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RE: [Pali] Re: About 'neta.m mama, nesoham asmi, na meso attaa'ti

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  • Dhammadarsa
    Ven Sirs and Ladies and Kind Sirs and Ladies I appreciate everyone s enquiring mind and contribution to this question. As we know Pali has elements from
    Message 1 of 26 , Jul 2, 2010
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      Ven Sirs and Ladies and Kind Sirs and Ladies



      I appreciate everyone's enquiring mind and contribution to this question.



      As we know Pali has elements from different languages, e.g. Vedic and I have
      read, maybe some other Prakrits, e.g. the vocative form 'Bhikkhave'. The
      irregularity we have been discussing may also be related to another Prakrit
      and the form could have been frozen due to later misunderstanding, thus
      accounting for its unchanged appearance in many contexts in the Pali texts.



      One thing I think is useful when we come to such questions is comparison
      with other versions, e.g. Sanskrit. Sometimes such comparison can throw
      light on irregularities in texts, but that may be beyond the scope of this
      list. In any case, I'm not the one to do that, but I do know a Sanskrit
      lecturer at a university here in Thailand I could ask, if people wished to
      know.



      Kind Regards







      <http://www.vicnet.net.au/~dhammadarsa> Integrating Emotion and Intellect =
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      Buddhist Monk

      Mahachulalongkornrajavidyalaya University
      Wang Noi
      Ayuthaya
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      From: Pali@yahoogroups.com [mailto:Pali@yahoogroups.com] On Behalf Of Nina
      van Gorkom
      Sent: Thursday, 1 July 2010 4:09 PM
      To: Pali@yahoogroups.com
      Subject: Re: [Pali] Re: About 'neta.m mama, nesoham asmi, na meso attaa'ti





      Dear Khristos and all,
      Thank you for your interesting observations.
      Khristos, I admire your keen observance, before I never gave this
      matter a thought. In fact your question makes me penetrate more
      deeply into the meaning of the text.
      For the sake of analysing I find it easier not to use the negation.
      The neuter eta.m as object of tanhaa can comprise so many things,
      even pa~n~nattis, which are not realities. Is it a solution to think
      of sabba.m? I cling to this or that, whatever appears. So, perhaps we
      can say that the neutre gender is sufficient, no need for another
      gender.
      'This is of me'.

      I consulted 'The Root of Existence', Bikkhu Bodhi's translation of
      the Muulapariyaaya Sutta , and in his intro he says: <The construct
      'this is mine' is a projection born of craving, for it is craving's
      function to appropriate things as the property of the self. >
      <Under the influence of conceit it becomes manifest in judgements and
      comparisons whereby we rank ourselves in relation to others as
      superior, equal of inferior. and under the influence of views, i.e.
      the theoretical bent of thought, the ego-bias issues in dogmas,
      tenets, and speculations concerning reality and nature of the
      personal self and its locus, the world.>

      N: As to conceit, esoham asmi, here the eso is correct, because one
      thinks of oneself to be thus or thus. I think of the 'I am conceit",
      asmi maana.
      As to the wrong view of self, one sees the self as controller (as
      Lennart mentioned), as possessor. For instance, one believes that
      there is a self who can at will induce the arising of Pa~n~naa.
      Whereas pa~n~naa is a cetasika that can only arise because of the
      appropriate conditions.
      Nina.

      Op 30-jun-2010, om 5:57 heeft k_nizamis het volgende geschreven:

      > Yet, please be patient with me a moment more, because I'm not yet
      > completely satisfied with the explanation at an intuitive
      > linguistic level. I'm still trying to understand the `sense' of the
      > one nt. nom. sg. and the two masc. nom. sg. demonstrative pronouns
      > in this formula.

      [Non-text portions of this message have been removed]





      [Non-text portions of this message have been removed]
    • k_nizamis
      Hi Nina: I admire and respect your devotion to working with the texts and understanding them in your actual practice. You must be busy, and I don t want to
      Message 2 of 26 , Jul 4, 2010
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        Hi Nina: I admire and respect your devotion to working with the texts and understanding them in your actual practice. You must be busy, and I don't want to distract you or add more to your plate. But your example just raised two thoughts. You wrote:

        << As to the wrong view of self, one sees the self as controller ... as possessor. For instance, one believes that there is a self who can at will induce the arising of Pa~n~naa. Whereas pa~n~naa is a cetasika that can only arise because of the appropriate conditions.>>

        Maybe we should be careful, though, not to throw the bathwater out with the baby.

        ((I hope my quotations are legible this time. I've cited from a UTF8 text.))

        1. Agreed that paññā is a `cetasika' (in Abhidhamma terminology), inasmuch as, in the Suttaani, it is referred to as a dhamma: e.g., MN 43 says (at i.292): "Paññā yañca viññāṇaṃ ime dhammā saṃsaṭṭhā no visaṃsaṭṭhā. . . . Yañcāvuso pajānāti taṃ vijānāti. Yaṃ vijānāti taṃ pajānāti." "Paññā and viññāṇaṃ - these dhammā are conjoined, not disjoined. . . . For, friend, what one wisely understands, that one cognises, and what one cognises, that one wisely understands."

        This may or may not raise a question about whether paññā and viññāṇa in the first sentence should be taken to refer primarily to what might very roughly be called `mental content' (your `cetasika'); Ven. Bodhi translates dhammā here as `states', which can only be understood as `mental states'; whereas the verbs pajānāti and vijānāti refer primarily to function and experience, i.e., to the `consciousness-of' that `mental content' or `mental state'. Perhaps this is supported by the following passage, a little farther on in the same text (i.293):

        "Neyyaṃ panāvuso dhammaṃ kena pajānātī"ti.
        Neyyaṃ kho āvuso dhammaṃ paññācakkhunā pajānātīti.
        "Paññā panāvuso kimatthiyā"ti?
        Paññā kho āvuso abhiññatthā pariññatthā pahānatthāti.

        "Friend, with what does one wisely understand a dhamma that can be known?"
        "Friend, one understands a dhamma that can be wisely known with the `wisdom-eye' (paññācakkhunā)."
        "Friend, what is the purpose of paññā?"
        "The purpose of paññā, friend, is direct knowledge, its purpose is full understanding, its purpose is abandoning." (Ven. Nyanamoli's & Ven. Bodhi's trans. modified)

        Of course, it is very difficult (well, impossible) to separate out `mental content' or `mental state' from the act of `knowing', of `recognising', of `intuiting'; but, at the same time, there is surely an important distinction to be recognised between the act of `knowing' and what is `known' in and through that act.

        2. Again, since paññā is a dhamma (of the type `cetasika', according to Abhidhamma), it is paticca-samuppanna, dependently co-arisen, it is dependent upon conditions. But it does not arise arbitrarily, nor does it arise merely automatically or deterministically. We can't just sit and wait, hoping that paññā will just happent to conditionally arise some day. MN 43 again says (at i.293): "paññā bhāvetabbā, viññāṇaṃ pariññeyyaṃ", "paññā is to be developed (cultivated), viññāṇa is to be thoroughly understood". This raises the deep and fascinating problem of `agency'. True, we cannot just `will' paññā to arise. But we can, and we are exhorted to, develop and cultivate the conditions that will be conducive for paññā to arise: that is a matter for which we have some volitional responsibility, and also some volitional effectivity. Just a couple of classical examples, with which you will be familiar, of this sense of agency, are the following:

        MN 32 (M i.215) "Idhāvuso . . . bhikkhu cittaṃ vasaṃ vatteti, no ca bhikkhu cittassa vasena vattati." "Here, friend, . . . a bhikkhu wields mastery over his mind, he does not let the mind wield mastery over him."

        And again, MN 20 (M i.120-121): "cetasā cittaṃ abhiniggaṇhitabbaṃ abhinippīḷetabbaṃ abhisantāpetabbaṃ", "he beats down, constrains, and crushes mind with mind"

        There are several instances in the Sutāni where the doctrine or view of the moral efficacy of doing and not doing acts (of body, speech, and intellect) is ascribed to the Buddha. The strongest example is at A i.62: "Kiriyavādī cāhaṃ brāhmaṇa akiriyavādī cāti. . . . Akiriyaṃ kho ahaṃ brāhmaṇa vadāmi kāyaduccaritassa vacīduccaritassa manoduccaritassa, anekavihitānaṃ pāpakānaṃ akusalānaṃ dhammānaṃ akiriyaṃ vadāmi. Kiriyañca kho ahaṃ brāhmaṇa vadāmi kāyasucaritassa vacīsucaritassa manosucaritassa, anekavihitānaṃ kusalānaṃ dhammānaṃ kiriyaṃ vadāmi. Evaṃ kho ahaṃ brāhmaṇa kiriyavādī ca akiriyavādī cāti." "I am one who preaches action [kiriya], Brahmin, and one who preaches non-action [akiriya]. . . . I say `non-action', Brahmin, of wrongdoing by body, wrongdoing by speech, wrongdoing by thought; of manifold evil and unwholesome thoughts [dhammā], I say `non-action'. And I say `action', Brahmin, of doing good by body, doing good by speech, doing good by thought; of manifold wholesome thoughts, I say `action'. In this way, Brahmin, I am one who preaches `action' and one who preaches `non-action'." (My trans.)

        There's also a quite humorous instance (MN 71, at i.483), where Vaccha asks the Buddha if any Aajivaka (`Fatalist', who doesn't believe that willed action has any effect upon a person's 'destiny') has ever gone to heaven after death. The Buddha replies: "Ito kho so vaccha ekanavuto kappo yamahaṃ anussarāmi nābhijānāmi kañci ājīvakaṃ saggūpagaṃ aññatra ekena, sopāsi kammavādī kiriyavādīti." "When I recollect the past ninety-one aeons, Vaccha, I do not recall any Aajivaka who, on the dissolution of the body, went to heaven, with one exception, and he held the doctrine of the moral efficacy of action, the doctrine of the moral efficacy of deeds." (Ven. Nyanamoli's and Ven. Bodhi's trans.)

        If we take the import of questions 1 and 2 together, we are invited to comprehend the nature of `knowing' and of `doing' in a way that admits their reality and efficacy, yet without having to posit an ontologically independent, separate, self-existing entity called an `attā', to which the pronoun `ahaṃ' refers as though it were a name for an `object'.

        Respectfully, with metta,
        Khristos
      • k_nizamis
        Dear Jim thank you for looking into and thinking about this. And the other kind people, too. That s a very peaceful result, methinks. To my mind, it has more
        Message 3 of 26 , Jul 4, 2010
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          Dear Jim

          thank you for looking into and thinking about this. And the other kind people, too.

          That's a very peaceful result, methinks. To my mind, it has more lived meaning than any other for "neta.m mama...". Not all will think so, I would guess, but that some careful others can independently come to the same conclusion is peaceful.

          Best wishes,
          metta,
          Khristos



          --- In Pali@yahoogroups.com, "Jim Anderson" <jimanderson.on@...> wrote:
          >
          > Hi Khristos,
          >
          > You wrote:
          > << Just quickly, though, "eso pañcakkhandhapabhedo ahampi na asmi"
          > perhaps rather "This 'I' consisting of the five aggregates, I am not"
          > (than 'does not exist', 'na atthi'), which would agree exactly with
          > what we've been saying.>>
          >
          > Yes, I agree. Your translation of this commentarial extract from
          > Ps-p.t I 286 as well as the Pali orignial supports your translation:
          > "I am (asmi) not this `I'" for "nesohamasmi" in your earlier reply to
          > Nina:
          >
          > << If so, then these could be translated: "I am (asmi) not this `I'",
          > and "This self is not of me (mine)", respectively? In this case, the
          > `I' that `I am not' is the one identified with the khandhaa, etc.; and
          > the `self' that is not `of me' is again the one identified with the
          > khandhaa, etc. >>
          >
          > Thanks for raising this interesting grammatical question concerning
          > "eso" and "eta.m".
          >
          > Best wishes,
          > Jim
          >
        • k_nizamis
          **Dear Nina and Moderator: again, citations in my post seem to look like `alphanumeric soup . Sorry, I haven t quite worked out what the technical problem is
          Message 4 of 26 , Jul 4, 2010
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            **Dear Nina and Moderator: again, citations in my post seem to look like `alphanumeric soup'. Sorry, I haven't quite worked out what the technical problem is with pasting UTF-8 text into posts. Rather than waste your time and give you headaches, I've reformatted this post using good old Velthius.** :-)

            Hi Nina: I admire and respect your devotion to working with the texts and understanding them in your actual practice. You must be busy, and I don't want to distract you or add more to your plate. But your example just raised two thoughts.

            In your post you wrote:

            "As to the wrong view of self, one sees the self as controller ... as possessor. For instance, one believes that there is a self who can at will induce the arising of pa~n~naa. Whereas pa~n~naa is a cetasika that can only arise because of the appropriate conditions."

            Maybe we should be careful, though, not to throw the bathwater out with the baby.

            1. Agreed that pa~n~naa is a `cetasika' (in the Abhidhamma sense), inasmuch as, in the Suttaani, it is referred to as a dhamma: e.g., MN 43 says (at i.292):

            "Pa~n~naa ya~nca vi~n~naa.na.m ime dhammaa sa.msa.t.thaa no visa.msa.t.thaa. . . . Ya~ncaavuso pajaanaati ta.m vijaanaati. Ya.m vijaanaati ta.m pajaanaati."

            "Pa~n~naa and vi~n~naa.na.m - these dhammaa are conjoined, not disjoined. . . . For, friend, what one wisely understands, that one cognizes, and what one cognizes, that one wisely understands."

            This may or may not raise a question about whether pa~n~naa and vi~n~naa.na.m in the first sentence should be taken to refer primarily to what might very roughly be called `mental content' (your `cetasika'); Ven. Bodhi translates dhammaa here as `states', which can only be understood as `mental states'; whereas the verbs pajaanaati and vijaanaati refer primarily to function and experience, i.e., to the `consciousness-of' that `mental content' or `mental state'. Perhaps this is supported by the following passage, a little farther on in the same text (i.293):

            "Neyya.m panaavuso dhamma.m kena pajaanaatii"ti.
            Neyya.m kho aavuso dhamma.m pa~n~naacakkhunaa pajaanaatiiti.
            "Pa~n~naa panaavuso kimatthiyaa"ti?
            Pa~n~naa kho aavuso abhi~n~natthaa pari~n~natthaa pahaanatthaati.

            "Friend, with what does one wisely understand a dhamma that can be wisely known?"
            "Friend, one understands a dhamma that can be wisely known with the `wisdom-eye' (pa~n~naacakkhunaa)."
            "Friend, what is the purpose of pa~n~naa?"
            "The purpose of pa~n~naa, friend, is direct knowledge, its purpose is full understanding, its purpose is abandoning."

            Of course, it is very difficult (well, impossible) to separate out `mental content' or `mental state' from the act of `knowing', of `recognising', of `intuiting'; but, at the same time, there is surely an important distinction to be recognised between the act of `knowing' and what is `known' in and through that act.

            2. Again, since pa~n~naa is a dhamma (of the type `cetasika', according to Abhidhamma), it is paticca-samuppanna, dependently co-arisen, it is dependent upon conditions. But it does not arise arbitrarily, nor does it arise merely automatically or deterministically. MN 43 again says (at i.293):

            "pa~n~naa bhaavetabbaa, vi~n~naa.na.m pari~n~neyya.m",

            "pa~n~naa is to be developed (cultivated), vi~n~naa.na is to be thoroughly understood".

            This raises the deep and fascinating problem of `agency'. True, we cannot just `will' pa~n~naa to arise. But we can, and we are exhorted to, develop and cultivate the conditions that will be conducive for pa~n~naa to arise: that is a matter for which we have some volitional responsibility, and also some volitional effectivity. Just a couple of classical examples, with which you will be familiar, of this sense of agency, are the following:

            MN 32 (M i.215) "Idhaavuso . . . bhikkhu citta.m vasa.m vatteti, no ca bhikkhu cittassa vasena vattati."

            "Here, friend, . . . a bhikkhu wields mastery over his mind, he does not let the mind wield mastery over him."

            And again, MN 20 (M i.120-121):

            "cetasaa citta.m abhinigga.nhitabba.m abhinippii.letabba.m abhisantaapetabba.m",
            "he should beat down, constrain, and crush mind with mind".

            There are several instances in the Suttaani where the doctrine or view of the moral efficacy of doing and not doing actions (of body, speech, and intellect) is ascribed to the Buddha. The strongest example is AN 2.1.4.3 (A i.62):

            "Kiriyavaadii caaha.m braahma.na akiriyavaadii caati. . . . Akiriya.m kho aha.m braahma.na vadaami kaayaduccaritassa vaciiduccaritassa manoduccaritassa, anekavihitaana.m paapakaana.m akusalaana.m dhammaana.m akiriya.m vadaami. Kiriya~nca kho aha.m braahma.na vadaami kaayasucaritassa vaciisucaritassa manosucaritassa, anekavihitaana.m kusalaana.m dhammaana.m kiriya.m vadaami. Eva.m kho aha.m braahma.na kiriyavaadii ca akiriyavaadii caati."

            "I am one who preaches action [kiriya], Brahmin, and one who preaches non-action [akiriya]. . . . I say `non-action', Brahmin, of wrongdoing by body, wrongdoing by speech, wrongdoing by thought; of manifold evil and unwholesome thoughts [dhammaa], I say `non-action'. And I say `action', Brahmin, of doing good by body, doing good by speech, doing good by thought; of manifold wholesome thoughts, I say `action'. In this way, Brahmin, I am one who preaches `action' and one who preaches `non-action'." (My trans.)

            There's also a quite humorous instance (MN 71, at i.483), where Vaccha asks the Buddha if any aajivaka (`fatalist', who doesn't believe that willed action has any effect) has ever gone to heaven after death. The Buddha replies:

            "Ito kho so vaccha ekanavuto kappo yamaha.m anussaraami naabhijaanaami ka~nci aajiivaka.m sagguupaga.m a~n~natra ekena, sopaasi kammavaadii kiriyavaadiiti."

            "When I recollect the past ninety-one aeons, Vaccha, I do not recall any aajivaka who, on the dissolution of the body, went to heaven, with one exception, and he held the doctrine of the moral efficacy of action, the doctrine of the moral efficacy of deeds." (Ven. Nyanamoli's and Ven. Bodhi's trans.)

            If we take the import of questions 1 and 2 together, we are invited to comprehend the nature of `knowing' and of `doing' in a way that admits their reality and efficacy, yet without having to posit an ontologically independent, separate, self-existing entity called an `attaa', to which the pronoun `aha.m' refers as though it were a name for an `object'.

            Respectfully, with metta,
            Khristos


            --- In Pali@yahoogroups.com, Nina van Gorkom <vangorko@...> wrote:
            >
            > Dear Khristos and all,
            > Thank you for your interesting observations.
            > Khristos, I admire your keen observance, before I never gave this
            > matter a thought. In fact your question makes me penetrate more
            > deeply into the meaning of the text.
            > For the sake of analysing I find it easier not to use the negation.
            > The neuter eta.m as object of tanhaa can comprise so many things,
            > even pa~n~nattis, which are not realities. Is it a solution to think
            > of sabba.m? I cling to this or that, whatever appears. So, perhaps we
            > can say that the neutre gender is sufficient, no need for another
            > gender.
            > 'This is of me'.
            >
            > I consulted 'The Root of Existence', Bikkhu Bodhi's translation of
            > the Muulapariyaaya Sutta , and in his intro he says: <The construct
            > 'this is mine' is a projection born of craving, for it is craving's
            > function to appropriate things as the property of the self. >
            > <Under the influence of conceit it becomes manifest in judgements and
            > comparisons whereby we rank ourselves in relation to others as
            > superior, equal of inferior. and under the influence of views, i.e.
            > the theoretical bent of thought, the ego-bias issues in dogmas,
            > tenets, and speculations concerning reality and nature of the
            > personal self and its locus, the world.>
            >
            > N: As to conceit, esoham asmi, here the eso is correct, because one
            > thinks of oneself to be thus or thus. I think of the 'I am conceit",
            > asmi maana.
            > As to the wrong view of self, one sees the self as controller (as
            > Lennart mentioned), as possessor. For instance, one believes that
            > there is a self who can at will induce the arising of Pa~n~naa.
            > Whereas pa~n~naa is a cetasika that can only arise because of the
            > appropriate conditions.
            > Nina.
            >
            > Op 30-jun-2010, om 5:57 heeft k_nizamis het volgende geschreven:
            >
            > > Yet, please be patient with me a moment more, because I'm not yet
            > > completely satisfied with the explanation at an intuitive
            > > linguistic level. I'm still trying to understand the `sense' of the
            > > one nt. nom. sg. and the two masc. nom. sg. demonstrative pronouns
            > > in this formula.
            >
            >
            >
            > [Non-text portions of this message have been removed]
            >
          • k_nizamis
            Dear Ven. Dhammadarsa, You have raised a very good point, and made an excellent recommendation with respect to checking the Sanskrit (especially seeking a
            Message 5 of 26 , Jul 5, 2010
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              Dear Ven. Dhammadarsa,

              You have raised a very good point, and made an excellent recommendation with respect to checking the Sanskrit (especially seeking a Sanskrit rendering of this formula). But I wonder, too, whether the Thai and other Asian translations of the Pali reveal anything in this respect?

              In my reply to Nina's first response to this question, I had flagged the historical problem, but didn't pursue it: <<Reflecting on this, there are probably at least a couple of possible (essentially historical) explanations for the unchanging form of this formula,in whatever context it occurs.>> (14809) But your message has kicked that idea back into gear for me! Of course, any interpretation is going to have to square itself also with the historical-linguistic dimension. Thank you.

              If you have the opportunity to put the question to your friend who teaches Sanskrit, that would be very interesting and helpful. I will report here some information I have just found, which might be useful to pass on to your friend, too; and also a further suggestion.

              My first reference is to F. Edgerton, Buddhist Hybrid Sanskrit Grammar and Dictionary, Vol. 1 Grammar (originally published 1953, reprinted 1993). No doubt Indic language studies have moved on since 1953. In any case, Edgerton explains that Buddhadhamma has been preserved in at least 4 Indic languages: standard Sanskrit, two middle Indic languages, Pali and Prakrit (of course 'Pali' is not the name of a language, but has come to be used for the language of the 'Pali Canon'), and Buddhist Hybrid Sanskrit (BHS), which was used in the North, although Edgerton supposes it was based on an otherwise unidentifiable Middle Indic vernacular. (Edgerton, p. 1, 1.1-1.4).

              It seems that very little of the 'early Buddhist canon' has been preserved in Sanskrit, and what has been preserved is not easily accessible to most of us. However, the Tibetan and Chinese canons are supposed to be translations of 'Sanskrit canons'. It should be kept in mind, thought, that these translations were made from written texts; the earlier oral canons had therefore already been inscribed, and so there is also the question of the historical development of the oral texts to be kept in mind.

              Still, it would of course be informative (but not conclusive, for a number of reasons) to know how `eta.m mama...' has been translated into Chinese and Tibetan within those respective Asian canons. If someone were able to check on this, it would be very helpful (I know a couple of people I can pass this request on to).

              As for BHS, in his section on BHS pronouns, Edgerton does have a reference to a peculiar usage of the nom.-acc. sg. nt. He notes: "The masc. `so' replaces `tad', e.g. Saddharmapu.n.dariika 62.7." But of course, this is a later Mahaayaana text. Similarly, Edgerton cites the use of some variant forms of 'so': e.g., with `se' and `su', he indicates a text Apabhra.m'sa or Apadaana (which he identifies as a Paa.li text?); he also cites these examples: `su bhava.nu', `ehu' for `etad', in Sanatkumaaracaritam (Apabhra.m'sa or Apadaana). (Edgerton, p. 114, 21.10.) I suspect that it is because of these examples that, in his table of paradigms for the 'generic pronouns' (p. 116, 21.46), he includes `so' along with `ta.m' under the forms for the Nt. Sg. Nom.-Acc., as well as giving it as the main form of the Mas. Sg. Nom. I was hoping Edgerton might cited the BHS version of 'eta.m mama...' in his Grammar or Dictionary, but so far, I haven't found anything.

              Edgerton's references are interesting, but perhaps a bit far away from our question. They might suggest another 'substitution' possibility (cf. Edgerton, p. 114, 21.2): if anyone is well-versed in Paa.li metrics, they might want to check the `neta.m mama...' formula metrically; but it seems very improbable that `metri causa' could be any adequate explanation of `eso' here.

              On the other hand, a very interesting reference emerges from W. D. Whitney, Sanskrit Grammar (2nd ed. 1889, reprinted 1993), in the section on Demonstrative Pronouns, which reads:

              "Though the demonstrative root `ta' is prevailingly of the third person, it is also freely used, both in the earlier language and in the later, as qualifying the pronouns of the first and second person, giving emphasis to them: thus, `so 'ham', `this I', or `I here'; `sa' or `saa tvam', `thou there'; `te vayam', `we here'; `tasya mama', `of me here', `tasmi"ns tvayi', `in thee there', and so on." (Whitney, p. 495, para. 498.)

              I'll inquire further into this and let you know whatever else I find out.

              Respectfully, with metta,
              Khristos


              --- In Pali@yahoogroups.com, "Dhammadarsa" <dhammadaso@...> wrote:
              >
              > Ven Sirs and Ladies and Kind Sirs and Ladies
              >
              >
              >
              > I appreciate everyone's enquiring mind and contribution to this question.
              >
              >
              >
              > As we know Pali has elements from different languages, e.g. Vedic and I have
              > read, maybe some other Prakrits, e.g. the vocative form 'Bhikkhave'. The
              > irregularity we have been discussing may also be related to another Prakrit
              > and the form could have been frozen due to later misunderstanding, thus
              > accounting for its unchanged appearance in many contexts in the Pali texts.
              >
              >
              >
              > One thing I think is useful when we come to such questions is comparison
              > with other versions, e.g. Sanskrit. Sometimes such comparison can throw
              > light on irregularities in texts, but that may be beyond the scope of this
              > list. In any case, I'm not the one to do that, but I do know a Sanskrit
              > lecturer at a university here in Thailand I could ask, if people wished to
              > know.
              >
              >
              >
              > Kind Regards
              >
              >
              >
              >
              >
              >
              >
              > <http://www.vicnet.net.au/~dhammadarsa> Integrating Emotion and Intellect =
              > Intelligence
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              > From: Pali@yahoogroups.com [mailto:Pali@yahoogroups.com] On Behalf Of Nina
              > van Gorkom
              > Sent: Thursday, 1 July 2010 4:09 PM
              > To: Pali@yahoogroups.com
              > Subject: Re: [Pali] Re: About 'neta.m mama, nesoham asmi, na meso attaa'ti
              >
              >
              >
              >
              >
              > Dear Khristos and all,
              > Thank you for your interesting observations.
              > Khristos, I admire your keen observance, before I never gave this
              > matter a thought. In fact your question makes me penetrate more
              > deeply into the meaning of the text.
              > For the sake of analysing I find it easier not to use the negation.
              > The neuter eta.m as object of tanhaa can comprise so many things,
              > even pa~n~nattis, which are not realities. Is it a solution to think
              > of sabba.m? I cling to this or that, whatever appears. So, perhaps we
              > can say that the neutre gender is sufficient, no need for another
              > gender.
              > 'This is of me'.
              >
              > I consulted 'The Root of Existence', Bikkhu Bodhi's translation of
              > the Muulapariyaaya Sutta , and in his intro he says: <The construct
              > 'this is mine' is a projection born of craving, for it is craving's
              > function to appropriate things as the property of the self. >
              > <Under the influence of conceit it becomes manifest in judgements and
              > comparisons whereby we rank ourselves in relation to others as
              > superior, equal of inferior. and under the influence of views, i.e.
              > the theoretical bent of thought, the ego-bias issues in dogmas,
              > tenets, and speculations concerning reality and nature of the
              > personal self and its locus, the world.>
              >
              > N: As to conceit, esoham asmi, here the eso is correct, because one
              > thinks of oneself to be thus or thus. I think of the 'I am conceit",
              > asmi maana.
              > As to the wrong view of self, one sees the self as controller (as
              > Lennart mentioned), as possessor. For instance, one believes that
              > there is a self who can at will induce the arising of Pa~n~naa.
              > Whereas pa~n~naa is a cetasika that can only arise because of the
              > appropriate conditions.
              > Nina.
              >
              > Op 30-jun-2010, om 5:57 heeft k_nizamis het volgende geschreven:
              >
              > > Yet, please be patient with me a moment more, because I'm not yet
              > > completely satisfied with the explanation at an intuitive
              > > linguistic level. I'm still trying to understand the `sense' of the
              > > one nt. nom. sg. and the two masc. nom. sg. demonstrative pronouns
              > > in this formula.
              >
              > [Non-text portions of this message have been removed]
              >
              >
              >
              >
              >
              > [Non-text portions of this message have been removed]
              >
            • Nina van Gorkom
              Dear Khristos, Thank you for your replay. I am just back from a trip and shall consider your post later on. Nina. ... [Non-text portions of this message have
              Message 6 of 26 , Jul 12, 2010
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                Dear Khristos,
                Thank you for your replay. I am just back from a trip and shall
                consider your post later on.
                Nina.
                Op 5-jul-2010, om 5:26 heeft k_nizamis het volgende geschreven:

                > Hi Nina: I admire and respect your devotion to working with the
                > texts and understanding them in your actual practice. You must be
                > busy, and I don't want to distract you or add more to your plate.
                > But your example just raised two thoughts.



                [Non-text portions of this message have been removed]
              • Nina van Gorkom
                Dear Khristos, Thank you for all the useful texts with the Pali and your interesting remarks. ... N: True, pa~n~naa can accompany vi~n~naa.na. It could not
                Message 7 of 26 , Jul 13, 2010
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                  Dear Khristos,
                  Thank you for all the useful texts with the Pali and your interesting
                  remarks.
                  Op 5-jul-2010, om 5:26 heeft k_nizamis het volgende geschreven:
                  > In your post you wrote:
                  >
                  > 1. Agreed that pa~n~naa is a `cetasika' (in the Abhidhamma sense),
                  > inasmuch as, in the Suttaani, it is referred to as a dhamma: e.g.,
                  > MN 43 says (at i.292):
                  >
                  > "Pa~n~naa ya~nca vi~n~naa.na.m ime dhammaa sa.msa.t.thaa no
                  > visa.msa.t.thaa. . . . Ya~ncaavuso pajaanaati ta.m vijaanaati. Ya.m
                  > vijaanaati ta.m pajaanaati."
                  >
                  > "Pa~n~naa and vi~n~naa.na.m - these dhammaa are conjoined, not
                  > disjoined. . . . For, friend, what one wisely understands, that one
                  > cognizes, and what one cognizes, that one wisely understands."
                  --------
                  N: True, pa~n~naa can accompany vi~n~naa.na. It could not arise
                  without citta. Vi~n~naa.na or citta cognizes the object and pa~n~naa
                  penetrates its true nature. Pa~n~naa illuminates the darkness of
                  ignorance.
                  I like your quote:
                  > <"Friend, with what does one wisely understand a dhamma that can be
                  > wisely known?"
                  > "Friend, one understands a dhamma that can be wisely known with the
                  > `wisdom-eye' (pa~n~naacakkhunaa)."
                  > "Friend, what is the purpose of pa~n~naa?"
                  > "The purpose of pa~n~naa, friend, is direct knowledge, its purpose
                  > is full understanding, its purpose is abandoning.">
                  > -----------
                  >
                  > 2. Again, since pa~n~naa is a dhamma (of the type `cetasika',
                  > according to Abhidhamma), it is paticca-samuppanna, dependently co-
                  > arisen, it is dependent upon conditions. But it does not arise
                  > arbitrarily, nor does it arise merely automatically or
                  > deterministically. ...
                  > This raises the deep and fascinating problem of `agency'. True, we
                  > cannot just `will' pa~n~naa to arise. But we can, and we are
                  > exhorted to, develop and cultivate the conditions that will be
                  > conducive for pa~n~naa to arise
                  -------
                  N: Yes, that is quite right.
                  ------
                  > K: that is a matter for which we have some volitional
                  > responsibility, and also some volitional effectivity. Just a couple
                  > of classical examples, with which you will be familiar, of this
                  > sense of agency, are the following:
                  >
                  > MN 32 (M i.215) "Idhaavuso . . . bhikkhu citta.m vasa.m vatteti, no
                  > ca bhikkhu cittassa vasena vattati."
                  >
                  > "Here, friend, . . . a bhikkhu wields mastery over his mind, he
                  > does not let the mind wield mastery over him."
                  ----------
                  N: All your quoted texts are very good. The Buddha also spoke daily
                  language to help the listeners. His disciples had no
                  misunderstandings about anattaa. Such daily language is very
                  effective. For instance, when I say to you: take courage, do the best
                  you can, it is more direct than if I would say: let the five khandhas
                  be courageous and not be disheartened. So, we can take this in the
                  right way: "Here, friend, . . . a bhikkhu wields mastery over his
                  mind, he does not let the mind wield mastery over him."
                  This is said in a very impressive way. It is something we can remember.
                  When we read the many lists of classifications of the Abhidhamma we
                  may think it dry and not so effective. But also this we can take in
                  the right way, see through it to get the deep meaning. Whatever we
                  read refers to the understanding of the reality of the present
                  moment, it refers to our life at this moment. In this way the
                  Abhidhamma can become very lively. It is not just in the book.
                  Nina.




                  [Non-text portions of this message have been removed]
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