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RE: [Revlist] Re: Brandywine Questions - VERY LOOONG

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  • umfspock87@cs.com
    Wow Bob, Thank you VERY MUCH for the detailed response.  It is incredibly helpful.  I have a couple of followup questions for you. In my mind, when the 3rd
    Message 1 of 5 , May 2, 2002
      Wow Bob,

      Thank you VERY MUCH for the detailed response.  It is incredibly helpful.  I have a couple of followup questions for you.

      In my mind, when the 3rd VA is "detached...to a fine wood on the right to cover his Field Pieces and right Flank,"  I envision them, as I think you do, as being separated from the rest of the brigade.  This is supported by the statement, "Marshall had orders to hold the Wood as long as it was tenable, and then retreat TO the right of the Brigade."  I interpret that to me rejoin Woodford's brigade by attaching itself its right flank.  The comment that, "he ( Col. Marshall of the 3rd VA ) was called off for fear of being surrounded..." also clearly suggests to me that the 3rd VA was out there on the right flank by itself... (and the cannon)

      However, I'm still a bit unclear as to just where on the right flank they were.  In my mind, if I were defending the right flank of the ling to prevent the line from being flanked, I'd actually position it more to the rearward of the main line rather than extending it to the front.  Then again, I suppose placing them in the rear would make it difficult for the cannon to fire effectively, so I can't help but see the 3rd VA as being even with the rest of the brigade (but detached) UNTIL the rest of the Brigade moved 200 paces to the rear and to the right.  The following Weedon quote seems to support this view... "In making this Alteration, unfavorable Ground made it necessary for Woodford to move his Brigade 200 Paces back of the Line & THREW Marshall's Wood in his front.  The way it is written suggests, to me, that it wasn't until the brigade moved 200 paces back that Marshall's regiment / wood found itself in a forward position.

      Does the Weedon map add anything to this issue?   And what happened to the brigade cannon?  Did Woodford keep it with Marshall in the front in such a vulnerable position or was it withdrawn when Woodford's Brigade moved?

      On another note, if I were standing along the stone wall that faces the cemetary at today's Birmingham Meeting-house when the battle begins, am I with Sullivan's men?  Did they use the wall as a breastwork?  And did Stirling's and Stephen's line extend to the right or did it curve more to the rear?  Many secondary sources imply that the Birmingham Meeting-house was the center of the storm, but it actually seems to have been the left of the storm.  Could you clarify your view.

      And finally, can I get your reaction to this passage form a book about Fauquier County in the Revolution by T. Triplett Russell and John K. Gott.  I have no idea where they found the info to be so detailed and tend to believe that it is the result of some creative writing.  However, perhaps you've come across a possible source for it.
      "The first column of British infantry had just reached the edge of the wood as Captain Chilton fell with a gaping wound in his side.  Fully conscious, he realized that thee musket ball that had torn through his vitals had done damage beyond the power of any physician to repair.  Around him the battle surged.  There were so few against so many, too few to spare any to take him from the field.  Here he would stay, under a tree, and watch their valiant efforts.  Perhaps his presence might give them greater courage...They carried him to an old Meeting House that was being used as a field hospital.  Tradition says it was Birmingham, but Weedon identifies it as Concord Meeting House on the Chester Road near Marshall's Wood."

      Now this is great stuff if it is true.  Unfortunately, none of it is cited.  I am aware of a letter written by a Virginian officer describing Chilton to Gen. Wolfe at Quebec, but that is all I've found on his death.

      Have you come across anything?  I'm particularly interested in the Concord Meeting House.  One of my units, the 3rd VA, wants to come and lay a wreath this September and we are very interested in where Chilton and any of the 3rd Virginians were, or still are.

      Whew,  I really do appreciate all the help and look forward to more of your input.  Thanks again.

      Cheers,

      Mike Cecere


      Roofus@... wrote:

      >
      >Mike:
      >
      >In following up John Rees' posting and your kind reply to John, John
      >Robertson and myself, I've put together an analytic interpretation of the
      >Weedon letter and map. I absolutely concur with John's recommendation of the
      >Smith book. The volume's brevity is misleading in that Smith always was
      >capable of compacting a great deal of the essential data in a small package.
      >(As you'll see, a talent which I obviously do not share!) I just checked
      >three of the used & rare book search sites and found one copy out there, but
      >nearly fell over upon seeing this 32-page book priced at $350! Given that you
      >might not wish to dash off a check in that amount, I'll be e-mailing you
      >off-forum about an alternative.
      >
      >The core problem in trying to interpret the Brandywine engagement, of course,
      >is the absurd lack of a definitive analytic study of the battle. As is
      >unfortunately also the case with Monmouth, the "classic" sources, other than
      >Smith, date from the late 19th century and, as a result, are certainly not
      >based on the exhaustive and critical probing of the primary data as would be
      >expected of a modern analysis. That also leads to the taproot problem that
      >the body of valid and reliable primary material on Brandywine is certainly
      >not profuse.
      >
      >I have long had particular interest in Brandywine based on being raised quite
      >near the area, having done a significant amount of exploring of the field and
      >relic recovery and, as like you, being challenged by the paucity of
      >substantive data. Most recently, I've been working with the diary and letters
      >of Captain John Chilton, 3rd VA, who, as you cite, was killed in the action
      >at Marshall's Woods. This material is being prepared for posting within the
      >Resource Library of our RevWar75.com web site. And, as John Rees also kindly
      >pointed out, the Weedon letter has already been posted within RW'75 under the
      >title of "Our Troops Went On In A Trott."
      >
      >IMO, the Weedon letter is without question the most important resource as to
      >the action around the Birmingham Meeting House. Dated September 11 and
      >obviously written from Chester that night, Weedon's narrative was clearly
      >based on immediate recall of on-site, personal observations of that day. (As
      >noted below, this personal recall was likely that of another, not Weedon.)
      >Most importantly, his narrative is quite clear in specifying the positioning
      >of Sterling's and Stephen's Divisions, the odd alignment of the latter, and,
      >in particular, the reason for the "thrown forward" position of the 3rd VA
      >within what was obviously named that day "Marshall's Woods."
      >
      >In addition, of course, Weedon's contribution also includes his own
      >interpretation of the engagement via the classic map which he included with
      >the letter. Without doubt, the map is far more a general presentation than an
      >accurate example of cartographic precision. The most appropriate description
      >of the map is "a rough sketch." But, it clearly provides a focused emphasis
      >on the Birmingham Meeting House engagement, specifying the arrival of
      >Sullivan's Division causing Sterling's and Stephen's Divisions to shift
      >further to the right, away from the meeting house, and, most directly to your
      >question, it depicts (and names) the "Marshall's Wood" location. Linked with
      >the quite specific narrative provided in the letter, these two documents
      >yield, IMO, a remarkably specific data source which is as close to "on the
      >spot" reporting as we have for nearly any AWI engagement.
      >
      >The following excerpt tracks the earlier "stop-start" movements of the two
      >divisions, their forced march to the right in response to the confirmation of
      >Howe's flanking, and, most importantly, specifies the cause of Marshall's 3rd
      >VA being thrown forward on the extreme right. To explain, the break in the
      >middle of the excerpt indicates Weedon's page break:
      >
      >
      >> – About 11 O’Clock, the General received Intelligence that a considerable
      >> Part of the Enemy’s Army had filed off to our right & supposing that they
      >> meant to cross Jones’s Ford; Gen. Sterling’s & Stephens’s Divisions were
      >> ordered to march to Birmingham meeting House (4 Miles) by Different Routs –
      >> they had gone about 1 ½ Mile when the General had Intelligence that the
      >> Enemy had not gone up, & ordered the advanced Divisions to halt, which they
      >> did for two Hours, & then received Orders to march as quickly as possibly –
      >> Intelligence from the Front, repeated the Account of the rapid Progress of
      >> the Enemy said to be about 1500 or 2000 & our Troops went on in a Trott to
      >> gain the Meeting House Hills before them, which they did, but then
      >> discovered The Enemy’s Main Body there amounting to about 6000 – However
      >> they formed in an agreeable Manner. General Woodford’s being to the right,
      >> he
      >>
      >> Detached Col. Marshall with his Regiment (only 170 Men) to a fine wood on
      >> the right to cover his Field Pieces & right Flank – Thus prepared they
      >> discovered General Sullivan’s Division marching up, & the Brigidiers rode
      >> to him to receive Orders, when he directed them to move all to the right to
      >> make room for his Division on the left – In making this Alteration,
      >> unfavorable Ground, made it necessary for Woodford to move his Brigade 200
      >> Paces back of the Line & threw Marshall’s Wood in his front – The Enemy
      >> came on rapidly, Scott, who was next to Woodford, was removed to bad
      >> Ground, & from his Brigade to the left of the whole Line appeared in some
      >> Confusion – Woodford’s Brigade stood firm & in good Order. Marshall had
      >> orders to hold the Wood as long as it was tenable, & then retreat to the
      >> right of the Brigade – he received the Enemy with a Firmness which will do
      >> Honor to him & his little Corps, as long as the 11th of Sepr. Is remembered
      >> – He continued there ¾ of one Hour, & must have done amazing Execution –
      >> he was called off for fear of being surrounded & retreated in good Order –
      >>
      >
      >In comparison with the typical "after action report" (or, in reality, the
      >lack thereof) within Continental Army data sources, this profile of the
      >Birmingham Meeting House engagement is, IMO, a "10" on the scale of detailed
      >precision. That is, I believe the combination of Weedon's narrative and his
      >sketch map comes much closer to the precision of documentation seen within
      >the AAR's of the Civil War OR's than can be found for nearly any other AWI
      >engagement.
      >
      >- After the two-hour "wait and see" lull, and upon being
      >  ordered forward the second time, the two Virginia
      >  divisions quick-timed it to the meeting house grounds,
      >  most likely being positioned behind the enclosure wall
      >  and on the reverse slope of the gentle meeting house
      >  ridge.
      >
      >- Importantly, Weedon very clearly specifies that it was at
      >  the time of the initial arrival that Woodford, on the right
      >  flank, positioned Marshall's 3rd VA within "a fine wood"
      >  on the extreme right of the brigade. Most to the point,
      >  Weedon specifies that the primary reason that Woodford
      >  made this disposition was to use the regiment's position
      >  within the woods "to cover his Field Pieces & right
      >  Flank." That is, the presence of the woods was seen by
      >  Woodford as offering a covered position from which the
      >  3rd could protect the brigade's (and army's) extreme right
      >  and its artillery position, IMO suggesting the woods
      >  position being somewhat forward of the brigade line.
      >  Thus, Woodford's apparent anticipation was to plan for a
      >  possible envelopment of the left of the enemy's
      >  advancing line by the 3rd being hidden in the treeline.
      >
      >- The arrival of Sullivan's Division and his ordering the
      >  two earlier divisions to shift right "to make room for his
      >  Division on the left" created, of course, a disruption of
      >  Woodford's plan. By his underlined emphasis, Weedon
      >  clearly places significance on the effect of Sullivan's
      >  ordered dispositions. Now, Sullivan's own two Maryland
      >  brigades took over possession of the meeting house
      >  wall position, Sterling's Pennsylvania and New Jersey
      >  brigades and Stephen's two Virginia brigades being
      >  shifted to the right.
      >
      >  Most to the point, this shifting left Marshall's 3rd
      >  Regiment, in a sense, "stranded" within the woods, its
      >  position now being directly in front of the brigade
      >  because " ... unfavorable Ground, made it necessary
      >  for Woodford to move his Brigade 200 Paces back of
      >  the Line & threw Marshall's Wood in his front."
      >
      >- As Howe's advance struck, apparently with greatest
      >  intensity on the meeting house position, the situation of
      >  Woodford's Brigade and, in particular, of the 3rd VA
      >  Regiment worsened. In response to heavy enemy attack,
      >  "... Scott, who was next to Woodford, was removed to
      >  bad ground & from his Brigade to the left of the whole
      >  Line appeared in some Confusion." That is, the entire
      >  meeting house line began to break up and pull back, from
      >  the extreme left of Sullivan's Division to Scott's Brigade
      >  on Woodford's left, leaving the latter Virginians in an
      >  exposed forward position and, most critically, leaving the
      >  3rd Regiment even further stranded in its most forward
      >  post within the woods.
      >
      >- From Weedon's description, it would seem that Howe's
      >  left indeed did fall somewhat short of Woodford's line in
      >  that the brigade "... stood firm & in good Order." If the
      >  attack had been as heavy upon the brigade's direct front
      >  as it was upon the entire Continental line stretching from
      >  Sullivan's left to Scott's adjoining brigade, one would
      >  expect that Weedon would have recorded it. The citation
      >  to "stood ... in good Order" certainly suggests that the
      >  sweep of Howe's line passed to the left of Woodford's
      >  position, the enemy's left flank crumbling Scott's line. It
      >  would seem probable that after the initial impact, Howe's
      >  left flank forces then concentrated on Woodford's main
      >  position and on the thrown forward 3rd Regiment. Having
      >  "... orders to hold the Wood as long as it was tenable &
      >  then retreat to the right of the Brigade", Marshall, per
      >  Weedon's account, was apparently heavily engaged for
      >  forty-five minutes "... & must have done amazing
      >  Execution", certainly suggesting a significant attack
      >  upon the isolated 3rd Virginia Regiment. Probability
      >  would suggest that it was during this fire fight that Captain
      >  John Chilton was killed or mortally wounded.
      >
      >- The regiment's situation was fortunately resolved by its
      >  being "... called off for fear of being surrounded &
      >  retreated in good order." Given its isolated position 200
      >  paces forward of its brigade, the successful withdrawal
      >  of the regiment in the face of Howe's left flank assault
      >  was one of the brighter aspects of the Continentals'
      >  performance at the Birmingham Meeting House line.
      >
      >I've attempted to analyze Weedon's account in detail because this truly
      >invaluable resource has not, in my experience, been sufficiently utilized to
      >develop a valid perspective of this first major phase of Brandywine. When
      >fully interpreted, the general's letter provides a very solid account of the
      >engagement in general and, most particularly, specifies the rationale for
      >Woodford's initial choice to post the 3rd Regiment within the somewhat
      >distanced woodline position, explains how Sullivan's arrival and his ordering
      >of the two initial Virginia brigades placed Woodford on "unfavorable Ground"
      >and caused the rest of the brigade to be pulled back 200 paces, and, lastly,
      >provides a reliable account of the subsequent combat of the 3rd Regiment in
      >its forward position.
      >
      >Mike, you cite having read Weedon's account via its appearance in print. I've
      >not checked "Rebels and Redcoats" to see if the entirety of the letter is
      >therein published. The point is that the letter in its entirety, as posted at
      >RevWar75.com, provides, IMO, the most valid account of the operations of the
      >3rd VA at Brandywine. Given his remarkably specific and detailed account, I
      >would strongly tend to believe that Weedon had been provided an account of
      >the action by one or more members of the brigade, perhaps including Woodford.
      >In that Greene's Division, to which his own brigade was assigned, only
      >appears on Weedon's map as posted along the Brandywine Creek and to the left
      >of Chads Ford, one would surely expect Weedon to have been with his command
      >and, resultantly, not an eyewitness to the initial Birmingham Meeting House
      >phase of the battle. Nonetheless, his account has such compelling detail and
      >clear logic, without a single element in contradiction to other contemporary
      >sources, I consider it a completely valid and remarkably specific
      >documentation.
      >
      >As to the first of the other sources you mention, Lee's account is very much
      >in line with Weedon's in specifying that the 3rd VA held the far right flank
      >position and was advanced some distance to the front (but does not specify
      >the cause of this being Sullivan's rearrangement of the line upon his
      >division's arrival.) His describing the regiment to have "... received the
      >first shock of the foe", however, is clearly at variance with Weedon's
      >account, and, most to the point, is clearly improbable given the disposition
      >of the line as described and mapped by Weedon. Given that the landmarks of
      >the meeting house and the ridge upon which it sits would have been highly
      >probable focus points for Howe's assault, and given that the Continental left
      >flank was anchored there via Sullivan's Division, the breakup of the
      >defensive line assuredly was as Weedon describes, that is, en masse from
      >Sullivan's left to Scott's brigade just to the left of Woodford. Both sheer
      >logic and Weedon's specific narrative would support that the latter's account
      >is far more likely than is Lee's citation of the "first shock" falling upon
      >the 3rd in its far removed extreme right flank position.
      >
      >As to the posting of the regiment seeming "weird" in being advanced but also
      >supposedly protecting the right flank of the line, Weedon's account also
      >solves that seeming mystery. What became "Marshall's Wood" was an inviting
      >and fully logical protected posting for the regiment to do exactly what was
      >clearly Woodford's intent of covering the right and the artillery. But, that
      >position was selected initially, before Sullivan arrived and shifted the two
      >initial divisions to the right and taking over the meeting house grounds for
      >his own division. Once Sterling's and Stephen's men were shuttled to the
      >right, the position of the 3rd Regiment came to be in front of the remainder
      >of Woodford's brigade. Due to that shifting ordered by Sullivan, the position
      >of the regiment did, indeed, become a bit "weird", but that was not a result
      >of Woodford's initial choice of ground. Also due to the shifting, the
      >remainder of the brigade was forced to pull back to a better position 200
      >paces in rear of its original line, thus further advancing the placement of
      >the 3rd Regiment.
      >
      >As to the location of Marshall's Woods, the site is shown as such on Weedon's
      >map, but this, of course, yields little precision in locating it today. From
      >the map, the position was clearly quite far to the right from the meeting
      >house, but its proximity to "Chester" as mapped is absurd. The map's
      >precision clearly leaves much to be desired except for the specific
      >positioning of the Continental units along the Chads Ford line and the
      >meeting house line. Thus, one could, at best, only approximate the actual
      >site today.
      >
      >As to whether the site was an orchard at the time of the battle, there are,
      >to my knowledge, no data other than the Weedon letter. From his phrasing, the
      >impression I have is of a grove of trees rather than an orchard.
      >
      >Carrington's citation of De Borre appears to be a valid but insufficient
      >presentation. De Borre, indeed, commanded one of Sullivan's two brigades and,
      >therefore, may well have been posted on the right of that division. Most
      >assuredly, his was not "... the right brigade of the entire line ..." as
      >Carrington purports. What happened to Sterling's and Stephen's divisions in
      >Carrington's account? That the "... chief resistance was made at the center",
      >as Carrington reports, suggests the adjoining 1st Maryland Brigade on De
      >Borre's left received the brunt of the attack along that portion of the line,
      >and that may be the case. But, in no way was either of Sullivan's brigades
      >posted "at the center" of the entire Continental line, that position actually
      >being held by Lord Sterling's Division.
      >
      >Most to the point, I have no idea what contemporary, primary sources
      >Carrington employed for his presentation.  DeBorre kept a journal of the
      >campaigns of 1777 and 1778 which Samuel E. Smith cites in "The Battle of
      >Brandywine", but this source is apparently in manuscript and held by a French
      >library. Smith makes only a very few references to the journal content, and I
      >get the impression that it provides little if any significant data as to the
      >meeting house line engagement.
      >
      >The excerpt from Wood's account is, as you suggest, a description of a
      >totally separate phase of the battle, and has nothing to do with the
      >Birmingham Meeting House phase. In fact, the Plowed (or Ploughed) Hill
      >location is usually referenced as the site of the third and final Continental
      >defense, being followed by the withdrawal to Dilworthtown. Locally, the area
      >is more frequently referred to as "Sandy Hollow", that title obviously
      >describing the declivity at the base of the ridge. The second position,
      >centered on a road intersection considerably in rear of Birmingham, is easily
      >visible from the crest of Plowed Hill. (The marker denoting the spot
      >traditionally attributed to be the location of Lafayette's wounding is in the
      >front yard of a house on the east side of this intersection.)
      >
      >Given the quite close proximity of the third and final "stand" site to the
      >second position, and supported by several primary sources, that last defense
      >appears to have been little more than a very brief pause in what had become a
      >running fight. In the fall of 1977, the same slope again being nothing but a
      >plowed cornfield, I confirmed the location as best represented in a German
      >map also pictured in Smith's book, through the recovery of a substantial
      >quantity of musket balls. From the dispersion of the recoveries, it was very
      >evident exactly where the Continental line had been drawn, the virtual
      >entirety of the musket balls being found within an area about 120 yards long
      >and 20 yards deep, perpendicular to the road anchoring the left flank.
      >Outside that quite small rectangle, in all directions, the recoveries fell
      >off abruptly. Over several seasons of detecting, nearly 200 balls were
      >recovered, with a notable majority being "drops" rather than fired balls. In
      >the field below and in front of the American position, the "Sandy Hollow"
      >yielded very few rounds, either fired or dropped. While 200 musket balls may
      >seem like a quite large recovery simply from the perspective of "finds", it
      >was immediately clear that this field was a "virgin site" as far as having
      >never been previously metal detected. Thus, the total recovery certainly
      >documents a very small and very brief encounter. The extremely small number
      >of balls found within Sandy Hollow would suggest that the Crown forces did
      >not even stop to form a firing line. The large proportion of "drops" at the
      >Continental position likewise suggests a very hurried formation with a lot of
      >fumbling taking place. In no way could this third and final phase have been
      >anywhere near a 45-minute engagement as was the case at Marshall's Woods. It
      >was clearly a brief pause during which perhaps one or two rounds were fired,
      >the Crown forces perhaps hardly even pausing in their driving the
      >Continentals from the field.
      >
      >I certainly congratulate any List stalwarts who may have made it this far.
      >Mike, I hope the above profiling of my own take on the operations of the 3rd
      >VA is of some benefit. Also, I'll be following this up with a direct e-mail
      >to you to see if we can be sure you get at least a working photocopy of the
      >Smith book.
      >
      >
      >Cordially,
      >
      >Bob McDonald
      >
      >For Superb Primary Resources:
      >www.RevWar75.com
      >
      >
      >[Non-text portions of this message have been removed]
      >
      >
      >
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    • ju_rees18938
      ... the cemetary at today s Birmingham Meeting-house when the battle begins, am I with Sullivan s men?  Did they use the wall as a breastwork?  And did
      Message 2 of 5 , May 2, 2002
        In answer to Mike Cecere's question:


        > On another note, if I were standing along the stone wall that faces
        the cemetary at today's Birmingham Meeting-house when the battle
        begins, am I with Sullivan's men?  Did they use the wall as a
        breastwork?  And did Stirling's and Stephen's line extend to the
        right or did it curve more to the rear?  Many secondary sources
        imply that the Birmingham Meeting-house was the center of the storm,
        but it actually seems to have been the left of the storm.  Could you
        clarify your view.
        >

        The American position near Birmingham Meeting from the meeting house
        towards the Brandywine Creek.

        { }
        { }
        { } [ ]
        { } Sullivan meeting house
        { } Stirling Woodford compound

        Creek

        Sullivan's division was hit before it could form and was driven
        off the field. Next came the Jersey Brigade, then Conway's Brigade,
        both of Stirling's Division.

        Hope this helps, John
      • ju_rees18938
        Mike, I tried to do a schematic but it didn t work. Sullivan s Division was on the left, advanced a bit, Stirling s Division next, then Woodford s, then
        Message 3 of 5 , May 2, 2002
          Mike, I tried to do a schematic but it didn't work. Sullivan's
          Division was on the left, advanced a bit, Stirling's Division next,
          then Woodford's, then Birmingham Meeting.

          John


          --- In Revlist@y..., "ju_rees18938" <ju_rees@m...> wrote:
          >
          > In answer to Mike Cecere's question:
          >
          >
          > > On another note, if I were standing along the stone wall that
          faces
          > the cemetary at today's Birmingham Meeting-house when the battle
          > begins, am I with Sullivan's men?  Did they use the wall as a
          > breastwork?  And did Stirling's and Stephen's line extend to the
          > right or did it curve more to the rear?  Many secondary sources
          > imply that the Birmingham Meeting-house was the center of the
          storm,
          > but it actually seems to have been the left of the storm.  Could
          you
          > clarify your view.
          > >
          >
          > The American position near Birmingham Meeting from the meeting
          house
          > towards the Brandywine Creek.
          >
          > { }
          > { }
          > { } [ ]
          > { } Sullivan meeting house
          > { } Stirling Woodford compound
          >
          > Creek
          >
          > Sullivan's division was hit before it could form and was driven
          > off the field. Next came the Jersey Brigade, then Conway's Brigade,
          > both of Stirling's Division.
          >
          > Hope this helps, John
        • mileset3
          ... field hospital. A Tradition says it was Birmingham, but Weedon identifies it as Concord Meeting House on the Chester Road near Marshall s Wood. I m
          Message 4 of 5 , May 2, 2002
            --- In Revlist@y..., umfspock87@c... wrote:

            > They carried him to an old Meeting House that was being used as a
            field hospital. A Tradition says it was Birmingham, but Weedon
            identifies it as Concord Meeting House on the Chester Road near
            Marshall's Wood. <snip> I'm particularly interested in the
            Concord Meeting House. One of my units, the 3rd VA, wants to come
            and lay a wreath this September and we are very interested in where
            Chilton and any of the 3rd Virginians were, or still are. <

            Mike:

            Concord Meeting still exits as an active Quaker meetinghouse. It's
            located in present day Concordville, about 4 miles southeast of
            Birmingham Meeting, on the route of the Continentals' retreat to
            Chester, PA after Brandywine.

            FWIW, I've done a great deal of research at the Chester County
            Historical Society, mainly into my family's genealogy, though I
            haven't been there in almost a year. They've got a good deal of
            information about the battle including, IIRC, maps. Can't say what's
            based on primary sources, but it might be a place to start.

            I live just north of Kennett Square (quite close, I'd like to think,
            to the route taken by the British flanking column on that other
            09/11). If you're interested in getting a group together for a
            "walking" tour of the sites that figured in the battle before we duke
            it out at the 225th this September, please keep me in mind. I will,
            of course, offer my parole for the day ;>)

            I remain, &c,

            Miles Twaddell
            42d RHR, LI Coy, 2d Pltn
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