Loading ...
Sorry, an error occurred while loading the content.

Re: [Root_Cause_State_of_the_Practice] A MESSAGE FOR NEW MEMBERS (AND HOLD-BACKS)

Expand Messages
  • Rolly Angeles
    Hello Mr. Corcoran, I have been reading some post if my time permits, I agree that 90% of the contributions come from 10% of the members, myself not include in
    Message 1 of 15 , May 31, 2006
    • 0 Attachment
      Hello Mr. Corcoran,
       
      I have been reading some post if my time permits, I agree that 90% of the contributions come from 10% of the members, myself not include in he 10%. Perhaps if there will be more feebacks and responses to the 90% in case they decided to write something then this 10% contributors will be increased.
       
      People (specially new once) ask something from this forum since it is important to them, even if we think that their inquiry is simply, once they see minimum or little reply then they will just stay away and be inactive.
       
      You three are the grandmasters around, perhaps its time to share something with others myself included, as I get very little reply from my previous posts.
       
      All the best,
       
       
      Rolly Angeles


      "Dr. Bill Corcoran" <William.R.Corcoran@...> wrote:
       
      A MESSAGE FOR NEW MEMBERS (AND HOLD-BACKS)
       
      (We have 461 members and the 90-10 Rule seems to apply; 90% of the contributions come from 10% of the members. This is not a complaint; but merely an observation.)
       
      As moderator, allow me to give the old "Preservation Hall" pitch: The more you put in, the more you get back.
       
      What can you contribute:
      • Questions
      • Assertions for testing
      • Your differing professional opinion 
      • Root cause investigation experiences: good and educational
      • A new poll
      • A vote in an existing poll
      • A record in a database table
      • A new database (Actually we  are at our quota of databases, but you can add one at http://groups.yahoo.com/group/Root_Cause_State_of_the_Practice_III/database
      • A new link
      • A new file
      • Your favorite root cause slide or picture as a JPG in the photos section
      • Your favorite root cause slide or picture as a JPG or GIF right in a message.
      What you can get
      • Ability to do limited benchmarking by asking members to tell you how they handle a certain issue
      • Access to people who might help you for free by telephone (including me at 860-285-8779, to a limited extent)
      • Poll results
      • Existing messages
      • Access to links
      • Files, including back issues of "The Firebird Forum"
      • Databases (as printable reports)-play around with this great feature
      • Access to photos
      • Etc.
       
      Let me know what I can do to make your e-group experience better.
      FEEDBACK IS THE BREAKFAST OF CHAMPIONS.
       
      Take care,
       
      Bill Corcoran
      Mission: Saving lives, pain, assets, and careers through thoughtful inquiry.
      Motto: If you want safety, peace, or justice, work for competency, integrity, and transparency.
       
      W. R. Corcoran, Ph.D., P.E.
      NSRC Corporation
      21 Broadleaf Circle
      Windsor, CT 06095-1634
      Voice and voice mail: 860-285-8779
      Fax and voice mail to e-mail: 206-888-6772
       

      Register for a full day of Root Cause Training on August 10, 2006 at Amelia Island, FL at https://secure.ans.org/meetings/uwc/registration/
       
      Subscribe to "The Firebird Forum" by sending an e-mail to TheFirebirdForum-subscribe@yahoogroups.com


      Talk is cheap. Use Yahoo! Messenger to make PC-to-Phone calls. Great rates starting at 1¢/min.

    • Dr. Bill Corcoran
      Rolly, Thanks ever so much. If you ask me a question on this forum I will answer it. I have noticed that I put some messages aside to answer later and then
      Message 2 of 15 , Jun 1, 2006
      • 0 Attachment
        Rolly,
         
        Thanks ever so much.
         
        If you ask me a question on this forum I will answer it.
         
        I have noticed that I put some messages aside to answer later and then don't get back to them unless another message comes up as an antecedent.
         
        Take care,
         
        Bill Corcoran
        Mission: Saving lives, pain, assets, and careers through thoughtful inquiry.
        Motto: If you want safety, peace, or justice, work for competency, integrity, and transparency.
         
        W. R. Corcoran, Ph.D., P.E.
        NSRC Corporation
        21 Broadleaf Circle
        Windsor, CT 06095-1634
        Voice and voice mail: 860-285-8779
        Fax and voice mail to e-mail: 206-888-6772
         

        Register for a full day of Root Cause Training on August 10, 2006 at Amelia Island, FL at https://secure.ans.org/meetings/uwc/registration/
         
        Subscribe to "The Firebird Forum" by sending an e-mail to TheFirebirdForum-subscribe@yahoogroups.com
        ----- Original Message -----
        Sent: Thursday, June 01, 2006 2:01 AM
        Subject: Re: [Root_Cause_State_of_the_Practice] A MESSAGE FOR NEW MEMBERS (AND HOLD-BACKS)

        Hello Mr. Corcoran,
         
        I have been reading some post if my time permits, I agree that 90% of the contributions come from 10% of the members, myself not include in he 10%. Perhaps if there will be more feedbacks and responses to the 90% in case they decided to write something then this 10% contributors will be increased.
         
        People (specially new once) ask something from this forum since it is important to them, even if we think that their inquiry is simply, once they see minimum or little reply then they will just stay away and be inactive.
         
        You three are the grandmasters around, perhaps its time to share something with others myself included, as I get very little reply from my previous posts.
         
        All the best,
         
         
        Rolly Angeles


        "Dr. Bill Corcoran" <William.R.Corcoran@...> wrote:
         
        A MESSAGE FOR NEW MEMBERS (AND HOLD-BACKS)
         
        (We have 461 members and the 90-10 Rule seems to apply; 90% of the contributions come from 10% of the members. This is not a complaint; but merely an observation.)
         
        As moderator, allow me to give the old "Preservation Hall" pitch: The more you put in, the more you get back.
         
        What can you contribute:
        • Questions
        • Assertions for testing
        • Your differing professional opinion 
        • Root cause investigation experiences: good and educational
        • A new poll
        • A vote in an existing poll
        • A record in a database table
        • A new database (Actually we  are at our quota of databases, but you can add one at http://groups.yahoo.com/group/Root_Cause_State_of_the_Practice_III/database
        • A new link
        • A new file
        • Your favorite root cause slide or picture as a JPG in the photos section
        • Your favorite root cause slide or picture as a JPG or GIF right in a message.
        What you can get
        • Ability to do limited benchmarking by asking members to tell you how they handle a certain issue
        • Access to people who might help you for free by telephone (including me at 860-285-8779, to a limited extent)
        • Poll results
        • Existing messages
        • Access to links
        • Files, including back issues of "The Firebird Forum"
        • Databases (as printable reports)-play around with this great feature
        • Access to photos
        • Etc.
         
        Let me know what I can do to make your e-group experience better.
        FEEDBACK IS THE BREAKFAST OF CHAMPIONS.
         
        Take care,
         
        Bill Corcoran
        Mission: Saving lives, pain, assets, and careers through thoughtful inquiry.
        Motto: If you want safety, peace, or justice, work for competency, integrity, and transparency.
         
        W. R. Corcoran, Ph.D., P.E.
        NSRC Corporation
        21 Broadleaf Circle
        Windsor, CT 06095-1634
        Voice and voice mail: 860-285-8779
        Fax and voice mail to e-mail: 206-888-6772
         

        Register for a full day of Root Cause Training on August 10, 2006 at Amelia Island, FL at https://secure.ans.org/meetings/uwc/registration/
         
        Subscribe to "The Firebird Forum" by sending an e-mail to TheFirebirdForum-subscribe@yahoogroups.com


        Talk is cheap. Use Yahoo! Messenger to make PC-to-Phone calls. Great rates starting at 1¢/min.

      • Dr. Bill Corcoran
        Mike, This one sounds interesting. Do you have a link to the web source of the information? Do you know if there is a tech spec that requires access to the
        Message 3 of 15 , Jun 1, 2006
        • 0 Attachment
          Mike,
           
          This one sounds interesting.
           
          Do you have a link to the web source of the information?
           
          Do you know if there is a tech spec that requires access to the (safety-related) switchgear room?
           
          Is there any design basis event that assumes access to the switchgear room?
           
          Is it acceptable for a non-safety-related failure to prevent access to safety-related systems, structures, and/or components?
           
          Take care,
           
          Bill Corcoran
          Mission: Saving lives, pain, assets, and careers through thoughtful inquiry.
          Motto: If you want safety, peace, or justice, work for competency, integrity, and transparency.
           
          W. R. Corcoran, Ph.D., P.E.
          NSRC Corporation
          21 Broadleaf Circle
          Windsor, CT 06095-1634
          Voice and voice mail: 860-285-8779
          Fax and voice mail to e-mail: 206-888-6772
           

          Register for a full day of Root Cause Training on August 10, 2006 at Amelia Island, FL at https://secure.ans.org/meetings/uwc/registration/
           
          Subscribe to "The Firebird Forum" by sending an e-mail to TheFirebirdForum-subscribe@yahoogroups.com
          ----- Original Message -----
          Sent: Wednesday, May 31, 2006 6:06 PM
          Subject: [Root_Cause_State_of_the_Practice] What do you think...it is a current event in controversy!

          Ok...at a nuclear power plant they had a short of a
          condensate pump leading to some smoke and maybe a
          small fire in the electric motor. Minor issues so far.
          The breaker is housed in a rather small room many feet
          away from the motor...the room is considered a vital
          electrical area....the switch gear room. So as the
          condensate motor shorted...the balancing resisters on
          top of the breaker heated up(in the switch gear
          room)...I consider this a normal response. The problem
          is this created a control room alarm, and the smoke
          from the resistors discharged the CO2 system. 

          I consider this a diversion of valuable control room
          and plant employee resources within an accident.

          There is a barrier with understanding what’s going on
          in the switch gear room...it’s basically a mystery on
          what causing the alarm and CO2 discharge until the gas
          is removed and allowing employee inspection.

          It seems to be a switch gear room and breaker poor
          design...in that a normal operation of the balancing
          resister leads to an unnecessary discharge of the CO2.
          So you got two reports of fire in the plant...and one
          is false. It should be remembered that the switch gear
          room is a vital area...thus the emergency hierarchal
          procedure with limited resources is to deal with the
          switch gear room first. So when purchasing a switch
          gear breaker in CO2 flooding area...you should
          purchase a breaker design that in all modes of
          operations and protective actions (balancing
          resisters)...that no ionization and smoke get
          discharged.

          Was there an issue with poor maintenance...allowing
          the build up of dust on the resisters.

          So the resister heats up and creates ionization and
          smoke when an out side component is shorted...this is
          a normal operation...and there is no fire hazard in
          the switch gear.

          This has happened in the past...we don’t know the
          magnitude of the number of times....the short and
          discharged CO2.

          Thanks,

          mike mulligan
          Hinsdale, Nh


          __________________________________________________
          Do You Yahoo!?
          Tired of spam?  Yahoo! Mail has the best spam protection around
          http://mail.yahoo.com



        • Michael Mulligan
          Bill, Do you have a link to the web source of the information? http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/event-status/event/2006/20060525en.html You could
          Message 4 of 15 , Jun 1, 2006
          • 0 Attachment
            Bill,



            Do you have a link to the web source of the
            information?

            http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/event-status/event/2006/20060525en.html
            You could do a google on Vermont Yankee and fire. The
            event is only about a week old. There is very little
            information available. I am going to ask them for a
            yahoo message board staffed with VY licensed and
            engineering employees...such that you could ask
            questions and the plant could have an outlet to
            clearly communicate back. You really need something
            like this throughout the nation...to demystify events
            going on in the industry. I can dream you know! The
            media people could be there also...such that they
            could ask smarter questions and get better responses.
            These little newspapers in Vermont locally and in
            Rutland....they have such a high reporter
            turnover....thus you are always reeducating them. The
            newspaper cycle...the unavailability of the
            reporters...really disserves VY. We wouldn’t be
            prepared if it was a bigger accident with these
            brittle communications channels ...and there would be
            excessive public relations damage....because the
            fragile communications channels would break down in a
            bigger accident. You can’t be building these
            communication things after an accident.



            Do you know if there is a tech spec that requires
            access to the (safety-related) switchgear room?

            I can’t remember.
            A tour ever 4 hours is a requirement on the logs? I
            wonder if they have to go in there for a shutdown and
            remote cool down of the reactor...if they had to
            abandon the control room. I imagine there are fuses in
            there that they would have to reset and replace for
            any hot shorts. It has been a long time.



            Is there any design basis event that assumes access to
            the switchgear room?

            I can’t remember.

            The diesel breakers are in there. It’s interesting...I
            think there is a soak time...meaning they discharge
            CO2...and then they are prohibited for going in switch
            gear for a period of time thinking the CO2 needs to
            soak in....and the wait is long enough to smoother the
            fire. You don’t want oxygen back in there. We are
            talking about all add ons here...not comprehensive
            engineering.



            Is it acceptable for a non-safety-related failure to
            prevent access to safety-related systems, structures,
            and/or components?

            They would correct that in the new plants?
            You right...it should all be all safety related and
            nothing else allowed. It’s fascinating that a problem
            in a non safety grade pump could take out a large
            portion of the both vital buses. They weren't thinking
            either placing the Control room one floor above the
            switch gear room. They had CO2 in the control room the
            last time with the other short and CO2 doscharge. I
            wonder did they get any measured CO2 in the CR this
            time...did they remove the toxic gas monitors?




            Again, I only have very old information...and all of
            this would have to be verified!


            Thanks,

            mike




            --- "Dr. Bill Corcoran"
            <William.R.Corcoran@...> wrote:

            > Mike,
            >
            > This one sounds interesting.
            >
            > Do you have a link to the web source of the
            > information?
            >
            > Do you know if there is a tech spec that requires
            > access to the (safety-related) switchgear room?
            >
            > Is there any design basis event that assumes access
            > to the switchgear room?
            >
            > Is it acceptable for a non-safety-related failure to
            > prevent access to safety-related systems,
            > structures, and/or components?
            >
            > Take care,
            >
            > Bill Corcoran
            > Mission: Saving lives, pain, assets, and careers
            > through thoughtful inquiry.
            > Motto: If you want safety, peace, or justice, work
            > for competency, integrity, and transparency.
            >
            > W. R. Corcoran, Ph.D., P.E.
            > NSRC Corporation
            > 21 Broadleaf Circle
            > Windsor, CT 06095-1634
            > Voice and voice mail: 860-285-8779
            > Fax and voice mail to e-mail: 206-888-6772
            >
            >
            > Register for a full day of Root Cause Training on
            > August 10, 2006 at Amelia Island, FL at
            > https://secure.ans.org/meetings/uwc/registration/
            >
            > Subscribe to "The Firebird Forum" by sending an
            > e-mail to TheFirebirdForum-subscribe@yahoogroups.com
            >
            > ----- Original Message -----
            > From: Michael Mulligan
            > To:
            > Root_Cause_State_of_the_Practice@yahoogroups.com
            > Sent: Wednesday, May 31, 2006 6:06 PM
            > Subject: [Root_Cause_State_of_the_Practice] What
            > do you think...it is a current event in controversy!
            >
            >
            > Ok...at a nuclear power plant they had a short of
            > a
            > condensate pump leading to some smoke and maybe a
            > small fire in the electric motor. Minor issues so
            > far.
            > The breaker is housed in a rather small room many
            > feet
            > away from the motor...the room is considered a
            > vital
            > electrical area....the switch gear room. So as the
            > condensate motor shorted...the balancing resisters
            > on
            > top of the breaker heated up(in the switch gear
            > room)...I consider this a normal response. The
            > problem
            > is this created a control room alarm, and the
            > smoke
            > from the resistors discharged the CO2 system.
            >
            > I consider this a diversion of valuable control
            > room
            > and plant employee resources within an accident.
            >
            > There is a barrier with understanding what's going
            > on
            > in the switch gear room...it's basically a mystery
            > on
            > what causing the alarm and CO2 discharge until the
            > gas
            > is removed and allowing employee inspection.
            >
            > It seems to be a switch gear room and breaker poor
            > design...in that a normal operation of the
            > balancing
            > resister leads to an unnecessary discharge of the
            > CO2.
            > So you got two reports of fire in the plant...and
            > one
            > is false. It should be remembered that the switch
            > gear
            > room is a vital area...thus the emergency
            > hierarchal
            > procedure with limited resources is to deal with
            > the
            > switch gear room first. So when purchasing a
            > switch
            > gear breaker in CO2 flooding area...you should
            > purchase a breaker design that in all modes of
            > operations and protective actions (balancing
            > resisters)...that no ionization and smoke get
            > discharged.
            >
            > Was there an issue with poor
            > maintenance...allowing
            > the build up of dust on the resisters.
            >
            > So the resister heats up and creates ionization
            > and
            > smoke when an out side component is shorted...this
            > is
            > a normal operation...and there is no fire hazard
            > in
            > the switch gear.
            >
            > This has happened in the past...we don't know the
            > magnitude of the number of times....the short and
            > discharged CO2.
            >
            > Thanks,
            >
            > mike mulligan
            > Hinsdale, Nh
            >
            >
            > __________________________________________________
            > Do You Yahoo!?
            > Tired of spam? Yahoo! Mail has the best spam
            > protection around
            > http://mail.yahoo.com
            >
            >
            >
            >
            >
            > If you want safety, peace, or justice work for
            > competency, integrity, and transparency.
            >
            >
            >
            > SPONSORED LINKS Social sciences Social science
            > course Social science degree
            > Social science education Social science
            > class Social science college
            >
            >
            >
            ------------------------------------------------------------------------------
            > YAHOO! GROUPS LINKS
            >
            > a.. Visit your group
            > "Root_Cause_State_of_the_Practice" on the web.
            >
            > b.. To unsubscribe from this group, send an
            > email to:
            >
            >
            Root_Cause_State_of_the_Practice-unsubscribe@yahoogroups.com
            >
            > c.. Your use of Yahoo! Groups is subject to the
            > Yahoo! Terms of Service.
            >
            >
            >
            ------------------------------------------------------------------------------
            >
            >


            __________________________________________________
            Do You Yahoo!?
            Tired of spam? Yahoo! Mail has the best spam protection around
            http://mail.yahoo.com
          • Jack Stanford
            My experience at CT Yankee - Access to the Alpha Switchgear room was required in the ops outside the Control Room AOP. Don t recall licensing basis
            Message 5 of 15 , Jun 2, 2006
            • 0 Attachment
              My experience at CT Yankee -
               
              Access to the Alpha Switchgear room was required in the ops outside the Control Room AOP.  Don't recall licensing basis requirement(s).
               
              Access to the Bravo Switchgear room was required to meet Appendix R requirements, as the building was specifically erected post initial startup to meet Appendix R requirements.
               
              Jack Stanford, SRO/PE
              210 Old Chester Road
              Haddam, CT  06438
               
               
               
              ----- Original Message -----
              Sent: Thursday, June 01, 2006 6:24 AM
              Subject: Re: [Root_Cause_State_of_the_Practice] What do you think...it is a current event in controversy!

              Mike,
               
              This one sounds interesting.
               
              Do you have a link to the web source of the information?
               
              Do you know if there is a tech spec that requires access to the (safety-related) switchgear room?
               
              Is there any design basis event that assumes access to the switchgear room?
               
              Is it acceptable for a non-safety-related failure to prevent access to safety-related systems, structures, and/or components?
               
              Take care,
               
              Bill Corcoran
              Mission: Saving lives, pain, assets, and careers through thoughtful inquiry.
              Motto: If you want safety, peace, or justice, work for competency, integrity, and transparency.
               
              W. R. Corcoran, Ph.D., P.E.
              NSRC Corporation
              21 Broadleaf Circle
              Windsor, CT 06095-1634
              Voice and voice mail: 860-285-8779
              Fax and voice mail to e-mail: 206-888-6772
               

              Register for a full day of Root Cause Training on August 10, 2006 at Amelia Island, FL at https://secure.ans.org/meetings/uwc/registration/
               
              Subscribe to "The Firebird Forum" by sending an e-mail to TheFirebirdForum-subscribe@yahoogroups.com
              ----- Original Message -----
              Sent: Wednesday, May 31, 2006 6:06 PM
              Subject: [Root_Cause_State_of_the_Practice] What do you think...it is a current event in controversy!

              Ok...at a nuclear power plant they had a short of a
              condensate pump leading to some smoke and maybe a
              small fire in the electric motor. Minor issues so far.
              The breaker is housed in a rather small room many feet
              away from the motor...the room is considered a vital
              electrical area....the switch gear room. So as the
              condensate motor shorted...the balancing resisters on
              top of the breaker heated up(in the switch gear
              room)...I consider this a normal response. The problem
              is this created a control room alarm, and the smoke
              from the resistors discharged the CO2 system. 

              I consider this a diversion of valuable control room
              and plant employee resources within an accident.

              There is a barrier with understanding what’s going on
              in the switch gear room...it’s basically a mystery on
              what causing the alarm and CO2 discharge until the gas
              is removed and allowing employee inspection.

              It seems to be a switch gear room and breaker poor
              design...in that a normal operation of the balancing
              resister leads to an unnecessary discharge of the CO2.
              So you got two reports of fire in the plant...and one
              is false. It should be remembered that the switch gear
              room is a vital area...thus the emergency hierarchal
              procedure with limited resources is to deal with the
              switch gear room first. So when purchasing a switch
              gear breaker in CO2 flooding area...you should
              purchase a breaker design that in all modes of
              operations and protective actions (balancing
              resisters)...that no ionization and smoke get
              discharged.

              Was there an issue with poor maintenance...allowing
              the build up of dust on the resisters.

              So the resister heats up and creates ionization and
              smoke when an out side component is shorted...this is
              a normal operation...and there is no fire hazard in
              the switch gear.

              This has happened in the past...we don’t know the
              magnitude of the number of times....the short and
              discharged CO2.

              Thanks,

              mike mulligan
              Hinsdale, Nh


              __________________________________________________
              Do You Yahoo!?
              Tired of spam?  Yahoo! Mail has the best spam protection around
              http://mail.yahoo.com



            • Michael Mulligan
              Jack, Hmmm....VY spent some monies putting in fire proofed sheet rock in the switch gear room....splitting the redundant sides of the vital bus. I’d say in
              Message 6 of 15 , Jun 3, 2006
              • 0 Attachment
                Jack,

                Hmmm....VY spent some monies putting in fire proofed
                sheet rock in the switch gear room....splitting the
                redundant sides of the vital bus. I’d say in the early
                1990’s. What’s in the new “B” switch gear room...?
                It’s amazing how they treated differently these
                plants...the NRC. Don’t forget the back-fit rules?

                Thanks,

                mike

                --- Jack Stanford <jack.stanford@...> wrote:

                > My experience at CT Yankee -
                >
                > Access to the Alpha Switchgear room was required in
                > the ops outside the Control Room AOP. Don't recall
                > licensing basis requirement(s).
                >
                > Access to the Bravo Switchgear room was required to
                > meet Appendix R requirements, as the building was
                > specifically erected post initial startup to meet
                > Appendix R requirements.
                >
                > Jack Stanford, SRO/PE
                > 210 Old Chester Road
                > Haddam, CT 06438
                >
                > StanfordJ@...
                > Jack.Stanford@...
                > 860-345-4344
                >
                >
                > ----- Original Message -----
                > From: Dr. Bill Corcoran
                > To:
                > Root_Cause_State_of_the_Practice@yahoogroups.com
                > Sent: Thursday, June 01, 2006 6:24 AM
                > Subject: Re: [Root_Cause_State_of_the_Practice]
                > What do you think...it is a current event in
                > controversy!
                >
                >
                > Mike,
                >
                > This one sounds interesting.
                >
                > Do you have a link to the web source of the
                > information?
                >
                > Do you know if there is a tech spec that requires
                > access to the (safety-related) switchgear room?
                >
                > Is there any design basis event that assumes
                > access to the switchgear room?
                >
                > Is it acceptable for a non-safety-related failure
                > to prevent access to safety-related systems,
                > structures, and/or components?
                >
                > Take care,
                >
                > Bill Corcoran
                > Mission: Saving lives, pain, assets, and careers
                > through thoughtful inquiry.
                > Motto: If you want safety, peace, or justice, work
                > for competency, integrity, and transparency.
                >
                > W. R. Corcoran, Ph.D., P.E.
                > NSRC Corporation
                > 21 Broadleaf Circle
                > Windsor, CT 06095-1634
                > Voice and voice mail: 860-285-8779
                > Fax and voice mail to e-mail: 206-888-6772
                >
                >
                > Register for a full day of Root Cause Training on
                > August 10, 2006 at Amelia Island, FL at
                > https://secure.ans.org/meetings/uwc/registration/
                >
                > Subscribe to "The Firebird Forum" by sending an
                > e-mail to TheFirebirdForum-subscribe@yahoogroups.com
                >
                > ----- Original Message -----
                > From: Michael Mulligan
                > To:
                > Root_Cause_State_of_the_Practice@yahoogroups.com
                > Sent: Wednesday, May 31, 2006 6:06 PM
                > Subject: [Root_Cause_State_of_the_Practice] What
                > do you think...it is a current event in controversy!
                >
                >
                > Ok...at a nuclear power plant they had a short
                > of a
                > condensate pump leading to some smoke and maybe
                > a
                > small fire in the electric motor. Minor issues
                > so far.
                > The breaker is housed in a rather small room
                > many feet
                > away from the motor...the room is considered a
                > vital
                > electrical area....the switch gear room. So as
                > the
                > condensate motor shorted...the balancing
                > resisters on
                > top of the breaker heated up(in the switch gear
                > room)...I consider this a normal response. The
                > problem
                > is this created a control room alarm, and the
                > smoke
                > from the resistors discharged the CO2 system.
                >
                > I consider this a diversion of valuable control
                > room
                > and plant employee resources within an accident.
                >
                >
                > There is a barrier with understanding what's
                > going on
                > in the switch gear room...it's basically a
                > mystery on
                > what causing the alarm and CO2 discharge until
                > the gas
                > is removed and allowing employee inspection.
                >
                > It seems to be a switch gear room and breaker
                > poor
                > design...in that a normal operation of the
                > balancing
                > resister leads to an unnecessary discharge of
                > the CO2.
                > So you got two reports of fire in the
                > plant...and one
                > is false. It should be remembered that the
                > switch gear
                > room is a vital area...thus the emergency
                > hierarchal
                > procedure with limited resources is to deal with
                > the
                > switch gear room first. So when purchasing a
                > switch
                > gear breaker in CO2 flooding area...you should
                > purchase a breaker design that in all modes of
                > operations and protective actions (balancing
                > resisters)...that no ionization and smoke get
                > discharged.
                >
                > Was there an issue with poor
                > maintenance...allowing
                > the build up of dust on the resisters.
                >
                > So the resister heats up and creates ionization
                > and
                > smoke when an out side component is
                > shorted...this is
                > a normal operation...and there is no fire hazard
                > in
                > the switch gear.
                >
                > This has happened in the past...we don't know
                > the
                > magnitude of the number of times....the short
                > and
                > discharged CO2.
                >
                > Thanks,
                >
                > mike mulligan
                > Hinsdale, Nh
                >
                >
                >
                > __________________________________________________
                > Do You Yahoo!?
                > Tired of spam? Yahoo! Mail has the best spam
                > protection around
                > http://mail.yahoo.com
                >
                >
                >
                >
                >
                > If you want safety, peace, or justice work for
                > competency, integrity, and transparency.
                >
                >
                >
                > SPONSORED LINKS Social sciences Social science
                > course Social science degree
                > Social science education Social science
                > class Social science college
                >
                >
                >
                ----------------------------------------------------------------------------
                > YAHOO! GROUPS LINKS
                >
                > a.. Visit your group
                > "Root_Cause_State_of_the_Practice" on the web.
                >
                > b.. To unsubscribe from this group, send an
                > email to:
                >
                >
                Root_Cause_State_of_the_Practice-unsubscribe@yahoogroups.com
                >
                > c.. Your use of Yahoo! Groups is subject to
                > the Yahoo! Terms of Service.
                >
                >
                >
                ----------------------------------------------------------------------------
                >
                >


                __________________________________________________
                Do You Yahoo!?
                Tired of spam? Yahoo! Mail has the best spam protection around
                http://mail.yahoo.com
              • Terry Herrmann
                Mike, I m not sure of the specifics regarding what events require access to the switchgear room. Most safety-related systems and components perform their
                Message 7 of 15 , Jun 4, 2006
                • 0 Attachment

                  Mike,

                  I'm not sure of the specifics regarding what events require access to the switchgear room.  Most safety-related systems and components perform their design safety function without operator intervention.  There may be Emergency Operating Procedures that require local opreator action, but for Boiling Water Reactors, these are symptom based and would direct other actions if the switchgear room were unavailable.  In addition, the operating crew in every plant I'm familiar with is trained in the use and has readily available SCBA equipment for use in case of fires.

                  Your comment:
                  Is it acceptable for a non-safety-related failure to prevent access to safety-related systems, structures, and/or components?

                  They would correct that in the new plants?  You right...it should all be all safety related and
                  nothing else allowed. It�s fascinating that a problem in a non safety grade pump could take out a large portion of the both vital buses. They weren't thinking either placing the Control room one floor above the switch gear room. They had CO2 in the control room the last time with the other short and CO2 doscharge. I wonder did they get any measured CO2 in the CR this time...did they remove the toxic gas monitors?


                  The segregation of safety and non safety-related systems and components has more to do with the QA program level and credit for performing functions credited as safety-related.  The potential for this kind of interaction is addressed in station Probabilistic Risk Assessments (refer to NFPA 805) and the Maintenance Rule under 10CFR50.65.  Additional precautions need to be taken where non safety-related components can potentially impact safety related components.

                  Terry Herrmann


                  From: Michael Mulligan <steamshovel2002@...>
                  Reply-To: Root_Cause_State_of_the_Practice@yahoogroups.com
                  To: Root_Cause_State_of_the_Practice@yahoogroups.com
                  Subject: [Root_Cause_State_of_the_Practice] What do you think...it is a current event in controversy!
                  Date: Thu, 1 Jun 2006 18:54:08 -0700 (PDT)

                  Bill,



                  Do you have a link to the web source of the
                  information?

                  http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/event-status/event/2006/20060525en.html
                  You could do a google on Vermont Yankee and fire. The
                  event is only about a week old. There is very little
                  information available. I am going to ask them for a
                  yahoo message board staffed with VY licensed and
                  engineering employees...such that you could ask
                  questions and the plant could have an outlet to
                  clearly communicate back. You really need something
                  like this throughout the nation...to demystify events
                  going on in the industry. I can dream you know! The
                  media people could be there also...such that they
                  could ask smarter questions and get better responses.
                  These little newspapers in Vermont locally and in
                  Rutland....they have such a high reporter
                  turnover....thus you are always reeducating them. The
                  newspaper cycle...the unavailability of the
                  reporters...really disserves VY. We wouldn�t be
                  prepared if it was a bigger accident with these
                  brittle communications channels ...and there would be
                  excessive public relations damage....because the
                  fragile communications channels would break down in a
                  bigger accident.  You can�t be building these
                  communication things after an accident.



                  Do you know if there is a tech spec that requires
                  access to the (safety-related) switchgear room?

                  I can�t remember.
                  A tour ever 4 hours is a requirement on the logs? I
                  wonder if they have to go in there for a shutdown and
                  remote cool down of the reactor...if they had to
                  abandon the control room. I imagine there are fuses in
                  there that they would have to reset and replace for
                  any hot shorts. It has been a long time.



                  Is there any design basis event that assumes access to
                  the switchgear room?

                  I can�t remember.

                  The diesel breakers are in there. It�s interesting...I
                  think there is a soak time...meaning they discharge
                  CO2...and then they are prohibited for going in switch
                  gear for a period of time thinking the CO2 needs to
                  soak in....and the wait is long enough to smoother the
                  fire. You don�t want oxygen back in there. We are
                  talking about all add ons here...not comprehensive
                  engineering.



                  Is it acceptable for a non-safety-related failure to
                  prevent access to safety-related systems, structures,
                  and/or components?

                  They would correct that in the new plants?
                  You right...it should all be all safety related and
                  nothing else allowed. It�s fascinating that a problem
                  in a non safety grade pump could take out a large
                  portion of the both vital buses. They weren't thinking
                  either placing the Control room one floor above the
                  switch gear room. They had CO2 in the control room the
                  last time with the other short and CO2 doscharge. I
                  wonder did they get any measured CO2 in the CR this
                  time...did they remove the toxic gas monitors?




                  Again, I only have very old information...and all of
                  this would have to be verified!


                  Thanks,

                  mike




                  --- "Dr. Bill Corcoran"
                  <William.R.Corcoran@...> wrote:

                  > Mike,
                  >
                  > This one sounds interesting.
                  >
                  > Do you have a link to the web source of the
                  > information?
                  >
                  > Do you know if there is a tech spec that requires
                  > access to the (safety-related) switchgear room?
                  >
                  > Is there any design basis event that assumes access
                  > to the switchgear room?
                  >
                  > Is it acceptable for a non-safety-related failure to
                  > prevent access to safety-related systems,
                  > structures, and/or components?
                  >
                  > Take care,

                  > Bill Corcoran
                  > Mission: Saving lives, pain, assets, and careers
                  > through thoughtful inquiry.
                  > Motto: If you want safety, peace, or justice, work
                  > for competency, integrity, and transparency.

                  > W. R. Corcoran, Ph.D., P.E.
                  > NSRC Corporation
                  > 21 Broadleaf Circle
                  > Windsor, CT 06095-1634
                  > Voice and voice mail: 860-285-8779
                  > Fax and voice mail to e-mail: 206-888-6772
                  >
                  >
                  > Register for a full day of Root Cause Training on
                  > August 10, 2006 at Amelia Island, FL at
                  > https://secure.ans.org/meetings/uwc/registration/
                  >
                  > Subscribe to "The Firebird Forum" by sending an
                  > e-mail to TheFirebirdForum-subscribe@yahoogroups.com
                  >
                  >   ----- Original Message -----
                  >   From: Michael Mulligan
                  >   To:
                  > Root_Cause_State_of_the_Practice@yahoogroups.com
                  >   Sent: Wednesday, May 31, 2006 6:06 PM
                  >   Subject: [Root_Cause_State_of_the_Practice] What
                  > do you think...it is a current event in controversy!
                  >
                  >
                  >   Ok...at a nuclear power plant they had a short of
                  > a
                  >   condensate pump leading to some smoke and maybe a
                  >   small fire in the electric motor. Minor issues so
                  > far.
                  >   The breaker is housed in a rather small room many
                  > feet
                  >   away from the motor...the room is considered a
                  > vital
                  >   electrical area....the switch gear room. So as the
                  >   condensate motor shorted...the balancing resisters
                  > on
                  >   top of the breaker heated up(in the switch gear
                  >   room)...I consider this a normal response. The
                  > problem
                  >   is this created a control room alarm, and the
                  > smoke
                  >   from the resistors discharged the CO2 system. 
                  >
                  >   I consider this a diversion of valuable control
                  > room
                  >   and plant employee resources within an accident.
                  >
                  >   There is a barrier with understanding what's going
                  > on
                  >   in the switch gear room...it's basically a mystery
                  > on
                  >   what causing the alarm and CO2 discharge until the
                  > gas
                  >   is removed and allowing employee inspection.
                  >
                  >   It seems to be a switch gear room and breaker poor
                  >   design...in that a normal operation of the
                  > balancing
                  >   resister leads to an unnecessary discharge of the
                  > CO2.
                  >   So you got two reports of fire in the plant...and
                  > one
                  >   is false. It should be remembered that the switch
                  > gear
                  >   room is a vital area...thus the emergency
                  > hierarchal
                  >   procedure with limited resources is to deal with
                  > the
                  >   switch gear room first. So when purchasing a
                  > switch
                  >   gear breaker in CO2 flooding area...you should
                  >   purchase a breaker design that in all modes of
                  >   operations and protective actions (balancing
                  >   resisters)...that no ionization and smoke get
                  >   discharged.
                  >
                  >   Was there an issue with poor
                  > maintenance...allowing
                  >   the build up of dust on the resisters.
                  >
                  >   So the resister heats up and creates ionization
                  > and
                  >   smoke when an out side component is shorted...this
                  > is
                  >   a normal operation...and there is no fire hazard
                  > in
                  >   the switch gear.
                  >
                  >   This has happened in the past...we don't know the
                  >   magnitude of the number of times....the short and
                  >   discharged CO2.
                  >
                  >   Thanks,
                  >
                  >   mike mulligan
                  >   Hinsdale, Nh
                  >
                  >
                  >   __________________________________________________
                  >   Do You Yahoo!?
                  >   Tired of spam?  Yahoo! Mail has the best spam
                  > protection around
                  >   http://mail.yahoo.com
                  >
                  >
                  >
                  >
                  >
                  >   If you want safety, peace, or justice work for
                  > competency, integrity, and transparency.
                  >
                  >
                  >
                  >   SPONSORED LINKS Social sciences  Social science
                  > course  Social science degree 
                  >         Social science education  Social science
                  > class  Social science college 
                  >
                  >
                  >
                  ------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                  >   YAHOO! GROUPS LINKS
                  >
                  >     a..  Visit your group
                  > "Root_Cause_State_of_the_Practice" on the web.
                  >      
                  >     b..  To unsubscribe from this group, send an
                  > email to:
                  >    
                  >
                  Root_Cause_State_of_the_Practice-unsubscribe@yahoogroups.com
                  >      
                  >     c..  Your use of Yahoo! Groups is subject to the
                  > Yahoo! Terms of Service.
                  >
                  >
                  >
                  ------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                  >
                  >


                  __________________________________________________
                  Do You Yahoo!?
                  Tired of spam?  Yahoo! Mail has the best spam protection around
                  http://mail.yahoo.com




                  If you want safety, peace, or justice work for competency, integrity, and transparency.



                  SPONSORED LINKS
                  Social sciencesSocial science courseSocial science degree
                  Social science educationSocial science classSocial science college


                  YAHOO! GROUPS LINKS





                • Michael Mulligan
                  Terry, I give the NRC a lot of credit on this one...they spent a lot of time on preparing VY for a feed pump and condensate pump in the prior inspection
                  Message 8 of 15 , Jun 4, 2006
                  • 0 Attachment
                    Terry,

                    I give the NRC a lot of credit on this one...they
                    spent a lot of time on preparing VY for a feed pump
                    and condensate pump in the prior inspection report.
                    One wonders what keyed them into focusing on a feed
                    pump and condensate trip...just weeks before the pump
                    short.

                    “While observing licensed operator training on the
                    expected plant response to a trip of a condensate pump
                    from 100% reactor power, the inspectors noted that the
                    simulator response differed from Reactor Engineering’s
                    predicted plant response in that the combination of
                    final core thermal power and core flow placed the
                    plant on a point on the power-to-flow map below the
                    established power-to-flow limit line, thus no rod
                    insertion was required.”

                    So how come VY didn’t pick up this is their procedures
                    and QA?

                    Then the question comes up symbolically with how does
                    an entity use procedures, policies and QA... the
                    bureaucracy as a public relation tool...is it a tool
                    of transparency or untransparency? I don’t think it
                    buys much understanding with having an
                    incident....then the best the industry can say is that
                    it was all covered by QA, procedures and
                    policies...without showing outsiders this is what
                    happened in our accident...what do you think, does our
                    bureaucracies make sense to you.



                    Thanks,

                    mike

                    --- Terry Herrmann <jherrmt@...> wrote:


                    ---------------------------------

                    Mike,

                    I'm not sure of the specifics regarding what events
                    require access to the switchgear room. Most
                    safety-related systems and components perform their
                    design safety function without operator intervention.
                    There may be Emergency Operating Procedures that
                    require local opreator action, but for Boiling Water
                    Reactors, these are symptom based and would direct
                    other actions if the switchgear room were unavailable.
                    In addition, the operating crew in every plant I'm
                    familiar with is trained in the use and has readily
                    available SCBA equipment for use in case of fires.

                    Your comment:
                    Is it acceptable for a non-safety-related failure to
                    prevent access to safety-related systems, structures,
                    and/or components?

                    They would correct that in the new plants? You
                    right...it should all be all safety related and
                    nothing else allowed. It’s fascinating that a problem
                    in a non safety grade pump could take out a large
                    portion of the both vital buses. They weren't thinking
                    either placing the Control room one floor above the
                    switch gear room. They had CO2 in the control room the
                    last time with the other short and CO2 doscharge. I
                    wonder did they get any measured CO2 in the CR this
                    time...did they remove the toxic gas monitors?

                    The segregation of safety and non safety-related
                    systems and components has more to do with the QA
                    program level and credit for performing functions
                    credited as safety-related. The potential for this
                    kind of interaction is addressed in station
                    Probabilistic Risk Assessments (refer to NFPA 805) and
                    the Maintenance Rule under 10CFR50.65. Additional
                    precautions need to be taken where non safety-related
                    components can potentially impact safety related
                    components.

                    Terry Herrmann

                    ---------------------------------
                    From: Michael Mulligan <steamshovel2002@...>
                    Reply-To:
                    Root_Cause_State_of_the_Practice@yahoogroups.com
                    To: Root_Cause_State_of_the_Practice@yahoogroups.com
                    Subject: [Root_Cause_State_of_the_Practice] What do
                    you think...it is a current event in controversy!
                    Date: Thu, 1 Jun 2006 18:54:08 -0700 (PDT)

                    Bill,



                    Do you have a link to the web source of the
                    information?

                    http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/event-status/event/2006/20060525en.html
                    You could do a google on Vermont Yankee and fire. The
                    event is only about a week old. There is very little
                    information available. I am going to ask them for a
                    yahoo message board staffed with VY licensed and
                    engineering employees...such that you could ask
                    questions and the plant could have an outlet to
                    clearly communicate back. You really need something
                    like this throughout the nation...to demystify events
                    going on in the industry. I can dream you know! The
                    media people could be there also...such that they
                    could ask smarter questions and get better responses.
                    These little newspapers in Vermont locally and in
                    Rutland....they have such a high reporter
                    turnover....thus you are always reeducating them. The
                    newspaper cycle...the unavailability of the
                    reporters...really disserves VY. We wouldn’t be
                    prepared if it was a bigger accident with these
                    brittle communications channels ...and there would be
                    excessive public relations damage....because the
                    fragile communications channels would break down in a
                    bigger accident. You can’t be building these
                    communication things after an accident.



                    Do you know if there is a tech spec that requires
                    access to the (safety-related) switchgear room?

                    I can’t remember.
                    A tour ever 4 hours is a requirement on the logs? I
                    wonder if they have to go in there for a shutdown and
                    remote cool down of the reactor...if they had to
                    abandon the control room. I imagine there are fuses in
                    there that they would have to reset and replace for
                    any hot shorts. It has been a long time.



                    Is there any design basis event that assumes access to
                    the switchgear room?

                    I can’t remember.

                    The diesel breakers are in there. It’s interesting...I
                    think there is a soak time...meaning they discharge
                    CO2...and then they are prohibited for going in switch
                    gear for a period of time thinking the CO2 needs to
                    soak in....and the wait is long enough to smoother the
                    fire. You don’t want oxygen back in there. We are
                    talking about all add ons here...not comprehensive
                    engineering.



                    Is it acceptable for a non-safety-related failure to
                    prevent access to safety-related systems, structures,
                    and/or components?

                    They would correct that in the new plants?
                    You right...it should all be all safety related and
                    nothing else allowed. It’s fascinating that a problem
                    in a non safety grade pump could take out a large
                    portion of the both vital buses. They weren't thinking
                    either placing the Control room one floor above the
                    switch gear room. They had CO2 in the control room the
                    last time with the other short and CO2 doscharge. I
                    wonder did they get any measured CO2 in the CR this
                    time...did they remove the toxic gas monitors?




                    Again, I only have very old information...and all of
                    this would have to be verified!


                    Thanks,

                    mike




                    --- "Dr. Bill Corcoran"
                    <William.R.Corcoran@...> wrote:

                    > Mike,
                    >
                    > This one sounds interesting.
                    >
                    > Do you have a link to the web source of the
                    > information?
                    >
                    > Do you know if there is a tech spec that requires
                    > access to the (safety-related) switchgear room?
                    >
                    > Is there any design basis event that assumes access
                    > to the switchgear room?
                    >
                    > Is it acceptable for a non-safety-related failure to
                    > prevent access to safety-related systems,
                    > structures, and/or components?
                    >
                    > Take care,
                    >
                    > Bill Corcoran
                    > Mission: Saving lives, pain, assets, and careers
                    > through thoughtful inquiry.
                    > Motto: If you want safety, peace, or justice, work
                    > for competency, integrity, and transparency.
                    >
                    > W. R. Corcoran, Ph.D., P.E.
                    > NSRC Corporation
                    > 21 Broadleaf Circle
                    > Windsor, CT 06095-1634
                    > Voice and voice mail: 860-285-8779
                    > Fax and voice mail to e-mail: 206-888-6772
                    >
                    >
                    > Register for a full day of Root Cause Training on
                    > August 10, 2006 at Amelia Island, FL at
                    > https://secure.ans.org/meetings/uwc/registration/
                    >
                    > Subscribe to "The Firebird Forum" by sending an
                    > e-mail to TheFirebirdForum-subscribe@yahoogroups.com
                    >
                    > ----- Original Message -----
                    > From: Michael Mulligan
                    > To:
                    > Root_Cause_State_of_the_Practice@yahoogroups.com
                    > Sent: Wednesday, May 31, 2006 6:06 PM
                    > Subject: [Root_Cause_State_of_the_Practice] What
                    > do you think...it is a current event in controversy!
                    >
                    >
                    > Ok...at a nuclear power plant they had a short of
                    > a
                    > condensate pump leading to some smoke and maybe a
                    > small fire in the electric motor. Minor issues so
                    > far.
                    > The breaker is housed in a rather small room many
                    > feet
                    > away from the motor...the room is considered a
                    > vital
                    > electrical area....the switch gear room. So as the
                    > condensate motor shorted...the balancing resisters
                    > on
                    > top of the breaker heated up(in the switch gear
                    > room)...I consider this a normal response. The
                    > problem
                    > is this created a control room alarm, and the
                    > smoke
                    > from the resistors discharged the CO2 system.
                    >
                    > I consider this a diversion of valuable control
                    > room
                    > and plant employee resources within an accident.
                    >
                    > There is a barrier with understanding what's going
                    > on
                    > in the switch gear room...it's basically a mystery
                    > on
                    > what causing the alarm and CO2 discharge until the
                    > gas
                    > is removed and allowing employee inspection.
                    >
                    > It seems to be a switch gear room and breaker poor
                    > design...in that a normal operation of the
                    > balancing
                    > resister leads to an unnecessary discharge of the
                    > CO2.
                    > So you got two reports of fire in the plant...and
                    > one
                    > is false. It should be remembered that the switch
                    > gear
                    > room is a vital area...thus the emergency
                    > hierarchal
                    > procedure with limited resources is to deal with
                    > the
                    > switch gear room first. So when purchasing a
                    > switch
                    > gear breaker in CO2 flooding area...you should
                    > purchase a breaker design that in all modes of
                    > operations and protective actions (balancing
                    > resisters)...that no ionization and smoke get
                    > discharged.
                    >
                    > Was there an issue with poor
                    > maintenance...allowing
                    > the build up of dust on the resisters.
                    >
                    > So the resister heats up and creates ionization
                    > and
                    > smoke when an out side component is shorted...this
                    > is
                    > a normal operation...and there is no fire hazard
                    > in
                    > the switch gear.
                    >
                    > This has happened in the past...we don't know the
                    > magnitude of the number of times....the short and
                    > discharged CO2.
                    >
                    > Thanks,
                    >
                    > mike mulligan
                    > Hinsdale, Nh
                    >
                    >
                    > __________________________________________________
                    > Do You Yahoo!?
                    > Tired of spam? Yahoo! Mail has the best spam
                    > protection around
                    > http://mail.yahoo.com
                    >
                    >
                    >
                    >
                    >
                    > If you want safety, peace, or justice work for
                    > competency, integrity, and transparency.
                    >
                    >
                    >
                    > SPONSORED LINKS Social sciences Social science
                    > course Social science degree
                    > Social science education Social science
                    > class Social science college
                    >
                    >
                    >
                    ------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                    > YAHOO! GROUPS LINKS
                    >
                    > a.. Visit your group
                    > "Root_Cause_State_of_the_Practice" on the web.
                    >
                    > b.. To unsubscribe from this group, send an
                    > email to:
                    >
                    >
                    Root_Cause_State_of_the_Practice-unsubscribe@yahoogroups.com
                    >
                    > c.. Your use of Yahoo! Groups is subject to the
                    > Yahoo! Terms of Service.
                    >
                    >
                    >
                    ------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                    >
                    >


                    __________________________________________________
                    Do You Yahoo!?
                    Tired of spam? Yahoo! Mail has the best spam
                    protection around
                    http://mail.yahoo.com




                    If you want safety, peace, or justice work for
                    competency, integrity, and transparency.



                    SPONSORED LINKS
                    Social sciences Social science course Social science
                    degree Social science education Social science class
                    Social science college

                    ---------------------------------
                    YAHOO! GROUPS LINKS


                    Visit your group
                    "Root_Cause_State_of_the_Practice" on the web.

                    To unsubscribe from this group, send an email to:

                    Root_Cause_State_of_the_Practice-unsubscribe@yahoogroups.com

                    Your use of Yahoo! Groups is subject to the Yahoo!
                    Terms of Service.


                    ---------------------------------






                    If you want safety, peace, or justice work for
                    competency, integrity, and transparency.



                    SPONSORED LINKS
                    Social
                    sciences Social
                    science course
                    Social science degree
                    Social science education
                    Social science
                    class Social
                    science college


                    ---------------------------------
                    YAHOO! GROUPS LINKS


                    Visit your group
                    "Root_Cause_State_of_the_Practice" on the web.

                    To unsubscribe from this group, send an email to:

                    Root_Cause_State_of_the_Practice-unsubscribe@yahoogroups.com

                    Your use of Yahoo! Groups is subject to the Yahoo!
                    Terms of Service.


                    ---------------------------------




                    __________________________________________________
                    Do You Yahoo!?
                    Tired of spam? Yahoo! Mail has the best spam protection around
                    http://mail.yahoo.com
                  • Terry Herrmann
                    OK Bill - I ll take the challenge, since I m not sure if I m in the 90% or 10% lately. I worked on an EPRI task force in the late 1990s to improve performance
                    Message 9 of 15 , Jun 5, 2006
                    • 0 Attachment

                      OK Bill - I'll take the challenge, since I'm not sure if I'm in the 90% or 10% lately.

                      I worked on an EPRI task force in the late 1990s to improve performance in corrective action programs titled Strategies for Optimizing Engineering Effectiveness in Corrective Action Programs (EPRI TR-109626). 

                      The report was developed based on discussions with engineering managers which revealed that Corrective Action Programs were consuming 30% or more of engineering resources. Further investigation indicated that numerous opportunities existed to incrementally reduce resource consumption while improving the quality of corrective actions.

                      The charter for this project was to identify, develop, and validate techniques to optimize engineering activities in support of plant Corrective Action Programs.

                      The report identified eight areas where actions can be taken to increase engineering effectiveness. Within each of the eight areas, specific key points and strategies are called out to highlight potential actions. 

                      I used much of what was produced in this report in Corrective Action Program improvements at my station with very good results.

                      To my knowledge, not very many plants used the report in a sustained way.

                      My question is; what could an organization like EPRI do to provide a tool for electric utilities that would help them to improve in the areas that we frequently discuss in this forum?  The product should be easy for organizations to pick up and apply and not favor any one particular RCA technique such as Phoenix, TapRoot, K-T, etc.

                      Terry Herrmann



                      From: "Dr. Bill Corcoran" <William.R.Corcoran@...>
                      Reply-To: Root_Cause_State_of_the_Practice@yahoogroups.com
                      To: <Root_Cause_State_of_the_Practice@yahoogroups.com>
                      Subject: Re: [Root_Cause_State_of_the_Practice] A MESSAGE FOR NEW MEMBERS (AND HOLD-BACKS)
                      Date: Thu, 1 Jun 2006 06:19:12 -0400

                      Rolly,
                       
                      Thanks ever so much.
                       
                      If you ask me a question on this forum I will answer it.
                       
                      I have noticed that I put some messages aside to answer later and then don't get back to them unless another message comes up as an antecedent.
                       
                      Take care,
                       
                      Bill Corcoran
                      Mission: Saving lives, pain, assets, and careers through thoughtful inquiry.
                      Motto: If you want safety, peace, or justice, work for competency, integrity, and transparency.
                       
                      W. R. Corcoran, Ph.D., P.E.
                      NSRC Corporation
                      21 Broadleaf Circle
                      Windsor, CT 06095-1634
                      Voice and voice mail: 860-285-8779
                      Fax and voice mail to e-mail: 206-888-6772
                       

                      Register for a full day of Root Cause Training on August 10, 2006 at Amelia Island, FL at https://secure.ans.org/meetings/uwc/registration/
                       
                      Subscribe to "The Firebird Forum" by sending an e-mail to TheFirebirdForum-subscribe@yahoogroups.com
                      ----- Original Message -----
                      Sent: Thursday, June 01, 2006 2:01 AM
                      Subject: Re: [Root_Cause_State_of_the_Practice] A MESSAGE FOR NEW MEMBERS (AND HOLD-BACKS)

                      Hello Mr. Corcoran,
                       
                      I have been reading some post if my time permits, I agree that 90% of the contributions come from 10% of the members, myself not include in he 10%. Perhaps if there will be more feedbacks and responses to the 90% in case they decided to write something then this 10% contributors will be increased.
                       
                      People (specially new once) ask something from this forum since it is important to them, even if we think that their inquiry is simply, once they see minimum or little reply then they will just stay away and be inactive.
                       
                      You three are the grandmasters around, perhaps its time to share something with others myself included, as I get very little reply from my previous posts.
                       
                      All the best,
                       
                       
                      Rolly Angeles


                      "Dr. Bill Corcoran" <William.R.Corcoran@...> wrote:
                       
                      A MESSAGE FOR NEW MEMBERS (AND HOLD-BACKS)
                       
                      (We have 461 members and the 90-10 Rule seems to apply; 90% of the contributions come from 10% of the members. This is not a complaint; but merely an observation.)
                       
                      As moderator, allow me to give the old "Preservation Hall" pitch: The more you put in, the more you get back.
                       
                      What can you contribute:
                      • Questions
                      • Assertions for testing
                      • Your differing professional opinion 
                      • Root cause investigation experiences: good and educational
                      • A new poll
                      • A vote in an existing poll
                      • A record in a database table
                      • A new database (Actually we  are at our quota of databases, but you can add one at http://groups.yahoo.com/group/Root_Cause_State_of_the_Practice_III/database
                      • A new link
                      • A new file
                      • Your favorite root cause slide or picture as a JPG in the photos section
                      • Your favorite root cause slide or picture as a JPG or GIF right in a message.
                      What you can get
                      • Ability to do limited benchmarking by asking members to tell you how they handle a certain issue
                      • Access to people who might help you for free by telephone (including me at 860-285-8779, to a limited extent)
                      • Poll results
                      • Existing messages
                      • Access to links
                      • Files, including back issues of "The Firebird Forum"
                      • Databases (as printable reports)-play around with this great feature
                      • Access to photos
                      • Etc.
                       
                      Let me know what I can do to make your e-group experience better.
                      FEEDBACK IS THE BREAKFAST OF CHAMPIONS.
                       
                      Take care,
                       
                      Bill Corcoran
                      Mission: Saving lives, pain, assets, and careers through thoughtful inquiry.
                      Motto: If you want safety, peace, or justice, work for competency, integrity, and transparency.
                       
                      W. R. Corcoran, Ph.D., P.E.
                      NSRC Corporation
                      21 Broadleaf Circle
                      Windsor, CT 06095-1634
                      Voice and voice mail: 860-285-8779
                      Fax and voice mail to e-mail: 206-888-6772
                       

                      Register for a full day of Root Cause Training on August 10, 2006 at Amelia Island, FL at https://secure.ans.org/meetings/uwc/registration/
                       
                      Subscribe to "The Firebird Forum" by sending an e-mail to TheFirebirdForum-subscribe@yahoogroups.com


                      Talk is cheap. Use Yahoo! Messenger to make PC-to-Phone calls. Great rates starting at 1�/min.

                      If you want safety, peace, or justice work for competency, integrity, and transparency.



                      SPONSORED LINKS
                      Social sciencesSocial science courseSocial science degree
                      Social science educationSocial science classSocial science college


                      YAHOO! GROUPS LINKS





                    • Terry Herrmann
                      Mike, There s more to this that is readily apparent. I worked with VY for a few weeks last year on the potential for a condensate and feedpump trip as part of
                      Message 10 of 15 , Jun 5, 2006
                      • 0 Attachment

                        Mike,

                        There's more to this that is readily apparent.  I worked with VY for a few weeks last year on the potential for a condensate and feedpump trip as part of questions that came up during the power uprate design.  There was a clear intent to avoid any unnecessary plant trip as these are the kinds of transients that challenge safety systems and increase plant risk. 

                        We modified the design specifically to increase the probability that we could handle a trip like this based on looking at the runback of the recirculation pumps and the change in steam and feed flow rates that could be handled by feedwater control valves.  It was actually a pretty complex analysis.

                        I'm not sure how the simulator was modeled, but we wanted to make sure we modeled things in the conservative direction with any assumptions we were making.  Having more data now reduces the needed conservatism required with the uncertainty present in the analysis.

                        In my opinion, this worked the way we intended.  We avoided the plant trip and the larger transient and modeled the system conservatively in the fact of uncertainty.

                        Terry Herrmann


                        From: Michael Mulligan <steamshovel2002@...>
                        Reply-To: Root_Cause_State_of_the_Practice@yahoogroups.com
                        To: Root_Cause_State_of_the_Practice@yahoogroups.com
                        Subject: RE: [Root_Cause_State_of_the_Practice] What do you think...it is a current event in controversy!
                        Date: Sun, 4 Jun 2006 17:52:11 -0700 (PDT)


                        Terry,

                        I give the NRC a lot of credit on this one...they
                        spent a lot of time on preparing VY for a feed pump
                        and condensate pump in the prior inspection report.
                        One wonders what keyed them into focusing on a feed
                        pump and condensate trip...just weeks before the pump
                        short.

                        �While observing licensed operator training on the
                        expected plant response to a trip of a condensate pump
                        from 100% reactor power, the inspectors noted that the
                        simulator response differed from Reactor Engineering�s
                        predicted plant response in that the combination of
                        final core thermal power and core flow placed the
                        plant on a point on the power-to-flow map below the
                        established power-to-flow limit line, thus no rod
                        insertion was required.�

                        So how come VY didn�t pick up this is their procedures
                        and QA?

                        Then the question comes up symbolically with how does
                        an entity use procedures, policies and QA... the
                        bureaucracy as a public relation tool...is it a tool
                        of transparency or untransparency? I don�t think it
                        buys much understanding with having an
                        incident....then the best the industry can say is that
                        it was all covered by QA, procedures and
                        policies...without showing outsiders this is what
                        happened in our accident...what do you think, does our
                        bureaucracies make sense to you.



                        Thanks,

                        mike

                        --- Terry Herrmann <jherrmt@...> wrote:


                        ---------------------------------

                        Mike,

                        I'm not sure of the specifics regarding what events
                        require access to the switchgear room.  Most
                        safety-related systems and components perform their
                        design safety function without operator intervention.
                        There may be Emergency Operating Procedures that
                        require local opreator action, but for Boiling Water
                        Reactors, these are symptom based and would direct
                        other actions if the switchgear room were unavailable.
                        In addition, the operating crew in every plant I'm
                        familiar with is trained in the use and has readily
                        available SCBA equipment for use in case of fires.

                        Your comment:
                        Is it acceptable for a non-safety-related failure to
                        prevent access to safety-related systems, structures,
                        and/or components?

                        They would correct that in the new plants?  You
                        right...it should all be all safety related and
                        nothing else allowed. It�s fascinating that a problem
                        in a non safety grade pump could take out a large
                        portion of the both vital buses. They weren't thinking
                        either placing the Control room one floor above the
                        switch gear room. They had CO2 in the control room the
                        last time with the other short and CO2 doscharge. I
                        wonder did they get any measured CO2 in the CR this
                        time...did they remove the toxic gas monitors?

                        The segregation of safety and non safety-related
                        systems and components has more to do with the QA
                        program level and credit for performing functions
                        credited as safety-related.  The potential for this
                        kind of interaction is addressed in station
                        Probabilistic Risk Assessments (refer to NFPA 805) and
                        the Maintenance Rule under 10CFR50.65.  Additional
                        precautions need to be taken where non safety-related
                        components can potentially impact safety related
                        components.

                        Terry Herrmann

                        ---------------------------------
                        From: Michael Mulligan <steamshovel2002@...>
                        Reply-To:
                        Root_Cause_State_of_the_Practice@yahoogroups.com
                        To: Root_Cause_State_of_the_Practice@yahoogroups.com
                        Subject: [Root_Cause_State_of_the_Practice] What do
                        you think...it is a current event in controversy!
                        Date: Thu, 1 Jun 2006 18:54:08 -0700 (PDT)

                        Bill,



                        Do you have a link to the web source of the
                        information?

                        http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/event-status/event/2006/20060525en.html
                        You could do a google on Vermont Yankee and fire. The
                        event is only about a week old. There is very little
                        information available. I am going to ask them for a
                        yahoo message board staffed with VY licensed and
                        engineering employees...such that you could ask
                        questions and the plant could have an outlet to
                        clearly communicate back. You really need something
                        like this throughout the nation...to demystify events
                        going on in the industry. I can dream you know! The
                        media people could be there also...such that they
                        could ask smarter questions and get better responses.
                        These little newspapers in Vermont locally and in
                        Rutland....they have such a high reporter
                        turnover....thus you are always reeducating them. The
                        newspaper cycle...the unavailability of the
                        reporters...really disserves VY. We wouldn�t be
                        prepared if it was a bigger accident with these
                        brittle communications channels ...and there would be
                        excessive public relations damage....because the
                        fragile communications channels would break down in a
                        bigger accident.  You can�t be building these
                        communication things after an accident.



                        Do you know if there is a tech spec that requires
                        access to the (safety-related) switchgear room?

                        I can�t remember.
                        A tour ever 4 hours is a requirement on the logs? I
                        wonder if they have to go in there for a shutdown and
                        remote cool down of the reactor...if they had to
                        abandon the control room. I imagine there are fuses in
                        there that they would have to reset and replace for
                        any hot shorts. It has been a long time.



                        Is there any design basis event that assumes access to
                        the switchgear room?

                        I can�t remember.

                        The diesel breakers are in there. It�s interesting...I
                        think there is a soak time...meaning they discharge
                        CO2...and then they are prohibited for going in switch
                        gear for a period of time thinking the CO2 needs to
                        soak in....and the wait is long enough to smoother the
                        fire. You don�t want oxygen back in there. We are
                        talking about all add ons here...not comprehensive
                        engineering.



                        Is it acceptable for a non-safety-related failure to
                        prevent access to safety-related systems, structures,
                        and/or components?

                        They would correct that in the new plants?
                        You right...it should all be all safety related and
                        nothing else allowed. It�s fascinating that a problem
                        in a non safety grade pump could take out a large
                        portion of the both vital buses. They weren't thinking
                        either placing the Control room one floor above the
                        switch gear room. They had CO2 in the control room the
                        last time with the other short and CO2 doscharge. I
                        wonder did they get any measured CO2 in the CR this
                        time...did they remove the toxic gas monitors?




                        Again, I only have very old information...and all of
                        this would have to be verified!


                        Thanks,

                        mike




                        --- "Dr. Bill Corcoran"
                        <William.R.Corcoran@...> wrote:

                        > Mike,
                        >
                        > This one sounds interesting.
                        >
                        > Do you have a link to the web source of the
                        > information?
                        >
                        > Do you know if there is a tech spec that requires
                        > access to the (safety-related) switchgear room?
                        >
                        > Is there any design basis event that assumes access
                        > to the switchgear room?
                        >
                        > Is it acceptable for a non-safety-related failure to
                        > prevent access to safety-related systems,
                        > structures, and/or components?
                        >
                        > Take care,

                        > Bill Corcoran
                        > Mission: Saving lives, pain, assets, and careers
                        > through thoughtful inquiry.
                        > Motto: If you want safety, peace, or justice, work
                        > for competency, integrity, and transparency.

                        > W. R. Corcoran, Ph.D., P.E.
                        > NSRC Corporation
                        > 21 Broadleaf Circle
                        > Windsor, CT 06095-1634
                        > Voice and voice mail: 860-285-8779
                        > Fax and voice mail to e-mail: 206-888-6772
                        >
                        >
                        > Register for a full day of Root Cause Training on
                        > August 10, 2006 at Amelia Island, FL at
                        > https://secure.ans.org/meetings/uwc/registration/
                        >
                        > Subscribe to "The Firebird Forum" by sending an
                        > e-mail to TheFirebirdForum-subscribe@yahoogroups.com
                        >
                        >   ----- Original Message -----
                        >   From: Michael Mulligan
                        >   To:
                        > Root_Cause_State_of_the_Practice@yahoogroups.com
                        >   Sent: Wednesday, May 31, 2006 6:06 PM
                        >   Subject: [Root_Cause_State_of_the_Practice] What
                        > do you think...it is a current event in controversy!
                        >
                        >
                        >   Ok...at a nuclear power plant they had a short of
                        > a
                        >   condensate pump leading to some smoke and maybe a
                        >   small fire in the electric motor. Minor issues so
                        > far.
                        >   The breaker is housed in a rather small room many
                        > feet
                        >   away from the motor...the room is considered a
                        > vital
                        >   electrical area....the switch gear room. So as the
                        >   condensate motor shorted...the balancing resisters
                        > on
                        >   top of the breaker heated up(in the switch gear
                        >   room)...I consider this a normal response. The
                        > problem
                        >   is this created a control room alarm, and the
                        > smoke
                        >   from the resistors discharged the CO2 system. 
                        >
                        >   I consider this a diversion of valuable control
                        > room
                        >   and plant employee resources within an accident.
                        >
                        >   There is a barrier with understanding what's going
                        > on
                        >   in the switch gear room...it's basically a mystery
                        > on
                        >   what causing the alarm and CO2 discharge until the
                        > gas
                        >   is removed and allowing employee inspection.
                        >
                        >   It seems to be a switch gear room and breaker poor
                        >   design...in that a normal operation of the
                        > balancing
                        >   resister leads to an unnecessary discharge of the
                        > CO2.
                        >   So you got two reports of fire in the plant...and
                        > one
                        >   is false. It should be remembered that the switch
                        > gear
                        >   room is a vital area...thus the emergency
                        > hierarchal
                        >   procedure with limited resources is to deal with
                        > the
                        >   switch gear room first. So when purchasing a
                        > switch
                        >   gear breaker in CO2 flooding area...you should
                        >   purchase a breaker design that in all modes of
                        >   operations and protective actions (balancing
                        >   resisters)...that no ionization and smoke get
                        >   discharged.
                        >
                        >   Was there an issue with poor
                        > maintenance...allowing
                        >   the build up of dust on the resisters.
                        >
                        >   So the resister heats up and creates ionization
                        > and
                        >   smoke when an out side component is shorted...this
                        > is
                        >   a normal operation...and there is no fire hazard
                        > in
                        >   the switch gear.
                        >
                        >   This has happened in the past...we don't know the
                        >   magnitude of the number of times....the short and
                        >   discharged CO2.
                        >
                        >   Thanks,
                        >
                        >   mike mulligan
                        >   Hinsdale, Nh
                        >
                        >
                        >   __________________________________________________
                        >   Do You Yahoo!?
                        >   Tired of spam?  Yahoo! Mail has the best spam
                        > protection around
                        >   http://mail.yahoo.com
                        >
                        >
                        >
                        >
                        >
                        >   If you want safety, peace, or justice work for
                        > competency, integrity, and transparency.
                        >
                        >
                        >
                        >   SPONSORED LINKS Social sciences  Social science
                        > course  Social science degree 
                        >         Social science education  Social science
                        > class  Social science college 
                        >
                        >
                        >
                        ------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                        >   YAHOO! GROUPS LINKS
                        >
                        >     a..  Visit your group
                        > "Root_Cause_State_of_the_Practice" on the web.
                        >      
                        >     b..  To unsubscribe from this group, send an
                        > email to:
                        >    
                        >
                        Root_Cause_State_of_the_Practice-unsubscribe@yahoogroups.com
                        >      
                        >     c..  Your use of Yahoo! Groups is subject to the
                        > Yahoo! Terms of Service.
                        >
                        >
                        >
                        ------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                        >
                        >


                        __________________________________________________
                        Do You Yahoo!?
                        Tired of spam?  Yahoo! Mail has the best spam
                        protection around
                        http://mail.yahoo.com




                        If you want safety, peace, or justice work for
                        competency, integrity, and transparency.



                        SPONSORED LINKS
                        Social sciences Social science course Social science
                        degree Social science education Social science class
                        Social science college

                        ---------------------------------
                        YAHOO! GROUPS LINKS


                            Visit your group
                        "Root_Cause_State_of_the_Practice" on the web.
                         
                            To unsubscribe from this group, send an email to:

                        Root_Cause_State_of_the_Practice-unsubscribe@yahoogroups.com
                         
                            Your use of Yahoo! Groups is subject to the Yahoo!
                        Terms of Service.


                        ---------------------------------






                        If you want safety, peace, or justice work for
                        competency, integrity, and transparency.

                             

                              SPONSORED LINKS 
                                                                        Social
                        sciences                                    Social
                        science course                                  
                        Social science degree                                
                                                      Social science education
                                                           Social science
                        class                                    Social
                        science college                                      
                                    
                           
                        ---------------------------------
                          YAHOO! GROUPS LINKS

                         
                            Visit your group
                        "Root_Cause_State_of_the_Practice" on the web.
                          
                            To unsubscribe from this group, send an email to:

                        Root_Cause_State_of_the_Practice-unsubscribe@yahoogroups.com
                          
                            Your use of Yahoo! Groups is subject to the Yahoo!
                        Terms of Service.

                         
                        ---------------------------------




                        __________________________________________________
                        Do You Yahoo!?
                        Tired of spam?  Yahoo! Mail has the best spam protection around
                        http://mail.yahoo.com




                        If you want safety, peace, or justice work for competency, integrity, and transparency.



                        SPONSORED LINKS
                        Social sciencesSocial science courseSocial science degree
                        Social science educationSocial science classSocial science college


                        YAHOO! GROUPS LINKS





                      • Jack Stanford
                        Mike, I don t think that fire proofed sheetrock was an option. We have it in our garage though ;-) Could not split the MCC either. And basically, almost all
                        Message 11 of 15 , Jun 6, 2006
                        • 0 Attachment
                          Mike,

                          I don't think that fire proofed sheetrock was an option. We have it in our
                          garage though ;-) Could not split the MCC either. And basically, almost
                          all critical MOVs were powered from it. So we constructed a new building at
                          HUGE cost. It really was built for Appendix R compliance was known as such.
                          Not sure what role the NRC played in all this as it was built close to 20
                          years ago. Not sure of NU's role either. I do know that between CY and
                          Millstone Unit 1, we had plenty of Appendix R issues to deal with.

                          What was in the Bravo switchgear building? Plenty of MCC buckets and some
                          480 volt breakers. And here I am announcing to all that I don't recall
                          anything about an additional EDG. How embarrassing...

                          MCC-5 could be powered from either EDG, BTW. That is a long story in itself
                          though.

                          Jack Stanford, SRO/PE
                          210 Old Chester Road
                          Haddam, CT 06438

                          StanfordJ@...
                          Jack.Stanford@...
                          860-345-4344


                          ----- Original Message -----
                          From: "Michael Mulligan" <steamshovel2002@...>
                          To: <Root_Cause_State_of_the_Practice@yahoogroups.com>
                          Sent: Saturday, June 03, 2006 9:31 AM
                          Subject: Re: [Root_Cause_State_of_the_Practice] What do you think...it is a
                          current event in controversy!


                          >
                          > Jack,
                          >
                          > Hmmm....VY spent some monies putting in fire proofed
                          > sheet rock in the switch gear room....splitting the
                          > redundant sides of the vital bus. I'd say in the early
                          > 1990's. What's in the new "B" switch gear room...?
                          > It's amazing how they treated differently these
                          > plants...the NRC. Don't forget the back-fit rules?
                          >
                          > Thanks,
                          >
                          > mike
                          >
                          > --- Jack Stanford <jack.stanford@...> wrote:
                          >
                          >> My experience at CT Yankee -
                          >>
                          >> Access to the Alpha Switchgear room was required in
                          >> the ops outside the Control Room AOP. Don't recall
                          >> licensing basis requirement(s).
                          >>
                          >> Access to the Bravo Switchgear room was required to
                          >> meet Appendix R requirements, as the building was
                          >> specifically erected post initial startup to meet
                          >> Appendix R requirements.
                          >>
                          >> Jack Stanford, SRO/PE
                          >> 210 Old Chester Road
                          >> Haddam, CT 06438
                          >>
                          >> StanfordJ@...
                          >> Jack.Stanford@...
                          >> 860-345-4344
                          >>
                          >>
                          >> ----- Original Message -----
                          >> From: Dr. Bill Corcoran
                          >> To:
                          >> Root_Cause_State_of_the_Practice@yahoogroups.com
                          >> Sent: Thursday, June 01, 2006 6:24 AM
                          >> Subject: Re: [Root_Cause_State_of_the_Practice]
                          >> What do you think...it is a current event in
                          >> controversy!
                          >>
                          >>
                          >> Mike,
                          >>
                          >> This one sounds interesting.
                          >>
                          >> Do you have a link to the web source of the
                          >> information?
                          >>
                          >> Do you know if there is a tech spec that requires
                          >> access to the (safety-related) switchgear room?
                          >>
                          >> Is there any design basis event that assumes
                          >> access to the switchgear room?
                          >>
                          >> Is it acceptable for a non-safety-related failure
                          >> to prevent access to safety-related systems,
                          >> structures, and/or components?
                          >>
                          >> Take care,
                          >>
                          >> Bill Corcoran
                          >> Mission: Saving lives, pain, assets, and careers
                          >> through thoughtful inquiry.
                          >> Motto: If you want safety, peace, or justice, work
                          >> for competency, integrity, and transparency.
                          >>
                          >> W. R. Corcoran, Ph.D., P.E.
                          >> NSRC Corporation
                          >> 21 Broadleaf Circle
                          >> Windsor, CT 06095-1634
                          >> Voice and voice mail: 860-285-8779
                          >> Fax and voice mail to e-mail: 206-888-6772
                          >>
                          >>
                          >> Register for a full day of Root Cause Training on
                          >> August 10, 2006 at Amelia Island, FL at
                          >> https://secure.ans.org/meetings/uwc/registration/
                          >>
                          >> Subscribe to "The Firebird Forum" by sending an
                          >> e-mail to TheFirebirdForum-subscribe@yahoogroups.com
                          >>
                          >> ----- Original Message -----
                          >> From: Michael Mulligan
                          >> To:
                          >> Root_Cause_State_of_the_Practice@yahoogroups.com
                          >> Sent: Wednesday, May 31, 2006 6:06 PM
                          >> Subject: [Root_Cause_State_of_the_Practice] What
                          >> do you think...it is a current event in controversy!
                          >>
                          >>
                          >> Ok...at a nuclear power plant they had a short
                          >> of a
                          >> condensate pump leading to some smoke and maybe
                          >> a
                          >> small fire in the electric motor. Minor issues
                          >> so far.
                          >> The breaker is housed in a rather small room
                          >> many feet
                          >> away from the motor...the room is considered a
                          >> vital
                          >> electrical area....the switch gear room. So as
                          >> the
                          >> condensate motor shorted...the balancing
                          >> resisters on
                          >> top of the breaker heated up(in the switch gear
                          >> room)...I consider this a normal response. The
                          >> problem
                          >> is this created a control room alarm, and the
                          >> smoke
                          >> from the resistors discharged the CO2 system.
                          >>
                          >> I consider this a diversion of valuable control
                          >> room
                          >> and plant employee resources within an accident.
                          >>
                          >>
                          >> There is a barrier with understanding what's
                          >> going on
                          >> in the switch gear room...it's basically a
                          >> mystery on
                          >> what causing the alarm and CO2 discharge until
                          >> the gas
                          >> is removed and allowing employee inspection.
                          >>
                          >> It seems to be a switch gear room and breaker
                          >> poor
                          >> design...in that a normal operation of the
                          >> balancing
                          >> resister leads to an unnecessary discharge of
                          >> the CO2.
                          >> So you got two reports of fire in the
                          >> plant...and one
                          >> is false. It should be remembered that the
                          >> switch gear
                          >> room is a vital area...thus the emergency
                          >> hierarchal
                          >> procedure with limited resources is to deal with
                          >> the
                          >> switch gear room first. So when purchasing a
                          >> switch
                          >> gear breaker in CO2 flooding area...you should
                          >> purchase a breaker design that in all modes of
                          >> operations and protective actions (balancing
                          >> resisters)...that no ionization and smoke get
                          >> discharged.
                          >>
                          >> Was there an issue with poor
                          >> maintenance...allowing
                          >> the build up of dust on the resisters.
                          >>
                          >> So the resister heats up and creates ionization
                          >> and
                          >> smoke when an out side component is
                          >> shorted...this is
                          >> a normal operation...and there is no fire hazard
                          >> in
                          >> the switch gear.
                          >>
                          >> This has happened in the past...we don't know
                          >> the
                          >> magnitude of the number of times....the short
                          >> and
                          >> discharged CO2.
                          >>
                          >> Thanks,
                          >>
                          >> mike mulligan
                          >> Hinsdale, Nh
                          >>
                          >>
                          >>
                          >> __________________________________________________
                          >> Do You Yahoo!?
                          >> Tired of spam? Yahoo! Mail has the best spam
                          >> protection around
                          >> http://mail.yahoo.com
                          >>
                          >>
                          >>
                          >>
                          >>
                          >> If you want safety, peace, or justice work for
                          >> competency, integrity, and transparency.
                          >>
                          >>
                          >>
                          >> SPONSORED LINKS Social sciences Social science
                          >> course Social science degree
                          >> Social science education Social science
                          >> class Social science college
                          >>
                          >>
                          >>
                          > ----------------------------------------------------------------------------
                          >> YAHOO! GROUPS LINKS
                          >>
                          >> a.. Visit your group
                          >> "Root_Cause_State_of_the_Practice" on the web.
                          >>
                          >> b.. To unsubscribe from this group, send an
                          >> email to:
                          >>
                          >>
                          > Root_Cause_State_of_the_Practice-unsubscribe@yahoogroups.com
                          >>
                          >> c.. Your use of Yahoo! Groups is subject to
                          >> the Yahoo! Terms of Service.
                          >>
                          >>
                          >>
                          > ----------------------------------------------------------------------------
                          >>
                          >>
                          >
                          >
                          > __________________________________________________
                          > Do You Yahoo!?
                          > Tired of spam? Yahoo! Mail has the best spam protection around
                          > http://mail.yahoo.com
                          >
                          >
                          >
                          >
                          >
                          >
                          > If you want safety, peace, or justice work for competency, integrity, and
                          > transparency.
                          > Yahoo! Groups Links
                          >
                          >
                          >
                          >
                          >
                          >
                        • Michael Mulligan
                          Yep...that’s what I marveled at....the engineers and operators must have done a lot of prior thinking “not” to get a big vessel transient that led to a
                          Message 12 of 15 , Jun 6, 2006
                          • 0 Attachment
                            Yep...that’s what I marveled at....the engineers and
                            operators must have done a lot of prior thinking “not”
                            to get a big vessel transient that led to a
                            trip.....trip of high and low levels. You had to do a
                            lot of work on those feed regulation valves and vessel
                            level control circuitry. You got to be given a lot of
                            credit for staying up at power because of the pump
                            trips and shut offs. Now let’s see, you must have to
                            create more voids in order to get more power? Big
                            credit needs to be given with having a spare
                            condensate motor available ...or the ability to repair
                            the damaged one.

                            I am with you with getting more data and
                            accurate....and allowing that reduction in uncertainty
                            in engineering....I just don’t buy it as a political
                            tool with trying to gain an out come of the regulator.


                            Thanks,

                            mike mulligan
                            Hinsdale, NH


                            ---------------------------------
                            From: Michael Mulligan <steamshovel2002@...>
                            Reply-To:
                            Root_Cause_State_of_the_Practice@yahoogroups.com
                            To: Root_Cause_State_of_the_Practice@yahoogroups.com
                            Subject: RE: [Root_Cause_State_of_the_Practice] What
                            do you think...it is a current event in controversy!
                            Date: Sun, 4 Jun 2006 17:52:11 -0700 (PDT)


                            Terry,

                            I give the NRC a lot of credit on this one...they
                            spent a lot of time on preparing VY for a feed pump
                            and condensate pump in the prior inspection report.
                            One wonders what keyed them into focusing on a feed
                            pump and condensate trip...just weeks before the pump
                            short.

                            “While observing licensed operator training on the
                            expected plant response to a trip of a condensate pump
                            from 100% reactor power, the inspectors noted that the
                            simulator response differed from Reactor Engineering’s
                            predicted plant response in that the combination of
                            final core thermal power and core flow placed the
                            plant on a point on the power-to-flow map below the
                            established power-to-flow limit line, thus no rod
                            insertion was required.”

                            So how come VY didn’t pick up this is their procedures
                            and QA?

                            Then the question comes up symbolically with how does
                            an entity use procedures, policies and QA... the
                            bureaucracy as a public relation tool...is it a tool
                            of transparency or untransparency? I don’t think it
                            buys much understanding with having an
                            incident....then the best the industry can say is that
                            it was all covered by QA, procedures and
                            policies...without showing outsiders this is what
                            happened in our accident...what do you think, does our
                            bureaucracies make sense to you.



                            Thanks,

                            mike

                            --- Terry Herrmann <jherrmt@...> wrote:


                            ---------------------------------

                            Mike,

                            I'm not sure of the specifics regarding what events
                            require access to the switchgear room. Most
                            safety-related systems and components perform their
                            design safety function without operator intervention.
                            There may be Emergency Operating Procedures that
                            require local opreator action, but for Boiling Water
                            Reactors, these are symptom based and would direct
                            other actions if the switchgear room were unavailable.
                            In addition, the operating crew in every plant I'm
                            familiar with is trained in the use and has readily
                            available SCBA equipment for use in case of fires.

                            Your comment:
                            Is it acceptable for a non-safety-related failure to
                            prevent access to safety-related systems, structures,
                            and/or components?

                            They would correct that in the new plants? You
                            right...it should all be all safety related and
                            nothing else allowed. It’s fascinating that a problem
                            in a non safety grade pump could take out a large
                            portion of the both vital buses. They weren't thinking
                            either placing the Control room one floor above the
                            switch gear room. They had CO2 in the control room the
                            last time with the other short and CO2 doscharge. I
                            wonder did they get any measured CO2 in the CR this
                            time...did they remove the toxic gas monitors?

                            The segregation of safety and non safety-related
                            systems and components has more to do with the QA
                            program level and credit for performing functions
                            credited as safety-related. The potential for this
                            kind of interaction is addressed in station
                            Probabilistic Risk Assessments (refer to NFPA 805) and
                            the Maintenance Rule under 10CFR50.65. Additional
                            precautions need to be taken where non safety-related
                            components can potentially impact safety related
                            components.

                            Terry Herrmann

                            ---------------------------------
                            From: Michael Mulligan <steamshovel2002@...>
                            Reply-To:
                            Root_Cause_State_of_the_Practice@yahoogroups.com
                            To: Root_Cause_State_of_the_Practice@yahoogroups.com
                            Subject: [Root_Cause_State_of_the_Practice] What do
                            you think...it is a current event in controversy!
                            Date: Thu, 1 Jun 2006 18:54:08 -0700 (PDT)

                            Bill,



                            Do you have a link to the web source of the
                            information?

                            http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/event-status/event/2006/20060525en.html
                            You could do a google on Vermont Yankee and fire. The
                            event is only about a week old. There is very little
                            information available. I am going to ask them for a
                            yahoo message board staffed with VY licensed and
                            engineering employees...such that you could ask
                            questions and the plant could have an outlet to
                            clearly communicate back. You really need something
                            like this throughout the nation...to demystify events
                            going on in the industry. I can dream you know! The
                            media people could be there also...such that they
                            could ask smarter questions and get better responses.
                            These little newspapers in Vermont locally and in
                            Rutland....they have such a high reporter
                            turnover....thus you are always reeducating them. The
                            newspaper cycle...the unavailability of the
                            reporters...really disserves VY. We wouldn’t be
                            prepared if it was a bigger accident with these
                            brittle communications channels ...and there would be
                            excessive public relations damage....because the
                            fragile communications channels would break down in a
                            bigger accident. You can’t be building these
                            communication things after an accident.



                            Do you know if there is a tech spec that requires
                            access to the (safety-related) switchgear room?

                            I can’t remember.
                            A tour ever 4 hours is a requirement on the logs? I
                            wonder if they have to go in there for a shutdown and
                            remote cool down of the reactor...if they had to
                            abandon the control room. I imagine there are fuses in
                            there that they would have to reset and replace for
                            any hot shorts. It has been a long time.



                            Is there any design basis event that assumes access to
                            the switchgear room?

                            I can’t remember.

                            The diesel breakers are in there. It’s interesting...I
                            think there is a soak time...meaning they discharge
                            CO2...and then they are prohibited for going in switch
                            gear for a period of time thinking the CO2 needs to
                            soak in....and the wait is long enough to smoother the
                            fire. You don’t want oxygen back in there. We are
                            talking about all add ons here...not comprehensive
                            engineering.



                            Is it acceptable for a non-safety-related failure to
                            prevent access to safety-related systems, structures,
                            and/or components?

                            They would correct that in the new plants?
                            You right...it should all be all safety related and
                            nothing else allowed. It’s fascinating that a problem
                            in a non safety grade pump could take out a large
                            portion of the both vital buses. They weren't thinking
                            either placing the Control room one floor above the
                            switch gear room. They had CO2 in the control room the
                            last time with the other short and CO2 doscharge. I
                            wonder did they get any measured CO2 in the CR this
                            time...did they remove the toxic gas monitors?




                            Again, I only have very old information...and all of
                            this would have to be verified!


                            Thanks,

                            mike




                            --- "Dr. Bill Corcoran"
                            <William.R.Corcoran@...> wrote:

                            > Mike,
                            >
                            > This one sounds interesting.
                            >
                            > Do you have a link to the web source of the
                            > information?
                            >
                            > Do you know if there is a tech spec that requires
                            > access to the (safety-related) switchgear room?
                            >
                            > Is there any design basis event that assumes access
                            > to the switchgear room?
                            >
                            > Is it acceptable for a non-safety-related failure to
                            > prevent access to safety-related systems,
                            > structures, and/or components?
                            >
                            > Take care,
                            >
                            > Bill Corcoran
                            > Mission: Saving lives, pain, assets, and careers
                            > through thoughtful inquiry.
                            > Motto: If you want safety, peace, or justice, work
                            > for competency, integrity, and transparency.
                            >
                            > W. R. Corcoran, Ph.D., P.E.
                            > NSRC Corporation
                            > 21 Broadleaf Circle
                            > Windsor, CT 06095-1634
                            > Voice and voice mail: 860-285-8779
                            > Fax and voice mail to e-mail: 206-888-6772
                            >
                            >
                            > Register for a full day of Root Cause Training on
                            > August 10, 2006 at Amelia Island, FL at
                            > https://secure.ans.org/meetings/uwc/registration/
                            >
                            > Subscribe to "The Firebird Forum" by sending an
                            > e-mail to TheFirebirdForum-subscribe@yahoogroups.com
                            >
                            > ----- Original Message -----
                            > From: Michael Mulligan
                            > To:
                            > Root_Cause_State_of_the_Practice@yahoogroups.com
                            > Sent: Wednesday, May 31, 2006 6:06 PM
                            > Subject: [Root_Cause_State_of_the_Practice] What
                            > do you think...it is a current event in controversy!
                            >
                            >
                            > Ok...at a nuclear power plant they had a short of
                            > a
                            > condensate pump leading to some smoke and maybe a
                            > small fire in the electric motor. Minor issues so
                            > far.
                            > The breaker is housed in a rather small room many
                            > feet
                            > away from the motor...the room is considered a
                            > vital
                            > electrical area....the switch gear room. So as the
                            > condensate motor shorted...the balancing resisters
                            > on
                            > top of the breaker heated up(in the switch gear
                            > room)...I consider this a normal response. The
                            > problem
                            > is this created a control room alarm, and the
                            > smoke
                            > from the resistors discharged the CO2 system.
                            >
                            > I consider this a diversion of valuable control
                            > room
                            > and plant employee resources within an accident.
                            >
                            > There is a barrier with understanding what's going
                            > on
                            > in the switch gear room...it's basically a mystery
                            > on
                            > what causing the alarm and CO2 discharge until the
                            > gas
                            > is removed and allowing employee inspection.
                            >
                            > It seems to be a switch gear room and breaker poor
                            > design...in that a normal operation of the
                            > balancing
                            > resister leads to an unnecessary discharge of the
                            > CO2.
                            > So you got two reports of fire in the plant...and
                            > one
                            > is false. It should be remembered that the switch
                            > gear
                            > room is a vital area...thus the emergency
                            > hierarchal
                            > procedure with limited resources is to deal with
                            > the
                            > switch gear room first. So when purchasing a
                            > switch
                            > gear breaker in CO2 flooding area...you should
                            > purchase a breaker design that in all modes of
                            > operations and protective actions (balancing
                            > resisters)...that no ionization and smoke get
                            > discharged.
                            >
                            > Was there an issue with poor
                            > maintenance...allowing
                            > the build up of dust on the resisters.
                            >
                            > So the resister heats up and creates ionization
                            > and
                            > smoke when an out side component is shorted...this
                            > is
                            > a normal operation...and there is no fire hazard
                            > in
                            > the switch gear.
                            >
                            > This has happened in the past...we don't know the
                            > magnitude of the number of times....the short and
                            > discharged CO2.
                            >
                            > Thanks,
                            >
                            > mike mulligan
                            > Hinsdale, Nh
                            >
                            >
                            > __________________________________________________
                            > Do You Yahoo!?
                            > Tired of spam? Yahoo! Mail has the best spam
                            > protection around
                            > http://mail.yahoo.com
                            >
                            >
                            >
                            >
                            >
                            > If you want safety, peace, or justice work for
                            > competency, integrity, and transparency.
                            >
                            >
                            >
                            > SPONSORED LINKS Social sciences Social science
                            > course Social science degree
                            > Social science education Social science
                            > class Social science college
                            >
                            >
                            >
                            ------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                            > YAHOO! GROUPS LINKS
                            >
                            > a.. Visit your group
                            > "Root_Cause_State_of_the_Practice" on the web.
                            >
                            > b.. To unsubscribe from this group, send an
                            > email to:
                            >
                            >
                            Root_Cause_State_of_the_Practice-unsubscribe@yahoogroups.com
                            >
                            > c.. Your use of Yahoo! Groups is subject to the
                            > Yahoo! Terms of Service.
                            >
                            >
                            >
                            ------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                            >
                            >


                            __________________________________________________
                            Do You Yahoo!?
                            Tired of spam? Yahoo! Mail has the best spam
                            protection around
                            http://mail.yahoo.com




                            If you want safety, peace, or justice work for
                            competency, integrity, and transparency.



                            SPONSORED LINKS
                            Social sciences Social science course Social science
                            degree Social science education Social science class
                            Social science college

                            ---------------------------------
                            YAHOO! GROUPS LINKS


                            Visit your group
                            "Root_Cause_State_of_the_Practice" on the web.

                            To unsubscribe from this group, send an email to:

                            Root_Cause_State_of_the_Practice-unsubscribe@yahoogroups.com

                            Your use of Yahoo! Groups is subject to the Yahoo!
                            Terms of Service.


                            ---------------------------------






                            If you want safety, peace, or justice work for
                            competency, integrity, and transparency.



                            SPONSORED LINKS
                            Social
                            sciences Social
                            science course
                            Social science degree
                            Social science education
                            Social science
                            class Social
                            science college


                            ---------------------------------
                            YAHOO! GROUPS LINKS


                            Visit your group
                            "Root_Cause_State_of_the_Practice" on the web.

                            To unsubscribe from this group, send an email to:

                            Root_Cause_State_of_the_Practice-unsubscribe@yahoogroups.com

                            Your use of Yahoo! Groups is subject to the Yahoo!
                            Terms of Service.


                            ---------------------------------




                            __________________________________________________
                            Do You Yahoo!?
                            Tired of spam? Yahoo! Mail has the best spam
                            protection around
                            http://mail.yahoo.com




                            If you want safety, peace, or justice work for
                            competency, integrity, and transparency.



                            SPONSORED LINKS
                            Social sciences Social science course Social science
                            degree Social science education Social science class
                            Social science college

                            ---------------------------------
                            YAHOO! GROUPS LINKS


                            Visit your group
                            "Root_Cause_State_of_the_Practice" on the web.

                            To unsubscribe from this group, send an email to:

                            Root_Cause_State_of_the_Practice-unsubscribe@yahoogroups.com

                            Your use of Yahoo! Groups is subject to the Yahoo!
                            Terms of Service.


                            ---------------------------------









                            __________________________________________________
                            Do You Yahoo!?
                            Tired of spam? Yahoo! Mail has the best spam protection around
                            http://mail.yahoo.com
                          Your message has been successfully submitted and would be delivered to recipients shortly.