Re: [RangeVoting] Re: More on the reversal problem
- On Fri, Apr 5, 2013 at 9:38 AM, Abd ul-Rahman Lomax <abd@...>wrote:
> **In fact, when Steven Brams discusses Bucklin in his book, *Mathematics and
> On the issue of reversing Bucklin votes.
> With Bucklin, the voter has an additional *option*. The voter may
> rank the candidates, within the approved class. However, the
> fundamental decision that a voter makes is still the same. The voter
> approves or does not approve, makes a decision whether or not the
> voter is willing to record a vote approving a particular candidate or
> not. Then the voter ranks the approved caniddates.
> If we assume that the approval cutoff is in the same position for
> reversal or non-reversal, the only amibguity in reversal is for
> candidates at the approval cutoff. Since, however, the fundamental
> decision is to approve/not approve, and the voter has, say, in the
> first case, chosen to approve, in the second case, reversed, the
> voter would not approve. It's a clean reversal that way.
> Bucklin appeared, in many analyses, to not pass reversal because of
> mindless ranking without regard for approval.
Democracy*, mostly in conjunction with his nearly identical system called
"Fallback Voting," he makes it clear that only approved candidates are
ranked by the voter.
So at least one person outside this group has noted this.
[Non-text portions of this message have been removed]
- At 08:12 AM 4/5/2013, Bruce Gilson wrote:
>On Fri, Apr 5, 2013 at 9:38 AM, Abd ul-Rahman LomaxThat would certainly be true, does not contradict what I wrote, and
> > Bucklin appeared, in many analyses, to not pass reversal because of
> > mindless ranking without regard for approval.
>In fact, when Steven Brams discusses Bucklin in his book, *Mathematics and
>Democracy*, mostly in conjunction with his nearly identical system called
>"Fallback Voting," he makes it clear that only approved candidates are
>ranked by the voter.
>So at least one person outside this group has noted this.
the concept of repeated voting with lowered approval cutoff was
extensively discussed by students of approval voting.
However, reviewing Mathematics and Democracy, I'm struck by what
seems to be entirely missing from it: any consideration of repeated
ballot, seeking an explicit majority, whether absolutely (Robert's
Rules) or as a goal (i.e., runoff systems that terminate, usually on
the second ballt, with a plurality result if a majority is not found
-- or that *force* a majority by disallowing any other votes that for two).
It's a glaring omission. It's not just Brams. The characteristics of
runoff voting were widely ignored in voting systems discussions,
including Bayesian Regret calculations that assumed the same voting
electorate with the same preferences. I can think of no example of
someone proposing runoff voting using an advanced voting system,
until I started doing it, and that blind spot seems to have existed
in the past.
Strangely, the actual behavior of runoff voting and how it differed
from IRV was either ignored, or was *explained* by some deficiency in
turnout, or manipulability by monied interests, ignoring the actual
situations. Yet Robert's Rules of Order is totally aware of the
problem of *not* holding a real runoff, using IRV. Their concern is
not abstract, they are parliamentarians. They also criticize IRV for
center squeeze, and their own preferential voting process *still
seeks a true majority or the election must be repeated.*
Almost by accident, in Arizona (it wasn't an accident, we have a man
on the ground there, who did yeoman work), we may be getting
Approval/Runoff, with a mandatory top two runoff. Technically, of
course, this is Top Two RAnge, which outperforms Range in simulations
with realistic voting patterns. We can probably do better, but this
is very good to start! (I've suggested that Bucklin for the primary,
at least, is an obvious move.)
(Pure Range with *accurate and commensurable* utility expression is,
by definition, optimal for summed social utility. But there are few
ways to get that expression. Interestingly, an inconvenient runoff
election does push results toward absolute utility, because if the
choices are not greatly different in utility, the voter has less
motivation to vote, hence expressed votes will tend to have higher
preference strength behind them.)
Reading over Brams I see that PAV is essentially what I've proposed,
but I've suggested a true hybrid ballot that allows equal ranking.
He's suggested, essentially, a ranked ballot with an explicit
approval cutoff. I've simply suggested using a Range ballot with
midrange as explicit approval cutoff. That allows ranking within the
approved and disapproved sets, yet the "sincere" ballot is easy to
vote, except for the *intrinsic difficulty*, deciding how to
categorize the candidates, which gets tougher when there are three or
more. (And there are always, in fact, many, if write-ins are
allowed.) Runoff systems make the decision in the primary a bit
easier, approval becomes a binary decision: would I prefer the
election of this candidate to a runoff being held?)
Brams also mentions voting after a series of pre-election polls. If
we assume that the polls are accurate, this is essentially repeated
ballot, but based on a sample instead of the full electorate.
However, that assumption can be a problem!
If, instead of a poll, it's a real election, in a runoff system
primary, we can be reasonably confident that a majority result is
real! Multiple majorities are a problem, but the hybrid ballots I've
suggested can find ways of making that choice, if it's considered
excessively inconvenient to refer it to the voters in a runoff.
(Polls should not simply collect favorite information, that will
distort them. Range polls are much better, that's been obvious for
some time. A Range 2 poll -- +/-, default 0 -- showed what
vote-for-one polls could not show, true relative position of
candidates, and strength of support and opposition.)