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TERRORISM: Country Reports on Terrorism 2006

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  • David P. Dillard
    TERRORISM: Country Reports on Terrorism 2006 Country Reports on Terrorism 2006 The Office of Electronic Information, Bureau of Public Affairs, manages this
    Message 1 of 1 , May 1, 2007
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      Country Reports on Terrorism 2006

      Country Reports on Terrorism 2006
      The Office of Electronic Information, Bureau of Public Affairs, manages
      this site as a portal for information from the U.S. State Department.

      U.S. law requires the Secretary of State to provide Congress, by April 30
      of each year, a full and complete report on terrorism with regard to those
      countries and groups meeting criteria set forth in the legislation. This
      annual report is entitled Country Reports on Terrorism. Beginning with the
      report for 2004, it replaced the previously published Patterns of Global

      .PDF Version

      Country Reports on Terrorism

      Links to All Reports

      U.S. law requires the Secretary of State to provide Congress, by April 30
      of each year, a full and complete report on terrorism with regard to those
      countries and groups meeting criteria set forth in the legislation. This
      annual report is entitled Country Reports on Terrorism. Beginning with the
      report for 2004, it replaced the previously published Patterns of Global

      Country Reports on Terrorism
      2006 (html version)
      2006 (pdf version)
      2005 (html version)
      2005 (pdf version)
      2004 (html version)
      2004 (pdf version)

      Patterns of Global Terrorism
      2003 (Patterns of Global Terrorism)
      2002 (Patterns of Global Terrorism)
      2001 (Patterns of Global Terrorism)
      2000 (Patterns of Global Terrorism)

      Table of Contents .HTML Version of the Most Recent Report:

      Background Information: Country Reports on Terrorism and Patterns of
      Global Terrorism

      -- Table of Contents

      -- Chapter 1 -- Strategic Assessment
      -- Chapter 2 -- Country Reports: Africa Overview
      -- Chapter 2 -- Country Reports: East Asia and Pacific Overview
      -- Chapter 2 -- Country Reports: Europe and Eurasia Overview
      -- Chapter 2 -- Country Reports: Middle East and North Africa Overview
      -- Chapter 2 -- Country Reports: South and Central Asia Overview
      -- Chapter 2 -- Country Reports: Western Hemisphere Overview
      -- Chapter 3 -- State Sponsors of Terrorism Overview
      -- Chapter 4 -- The Global Challenge of WMD Terrorism
      -- Chapter 5 -- Terrorist Safe Havens (7120 Report)
      -- Chapter 6 -- Terrorist Organizations
      -- Chapter 7 -- Legislative Requirements and Key Terms
      -- National Counterterrorism Center: Annex of Statistical Information
      -- International Conventions and Protocols on Terrorism

      Detailed Table of Contents of Most Recent .HTML Version of Report


      Country Reports on Terrorism -Report Home Page
      Released by the Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism
      April 30, 2007

      Table of Contents

      Chapter 1. Strategic Assessment

      Chapter 2. Country Reports: Africa Overview
      Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Partnership
      The African Union
      Sierra Leone
      South Africa

      Chapter 2. Country Reports: East Asia and Pacific Overview
      o Hong Kong
      o Macau
      Republic of Korea
      New Zealand

      Chapter 2. Country Reports: Europe and Eurasia Overview
      Bosnia and Herzegovina
      Czech Republic
      The Netherlands
      o Kosovo
      United Kingdom
      o Northern Ireland

      Chapter 2. Country Reports: Middle East and North Africa Overview
      The Summer War
      Israel, West Bank, and Gaza
      Saudi Arabia
      United Arab Emirates

      Chapter 2. Country Reports: South and Central Asia Overview
      Sri Lanka

      Chapter 2. Country Reports: Western Hemisphere Overview
      Inter-American Committee Against Terrorism (CICTE)
      Tri-Border Area
      El Salvador
      Trinidad and Tobago

      Chapter 3. State Sponsors of Terrorism Overview
      North Korea

      Chapter 4. The Global Challenge of WMD Terrorism

      Chapter 5. Terrorist Safe Havens (7120 Report)
      (Update of Information Originally Reported Under Section 7120(b) of the
      Intelligence Reform and Terrorist Prevention Act)
      1. Terrorist Safe Havens: Strategies, Tactics, Tools for Disrupting or
      Eliminating Safe Havens
      2. Support for Pakistan
      3. Collaboration with Saudi Arabia
      4. Struggle of Ideas in the Islamic World
      5. Outreach through Foreign Broadcast Media
      6. Visas for Participants in United States Programs
      7. Basic Education in Muslim Countries
      8. Economic Reform

      Chapter 6. Terrorist Organizations
      Abu Nidal Organization (ANO)
      Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG)
      Al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigade
      Ansar al-Sunna (AS)
      Armed Islamic Group (GIA)
      Asbat al-Ansar
      Aum Shinrikyo (Aum)
      Basque Fatherland and Liberty (ETA)
      Communist Party of Philippines/New People's Army (CPP/NPA)
      Continuity Irish Republican Army (CIRA)
      Gama'a al-Islamiyya (IG)
      Harakat ul-Mujahedin (HUM)
      Islamic Jihad Union (IJU)
      Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU)
      Jaish-e-Mohammed (JEM)
      Jemaah Islamiya Organization (JI)
      Al-Jihad (AJ)
      Kahane Chai (Kach)
      Kongra-Gel (KGK/PKK)
      Lashkar e-Tayyiba (LT)
      Lashkar i Jhangvi (LJ)
      Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE)
      Libyan Islamic Fighting Group (LIFG)
      Moroccan Islamic Combatant Group (GICM)
      Mujahedin-e Khalq Organization (MEK)
      National Liberation Army (ELN)
      Palestine Liberation Front (PLF)
      Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ)
      Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP)
      Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine-General Command (PFLP-GC)
      Al-Qaida (AQ)
      Al-Qaida in Iraq (AQI)
      Al-Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM/GSPC)
      [Formerly Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat]
      Real IRA (RIRA)
      Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC)
      Revolutionary Nuclei (RN)
      Revolutionary Organization 17 November
      Revolutionary People's Liberation Party/Front (DHKP/C)
      Shining Path (SL)
      United Self-Defense Forces of Colombia (AUC)

      Other Groups of Concern
      Al-Badhr Mujahedin (al-Badr)
      Al-Ittihad al-Islami (AIAI)
      Alex Boncayao Brigade (ABB)
      Anti-Imperialist Territorial Nuclei (NTA)
      Cambodian Freedom Fighters (CFF)
      Communist Party of India (Maoist)
      Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist)/United People's Front
      Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda (FDLR)
      East Turkistan Islamic Movement (ETIM)
      First of October Antifascist Resistance Group (GRAPO)
      Harakat ul-Jihad-I-Islami (HUJI)
      Harakat ul-Jihad-I-Islami/Bangladesh (HUJI-B)
      Hizb-I Islami Gulbuddin (HIG)
      Hizbul-Mujahedin (HM)
      Irish National Liberation Army (INLA)
      Irish Republican Army (IRA)
      Islamic Army of Aden (IAA)
      Islamic Great East Raiders-Front (IBDA-C)
      Islamic International Peacekeeping Brigade (IIPB)
      Jamaatul-Mujahedin Bangladesh (JMB)
      Jamiat ul-Mujahedin (JUM)
      Japanese Red Army (JRA)
      Kumpulan Mujahedin Malaysia (KMM)
      Lord's Resistance Army (LRA)
      Loyalist Volunteer Force (LVF)
      New Red Brigades/Communist Combatant Party (BR/PCC)
      People Against Gangsterism and Drugs (PAGAD)
      Rajah Solaiman Movement (RSM)
      Red Hand Defenders (RHD)
      Revolutionary Proletarian Initiative Nuclei (NIPR)
      Revolutionary Struggle (RS)
      Riyadus-Salikhin Reconnaissance and Sabotage Battalion of Chechen Martyrs
      Sipah-I-Sahaba/Pakistan (SSP)
      Special Purpose Islamic Regiment (SPIR)
      Al-Tawhid w'al Jihad (TWJ)
      Tenrik Mifaz-E-Shariah Mohammadi (TNSM)
      Tunisian Combatant Group (TCG)
      Tupac Amaru Revolutionary Movement (MRTA)
      Turkish Hizballah
      Ulster Defense Association/Ulster Freedom Fighters (UDA/UFF)
      Ulster Volunteer Force (UVF)
      United Liberation Front of Assam (ULFA)

      Chapter 7: Legislative Requirements And Key Terms

      National Counterterrorism Center: Annex of Statistical Information

      International Conventions and Protocols on Terrorism

      Report Home Page

      Country Reports on Terrorism -Report Home Page
      Released by the Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism
      April 30, 2007

      Chapter 1 -- Strategic Assessment



      This chapter highlights terrorism trends and ongoing issues, focusing on
      calendar year 2006 that will provide a framework for detailed discussion
      in later chapters. Since this issue of the Country Reports on Terrorism
      falls 5 years after the attacks of September 11, 2001, the chapter
      commences with a review of progress against the terrorist threat to date.

      Five Years On, Progress is Mixed

      Significant Achievements
      Five years after 9/11, the international community's conflict with
      transnational terrorists continues. Cooperative international efforts have
      produced genuine security improvements - particularly in securing borders
      and transportation, enhancing document security, disrupting terrorist
      financing, and restricting the movement of terrorists. The international
      community has also achieved significant success in dismantling terrorist
      organizations and disrupting their leadership. This has contributed to
      reduced terrorist operational capabilities and the detention or death of
      numerous key terrorist leaders.

      Working with allies and partners across the world, through coordination
      and information sharing, we have created a less permissive operating
      environment for terrorists, keeping leaders on the move or in hiding, and
      degrading their ability to plan and mount attacks. Canada, Australia, the
      United Kingdom, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, Pakistan, Afghanistan, and many
      other partners played major roles in this success, recognizing that
      international terrorism represents a threat to the whole international

      Through the Regional Strategic Initiative, the State Department is working
      with ambassadors and interagency representatives in key terrorist theaters
      of operation to assess the threat and devise collaborative strategies,
      action plans, and policy recommendations. We have made progress in
      organizing regional responses to terrorists who operate in ungoverned
      spaces or across national borders. This initiative has produced better
      intra-governmental coordination among United States government agencies,
      greater cooperation with and between regional partners, and improved
      strategic planning and prioritization, allowing us to use all tools of
      statecraft to establish long-term measures to marginalize terrorists. (See
      Chapter 5 -- Terrorist Safe Havens (7120 Report) for further information
      on the Regional Strategic Initiative.)

      Continuing Challenges

      Despite this undeniable progress, major challenges remain. Several states
      continue to sponsor terrorism. Iran remains the most significant state
      sponsor of terrorism and continues to threaten its neighbors and
      destabilize Iraq by providing weapons, training, advice, and funding to
      select Iraqi Shia militants. Syria, both directly and in coordination with
      Hizballah, has attempted to undermine the elected Government of Lebanon
      and roll back progress toward democratization in the Middle East. Syria
      also supports some Iraqi Baathists and militants and has continued to
      allow foreign fighters and terrorists to transit through its borders into

      International intervention in Iraq has brought measurable benefits. It has
      removed an abusive totalitarian regime with a history of sponsoring and
      supporting regional terrorism and has allowed a new democratic political
      process to emerge. It also, however, has been used by terrorists as a
      rallying cry for radicalization and extremist activity that has
      contributed to instability in neighboring countries.

      Afghanistan remains threatened by Taliban insurgents and religious
      extremists, some of whom are linked to al-Qaida (AQ) and to sponsors
      outside the country. In Afghanistan public support for the government
      remains high, national institutions are getting stronger and the majority
      of Afghans believe they are better off than under the Taliban. But to
      defeat the resurgent threat, the international community must deliver
      promised assistance and work with Afghans to build counterinsurgency
      capabilities, ensure legitimate and effective governance, and counter the
      surge in narcotics cultivation.

      The Israeli/Palestinian conflict remains a source of terrorist motivation.
      The holding of free elections in the Palestinian Territories was a welcome
      sign of democratization, but HAMAS' subsequent refusal to disavow
      terrorism or accept Israel's internationally-accepted right to exist
      undermined the election's impact. Terrorist activity emanating from the
      Palestinian Territories remains a key destabilizing factor and a cause for

      The summer war in Lebanon between Israel and Hizballah was a prime example
      of how Hizballah's continued efforts to manipulate persisting grievances
      along the Israeli/Lebanese border can quickly escalate into open warfare.
      The conflict did force the international community again to demand
      Hizballah's complete disarmament, in UN Security Council Resolution
      (UNSCR) 1701, and generated a renewed international commitment to support
      a peaceful, stable, multi-sectarian democracy in Lebanon. Even so,
      Hizballah, a designated foreign terrorist organization, in combination
      with state sponsors of terrorism Iran and Syria, continues to undermine
      the elected Government of Lebanon and remains a serious security threat in
      the Middle East.

      AQ and its affiliates have adapted to our success in disrupting their
      operational capability by focusing more attention and resources on their
      propaganda and misinformation efforts. They exploit and interpret the
      actions of numerous local, pseudo-independent actors, using them to
      mobilize supporters and sympathizers, intimidate opponents and influence
      international opinion. Terrorists consider information operations to be a
      principal part of their effort. The international community has yet to
      muster a coordinated and effectively resourced counter to extremist

      Overall, AQ and its loose confederation of affiliated movements remain the
      most immediate national security threat to the United States and a
      significant security challenge to the international community.

      Key Al-Qaida Trends

      Single terrorist events, like the Askariya mosque bombing in Samarra, Iraq
      on February 22, 2006, which provoked widespread sectarian violence and
      changed the character of the war in Iraq, can become triggers for broader
      conflict or templates for copycat attacks. Because terrorism is
      fundamentally political, the political significance of major events is
      vital in determining meaningful responses. Thus, the trends presented in
      this section are interpretive - they provide qualitative insight to
      complement the statistical detail covered in later chapters.

      Transition from "Expeditionary" to "Guerrilla" Terrorism

      Early AQ terrorist attacks were largely expeditionary. The organization
      selected and trained terrorists in one country, then clandestinely
      inserted a team into the target country to attack a pre-planned objective.
      The 1998 U.S. embassy bombings in Nairobi and Dar es-Salaam, the 2000
      attack on the USS Cole, and the 9/11 attacks were examples of this.
      Improved international border security, transportation security and
      document control have made this type of attack more difficult. Clandestine
      insertion across borders is harder, reconnaissance is more risky, and
      international movement of funds and equipment is more likely to be

      Thus we have seen a trend toward guerrilla terrorism, where the
      organization seeks to grow the team close to its target, using target
      country nationals. Through intermediaries, web-based propaganda, and
      subversion of immigrant expatriate populations, terrorists inspire local
      cells to carry out attacks which they then exploit for propaganda
      purposes. This circumvents the need to insert a team across borders or
      clandestinely transfer funds and materiel. The 2004 Madrid bombing, the
      London attacks of July 2005, and the thwarted August 2006 attempt to
      attack passenger jets operating from British airports include elements of
      this approach.

      Both expeditionary and guerrilla approaches co-exist, alongside true
      "home-grown" terrorism involving local cells acting spontaneously rather
      than being than consciously inspired by trans-national terrorists. Rather
      than adopting a single modus operandi, AQ and its affiliated movements
      continue to be highly adaptive, quickly evolving new methods in response
      to countermeasures.

      Terrorist Propaganda Warfare

      As identified in the 2005 Country Reports, the international community's
      success in disrupting terrorist leadership and operational capacity led AQ
      to focus greater efforts on misinformation and anti-Western propaganda.
      This trend accelerated this year, with AQ cynically exploiting the
      grievances of local groups and attempting to portray itself as the
      vanguard of a global movement. AQ still retains some operational
      capability and the intent to mount large-scale spectacular attacks,
      including on the United States and other high-profile Western targets.
      Overall, however, AQ's current approach focuses on propaganda warfare -
      using a combination of terrorist attacks, insurgency, media broadcasts,
      Internet-based propaganda, and subversion to undermine confidence and
      unity in Western populations and generate the false perception of a
      powerful worldwide movement.

      The Terrorist "Conveyor Belt"

      Radicalization of immigrant populations, youth and alienated minorities in
      Europe, the Middle East, and Africa continued. It became increasingly
      clear, however, that such radicalization does not occur by accident, or
      because such populations are innately prone to extremism. Rather, there
      was increasing evidence of terrorists and extremists manipulating the
      grievances of alienated youth or immigrant populations and then cynically
      exploiting those grievances to subvert legitimate authority and create

      Terrorists seek to manipulate grievances represent a "conveyor belt"
      through which terrorists seek to convert alienated or aggrieved
      populations, convert them to extremist viewpoints, and turn them, by
      stages, into sympathizers, supporters, and ultimately, members of
      terrorist networks. In some regions, this includes efforts by AQ and other
      terrorists to exploit insurgency and communal conflict as radicalization
      and recruitment tools, especially using the Internet to convey their
      message. Countering such efforts demands that we treat immigrant and youth
      populations not as a source of threat to be defended against, but as a
      target of enemy subversion to be protected and supported. It also requires
      community leaders to take responsibility for the actions of members within
      their communities and act to counteract extremist subversion.

      A New Kind of Enemy

      Al-Qaida as a Global Insurgency

      The surface events mentioned above highlight a deeper trend: the
      transformation of international terrorism from the traditional forms that
      Congress intended to address when it established the annual Country
      Reports series into a broader, multifarious approach to transnational
      non-state warfare that now resembles a form of global insurgency. We have
      entered a new era of conflict that may demand new paradigms and different
      responses from those of previous eras.

      AQ and its core leadership group represent a global action network that
      seeks to aggregate and exploit the effects of widely dispersed,
      semi-independent actors. It openly describes itself as a transnational
      guerrilla movement and applies classic insurgent strategies at the global
      level. AQ applies terrorism, but also subversion, propaganda, and open
      warfare, and it seeks weapons of mass destruction in order to inflict the
      maximum possible damage on its opponents. It links and exploits a wider,
      more nebulous community of regional, national, and local actors who share
      some of its objectives, but also pursue their own local agendas. Finally,
      it works through regional and cross-border safe havens that facilitate its
      actions while hampering government responses.

      Disaggregating the Threat

      To the extent that AQ succeeds in aggregating this broader constellation
      of extremist actors, it can begin to pursue more frequent and
      geographically extensive terror attacks. Therefore, we must act to
      disaggregate the threat, through international cooperation,
      counterpropaganda, counter subversion, counterinsurgency, and traditional

      Disaggregation breaks the links in the chain that exploit ordinary
      people's grievances and manipulates them into becoming terrorists. It
      seeks to provide those who are already radicalized with a way out and to
      create pathways for alienated groups to redress their legitimate
      grievances without joining the terrorist network. Disaggregation denies AQ
      its primary objective of achieving leadership over extremist movements
      worldwide and unifying them into a single movement. It does not remove the
      threat but helps reduce it to less dangerous local components, which can
      be dealt with by individual governments and communities working together.

      Trusted Networks

      Such cooperation requires the creation of trusted networks to displace and
      marginalize extremist networks. While killing and capturing key terrorist
      actors is fundamental in combating terrorism, it can have detrimental
      effects. These actions do not eliminate the threat and, if mishandled, can
      be actively counterproductive. Instead, we must seek to build trusted
      networks of governments, private citizens and organizations, multilateral
      institutions, and business organizations that work collaboratively to
      defeat the threat from violent extremism.

      Such networks, over time, help wean at-risk populations away from
      subversive manipulation by terrorists and create mechanisms to address
      people's needs and grievances, thus marginalizing terrorists. Youth
      organizations, educational networks, business partnerships, women's
      empowerment, and local development initiatives can all play a role, with
      government as a supportive partner.

      Leaders, Safe Havens, Underlying Conditions

      To make such active measures effective, the three strategic components of
      the terrorist threat that must be neutralized are leaders, safe havens,
      and underlying conditions. Leaders provide a motivating, mobilizing, and
      organizing function and act as symbolic figureheads. Safe havens, which
      are often in ungoverned or under-governed spaces, provide a secure
      environment for training, planning, financial and operational support; and
      a base for mounting attacks. They may be physical or virtual in nature. In
      addition, underlying conditions provide the fuel, in the form of
      grievances and conflicts that power the processes of radicalization.

      Treating this new era of conflict as a form of global insurgency implies
      that counterinsurgency methods are fundamental in combating the new form
      of transnational terrorism. These methods include firstly, a focus on
      protecting and securing the population; and secondly, politically and
      physically marginalizing the insurgents, winning the support and
      cooperation of at-risk populations by targeted political and development
      measures, and conducting precise intelligence-led special operations to
      eliminate critical enemy elements with minimal collateral damage.

      Integrating All Elements of National Power

      All elements of national power including diplomatic, military, economic,
      and intelligence, must be integrated and applied in a coordinated
      whole-of-government fashion. The intellectual and psychological dimensions
      of the threat are at least as important as its physical dimension, so
      countermeasures must be adequately coordinated and resourced. Thus, the
      military component of national power plays only a supporting role in this
      effort; the primary focus is on non-military influence.

      Because the enemy is a non-state actor who thrives among disaffected
      populations, private sector efforts are at least as important as
      government activity. Citizen diplomacy, cultural activity,
      person-to-person contact, economic cooperation and development, and the
      application of media and academic resources are key components of our
      response to the threat. Motivating, mobilizing, and supporting such
      privately led activities are key leadership tasks in the new environment.

      Commitment - the Key to Success

      Experience since 9/11 has shown that the key success factor in confronting
      violent extremism is the commitment by governments to work with each
      other, with the international community, with private sector
      organizations, and with their citizens and immigrant populations.

      Where governments cooperate, build trusted networks, seek active informed
      support from their people, provide responsive, effective and legitimate
      governance, and engage closely with the international community, the
      threat from terrorism has been significantly reduced.

      Where governments have lacked commitment in working with their neighbors
      and engaging the support of their people, terrorism and the instability
      and conflict that terrorists exploit remain key sources of threat.


      This chapter sets the scene for the detailed analysis that follows. In
      reviewing events since 9/11, it is clear that progress has been mixed.
      Significant achievements in border security, information sharing,
      transportation security, financial controls, and the killing or capture of
      numerous terrorist leaders have reduced the threat. But the threat still
      remains, and state sponsorship, the terrorist response to intervention in
      Iraq, improved terrorist propaganda capabilities, the pursuit of nuclear
      weapons by state sponsors of terrorism, and terrorist exploitation of
      grievances represent ongoing challenges. Recent trends include the
      emergence of "guerrilla" terrorism in parallel with traditional
      "expeditionary" approaches, improved AQ propaganda warfare capacity, and
      emerging evidence of terrorist "conveyor belt" that seeks to deliberately
      manipulate and exploit grievances in at-risk populations.

      A deeper trend is the shift in the nature of terrorism, from traditional
      international terrorism of the late 20th century into a new form of
      transnational non-state warfare that resembles a form of global
      insurgency. This represents a new era of warfare, and countering this
      threat demands the application of counterinsurgency techniques that focus
      on protecting, securing, and winning the support of at-risk populations,
      in addition to targeting violent extremist networks and individual

      Trusted networks of private and government organizations and individuals,
      and the application of integrated civil-military measures across all
      elements of national power are keys to this approach. Terrorist leaders,
      safe havens, and the underlying conditions that terrorists exploit are the
      principal strategic targets that we must address. The key success factor
      that has emerged so far is commitment by governments to work with the
      international community, their own populations, and at-risk immigrant or
      youth populations, to counter the threat collaboratively.

      Within this framework, subsequent sections of this report will now present
      detailed analyses of each region and country.


      Follow the links at this web URL to read the entire report:


      David Dillard
      Temple University
      (215) 204 - 4584
      General Internet & Print Resources
      Digital Divide Network
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