Court determines what ails the PAMites!
- Finally, we have a name to put on the problem with the PAMites. It
is official. Even Harold Helm has to appreciate this, since it comes
right out of his mental health "bible". This is going to be a must
read for all those interested in following the PAMites.
It is called "persecutory delusional disorder" and is pursuant to the
Diagnostics and Statistical Manual IV-TR.
See the case following my name below for details.
ROY WILFRED WOOTEN,
Release Date: APRIL 29, 2004
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT
Before: MARTIN and ROGERS, Circuit Judges; BELL, District Judge./*/
 This is a direct appeal from a district court judgment finding
Roy Wilfred Wooten incompetent to stand trial. The parties have
agreed to waive oral argument and, upon examination, this panel
unanimously agrees that oral argument is not needed. Fed. R. App. P.
 On November 14, 2001, Roy Wilfred Wooten, a professional
musician, was indicted on four counts of tax evasion, in violation of
26 U.S.C. section 7201. Wooten's subsequent conduct caused the
district court to question Wooten's competency to stand trial. Wooten
underwent several competency evaluations, the results of which
convinced the district court that Wooten was, in fact, incompetent to
stand trial within the meaning of 18 U.S.C. section 4241(d).
Accordingly, the district court ordered that Wooten be committed to
the custody of the Attorney General of the United States for further
evaluation and treatment. This commitment order was stayed, however,
pending Wooten's appeal to this Court.
 The only issue before this panel is whether the district court
erred in concluding that Wooten was incompetent to stand trial. The
district court's determination will not be disturbed on appeal unless
clearly erroneous. United States v. Shepard, 538 F.2d 107, 110 (6th
 After his indictment on charges related to tax evasion, Wooten
was released on an unsecured bond. He subsequently appeared before
the district court when ordered to do so, but his participation in
the district court proceedings was defined by his insistence on
responding to virtually every question with arcane, pseudo-legal
jargon commonly associated with tax protestor literature. He also
repeatedly proclaimed his beliefs that the federal government is
bankrupt, the Department of the Navy runs the country under Admiralty
Law and the Uniform Commercial Code, the Internal Revenue Service is
really a foreign debt collector based in Puerto Rico and that Wooten,
who lives in Nashville, is not actually a resident of the United
States. Wooten also filed volumes of pleadings, many signed only with
his thumb print, that the district court found virtually
indecipherable. Faced with these abnormalities, the district court,
fearing that Wooten might not be competent to assist in his own
defense, ordered a competency evaluation. The district court
concluded that the results of the first evaluation were unreliable
because of the examiner's inexperience and therefore ordered Wooten
to submit to another evaluation by a different mental health
professional, Dr. Pamela Auble.
 Dr. Auble, a neuropsychologist, spent approximately four hours
interviewing Wooten and also reviewed a significant amount of
documentation that was provided to her. She ultimately concluded that
Wooten suffered from a persecutory delusional disorder. Pursuant to
the Diagnostics and Statistical Manual IV-TR, a diagnosis of
persecutory delusional disorder is appropriate if the following
factors are satisfied:
(1) non-bizarre delusions of at least one month's duration;
(2) criteria A for schizophrenia is not met;
(3) apart from the impact of delusions or its ramifications,
functioning is not markedly impaired and behavior is not
obviously odd or bizarre;
(4) if mood episodes occur with the delusions, their total
duration has been brief relative to the duration of the
delusional periods; and
(5) the disturbances cannot be due to the direct physiological
effects of a substance like a drug of abuse or a medication, or
a general medical condition.
Dr. Auble acknowledged that Wooten understood the charges against him
as well as the roles of the various individuals in the courtroom, but
she nevertheless concluded that Wooten's belief system affected his
behavior such that it interfered with his ability to function in a
 Wooten disagreed with Dr. Auble's opinion and insisted that he
was competent to stand trial. He presented two witnesses -- Dr. Jack
Gilliland and Dr. Lindley Murray, both psychologists -- to counter
Dr. Auble's testimony. Dr. Gilliland conducted a competency
evaluation consisting of personal interviews with Wooten and a review
of various documents that Wooten provided to him. Dr. Gilliland
testified that he and Dr. Murray -- who conducted the psychological
assessment portion of the evaluation but who did not review any
documents in much detail -- had both concluded that Wooten was
competent to stand trial.
 After holding a hearing and considering all the relevant
evidence, the district court found "by a preponderance of the
evidence that Mr. Wooten is suffering from a mental disease or defect
of delusional disorder," which "prevents Mr. Wooten from assisting
properly in his defense." Accordingly, the district court concluded
that Wooten was not mentally competent to stand trial within the
meaning of 18 U.S.C. section 4241. The district court found the
opinion of Dr. Auble credible, especially as it was corroborated by
the court's own observations of Wooten's behavior in court and the
numerous "irrational" documents that he had filed. The district court
credited Dr. Auble's testimony over that of Dr. Gilliland and Dr.
Murray because of Dr. Auble's "greater experience" and because "Dr.
Gilliland and Dr. Murray did not review all the pertinent documents,
didn't review all the transcripts, and didn't do, in my opinion, a
thorough evaluation of Mr. Wooten on that basis." Wooten was ordered
committed to the custody of the Attorney General of the United
States, but the commitment order was stayed in order to allow him to
pursue this appeal.
 It is beyond peradventure that one may not be tried for a crime
unless he is mentally competent to stand trial. Godinez v. Moran, 509
U.S. 389, 396 (1993). The "test of whether a defendant is competent
to stand trial is 'whether he has sufficient present ability to
consult with his lawyer with a reasonable degree of rational
understanding and whether he has a rationale as well as factual
understanding of the proceedings against him.'" United States v.
Murphy, 107 F.3d 1199, 1203 (6th Cir. 1997) (citing Dusky v. United
States, 362 U.S. 402, 402 (1960)). A defendant shall be deemed
incompetent where a court finds "by a preponderance of the evidence
that the defendant is presently suffering from a mental disease or
defect rendering him mentally incompetent to the extent that he is
unable to understand the nature and consequences of the proceedings
against him or to assist properly in his defense." 18 U.S.C. section
 We believe that the district court's determination that Wooten
was incompetent to stand trial finds ample support in the record. In
making its determination, the district court properly relied upon the
expert testimony of neuropsychologist Dr. Auble -- which the court
reasonably found to be more credible than the testimony of Dr.
Gilliland and Dr. Murray -- as well as the court's own observations
of Wooten throughout the pre-trial proceedings. That Wooten
was "unable . . . to assist properly in his defense" is further
illustrated by one particular episode in which he completely
undermined his counsel's successful attempt to redact incriminating
evidence from Dr. Auble's report and to protect Wooten's Fifth
Amendment privileges. We also note that appointed counsel for Wooten
and the United States Attorney both agree that the district court's
decision should be affirmed as not clearly erroneous, and Wooten's
letter to this Court in response to his counsel's brief does not
challenge that conclusion.
 Under these circumstances, we are unable to say that the
district court's determination that Wooten was incompetent to stand
trial was clearly erroneous./1/ Therefore, the district court's
judgment is AFFIRMED.
ENTERED BY ORDER OF THE COURT