Loading ...
Sorry, an error occurred while loading the content.

more signal

Expand Messages
  • quasibill
    Although I may be becoming a one trick pony by constantly posting articles found elsewhere: http://www.counterpunch.org/hudson05012008.html IMO, a very good
    Message 1 of 9 , May 1, 2008
    • 0 Attachment
      Although I may be becoming a one trick pony by constantly posting
      articles found elsewhere:

      http://www.counterpunch.org/hudson05012008.html

      IMO, a very good description of what is going on in the economy today
      especially with respect to the federal reserve and banks. Although I'm
      still wary of trying to compare too much to Japan circa 1991 - the U.S.
      is a net debtor, whereas Japan was a net creditor when the printing
      presses were revved to full speed.
    • Kevin Carson
      ... Thanks, quasibill. This is a good article, and Hudson s one of my favorite CP writers anyway. I m in the process of revising Ch. 3 of my org theory
      Message 2 of 9 , May 8, 2008
      • 0 Attachment
        On 5/1/08, quasibill <quasibill@...> wrote:

        > Although I may be becoming a one trick pony by constantly posting
        > articles found elsewhere:
        >
        > http://www.counterpunch.org/hudson05012008.html
        >
        > IMO, a very good description of what is going on in the economy today
        > especially with respect to the federal reserve and banks. Although I'm
        > still wary of trying to compare too much to Japan circa 1991 - the U.S.
        > is a net debtor, whereas Japan was a net creditor when the printing
        > presses were revved to full speed.

        Thanks, quasibill. This is a good article, and Hudson's one of my
        favorite CP writers anyway.

        I'm in the process of revising Ch. 3 of my org theory manuscript to
        incorporate a section on the role of the central banking system in
        promoting large organizational size (especially through
        "malinvestment" in excessively "roundabout" modes of production), so
        this is the kind of thing I'm looking for.

        Especially interesting was the observation that a low discount rate
        doesn't necessarily translate into low interest rates for ordinary
        people. It's a low interest rate for those standing closest to the
        Fed's money spigot.

        --
        Kevin Carson
        Mutualist Blog: Free Market Anti-Capitalism
        http://mutualist.blogspot.com
        Studies in Mutualist Political Economy
        http://www.mutualist.org/id47.html
        Anarchist Organization Theory Project
        http://mutualist.blogspot.com/2005/12/studies-in-anarchist-theory-of.html
      • Dan Ust
        ... This is nothing more but Austrian Economics 101 on inflation and other interventions: none of these are transmitted instantaneously throughout an economy.
        Message 3 of 9 , May 9, 2008
        • 0 Attachment
          --- On Fri, 5/9/08, Kevin Carson <free.market.anticapitalist@...> wrote:

          > Especially interesting was the observation that a low
          > discount rate
          > doesn't necessarily translate into low interest rates
          > for ordinary
          > people. It's a low interest rate for those standing
          > closest to the
          > Fed's money spigot.

          This is nothing more but Austrian Economics 101 on inflation and other interventions: none of these are transmitted instantaneously throughout an economy. The fact that such policies are harmful in the long run and throughout the economy, of course, goes along with their short run, localized benefits.

          Regards,

          Dan


          ____________________________________________________________________________________
          Be a better friend, newshound, and
          know-it-all with Yahoo! Mobile. Try it now. http://mobile.yahoo.com/;_ylt=Ahu06i62sR8HDtDypao8Wcj9tAcJ
        • quasibill
          ... other interventions: none of these are transmitted instantaneously throughout an economy. The fact that such policies are harmful in the long run and
          Message 4 of 9 , May 12, 2008
          • 0 Attachment
            --- In LeftLibertarian2@yahoogroups.com, Dan Ust <dan_ust@...> wrote:
            >
            > --- On Fri, 5/9/08, Kevin Carson <free.market.anticapitalist@...>
            wrote:
            >
            > > Especially interesting was the observation that a low
            > > discount rate
            > > doesn't necessarily translate into low interest rates
            > > for ordinary
            > > people. It's a low interest rate for those standing
            > > closest to the
            > > Fed's money spigot.
            >
            > This is nothing more but Austrian Economics 101 on inflation and
            other interventions: none of these are transmitted instantaneously
            throughout an economy. The fact that such policies are harmful in
            the long run and throughout the economy, of course, goes along with
            their short run, localized benefits.
            >
            > Regards,
            >
            > Dan

            Actually, Dan, I was hoping you'd chime in on this. Is there an
            Austrian who is applying the theory to the facts on hand in a
            cohesive manner like the article cited? The Mises crew has a few
            that seem to have a passing interest and recognize that "mal-
            investment" can be "over-investment", but I haven't caught many
            propounding detailed, cohesive descriptions of current events. From
            past comments, IIRC, you had knowledge of non-Mises austrians who
            specialized in ABCT - I'm really curious if they're trying to apply
            their insights to current events.

            Interestingly enough, Reisman had a pretty decent post there a couple
            of months back on the economy. Had a few of his well-known blind-
            spots (like pining for a gold-standard instead of a free market in
            currency), but pretty good, nonetheless.

            I'd appreciate it if you could point me in the right direction.
          • Dan Ust
            ... To recent trends -- meaning trend of the last year or two? There are, but these are events in progress and I d wait a few years before having a coherent
            Message 5 of 9 , May 13, 2008
            • 0 Attachment
              --- On Mon, 5/12/08, quasibill <quasibill@...> wrote:

              > --- In LeftLibertarian2@yahoogroups.com, Dan Ust
              > <dan_ust@...> wrote:
              > >
              > > --- On Fri, 5/9/08, Kevin Carson
              > <free.market.anticapitalist@...>
              > wrote:
              > >
              > > > Especially interesting was the observation that a
              > low
              > > > discount rate
              > > > doesn't necessarily translate into low
              > interest rates
              > > > for ordinary
              > > > people. It's a low interest rate for those
              > standing
              > > > closest to the
              > > > Fed's money spigot.
              > >
              > > This is nothing more but Austrian Economics 101 on
              > inflation and
              > other interventions: none of these are transmitted
              > instantaneously
              > throughout an economy. The fact that such policies are
              > harmful in
              > the long run and throughout the economy, of course, goes
              > along with
              > their short run, localized benefits.
              > >
              > > Regards,
              > >
              > > Dan
              >
              > Actually, Dan, I was hoping you'd chime in on this. Is
              > there an
              > Austrian who is applying the theory to the facts on hand in
              > a
              > cohesive manner like the article cited?

              To recent trends -- meaning trend of the last year or two? There are, but these are events in progress and I'd wait a few years before having a coherent view of what's happening. Imagine a blow-by-blow reporting of World War Two -- one attempting to explain the meaning of each -- and expecting that to really get things right as they're happening. Would a reporter or commentator really guess, at the time, what explained what and which events were key and which were just so much noise in the data? (To be sure, explaining things afterward does not mean all issues are settled or that everything salient is known and recorded.)

              Even so, there are studies by Austrians that cover things like the dot-com bust -- e.g., "Does Austrian Business Cycle Theory Help Explain the Dot-Com Boom and Bust?" at:

              http://mises.org/journals/qjae/pdf/qjae6_2_3.pdf

              (Sorry, it's a PDF.)

              My point, however, was not whether Austrians or people at mises.org (see below) were explaining the current debt and inflation issues. My point was that Kevin's statement -- "It's a low interest rate for those standing closest to the Fed's money spigot." -- seemed to say that he (and perhaps many others here and elsewhere) see this as some brand new insight. It's not for nothing that Austrian economics is seen as the "economics of time and ignorance" (incidentally, the title of a decades old book on just this very subject). In fact, in their analyses of inflation, time delays are all important. This is not only why inflation causes malinvestments in production goods (actually, usually, unsustainable increases in both investment and consumption*), but also why inflationary booms do not raise all boats -- even all capital boats -- equally.

              Stephen Horwitz** and Roger Garrison***, in their respective recent works on macroeconomics, go over just this phenomenon of how inflation spreads through an economy. The people close to the inflationary "spigot" go get the benefits first. As the inflation spreads, devaluing money overall, different groups realize benefits at the expense of others, until the benefits are exhausted and consumer prices rise -- not uniformly in terms of either goods and services or timing -- and those who rely on fixed annuities and other fixed payments (think pensioners), personal savings, or stable invests realize a loss.

              The general problem of inflationary policy is that there are such initial benefits and that the problems, real and serious, don't appear until much later -- some times, in a big way, only years later. Were these initial benefits not forthcoming, no one would bother to advocate inflation. Naturally, one would expect those who might benefit the most from inflationary policies -- actual or potential big debtors, including the government itself, those paid directly by government subsidy (think public works), and large investors and large banks -- would find them to their liking and be most likely to talk up the benefits while talking down the costs.

              > The Mises crew

              I take it you mean mises.org. Though they are perhaps the loudest spokesgroup for Austrian economics, they are not equivalent to the school or the idea.

              > has a few
              > that seem to have a passing interest and recognize that
              > "mal-
              > investment" can be "over-investment", but I
              > haven't caught many
              > propounding detailed, cohesive descriptions of current
              > events.

              See above. I think it's coming out in drips and drabs, such as some recent analyses of the mortgage finance issues.

              > From
              > past comments, IIRC, you had knowledge of non-Mises
              > austrians who
              > specialized in ABCT - I'm really curious if they're
              > trying to apply
              > their insights to current events.

              I'm not sure they're non-Mises. What do you mean by that term? Mises was the seminal thinker of modern Austrians, so I think all Austrians owe some debt to him. This doesn't mean anyone fancying Austrian economics must pay homage and agree with every sentence Mises scribbled.

              > Interestingly enough, Reisman had a pretty decent post
              > there a couple
              > of months back on the economy. Had a few of his well-known
              > blind-
              > spots (like pining for a gold-standard instead of a free
              > market in
              > currency), but pretty good, nonetheless.

              That always bothers me too: his being a gold bug, but not realizing the problem is not lack of a gold standard, but government meddling in money at all. And all his talk about how to implement a gold stanard is an excellent soporific. We really only need one thing -- and it will probably be immediately painful: to get government out of money and banking (and, of course, everything else, but starting with legal tender laws would probably be an easier sell for the general populace than full anarchism).

              > I'd appreciate it if you could point me in the right
              > direction.

              I don't know about right, but just the direction that I think is better than the usual bash Mises one or "be ignorant of ABCT and Austrian economics and then act like someone repeating an Austrian commonplace is boldly discovering new knowledge." :)

              Regards,

              Dan

              * One of the mises.org MP3s had a good example illustrating this via a Soviet central planner. Here's what I recall. Imagine, instead of money, the central planner uses loyal party bureaucrat Ivan to gauge projects before putting them into play. The central planner asks Ivan if they are enough bricks, mortar, wood, nails, etc. to build lots of homes for the proletariat. Ivan inflates his numbers -- there is actually only enough to build five houses, but he pads the numbers as if there were enough to build seven houses. Construction starts and no allowances are made, because Ivan is trusted, for shoftfalls. So, consumption continues at the usual rate or maybe a higher rate because things look so good. Eventually, everyone, including the central planner, notices that the seven houses can't be built. There simply aren't enough bricks, etc. (I reckon, in the real world, Ivan would be purged -- or some scapegoat found, such as marketeers,
              counter-revolutionaries, or sabotuers.:) In fact, not only can seven homes not be completed, but in order to completing any homes, a few of the partly built ones must be taken apart at high expense. Instead of only five homes, only three can be completed and consumption may have to fall to make up the difference.

              Anyhow, I thought it was an interesting analogy -- if a bit simple.

              ** See my review of his _Microfoundations and Macroeconomics: An Austrian Perspective_ at:

              http://mars.superlink.net/~neptune/Macro.html

              *** _Time and Money: The Macroeconomics of Capital Structure_
            • quasibill
              ... are, but these are events in progress and I d wait a few years before having a coherent view of what s happening. Imagine a blow-by-blow reporting of
              Message 6 of 9 , May 14, 2008
              • 0 Attachment
                --- In LeftLibertarian2@yahoogroups.com, Dan Ust <dan_ust@...> wrote:
                > To recent trends -- meaning trend of the last year or two? There
                are, but these are events in progress and I'd wait a few years before
                having a coherent view of what's happening. Imagine a blow-by-blow
                reporting of World War Two -- one attempting to explain the meaning
                of each -- and expecting that to really get things right as they're
                happening. Would a reporter or commentator really guess, at the
                time, what explained what and which events were key and which were
                just so much noise in the data? (To be sure, explaining things
                afterward does not mean all issues are settled or that everything
                salient is known and recorded.)

                Obviously, going too far out and predicting particulars is
                problematic. But at the same time, we are dealing with a relatively
                open process about which statistics are widely available. ABCT helps
                to make certain predictions, and using those broad outlines, one can
                look at available data and make some broad predictions several years
                out, and some particular predictions a few years out. The iTulip
                site I've pimped here before does a very good job of that, IMO, but
                they are more Austrian influenced heterodox types than academics who
                have specialized in ABCT. I'd like to see a comparison of the two,
                as a way of determining some of the weaknesses in each.

                > My point, however, was not whether Austrians or people at mises.org
                (see below) were explaining the current debt and inflation issues.
                My point was that Kevin's statement -- "It's a low interest rate for
                those standing closest to the Fed's money spigot." -- seemed to say
                that he (and perhaps many others here and elsewhere) see this as some
                brand new insight. It's not for nothing that Austrian economics is
                seen as the "economics of time and ignorance" (incidentally, the
                title of a decades old book on just this very subject). In fact, in
                their analyses of inflation, time delays are all important. This is
                not only why inflation causes malinvestments in production goods
                (actually, usually, unsustainable increases in both investment and
                consumption*), but also why inflationary booms do not raise all
                boats -- even all capital boats -- equally.

                Ah, but for many Austrians, especially at mises.org, the centralizing
                effect of transfering the benefits of saving from the many savers to
                the few bankers is completely dismissed out of hand. In fact, that
                is why there seems to be such a lack of focused academic interest on
                the issue there, if I might be permitted to speculate.

                >
                > Stephen Horwitz** and Roger Garrison***, in their respective recent
                works on macroeconomics, go over just this phenomenon of how
                inflation spreads through an economy. The people close to the
                inflationary "spigot" go get the benefits first. As the inflation
                spreads, devaluing money overall, different groups realize benefits
                at the expense of others, until the benefits are exhausted and
                consumer prices rise -- not uniformly in terms of either goods and
                services or timing -- and those who rely on fixed annuities and other
                fixed payments (think pensioners), personal savings, or stable
                invests realize a loss.

                Thanks for the recommendations. I'll try and pick up their stuff.
                That's what I was looking for.

                >
                > The general problem of inflationary policy is that there are such
                initial benefits and that the problems, real and serious, don't
                appear until much later -- some times, in a big way, only years
                later. Were these initial benefits not forthcoming, no one would
                bother to advocate inflation. Naturally, one would expect those who
                might benefit the most from inflationary policies -- actual or
                potential big debtors, including the government itself, those paid
                directly by government subsidy (think public works), and large
                investors and large banks -- would find them to their liking and be
                most likely to talk up the benefits while talking down the costs.

                I've actually become quite doubtful that the Fed takes any sort of
                input from the rest of the state apparatus. They are not truly
                directly accountable to anyone but themselves over any meaningful
                timeframe. So long as the interests converge with the rest of the
                state, they will monetize the deficit. But I think that only
                persists so long as it is in the rational self-interest of the Fed
                members. And as the actual first users of the money (to generate
                interests on loans), the Fed has several agendas all its own.
                >
                > > The Mises crew
                >
                > I take it you mean mises.org. Though they are perhaps the loudest
                spokesgroup for Austrian economics, they are not equivalent to the
                school or the idea.

                Yes, that's what I was referring to, and what I called them "crew" -
                because I realize that they do not represent the entirety of the
                school. Hence my question to you, as you are clearly more familiar
                with the other "strands" of the school.

                > I'm not sure they're non-Mises. What do you mean by that term?

                Again, I was using shorthand for mises.org.

                > That always bothers me too: his being a gold bug, but not realizing
                the problem is not lack of a gold standard, but government meddling
                in money at all. And all his talk about how to implement a gold
                stanard is an excellent soporific. We really only need one thing --
                and it will probably be immediately painful: to get government out of
                money and banking (and, of course, everything else, but starting with
                legal tender laws would probably be an easier sell for the general
                populace than full anarchism).

                Easier sell to the population, but one that will never be possible
                until the Fed is entirely discredited. The problem is that when that
                happens, the economy will be so far in the crapper that all kinds bad
                ideas start becoming popular - this was the problem in the Weimar
                Republic.

                >
                > * One of the mises.org MP3s had a good example illustrating this
                via a Soviet central planner. Here's what I recall. Imagine,
                instead of money, the central planner uses loyal party bureaucrat
                Ivan to gauge projects before putting them into play. The central
                planner asks Ivan if they are enough bricks, mortar, wood, nails,
                etc. to build lots of homes for the proletariat. Ivan inflates his
                numbers -- there is actually only enough to build five houses, but he
                pads the numbers as if there were enough to build seven houses.
                Construction starts and no allowances are made, because Ivan is
                trusted, for shoftfalls. So, consumption continues at the usual rate
                or maybe a higher rate because things look so good. Eventually,
                everyone, including the central planner, notices that the seven
                houses can't be built. There simply aren't enough bricks, etc. (I
                reckon, in the real world, Ivan would be purged -- or some scapegoat
                found, such as marketeers,
                > counter-revolutionaries, or sabotuers.:) In fact, not only can
                seven homes not be completed, but in order to completing any homes, a
                few of the partly built ones must be taken apart at high expense.
                Instead of only five homes, only three can be completed and
                consumption may have to fall to make up the difference.
                >
                > Anyhow, I thought it was an interesting analogy -- if a bit simple.

                A good analogy that either you posted before, or I saw in a
                transcript somewhere. I think it could be updated slightly to say
                that 7 homeowners are each given "title" to enough bricks to build
                one house; however, there are only enough bricks at the yard for 5
                houses. Proceed from there.

                I'm working through your review right now.

                Thanks.
              • Kevin Carson
                ... Not necessarily. I specifically mentioned it as something brought out in that article. And it recurs in the more sophisticated analyses, like those of
                Message 7 of 9 , May 14, 2008
                • 0 Attachment
                  On 5/13/08, Dan Ust <dan_ust@...> wrote:

                  > My point was that Kevin's statement -- "It's a low interest rate for those standing closest to the Fed's money spigot." -- seemed to say that he (and perhaps many others here and elsewhere) see this as some brand new insight.
                  >

                  Not necessarily. I specifically mentioned it as something brought out
                  in that article. And it recurs in the more sophisticated analyses,
                  like those of Rothbard, Grinder and Hagel, etc.

                  But you'd be amazed at how many times some drone in the comments
                  thread at Mises.Org criticizes the William Greene theory of the
                  banking monopoly making credit artificially scarce and expensive, on
                  the grounds that central banking makes it artificially abundant and
                  cheap--and they both can't be true at the same time.

                  --
                  Kevin Carson
                  Mutualist Blog: Free Market Anti-Capitalism
                  http://mutualist.blogspot.com
                  Studies in Mutualist Political Economy
                  http://www.mutualist.org/id47.html
                  Anarchist Organization Theory Project
                  http://mutualist.blogspot.com/2005/12/studies-in-anarchist-theory-of.html
                • Richard Garner
                  Its obvious, really. One Austrian point against monetarists was that increases in money supply aren t uniform throughout the economy, but occur by money
                  Message 8 of 9 , May 14, 2008
                  • 0 Attachment
                    Its obvious, really. One Austrian point against monetarists was that increases in money supply aren't uniform throughout the economy, but occur by money suppliers giving money to one group, and the new money gradually working its way through. For that first group, it is plain that they benefit from the increase in money without immediately feeling the effects of inflation. For the last, they get only the inflation. So it could be easy to suggest that the immediate recipients of new money get it at a lower interest rate than the latter.
                     
                    Richard
                     
                     
                     
                    ----- Original Message -----
                    Sent: Wednesday, May 14, 2008 4:58 PM
                    Subject: Re: [LeftLibertarian2] Re: Nothing new to see here

                    On 5/13/08, Dan Ust <dan_ust@yahoo. com> wrote:

                    > My point was that Kevin's statement -- "It's a low interest rate for those standing closest to the Fed's money spigot." -- seemed to say that he (and perhaps many others here and elsewhere) see this as some brand new insight.
                    >

                    Not necessarily. I specifically mentioned it as something brought out
                    in that article. And it recurs in the more sophisticated analyses,
                    like those of Rothbard, Grinder and Hagel, etc.

                    But you'd be amazed at how many times some drone in the comments
                    thread at Mises.Org criticizes the William Greene theory of the
                    banking monopoly making credit artificially scarce and expensive, on
                    the grounds that central banking makes it artificially abundant and
                    cheap--and they both can't be true at the same time.

                    --
                    Kevin Carson
                    Mutualist Blog: Free Market Anti-Capitalism
                    http://mutualist. blogspot. com
                    Studies in Mutualist Political Economy
                    http://www.mutualis t.org/id47. html
                    Anarchist Organization Theory Project
                    http://mutualist. blogspot. com/2005/ 12/studies- in-anarchist- theory-of. html

                  • MikeHolmesTX@cs.com
                    In a message dated 5/14/2008 1:04:59 PM Central Daylight Time, ... It also appears that at times there is a futures market in the Fed money supply, wherein
                    Message 9 of 9 , May 14, 2008
                    • 0 Attachment
                      In a message dated 5/14/2008 1:04:59 PM Central Daylight Time, Richard_Garner2000@... writes:


                      Its obvious, really. One Austrian point against monetarists was that increases in money supply aren't uniform throughout the economy, but occur by money suppliers giving money to one group, and the new money gradually working its way through. For that first group, it is plain that they benefit from the increase in money without immediately feeling the effects of inflation. For the last, they get only the inflation. So it could be easy to suggest that the immediate recipients of new money get it at a lower interest rate than the latter.

                      Richard


                      It also appears that at times there is a "futures market" in the Fed money supply, wherein lenders and other middlemen can create asset bubbles, such as the housing market/real estate boom, by lending money way over underlying asset values.

                      These banks/lenders/middlemen make commissions and upfront fees while often passing along most of the downstream credit risk. This has been a major industry in nearly every part of the credit market. Housing loans in particular were sliced and diced and packaged for sale to ultimate creditors, who were told (or naively believed) that the underlying loans were properly collateralized and that borrowers were credit worthy.

                      The Fed happily fed this bubble but didn't really create it.

                      Then, when the bubble burst, the Fed comes along and basically bails out the biggest lenders and financial institutions, some of which did actually end up holding billions in inflated assets. The money spigot opened (as in the Morgan Stanley bailout) to "guarantee" the underlying inflated value of corporate housing bond portfolios.

                      So in this case the insider Fed futures market recklessly lent and were subsequently able to plead "necessity" to get cheap or interest free money to bail out their own greedy mistakes. Wall St. financiers correctly predicted that the consequences of their bad decisions would still be seen as "too big to fail" and hence would be bailed out by Fed low interest money. The fact that the NYC money center is almost completely dominated by elected Democrats guarantees that the political muscle to pressure the Fed is bipartisan, and thus sold to the public as "stability" rather than a plutocratic rip off.

                      Instead of getting the money first and then lending it out at a mark up, financial institutions first lent money on bogus collateral and made money on the fees; when things soured they then relied on the cheap Fed money to keep them afloat.

                      A lot of hedge fund and financial institution leaders have personally suffered however, being fired or merged out of jobs, but not before they made huge bonuses on the earlier lending frenzy.

                      So ultimately access to government money creation works in any number of ways, sometimes in a round about manner. But any time financiers figure they can stick someone else with the tab (taxpayers, ultimately) they will work overtime to make a monopoly profit.

                      There are predictions that the next bubble to be burst is the credit card debt bubble, since once again easy access by banks to credit has mushroomed this area into a sea of poor lending and looming write offs. Like housing debt, much of this is not held by originators but sold in bulk to ultimate creditors including pension funds and private investors.

                      When credit card lenders get money at about 3% and charge from 10%-28% interest on card balances, and still lose money, you get the idea that the amount of bad debt here must be a huge percentage of the underlying debt.

                      (These bad loans, as with housing, only become a problem when the secondary market for such debt disappears in the wake of realization that the bubble has burst. Banks have to "mark to market" their loans every quarter and if the market isn't buying any -- quite sensibly since they know the bust is here -- these assets for banks drop in value to near zero. This in turn wipes out a big chunk of their reserve capital -- since they can lend up to 20 to 1 based on reserves -- and thus can quickly jeopardize even the largest banks which hold such bad debt.)

                      If the recession really hits individuals hard, you will see much of this debt unsaleable and more begging by finance houses to have the Fed bail them out by essentially guaranteeing bad credit card debt by the Fed or with outright low interest loans to keep capital requirements (by banks) for reserves at legal levels.

                      So it isn't always the first Fed borrowers who profit. Sometimes it is those who can pull off the politically delicate task of getting the Fed to bail them out after they have profited from bad lending policies but before the bad paper comes home to roost. Hence there is sort of a "futures" market in access to Fed capital, betting that today's asset bubble lending practices will ultimately be bailed out by friendly politicians and compliant Fed bankers.

                      MH
                    Your message has been successfully submitted and would be delivered to recipients shortly.