69758TofI – Deputy FM: ‘Netanyahu wron g to back Palestinian state, and it’s hurting him in Likud’
- Jul 29, 2013
TofI – MONDAY, JUL 29, 2013
THE TIMES OF ISRAEL
Deputy FM: ‘Netanyahu wrong to back Palestinian state, and it’s hurting him in Likud’
Pro-settlement hawk Ze’ev Elkin sees little prospect of progress at talks, because ‘the Palestinians haven’t budged a millimeter for 20 years’
In an interview at his office in the Foreign Ministry, where he serves as the deputy to acting foreign minister Netanyahu, Elkin said Netanyahu “is going against the flow of his own party. He’s paying a political price day after day, hour after hour, for his belief in a Palestinian state… It’s very hard for him in his party.”
Asked whether this meant Netanyahu would ultimately lose control of the Likud, Elkin said he didn’t know. Pressed, the deputy foreign minister said Netanyahu is “
Elkin, who immigrated from the former Soviet Union in 1990, and moved from academia into politics after leading an effort among Russian immigrants to oppose prime minister Ariel Sharon’s disengagement from Gaza, entered the Knesset in 2006 with Kadima but moved to the Likud in the 2009 elections. A resident of Kfar Eldad in the Etzion Bloc south of Jerusalem, Elkin, 42, an Orthodox former Bnei Akiva secretary in the FSU, is a staunch opponent of Palestinian statehood and said that opposition to a Palestinian state was overwhelming in the Likud’s Knesset faction. He said a majority of the government and the coalition opposed a Palestinian state as well.
Asked why Netanyahu had placed known Likud opponents of so central a policy in key government positions — including himself as deputy foreign minister and Danny Danon as deputy defense minister — Elkin said Netanyahu really had little choice. Numerous relatively young Likud politicians who oppose Palestinian statehood had fared well in the Likud party primaries before the last elections, and so they had to be given relatively prestigious jobs. By rights, said Elkin, he ought to have been a minister in the government. When it became clear that there was no room for him, he said, he was offered the deputy ministerial post of his choice, and chose foreign.
Elkin, who made plain he would have opposed the release of pre-Oslo Palestinian prisoners that was approved by the cabinet on Sunday, said he saw little prospect of progress in the resuming peace talks, “n
Let’s work by a process of elimination. First of all, a Palestinian state, I oppose it for many reasons. Partly for ideological reasons, a question of rights. These are precisely the areas of the Land of Israel which is the historical basis of the Jewish people. If you dig in Tel Aviv, the likelihood of finding something Jewish is weak. In contrast to the area where I live.
Secondly, in the past 20 years, every withdrawal has brought more Palestinian terrorism. Whether under Oslo I, Oslo II or the disengagement, the result was always the same: a worsening of security. Ask a resident of Ashdod today if he felt more secure before the Oslo Accords or now, the answer is obvious. The conclusion is that this solution doesn’t work. It brings less security and more problems. It doesn’t advance us anywhere.
My answer is complicated. The western approach, which says there has to be a solution right away and that it’s binary — you have to decide now — is often wrong. When you try to build a solid concept on shifting sands, your concept collapses. There are situations when you have to say sometimes, “I don’t see a solution,” like now. I don’t have to say that, since I don’t have a solution, I’ll take the first solution that comes to hand. I have to ask myself whether that solution will make matters worse or better. If I think it will make matters worse, I shouldn’t adopt it. I don’t accept that there’s a [binary] dilemma between a Palestinian state and a single binational state. Nobody can predict how things will pan out. And if I know that a Palestinian state is bad, I don’t have to run to it simply because I don’t have another option on the table. I can seek to manage the conflict, and wait and see. Perhaps another solution will emerge.
Absolutely, and I certainly think a Palestinian state is no solution. And if I think a Palestinian state is no solution, that means I do want a Jewish presence here. Which raises the question: What do you do with the Palestinian population? And I don’t think the answer to that question can be found right now. But a Palestinian state is no solution, not for us and I don’t think for them either. I’m in touch with lots of Palestinians, given where I live, and lots of them say that things are much worse now than they were before Arafat. Now, with Abu Mazen [Mahmoud Abbas], it’s a little bit better.
The state of Israel, in its handling of the negotiations with the Palestinians, has always made a beginner’s mistake. We ran the negotiations salami-style.The other side consistently raised its territorial ambitions and we always said, “We’ll say how much we need at the end.” The other side isn’t static. Things that the other side wouldn’t have dreamed of demanding at the start of the process, today it demands. Arafat talked about [wanting sovereignty on] the outskirts of Jerusalem so that he’d be able to say that Al Quds is the capital of Palestine. Now, Abbas won’t talk about anything less than the Temple Mount. Over the past 20 years, they’ve made dramatic headway in enlarging their demands, in their understanding in what they can get from Israel.
If you’re going to disengage from Gaza, why do you not simultaneously annex Judea and Samaria?
Today we’re ostensibly arguing with them about 60 percent of Judea and Samaria. They have Gaza and they have 40 percent of Judea and Samaria already, and we’re arguing as though we’re still at the start. What we gave, we gave. It’s no longer on the table. That’s a mistake. It wouldn’t work in a bazaar.
In my opinion we shouldn’t be giving, but if you are giving, if you believe in a Palestinian state, then you have to take as well. If you’re going to disengage from Gaza, why do you not simultaneously annex Judea and Samaria? If we’d at least annexed when we gave, our situation with the Palestinians today would be better. They would come to terms with what was ours and we’d be arguing over the balance. It’s a fatal mistake.
There needs to be gradual annexation in accordance with the Israeli consensus. Where there isn’t a Palestinian populace and there is a consensus in Israel and a degree of international recognition that this will be Israeli, we should have moved forward. Does that mean that I’m saying today, immediately, we should annex? I don’t believe that that would pass. We have gotten the world used to the fact through these years that we’re leaving annexation to the end. The world has gotten used to that.
We have to decide for ourselves and then to explain to the world. It will take time to change the world back. Internally too, this requires a fundamental change. It’s not a political decision. We have to admit where we went wrong and change the Israeli approach.
They already have a certain amount of self-determination — something that’s less than a state but covers almost all of the Palestinian population. People forget that in the 60% of Judea and Samaria that is Area C we barely rule over any Palestinians there.
For at least half of the Palestinian population, the ’67 borders aren’t enough either. So long as you can’t reach a final status agreement, they’ll always be unsatisfied. But I stress, I don’t know what’s going to happen in the future. There are all sorts of instabilities on the other sides of our borders.
The government reflects the public.
All over Europe there are multi-party coalitions. The notion that a government has to be of a single color is not appropriate for a parliamentary democracy.
So your question is different. Your question is, How am I supposed to act in the Foreign Ministry? If you count how many people in the Likud today openly support the two-state solution, there are not many (.) who would say they are certain in support of a Palestinian state. And in the last primaries, a group of young politicians came very high and so they should have been incorporated into the government. The prime minister can’t ignore that.
But Danny Danon came fifth in the primaries. He had every reason to expect to be a minister.
You can’t face off against everybody. All the young politicians came high. You had Danon and me and Yariv Levin and Tzipi Hotovely. You could include Miri Regev, and Yuli Edelstein with his views.
Talking to you, no. Because I assume you’re interviewing me as a public figure and not only as the deputy foreign minister. But when I hold formal meetings [with international politicians], I don’t lecture them that it’s forbidden to establish a Palestinian state. As deputy foreign minister, I represent the ministry’s policy. There’s a foreign minister and that minister is the prime minister.
If we want to prevail, the right has to be interested in hasbara action abroad no less than it is active in building another new home
If they ask my personal opinion, I don’t hide it. I haven’t changed my opinions. I don’t say, ‘What I see here, I didn’t see from there.’ I haven’t changed my opinions despite the Israeli tradition to do so. But I have a lot now to say to my friends the settlers and my friends on the right, that I had internalized less before.
I’ll give you an example. Not long ago there was a conference about (propaganda) that the Yesha (Settlers) Council organized. I spoke after Naftali Bennett (the minister of economics and the leader of the religious-nationalist Jewish Home party). . What he said that wasn’t accurate, in my opinion, is that ‘We don’t have a problem. The world isn’t interested in the Palestinian issues. We’re inventing this problem. If we stop scaring ourselves everything will be fine.’ I spoke after him. He got very warm applause. I strongly disagreed with him. I said I wished that he was right. I told him that it was very difficult in Europe even among our friends to find countries that support the settlement enterprise. I think it would be an erroneous stance to say there’s no problem. There a problem.
But from there I don’t draw the conclusions that Tzipi Livni draws — that the only solution for us is to go with the flow, and to give in to them, and to establish two states, and then the world will calm down and everything will be fine — because I think that will bring us to a lousy place. My solution was that the right needs to think about hasbara and diplomatic activism. The right and the settlement movement for a long time focused only on practical action, and completely abandoned diplomatic activity. Today we’re paying the price, a very heavy price, for not engaging in hasbara and not explaining our position to the world. If we want to prevail, the right has to be interested in hasbara action abroad no less than it is active in building another new home.
That’s one of the reasons why I wanted to be in this job. I chose it. By virtue of years in parliament, I ought to have been a minister, but because of the limitations, it didn’t work out. I was the first one to miss out. I could choose: the Defense Ministry, Foreign, Education. And I chose the Foreign Ministry.
For 20 years the Palestinians haven’t budged a millimeter in their demands
I don’t know.
He’s prepared to pay a political price for something he believes is right. I think he’s wrong. We have a real disagreement. But I respect his capacity to say, ‘This is what I believe is right and I’m prepared to pay a political price. I’m leading in this direction because I believe in it.’ That’s what I expect of a leader — to know when to lead against the flow. In this instance, I disagree with him, but I respect him. Anyone who understands and sees the price he pays politically in his party and on his control of the party because he’s insistent on this, knows that it would be foolish for him to do this if he wasn’t serious about it and if he didn’t really think it was right.