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Re: ideas for new Condorcet methods

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  • cbenhamau
    ... value-for-money ... doesn t include ... CB: Yes, that is one of the reasons that I m not a big fan of it. ... CB: It is perceived wisdom on EM that
    Message 1 of 9 , Sep 1, 2006
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      --- In RangeVoting@yahoogroups.com, "warren_d_smith31" <wds@...> wrote:
      >
      > > I think Clone Independence is such an important and
      "value-for-money"
      > > property that I can't see that leaving it out of a package that
      doesn't include
      > > FBC is justified. (And I am not a big fan of FBC).
      >
      > --well, no Condorcet method has FBC.

      CB: Yes, that is one of the reasons that I'm not a big fan of it.


      > And probably no rank-order method either (? I should really try to
      > prove or disprove that).

      CB: It is perceived wisdom on EM that "ER-Bucklin(Whole)" meets FBC,
      Majority for solid coaltions, the Plurality criterion, and Mono-raise.

      http://wiki.electorama.com/wiki/ER-Bucklin
      <http://wiki.electorama.com/wiki/ER-Bucklin>


      > Actually, I thought some more, and my "new" Condorcet method is
      actually
      > Copeland//Condorcet-least-reversal,
      > that is, you break Copeland ties using the "least reversal" idea
      > of Condorcet.
      >
      > So it is not so new.
      >
      > As you correctly say, it is not so impressive, but on the other hand,
      > the Smith,IRV thing you and Woodall like was also not so impressive...
      >

      CB: Certainly not for monotonicty fans, but it depends what impresses
      you. I admit that it's a bit awkward and unintuitive to sell.



      Chris Benham






      [Non-text portions of this message have been removed]
    • warren_d_smith31
      ... --ok, but what I meant was, what about rank order mehtid where it really is a rank ordering, no equal-ranks allowed. Does such a voting method exist, in
      Message 2 of 9 , Sep 1, 2006
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        > > --well, no Condorcet method has FBC.
        > > And probably no rank-order method either (? I should really try to
        > > prove or disprove that).
        >
        > CB: It is perceived wisdom on EM that "ER-Bucklin(Whole)" meets FBC,
        > Majority for solid coaltions, the Plurality criterion, and Mono-raise.
        >
        > http://wiki.electorama.com/wiki/ER-Bucklin
        > <http://wiki.electorama.com/wiki/ER-Bucklin>

        --ok, but what I meant was, what about rank order mehtid where it really is
        a rank ordering, no equal-ranks allowed.

        Does such a voting method exist, in which FBC is satisfied
        (i.e. nobody ever is incentived to betray their favorite)?

        I don't know. You can prove the answer is "no"
        under conditions of "reasonability" of the voting system;
        the problem is to shrink the set of assumed-conditions down to virtually nothing,

        For example can we prove this if the only things we assume is
        it is not a dictatorship and unanimously top-ranked candidaesmust win?

        wds
      • cbenhamau
        ... Mono-raise. ... really is ... virtually nothing, ... win? ... CB: If truncation isn t allowed, wouldn t just elect the candidate with the fewest bottom
        Message 3 of 9 , Sep 1, 2006
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          --- In RangeVoting@yahoogroups.com, "warren_d_smith31" <wds@...> wrote:
          >
          > > > --well, no Condorcet method has FBC.
          > > > And probably no rank-order method either (? I should really try to
          > > > prove or disprove that).
          > >
          > > CB: It is perceived wisdom on EM that "ER-Bucklin(Whole)" meets FBC,
          > > Majority for solid coaltions, the Plurality criterion, and
          Mono-raise.
          > >
          > > http://wiki.electorama.com/wiki/ER-Bucklin
          > > <http://wiki.electorama.com/wiki/ER-Bucklin>
          >
          > --ok, but what I meant was, what about rank order method where it
          really is
          > a rank ordering, no equal-ranks allowed.
          >
          > Does such a voting method exist, in which FBC is satisfied
          > (i.e. nobody ever is incentived to betray their favorite)?
          >
          > I don't know. You can prove the answer is "no"
          > under conditions of "reasonability" of the voting system;
          > the problem is to shrink the set of assumed-conditions down to
          virtually nothing,
          >
          > For example can we prove this if the only things we assume is
          > it is not a dictatorship and unanimously top-ranked candidates must
          win?
          >
          > wds
          >
          CB: If truncation isn't allowed, wouldn't just "elect the candidate with
          the fewest bottom preferences" fit the bill?

          Chris Benham
        • warren_d_smith31
          ... --excellent observation! This anti-plurality voting scheme offers no incentive to anybody to betray their favorite. (But it is a horrible voting system
          Message 4 of 9 , Sep 2, 2006
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            > CB: If truncation isn't allowed, wouldn't just "elect the candidate with
            > the fewest bottom preferences" fit the bill?

            --excellent observation!
            This "anti-plurality voting" scheme offers no incentive to anybody to
            betray their favorite. (But it is a horrible voting system for other reasons...).
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