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Professor Francis Boyle: IMPEACH OBAMA NOW!!! -

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    Professor Francis Boyle: IMPEACH OBAMA NOW!!! -- #N3 24:15 http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=eS-nlv2YyrQ http://www.youtube.com/user/NextNewsNetwork Published on
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      Professor Francis Boyle: IMPEACH OBAMA NOW!!! -- #N3 24:15


      Published on Sep 6, 2013
      You've seen them all over the country. Overpasses full
      of signs and people calling for the Impeachment of
      President Obama. Some have even gotten arrested for
      urging this action against America's Commander-in-Chief.

      Like presidents before him Obama faces Congress to
      engage yet another sovereign nation in acts of war.

      The last time Professor Francis Boyle joined us,
      he had returned from convicting former president
      Bush of War Crimes at an international tribunal.

      Now, Professor Boyle calls for Obama's Impeachment and he is
      here to talk to us today to provide you with his reasons why.

      Dr. Francis Boyle, a professor of international law at the University
      of Illinois College of Law. He served as a prosecutor at the tribunal.

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      The Constitution and Impeachment
      The Constitution, Article II, Section 4:
      The President, Vice President and all civil Officers of the United
      States, shall be removed from Office on Impeachment for, and
      Conviction of, Treason, Bribery, or other high Crimes and
      The Constitution, Article I, Section 3:
      The Senate shall have the sole Power to try all Impeachments. When
      sitting for that Purpose, they shall be on Oath or Affirmation. When
      the President of the United States is tried, the Chief Justice shall
      preside: And no Person shall be convicted without the Concurrence of
      two thirds of the Members present.
      Judgment in Cases of Impeachments shall not extend further than to
      removal from Office, and disqualification to hold and enjoy any Office
      of honor, Trust, or Profit under the United States, but the Party
      convicted shall nevertheless be liable and subject to Indictment,
      Trial, Judgment, and Punishmnet, according to Law.
      The Framers' Debates on the Impeachment Provisions (from the notes of
      James Madison, taken at the Constitutional Convention in Philadelphia,
      Saturday, June 2
      Mr. Dickenson moved "that the Executive be made removeable bv the
      National Legislature on the request of a
      rnajority of the Legislatures of individual States." It was necessary
      he said to place the power of removing
      somewhere. He did not like the plan of impeaching the Great officers
      of State. He did not know how provision
      could be made for removal of them in a better mode than that which he
      had proposed. He had no idea of abolishing
      the State Governments as some gentlemen seemed inclined to do. The
      happiness of this Country in his opinion
      required considerable powers to be left in the hands of the States.
      Mr. Bedford seconded the motion.
      Mr. Sherman contended that the National Legislature should have power
      to remove the Executive at pleasure.
      Mr. Mason. Some mode of displacing an unfit magistrate is rendered
      indispensable by the fallibility of those who
      choose, as well as by the corruptibility of the man chosen . He
      opposed decidedly the making the Executive the
      mere creature of the Legislature as a violation of the fundamental
      principle of good Government.
      Mr. Madison & Mr. Wilson observed that it would leave an equality of
      agency in the small with the great States;
      that it would enable a minority of the people to prevent ye. removal
      of an officer who had rendered himself justlv
      criminal in the eyes of a majority; that it would open a door for
      intrigues agst. him in States where his
      administration tho' just might be unpopular, and might tempt him to
      pay court to particular States whose leading
      parfizans he might fear, or wish to engage as his partisans. They
      both thought it bad policy to introduce such a
      mixture of the State authorities, where their agency could be
      otherwise supplied. . .
      . . . On Mr. Dickenson's motion for making Executive removeable by
      Natl.; Legislature at request of majority of
      State Legislatures was also rejected--all the States being in the
      negative Except Delaware which gave an
      affirmative vote.

      Friday, July 20
      "to be removeable on impeachment and conviction for mal practice or
      neglect of duty." see Resol: 9
      Mr. Pinkney & Mr. Govr. Morris moved to strike out this part of the
      Resolution. Mr. P. observd. he ought not to
      be impeachable whilst in office
      Mr. Davie. If he be not impeachable whilst in office, he will spare
      no efforts or means whatever to get himself
      re-elected. He considered this as an essential security for the good
      behaviour of the Executive.
      Mr. Wilson concurred in the necessity of making the Executive
      impeachable whilst in office.
      Mr. Govr. Morris. He can do no criminal act without Coadjutors who
      mav be punished. In case he should be
      re-elected, that will be sufficient proof of his innocence. Besides
      who is to impeach? Is the impeachment to
      suspend his functions. If it is not the mischief will go on. If it
      is the impeachment will be nearly equivalent to a
      displacement, and will render the Executive dependent on those who are
      to impeach
      Col. Mason. No point is of more importance than that the right of
      impeachment should be continued. Shall any
      man be above justice? Above all shall that man be above it, who can
      commit the most extensive injusfice? When
      great crimes were committed he was for punishing the principal as well
      as the Coadjutors. There had been much
      debate & difficulty as to the mode of chusing the Executive. He
      approved of that which had been adopted at first,
      namely of referring the appointment to the Natl. Legislature. One
      objection agst. Electors was the danger of their
      being corrupted by the Candidates; & this furnished a peculiar reason
      in favor of impeachments whilst in office.
      Shall the man who has practised corruption & by that means procured
      his appointment in the first instance, be
      suffered to escape punishment, by repeating his guilt?
      Docr. Franklin was for retaining the clause as favorable to the
      Executive. History furnishes one example only of
      a first Magistrate being formally brought to public Justice. Every
      body cried out agst. this as unconstitutional.
      What was the practice before this in cases where the chief Magistrate
      rendered himself obnoxious? Whv recourse
      was had to assassination in wch. he was not only deprived of his life
      but of the opportunity of vindicating his
      character. It wd. be the best way therefore to provide in the
      Constitution for the regular punishment of the
      Executive where his misconduct should deserve it, and for his
      honorable acquittal when he should be unjustly
      Mr. Govr. Morris admits corruption & some few other offences to be
      such as ought to be impeachable; but thought
      the cases ought to be enumerated & defined:
      Mr. Madison thought it indispensable that some provision should be
      made for defending the Communi ty agst. the
      incapacity, negligence or perfidy of the chief Magistrate. The
      imitation of the period of his service, was not a
      sufficient security. He might lose his capacity after his
      appointment. He might pervert his administration into a
      scheme of peculation or oppression. He might betrav his trust to
      foreign powers. The case of the Executive
      Magistracy was very distinguishable, from that of the Legislature or
      of any other public body, holding offices of
      limited duration. It could not be presumed that all or even a
      majority of the members of an Assembly would either
      lose their capacity for discharging, or be bribed to betray, their
      trust. Besides the restraints of their personal
      integrity & honor, the difficulty of acting in concert for purposes of
      corruption was a security to the public. And if
      one or a few members only should be seduced, the soundness of the
      remaining members, would maintain the
      integrity and fidelity of the body. In the case of the Executive
      Magistracy which was to be administered by a single
      man, loss of capacity or corruption was more within the compass of
      probable events, and either of them might be
      fatal to the Republic.
      Mr. Pinkney did not see the necessity of impeachments. He was sure
      they ought not to issue from the Legislature
      who would in that case hold them as a rod over the Executive and by
      that means effectually destroy his
      independence. His revisionary power in particular would be rendered
      altogether insignificant.
      Mr. Gerry urged the necessity of impeachments. A good magistrate
      will not fear them. A bad one ought to be kept
      in fear of them. He hoped the maxim would never be adopted here that
      the chief magistrate could do no wrong.
      Mr. King expressed his apprehensions that an extreme caution in favor
      of liberty might enervate the Government
      we were forming. He wished the House to recur to the primitive axiom
      that the three great departments of Govts.
      should be separate & independent: that the Executive & judiciary
      should be so as well as the Legislative: that the
      executive should be so equaliv with the Judiciary. Would this be the
      case, if the Executive should be impeachable?
      It had been said that the Judiciary would be impeachable. But it
      should have been remembered at the same time
      that the Judiciary hold their places not for a limited time, but
      during good behaviour. It is necessary therefore that
      a forum should be established for trying misbehaviour. Was the
      Executive to hold his place during good
      behaviour? The Executive was to hold his place for a limited term
      like the members of the Legislature: Like them
      particularly the Senate whose members would continue in appointmt. the
      same term of 6 years he would
      periodically be tried for his behaviour by his electors, who would
      continue or discontinue him in trust according to
      the manner in which he had discharged it. Like them therefore, he
      ought to be subject to no intermediate trial, bv
      impeachment. He ought not to be impeachable unless he held his office
      during good behaviour, a tenure which
      would be most agreeable to him; provided an independent and effectual
      forum could be devised. But under no
      circumstances ought he to be impeachable by the Legislature. This
      would be destructive of his independence and
      of the principles of the Constitution. He relied on the vigor of the
      Executive as a great security for the public
      Mr. Randolph. The propriety of impeachments was a favorite principle
      with him. Guilt wherever found ought to be
      punished. The Executive will have great opportunitys of abusing his
      power; particularly in time of war when the
      military force, and in some respects the public money will be in his
      hands. Should no regular punishment be
      provided, it will be irregularly inflicted by tumults & insurrecfions.
      He is aware of the necessity of proceeding with
      a cautious hand, and of excluding as much as possible the influence of
      the Legislature from the business. He
      suggested for consideration an idea which had fallen [from Col
      Hamilton] of composing a forum out of the Judges
      belonging to the States: and even of requiring some preliminary
      inquest whether just grounds of impeachment
      Doctr. Franklin mentioned the case of the Prince of Orange during the
      late war. An agreement was made between
      France & Holland; bv which their two fleets were to unite at a certain
      time & place. The Dutch fleet did not
      appear. Every body began to wonder at it. At length it was suspected
      that the Statholder was at the bottom of the
      matter. This suspicion prevailed more & more. Yet as he could not be
      impeached and no regular examination took
      place, he remained in his office, and strengthening his own party, as
      the party opposed to him became formidable,
      he gave birth to the most violent animosities & contentions. Had he
      been impeachable, a regular & peaceable
      enquiry would have taken place and he would if guilty have been duly
      punished, if innocent restored to the
      confidence of the public.
      Mr. King remarked that the case of the Statholder was not applicable.
      He held his place for life, and was not
      periodically elected. In the former case impeachments are proper to
      secure good behaviour. In the latter they are
      unnecessary; the periodical responsibility to the electors being an
      equivalent security.
      Mr. Wilson observed that if the idea were to be pursued, the Senators
      who are to hold their places during the same
      term with the Executive, ought to be subject to impeachment & removal.
      Mr. Pinkney apprehended that some gentlemen reasoned on a supposition
      that the Executive was to have powers
      which would not be committed to him: He presumed that his powers would
      be so circumscribed as to render
      impeachments unnecessary.
      Mr. Govr. Morris's opinion had been changed by the arguments used in
      the discussion. He was now sensible of the
      necessity of impeachments, if the Executive was to continue for any
      time in office. Our Executive was not like a
      Magistrate having a life interest, much less like one having an
      hereditary interest in his office. He may be bribed
      bv a greater interest to betray his trust; and no one would say that
      we ought to expose ourselves to the danger of
      seeing the first Magistrate in forign pay, without being able to guard
      agst. it by displacing him. One would think the
      King of England well secured agst. bribery. He has as it were a fee
      simple in the whole Kingdom. Yet Charles II
      was bribed by Louis XIV. The Executive ought therefore to be
      impeachable for treachery; Corrupting his electors,
      and incapacity were other causes of impeachment. For the latter he
      should be punished not as a man, but as an
      officer, and punished oniv by degradation from his office. This
      Magistrate is not the King but the prime-Minister.
      The people are the King. When we make him amenable to Justice however
      we should take care to provide some
      mode that will not make him dependent on the Legislature.
      It was moved & 2ded. to postpone the question of impeachments
      which was negatived. Mas. & S. Carolina only
      being ay.
      On ye. Question, Shall the Executive be removeable on impeachments &c.?
      Mas. no. Ct. ay. N. J. ay. Pa. ay. Del ay. Md. ay. Va. ay.
      N. C. ay. S. C. no. Geo. ay.

      Saturday, September 8
      The clause referring to the Senate, the trial of impeachments agst.
      the President, for Treason & bribery, was taken
      Col. Mason. Why is the provision restrained to Treason & bribery
      only? Treason as defined in the Constitution
      will not reach many great and dangerous offences. Hastings is not
      guilty of Treason. Attempts to subvert the
      Constitution may not be Treason as above defined. As bills of
      attainder which have saved the British Constitution
      are forbidden, it is the more necessary to extend: the power of
      impeachments. He movd. to add after "bribery"
      "or maladministration." Mr. Gerry seconded him.
      Mr. Madison So vague a term will be equivalent to a tenure during
      pleasure of the Senate.
      Mr. Govr. Morris, it will not be put in force & can do no harm. An
      election of very four years will prevent
      Col. Mason withdrew "maladministration" & substitutes "other high
      crimes & misdemesnors agst. the State"
      On the question thus altered
      N. H. ay. Mas. ay. Ct. ay. N. J. no. Pa. no. Del. no. Md. ay.
      Va. ay. N. C. ay. S. C. ay. Geo. ay.

      Daniel Farber and Suzanna Sherry, in their book A History of the
      American Constitution (1990), report the final developments at the
      Convention that led to the final language found in the Constitution:
      Finally, there were many debates about the exact procedures that
      should be followed in cases of impeachment.
      Some delegates mistrusted the Senate, and some the House. Many were
      worried that neither branch would have
      enough firmness of purpose to oppose the president. A few were
      concerned that providing for impeachment would
      subordinate the president to the legislature. The Convention in fact
      could not reach agreement on most of the
      issues arising out of impeachment procedures. The Committee on Detail
      thus forged its own compromise
      provisions that appear in the Constitution. Although there was some
      grumbling, the Committee's basic ideas were
      Impeachment Trial Homepage
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