues you raise, I have comments inserted below with your original remarks:
                       
                      And that, I think, is what Haidt is saying, i.e., the five pillars of morality are hard-wired into the psyche and are only tweaked by the reward structure.
                       
                      For Haidt, perhaps, they appear hard-wired.  But I would sugges that Haidt's pillars or foundations are merely metaphorical lables designed to articulate something he has observed that is not so easy to describe in complete detail, particularly in front of a lay audience.  There are a lot of things we appear to be "hard-wired" for, but for each of those there are exceptions that disprove the apparent rule.
                       
                      The five pillars are part of our evolutionary legacy.
                       
                      I agree there is some sort of legacy here, evolutionary or otherwise.  Philosophers and Anthropologists have been writing about this sort of stuff for centuries.  The moderator's remarks about Haidt's work being a new spin on some old work was dead on.  Adam Smith did touch on just these subjects, peripherally, in his philosophy.
                       
                      The influence of built in morality is not reflected in root cause analysis yet.
                       
                      To a certain extent, I agree with you.  But at root (if you'll excuse the expression) our very existence as determiners of root causes and the processes we use all reflect the existence of some sort of ethical grounding.  Maybe Haidt's metaphoric structure does not capture all of the nuances completely, but the foundations are there . . . else no one would care one way or the other about what caused events and what could be done to prevent them.
                       
                      It is exploited as second nature by insightful managers on both sides of the ethics boundary.
                       
                      I would suggest first that insightful managers have no need to "exploit" an ethical system.  Rather, their behaviors reflect the ethical structure (or lack thereof) which they have developed naturally over the course of their lives.  Some of us take far longer to learn the lessons and develop an ethics that works.  I am, second, curious about what you mean by "both sides of the eithics boundary;" are there only two sides?  If so, what are they?
                       
                      It is what keeps knowledgeable insiders from squealing at places like Enron, BP, Davis-Besse, and some rogue religious institutions.
                       
                      It is also what keeps Marines at their guns at Chosin Reservoir, for example.
                       
                      I agree that it is our ethics (or, again, lack thereof) that keeps us performing consistently, often against our natural (animal?) tendencies.
                       
                      Notice that every pillar virtue can be distorted to support a vice.
                       
                      I would suggest, rather, that it is the absence of a foundation in an individual's background or philosophy that results in what those with the foundation read/regard as a vice.  There are many behaviors taken for granted as normal today which one hundred or more years ago would be considered a vice; are we any less ethical than those who might view the behaviors that way.  Similarly, there are behaviors from the past that we view as barbarous vices which were considered normal and appropriate; were people in the past any less ethical than are we?
                       
                      Haidt's point was that ethical systems vary with the foundations held to be important by individuals and the group. 
                       
                      I would imagine that experienced employee concerns program professionals will pickup on this very quickly.
                       
                      I agree absolutely . . . unfortunately, many that I know don't care about or get the time to care about these sorts of issues or insights.
                       
                      Randy
                       
                    • Rich Higgins
                      Bob - I have not seen the Challenger group think video, but Group Think is the concept underlying the Abilene Paradox, a parable by Jerry Harvey used to
                      Message 10 of 12 , Jan 4, 2008
                      • 0 Attachment
                        Re: [Root_Cause_State_of_the_Practice] Re: Moral Psychology Bob -

                        I have not seen the Challenger group think video, but Group Think is the concept underlying the Abilene Paradox, a parable by Jerry Harvey used to illustrate one element of group behavior in his book, The Abiliene Paradox and Other Meditations of Management.  When conducting a RCA, the team members should not only attempt to identify whether or not group think was a factor in the event being analyzed, but should guard against group think in their own deliberations. In the book, Decision making: A psychological analysis of conflict, choice, and commitment, Irving Janis and L. Mann list the following eight symptoms of Group Think.

                        1. Illusion of Invulnerability (a.k.a. Risky Shift): Members ignore obvious danger, take extreme risk, and are overly optimistic.
                        2. Collective Rationalization (or normalization of deviation): Members discredit and explain away warnings contrary to the group’s conclusions.
                        3. Illusion of Morality (We are on the high ground): Members believe their decisions are morally correct, ignoring the ethical consequences of their decisions.
                        4. Excessive Stereotyping (Us vs. Them):The group constructs negative sterotypes of rivals outside the group.
                        5. Pressure for Conformity (Go along to get along): Members pressure any in the group who express arguments against the group's stereotypes, illusions, or commitments, viewing such opposition as disloyalty.
                        6. Self-Censorship (“Better to keep my mouth shut than take a chance of being ridiculed.”): Members withhold their dissenting views and counter-arguments.
                        7. Illusion of Unanimity (The Abilene Paradox): Members perceive falsely that everyone agrees with the group's decision; silence is seen as consent.
                        8. Mindguards (The opposite of Devil’s advocates): Some members appoint themselves to the role of protecting the group from adverse information that might threaten group complacency.

                        Rich


                        On 1/3/08 7:07 AM, "Bob Latino" <blatino@...> wrote:


                         
                         

                        Is this similar to the Groupthink video put out about Challenger launch discussion (CRM Films)?  I think the other one was an old one called “The Abilene Paradox” which also focused on the Groupthink concept.
                         
                        Bob L.
                         


                        From: Root_Cause_State_of_the_Practice@yahoogroups.com [mailto:Root_Cause_State_of_the_Practice@yahoogroups.com] On Behalf Of Rich Higgins
                        Sent: Thursday, January 03, 2008 8:10 AM
                        To: Root_Cause_State_of_the_Practice@yahoogroups.com
                        Subject: Re: [Root_Cause_State_of_the_Practice] Re: Moral Psychology


                        Bill -

                        Over emphasis on In-Group Dynamics is an interesting phenomena, as it fosters the development of a mini-culture that could be at odds with that of the company.  An “us versus them” mentality emerges when the group feels that they are being unfairly constrained by the expectations of the larger group.  The workers in the group may not intentionally hide transgressions, they simply do not recognize them as such because “that is the way WE do business”.  

                        Individuals want to be accepted by the group and not viewed as outsiders, so they “go along to get along”.  While anyone would stop work in the face of an obvious and imminent safety hazard, minor transgressions are accepted as a cost of doing business.  

                        “Risky Shift” is another phenomena I observe occasionally.  People in a work group get together to plan a hazardous job, and end up accepting more risk than any one of them would individually.  After an event, they are at a loss to explain why it made sense to them at the time.

                        It does go deeper than the formal rewards structure.

                        Rich

                        On 1/2/08 1:54 PM, "Dr. Bill Corcoran" <williamcorcoran@...> wrote:



                         
                         

                        Rich,

                        I am answering your last message on this topic.

                        The slide below is my summary of Haidt's article in SCIENCE.

                        I see all five categories of moral behavior among the people involved in events as well as those investigating them.

                        It is the trade-offs/ prioritizations that seem to cause problems.

                        For example, people who place safety (constraints on harm to others) ahead of Ingroup-Outgroup Dynamics (Concealment of transgressions and vulnerability) are rare enough that safety problems do not get raised up, as in the case of the S-102 spill.

                        It is hard to envision that lots of people did not pick-up on lots of obvious and subtle safety transgressions and vulnerabilities.

                        I have seen people hide safety problems out of loyalty to the organization.

                        Sometimes it is not intentional. It is just their morality.

                        How many people report safety problems and transgressions?

                        What is driving that behavior?

                        I think that it goes deeper than the reward structure.

                        Take care,
                         
                        Bill Corcoran
                        Mission: Saving lives, pain, assets, and careers through thoughtful inquiry.
                        Motto: If you want safety, peace, or justice, then work for competency, integrity, and transparency.
                         
                        W. R. Corcoran, Ph.D., P.E.
                        NSRC Corporation
                        21 Broadleaf Circle
                        Windsor, CT 06095-1634
                        Voice and voice mail: 860-285-8779

                        ROOT CAUSE INVESTIGATION HELP LINE 860-285-8779

                        Join the on-going discussion of Root Cause Analysis problems, puzzles, and progress at http://groups.yahoo.com/group/Root_Cause_State_of_the_Practice/   

                        Subscribe to "The Firebird Forum" by sending an e-mail to TheFirebirdForum-subscribe@yahoogroups.com

                         
                            


                            


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