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Re: Peripheral Consciousness. And an abstract +.

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  • interelectromagnetic <interelectromagnet
    ... like ... Glen D I apologize to anyone replying to me on any other threads, but right now I can only stay with this line. Next week, or on Friday this
    Message 1 of 12 , Jan 6, 2003
      --- In MindBrain@yahoogroups.com, Thomas Zoëga Ramsøy <ramsoy@t...>
      <ramsoy@t...> wrote:
      > Dear Glen,
      > TZR
      > Yes, I find that his "dynamic core" concept is indeed a concept of
      > dynamics in the brain, which parallels with experience. But I'd
      > to learn more about what you think and your theory/approach/writing.
      Glen D
      I apologize to anyone replying to me on any other threads, but right
      now I can only stay with this line. Next week, or on Friday this
      week, I'll try to get to some others as I'll again have a fair amount
      of time.

      To respond to TZR's invitation to elucidate my own position, as well
      as to Augustin Carreno's suggestion of an abstract being made
      available, I'll now do what I can do in a short time, post a one-page
      abstract and a "proposal", both of which I've had on hand. I did
      write a book, because it's a discursive and fairly involved set of
      arguments and phenomena that I bring into coherence (largely) in my
      discussions of consciousness. So I don't want to give the impression
      that these are adequate, which I believe the "contents" complete with
      subheadings that I'm including should also bear out. However, I hope
      they'll be helpful and of interest to some.

      First, there is a little bit of explanation at the following website,
      which doesn't appear as if it will link (maybe it can be pasted in,
      though). It's the Amazon site for my book, "Inducing Consciousness
      on the Way to Cognition". A nearly full chapter is there as well,
      the trouble is that it is in the middle of the issues involved, and
      chosen more for the sake of setting up referential material on the
      web than of explaining. But anyone is welcome to it, naturally.


      One page abstract
      The primary purpose of the movement of the action-potential
      (essentially the nerve impulse) was and is to move the energy that
      can activate action from its origin in the sensory cell(s) to the
      motor cell(s). If this conduit is single, the matter of information
      and energy is unproblematic, for the two are unified within the
      action-potential. However, once there are many "nerves", the
      information that exists in the differentials across the nerve
      impulses must find a way to be used.
      Induction, particularly the normal electrical kind which is a
      virtual inevitability among nearby electro-chemical phenomena, would
      be able to communicate information between neighboring nerves. This
      induction could shape nervous output and the organism's actions more
      quickly and much more accurately than any proposed communication
      between nerves via synapses, for the latter are probabilistic and
      tend to destroy especially the categorical information held within
      nerves. Induction can allow the separation of the information
      received from various senses while permitting these different types
      of data to nevertheless influence each other.
      The sense that we have of harmonic interactions seems to be a
      prime example of a phenomenological demonstration of our experience
      coinciding with the interacting fields mentioned above. With that
      phenomenon as an analogy, we can make a reasonable explanation of our
      causal experience, of the manner by which we experience psychological
      causation. Physical causation is extrapolated from the former
      through repetition, and by our consciousness of the causal steps
      within our mental experience.
      From this and for other reasons, it appears obvious that the
      causal accounting occurs as consciousness, which is especially
      important in the case of our experiences of rapidly shifting sensory
      phenomena. It is not even possible for us to track the often
      extremely complex causality that we visualize in our consciousness if
      it is not simply a part of consciousness, for any "reporting" would
      distort efferent nervous output, making our actions useless. Again,
      the massive complexity of what we know is unexplainable via
      information-losing synapses, but would require something like
      induction in finely divided fields if cognition, along with
      consciousness, were not simply due to this induction. It may be a
      quantum effect, and is thus compatible with QM without resorting to
      the "magic" of the quantum world to "explain" conscious cognition.
      The explanatory value of this hypothesis is large and wide-
      ranging, and should be amenable to empirical tests as well.
      Induction can provide for a sort of emergent "programming" which can
      shape both transitory outputs and the structure of the brain. It
      also is thereby straightforward to locate a probable site in which
      unconsciousness with its separate causality can exist, while the
      conscious causation should be located within the interactions of
      finely divided electro-magnetic fields. This could explain how it is
      that our conscious effects are so partial, for they can only cause
      the unconscious action-potentials to shift somewhat (to, perhaps, non-
      action-producing destinations), while being fully unable to not react
      to the same.
      There are, as well, philosophical ramifications. This
      hypothesis is easily fit into the Anaximandrian flux, with its
      appearance and disappearance of (conscious) objects. One can
      actually link premises and conclusions using a version of this,
      something rationalists have neglected to notice is a necessity. It
      agrees well with Nietzsche, somewhat less so with Derrida and
      deconstruction, yet it manages to maintain both the value of Derrida
      and that of the analytic philosophers.

      Proposal for:
      Induction, and Consciousness as the Medium of Cognition

      By Glen Davidson

      The primary purpose of this book is to demonstrate a convergence of
      evidence to a certain kind of electro-magnetic induction in the brain
      as the neural correlate of consciousness and cognition. While taking
      into account some of the basics of neural physiology, the book is not
      primarily concerned with the physics and biology of consciousness and
      cognition, but rather with what type of phenomenon could explain
      conscious experience and the psychological operations of our
      judgments of phenomena such as causality.

      This is not a book beholden to any particular method or belief,
      instead assuming the value of the limits found by science, while
      considering experience to be more fundamental than science itself.
      Thus the book begins with evolutionary questions of neural
      development which lead to further questions of how information might
      interact in the continuous wholes that would be produced by the
      almost inevitable "cross-talk" of nerves, especially if this "cross-
      talk" would be due primarily to electro-magnetic induction. The most
      central issue discussed, along several lines, is the manner in which
      the information in the inductions across nerves might react, and how
      this seems to accord with our conscious, cognitive experience.

      Importantly, the argument runs more on the line of producing a model
      of induction that is adequate to our cognitive and conscious
      experience, in preference to attempting to adduce "scientific
      evidence" for it. In this way it is more like theoretical physics
      than most of biology and chemistry. It should be amenable to testing
      and more objective observations, but this book is concerned with the
      conceptual issue of induction as the neural correlate of
      consciousness. Interacting electro-magnetic fields (which relate to
      induction) are shown to be able to relate disparate cognitive,
      psychological, and philosophical ideas that have typically been
      thought to agree little, if at all.

      So it is quite an encompassing hypothesis. Perhaps this fact could
      be disconcerting, yet to come up with any sort of explanation of
      consciousness would appear likely to involve a great many aspects of
      cognition and experience if it would explain anything at all. Hence
      the book takes into account the fact that most information taken in
      has no meaning to the organism except as it interacts with other
      information, and the problem of probabilistic synapses, the problem
      of fast integrations of information necessary to organisms, and the
      difficulty pointed out by the quantum consciousness proponents, that
      the brain is unlikely to have sufficient "wiring" to deal with all of
      the information with which it uses (that is, if simply "wires" and
      synapses are involved).

      Then, too, the systematic integrations of partly chaotic systems are
      given a proposed solution under the interacting fields hypothesis of
      consciousness. The massive integrations that we effect on a routine
      basis across shifting sets of information are far too complex to have
      an accounting under the simple and slow nerve-synapse conception of
      conscious cognition. That quantum mechanics plays a role in the
      field interactions is acknowledged as probable in the book, but
      little discussed, due to the lack of much evidence.

      Because I am a philosopher, and have been something of a Nietzschean
      from before having read Nietzsche, the perspective from which the
      book looks at the problem is vaguely Nietzschean, both in its
      acceptance of science and psychology, and in its refusal to treat
      Nietzsche as canon. The flux of life, information, and experience is
      given a physiological basis on the conceptual level in this book.
      Rational capabilities are not ignored, but treated as largely
      secondary to the massive interactions of data in (albeit rationally
      spaced and controlled) intermingling fields. One of the
      philosophical subjects briefly discussed is the problem of becoming
      (following Parmenides) as being incompatible with rationality—and yet
      the mind is able to become even to the extent of realizing new
      rational extrapolations, and to increase the degree to which logic is
      held in the mind.

      I attempt to bring incompatible philosophies into something of an
      agreement under the inductional model—which I concede is less of
      an "explanation" than an integrative concept itself. Hegel's
      syntheses and Derrida's deconstruction (which I believe is somewhat
      of a synthesis itself) are fitted into a brain that somehow manages
      to incorporate both permanence and change without itself experiencing
      the great difficulties encountered in philosophy. There is not a lot
      of philosophy in this work, certainly less than psychology, but what
      there is demonstrates the power of this model of consciousness for
      providing a concept for grappling with considerable perplexities.


      The latter piece, the proposal, is less of an attempt to actually
      explain than to state what is involved. Both pieces tend to conflate
      the "induction" I'm discussing with electrical induction, though the
      latter actually breaks from that model later on. This was due to the
      matter of length and the attempt not to get too deep into matters,
      yet I think I should point out here that I do not see the two as the
      same. In fact, induction may not be the best word for the aspect of
      consciousness involved, although informationally it is crucial to me
      to discuss the issues of data interactivity, and induction of causal
      forces, between nerves.

      The fact remains that despite my attempts to explain, it isn't easy.
      On the whole the matters discussed are complicated and cross-
      disciplinary, typically assuming a pretty fair and broad-based
      education in the reader. This is so particularly for the "proposal",
      I believe not as much in the "abstract".

      I'll sign off here, making no comments on the table of contents of my
      book (except that the page numbering differs from the published
      version), which follows.

      Back (to this forum) some time later this week,

      Glen Davidson


      Introduction----------------------------------------------- 3
      1. Coordinating the routing of nerve impulses-------------- 12
      The original purpose of the nerve------------------- 12
      Two ways of shaping output------------------------- 14
      Reason's detractors therefore example the appeal to the
      rational---- 16
      The rational probably comes from, and evolves for the sake of,
      routing nervous content-------------------- 17
      Space, time—and logic in routing------------------ 18
      Relations of nerve signals producing "rationalized" sets of
      signals- 19
      Unique information would also shape the nerve signals---21

      2. Information is an unavoidable issue in routing and switching- 23
      Codes and symbols---------------------------------------- 23
      There is no meaning, or sense in its very self, for which to
      code------ 24
      Types of interactions of nerves----------------- 26
      Harmonic interactions-------------------------- 27
      The problem of novel information---------------- 28
      Considerations of projected information--------- 30
      Information apparently shapes action during routing and
      switching 31
      Data shift the contexts of information in the brain---- 33

      3. The difference between information and action-potentials---- 35
      Information is in the differences between signals------- 35
      Problems with the probabilistic reactions in nerves and
      synapses---- 37
      The question of the high-speed combinations of information in
      the moving animal--------------------------------------------- 38
      Combining separate categories of information from different
      senses 40
      The need for non-destructive methods of processing complexity-
      ----- 43
      Information must be processed within its context------ 44
      The sort of medium necessary for lossless information
      processing--- 45

      4. Affection at a distance—harmonics and associations-------- 47
      Our metaphors for mental phenomena apparently come from these
      phenomena------------------------------------- 47
      Rhythm, electro-magnetic induction, and communication of
      Information----------------------------------- 48
      Resonance and continuity of information--------------- 52
      Recognition of identities through harmonies and resonance 55
      Induced energies and information merging into identities 57
      Associations could result from induction------------- 59
      Memory is data-poor in comparison with our rich conscious
      associations--------------------------------- 61
      Non-causal associations via induction---------------- 63
      Magical associations--------------------------------- 66
      Metaphor returns to consideration-------------------- 68
      Summary---------------------------------------------- 70

      5. Simultaneity of causality and consciousness--------------- 72
      The question posed of whether causality can be disentangled
      from consciousness------------------------------------------- 72
      So does causality cause consciousness?--------------- 75
      The only reference against which causality takes place in the
      overall field is the field itself------------ 78
      Consciousness registers the account of mental processes 80
      The disappearance of causal data from cognition and
      consciousness--------------------------------- 82
      Mental causation and consciousness are necessarily the same
      process--------------------------------------- 83
      The filtering function of synapses-------------------- 85
      Conscious knowledge of identity and causation from the inside-
      ---- 86
      "Real" causality is merely the derivative of mental causation—
      and of consciousness-------------------------- 88

      6. Induction as a method of internalization------------------- 91
      Effects of higher dimensional movements on one-dimensional
      streams--------------------------------------- 91
      Cognition must process a great many chaotic, even scattered,
      forms----------------------------------------- 92
      Dynamic causation unifying mental objects and patterns- 94
      Causal intrusions into the interiors of nerve impulses- 97
      Induction would particularly involve the data of difference
      in its effect------------------------------------------------- 99
      The product of causal induction, the tertium quid, must be
      energy 101
      The breadth and the integrational tendencies of the
      inductional flux---------------------------------------------- 103
      The problem of becoming, consciousness, and induction- 105

      7. Activating potentials to fluidize information-------------- 108
      Derrida, Jung, and their different differentials------ 108
      Oppositions apparently have powerful conscious effects 110
      The tertium quid of energy coming out of the clash of
      opposites---- 113
      The process of relating information is essential—and could be
      quantum--------------------------------------- 114

      8. Information interacting in fields is the best analogy with
      consciousness- 117
      "Freedom" in a will incorporating potentials---------- 117
      The force to "program" nerve responses---------------- 119
      Conscious fields versus unconscious forces in the nerves 121
      Honing nerve signals through non-nerve information processing-
      -- 124
      Too much information interacts at once to happen in separate
      nerves---------------------------------------- 124
      We learn data that exist at the periphery of our drives and
      desires- 126
      The becoming of the conscious flux-------------------- 128
      Nerves and synapses provide the stability against which the
      fields may interact------------------------------------------- 130

      9. The non-universal mind—consciousness as a momentary flux--- 132
      Getting away from the temptation of pan-psychism------ 132
      Stability of information and categories in consciousness,
      versus in electricity----------------------------------------- 134
      Emergent internalism in consciousness----------------- 135
      Continuity in consciousness and in field states of the brain--
      -------- 136
      How might nerves allow for unconsciousness to exist?-- 136
      Specialization of nerves allows or disallows cross-talk,
      according to function----------------------------------------- 139
      Losing conscious cognition to non-information-processing nerve
      routes---------------------------------------- 140
      Potentials and actualities in the electro-magnetic field, and
      the process of becoming--------------------------------------- 142
      "Permanence" and its becoming------------------------- 145
      Logic's missing connection between premises and conclusions---
      -- 147
      The massive coordination and interactions of energized
      information in consciousness------------------ 148
      The closed internality of conscious field activity and
      causality------ 149
      Only the mind can know causation and becoming, being the
      source of all analogous judgments of the same----------------- 150

      10. Inductions and philosophy--------------------------------- 154
      Advantages of action-potentials over electricity for
      organisms------ 154
      Evolution of cross-talk into information-processing--- 155
      Unifying philosophies and psychology within the inductional
      model of cognition---------------------------- 157
      Fluidizing the driving potentials--------------------- 159
      Synthesis has been one of the great philosophical problems161
      Qualia as possible energy-inducing differentials, driving the
      flux in part-------------------------------------------------- 162
      The brain's tertium quid as the model for perceived
      syntheses----- 163
      Summary----------------------------------------------- 164

      Appendix------------------------------------------------------- 167
      The qualia problem------------------------------------ 167
      The disappearance of color into the neutral signal of white---
      ------- 168
      Fitting the "first color" into black and white vision- 169
      The incidental nature of color qualia----------------- 170
      Losing qualia in order to preserve the energy balance of
      consciousness--------------------------------- 171
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