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A policy of cold self-interest

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  • John Halucha
    This is posted for Oct. 1, 1939 at http://polishgreatness.blogspot.com/ In his first broadcast of the war, British Lord of the Admiralty Winston Churchill
    Message 1 of 8 , Oct 1, 2010
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      This is posted for Oct. 1, 1939 at http://polishgreatness.blogspot.com/

      In his first broadcast of the war, British Lord of the Admiralty Winston
      Churchill stated that the Soviet Union has "pursued a policy of cold
      self-interest" in relation to Poland. He added that "we could have wished that
      the Russian armies should be standing on their present line as friends and
      allies of Poland instead of invaders. But that the Russian armies should stand
      on this line was clearly necessary for the safety of Russia against the Nazi
      menace."

      Maybe Winston is whom Orwell used as a model for doublethink? And it is no
      accident that the protagonist in 1984 was named Winston? (Although Orwell's
      Winston was a victim, while WC was a perpetrator.)
      Nobody "pursued a policy of cold self-interest" more than WC did - Poland was
      actually a treaty ally of Britain when he stabbed it in the back. His perfidy
      started earlier than I thought as he excused the Soviet aggressor for invading
      Poland less than two weeks after Stalin's cowardly attack.
      Apologists for WC can well and truly claim that he did anything and everything
      for the British empire, readily sacrificing honour for cold self-interest. It
      turns out that WC was personally consistent from beginning to end in throwing
      Poland to the Russian bear.
      John Halucha
      Sault Ste Marie, Canada



      [Non-text portions of this message have been removed]
    • janusz_ks
      ... First Lord of the Admiralty (but that s simply nitpicking). This policy does not seem to be WC s invention, and he wasn t the only one to pursue it. rival
      Message 2 of 8 , Oct 1, 2010
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        --- In Kresy-Siberia@yahoogroups.com, John Halucha <john.halucha@...> wrote:

        > In his first broadcast of the war, British Lord of the Admiralty
        > Winston Churchill stated that the Soviet Union has "pursued a policy
        > of cold self-interest" in relation to Poland.
        First Lord of the Admiralty (but that's simply nitpicking).
        This policy does not seem to be WC's invention, and he wasn't the only one to pursue it.

        "rival concepts of the diplomat's functions: the traditional UK Foreign Office emphasis on competitively and exclusively promoting the national interest; versus alternatively concentrating on the internationalist, ethical obligations that should govern diplomatic (and other) behaviour"
        This is from
        http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/mnp/hjd/2010/00000005/00000003/art00004
        Give me a few days and I'll find more UK sources supporting the "traditional UK Foreign Office emphasis on national interest".
      • Barbara Scrivens
        Reading Norman Davies’ White Eagle Red Star, it becomes clear that the British government of Lloyd George had a similarly dismissive attitude towards Poland
        Message 3 of 8 , Oct 13, 2010
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          Reading Norman Davies’ White Eagle Red Star, it becomes clear that the British government of Lloyd George had a similarly dismissive attitude towards Poland during the 1919-1920 war with the Soviets. Although it was the Poles who won the ‘miracle on the Vistula’, for example, credit was given to some French dignitary who happened to be visiting at the time (and kept away from the action so as not to get in the way).



          This lack of support for Poland from the British government was not something cooked up quickly. It had been brewing for some time. Churchill would have absorbed much of the mis-information, and probably felt justified in what he did – no excuse. The age old theme – let’s not allow facts get in the way of a good story. (Yes, I know I haven’t given the exact name of the French guy, but at my next read, he’ll be hunted for.)



          Barbara Scrivens

          Auckland





          From: Kresy-Siberia@yahoogroups.com [mailto:Kresy-Siberia@yahoogroups.com] On Behalf Of John Halucha
          Sent: Saturday, 2 October 2010 9:10 a.m.
          To: Kresy-Siberia@yahoogroups.com
          Subject: [Kresy-Siberia] A policy of cold self-interest





          This is posted for Oct. 1, 1939 at http://polishgreatness.blogspot.com/

          In his first broadcast of the war, British Lord of the Admiralty Winston
          Churchill stated that the Soviet Union has "pursued a policy of cold
          self-interest" in relation to Poland. He added that "we could have wished that
          the Russian armies should be standing on their present line as friends and
          allies of Poland instead of invaders. But that the Russian armies should stand
          on this line was clearly necessary for the safety of Russia against the Nazi
          menace."

          Maybe Winston is whom Orwell used as a model for doublethink? And it is no
          accident that the protagonist in 1984 was named Winston? (Although Orwell's
          Winston was a victim, while WC was a perpetrator.)
          Nobody "pursued a policy of cold self-interest" more than WC did - Poland was
          actually a treaty ally of Britain when he stabbed it in the back. His perfidy
          started earlier than I thought as he excused the Soviet aggressor for invading
          Poland less than two weeks after Stalin's cowardly attack.
          Apologists for WC can well and truly claim that he did anything and everything
          for the British empire, readily sacrificing honour for cold self-interest. It
          turns out that WC was personally consistent from beginning to end in throwing
          Poland to the Russian bear.
          John Halucha
          Sault Ste Marie, Canada

          [Non-text portions of this message have been removed]



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          Checked by AVG - www.avg.com
          Version: 9.0.856 / Virus Database: 271.1.1/3149 - Release Date: 10/01/10 07:34:00



          [Non-text portions of this message have been removed]
        • Beata Kalinska
          The Frenchman I believe you are refering to is General Maurice Weygand. For quick and basic information with usual advisement:
          Message 4 of 8 , Oct 13, 2010
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            The Frenchman I believe you are refering to is General Maurice Weygand.

            For quick and basic information with usual advisement:

            http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Maxime_Weygand


            "Weygand in Poland
            Weygand was briefly sent to Poland as head of the French military mission in
            1920 during the Polish-Soviet War. The mission also included French diplomat
            Jean Jules Jusserand and the British diplomat Lord Edgar Vincent D'Abernon. It
            achieved little; indeed, the crucial Battle of Warsaw was fought and won by the
            Poles before the mission could return and make its report. Subsequently, for
            many years, the myth that the timely arrival of Allied forces saved Poland was
            begun, a myth in which Weygand occupies the central role.
            Weygand travelled to Warsaw in the expectation of assuming command of the Polish
            army, yet he met with a very disappointing reception. His first meeting with
            Piłsudski on 24 July started on the wrong foot, as he had no answer to
            Piłsudski's opening question, "How many divisions do you bring?" Weygand had no
            divisions to offer. On 27 July, he was installed as adviser to the Polish Chief
            of Staff, Rozwadowski, but their cooperation was poor. He was surrounded by
            officers who regarded him as an interloper and who deliberately spoke in
            Polish, depriving him not only of a part in their discussions but even of the
            news from the front. His suggestions for the organization of Poland's defence
            were systematically rejected. At the end of July he proposed that the Poles
            hold the line of the Western Bug; a week later he proposed a purely defensive
            posture along the Vistula. Neither plan was accepted. One of his few
            contributions was to insist that a system of written staff orders should
            replace the existing haphazard system of orders passed by word of mouth. He was
            of special assistance to General Władysław Sikorski, to whom he expounded the
            advantages of the River Wkra. But on the whole he was quite out of his element,
            a man trained to give orders yet placed among people without the inclination to
            obey, a proponent of defence in the company of enthusiasts for the attack. On
            18 August, when he met Piłsudski again he was told nothing of the great
            victory, but was "regaled instead with a Jewish tale". It offended his dignity
            as a "représentant de la France" and he threatened to leave. Indeed there was
            nothing to do but leave. The battle was won; armistice negotiations were
            beginning; the crisis had passed. He urged D'Abernon and Jusserand to pack
            their bags and make as decent an exit as possible. He was depressed by his
            failure and dismayed by Poland's disregard for the Entente. On the station at
            Warsaw on 25 August he was consoled by the award of the medal, the Virtuti
            Militari; at Kraków on the 26th he was dined by the mayor and corporation; at
            Paris on the 28th he was cheered by crowds lining the platform of the Gare de
            l'Est, kissed on both cheeks by the Premier Alexandre Millerand and presented
            with the grand-croix de la légion d'honneur. He could not understand what had
            happened and has admitted in his memoirs that "the victory was Polish, the plan
            was Polish, the army was Polish". He was the first uncomprehending victim, as
            well as the chief beneficiary, of a legend already in circulation that he,
            Weygand, was the victor of Warsaw. This legend persisted for more than forty
            years even in academic circles."





            ________________________________
            From: Barbara Scrivens <scrivs@...>
            To: Kresy-Siberia@yahoogroups.com
            Sent: Wed, October 13, 2010 7:19:41 PM
            Subject: RE: [Kresy-Siberia] A policy of cold self-interest


            Reading Norman Davies’ White Eagle Red Star, it becomes clear that the British
            government of Lloyd George had a similarly dismissive attitude towards Poland
            during the 1919-1920 war with the Soviets. Although it was the Poles who won the
            ‘miracle on the Vistula’, for example, credit was given to some French
            dignitary who happened to be visiting at the time (and kept away from the action
            so as not to get in the way).


            This lack of support for Poland from the British government was not something
            cooked up quickly. It had been brewing for some time. Churchill would have
            absorbed much of the mis-information, and probably felt justified in what he did
            – no excuse. The age old theme – let’s not allow facts get in the way of a
            good story. (Yes, I know I haven’t given the exact name of the French guy, but
            at my next read, he’ll be hunted for.)

            Barbara Scrivens

            Auckland

            From: Kresy-Siberia@yahoogroups.com [mailto:Kresy-Siberia@yahoogroups.com] On
            Behalf Of John Halucha
            Sent: Saturday, 2 October 2010 9:10 a.m.
            To: Kresy-Siberia@yahoogroups.com
            Subject: [Kresy-Siberia] A policy of cold self-interest

            This is posted for Oct. 1, 1939 at http://polishgreatness.blogspot.com/

            In his first broadcast of the war, British Lord of the Admiralty Winston
            Churchill stated that the Soviet Union has "pursued a policy of cold
            self-interest" in relation to Poland. He added that "we could have wished that
            the Russian armies should be standing on their present line as friends and
            allies of Poland instead of invaders. But that the Russian armies should stand
            on this line was clearly necessary for the safety of Russia against the Nazi
            menace."

            Maybe Winston is whom Orwell used as a model for doublethink? And it is no
            accident that the protagonist in 1984 was named Winston? (Although Orwell's
            Winston was a victim, while WC was a perpetrator.)
            Nobody "pursued a policy of cold self-interest" more than WC did - Poland was
            actually a treaty ally of Britain when he stabbed it in the back. His perfidy
            started earlier than I thought as he excused the Soviet aggressor for invading
            Poland less than two weeks after Stalin's cowardly attack.
            Apologists for WC can well and truly claim that he did anything and everything
            for the British empire, readily sacrificing honour for cold self-interest. It
            turns out that WC was personally consistent from beginning to end in throwing
            Poland to the Russian bear.
            John Halucha
            Sault Ste Marie, Canada

            [Non-text portions of this message have been removed]

            No virus found in this incoming message.
            Checked by AVG - www.avg.com
            Version: 9.0.856 / Virus Database: 271.1.1/3149 - Release Date: 10/01/10
            07:34:00

            [Non-text portions of this message have been removed]






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          • RICHARD KASPRZAK
            We must remember the brits owed the russians lots, for defeating the french and napolean.  Unfortunatedly, many Poles were in the french army.  
            Message 5 of 8 , Oct 14, 2010
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              We must remember the brits owed the russians lots, for defeating the french and napolean.  Unfortunatedly, many Poles were in the french army.
               
                                                                                                          Rysiek

              --- On Wed, 10/13/10, Barbara Scrivens <scrivs@...> wrote:


              From: Barbara Scrivens <scrivs@...>
              Subject: RE: [Kresy-Siberia] A policy of cold self-interest
              To: Kresy-Siberia@yahoogroups.com
              Date: Wednesday, October 13, 2010, 7:19 PM


               



              Reading Norman Davies’ White Eagle Red Star, it becomes clear that the British government of Lloyd George had a similarly dismissive attitude towards Poland during the 1919-1920 war with the Soviets. Although it was the Poles who won the ‘miracle on the Vistula’, for example, credit was given to some French dignitary who happened to be visiting at the time (and kept away from the action so as not to get in the way).

              This lack of support for Poland from the British government was not something cooked up quickly. It had been brewing for some time. Churchill would have absorbed much of the mis-information, and probably felt justified in what he did – no excuse. The age old theme – let’s not allow facts get in the way of a good story. (Yes, I know I haven’t given the exact name of the French guy, but at my next read, he’ll be hunted for.)

              Barbara Scrivens

              Auckland

              From: Kresy-Siberia@yahoogroups.com [mailto:Kresy-Siberia@yahoogroups.com] On Behalf Of John Halucha
              Sent: Saturday, 2 October 2010 9:10 a.m.
              To: Kresy-Siberia@yahoogroups.com
              Subject: [Kresy-Siberia] A policy of cold self-interest

              This is posted for Oct. 1, 1939 at http://polishgreatness.blogspot.com/

              In his first broadcast of the war, British Lord of the Admiralty Winston
              Churchill stated that the Soviet Union has "pursued a policy of cold
              self-interest" in relation to Poland. He added that "we could have wished that
              the Russian armies should be standing on their present line as friends and
              allies of Poland instead of invaders. But that the Russian armies should stand
              on this line was clearly necessary for the safety of Russia against the Nazi
              menace."

              Maybe Winston is whom Orwell used as a model for doublethink? And it is no
              accident that the protagonist in 1984 was named Winston? (Although Orwell's
              Winston was a victim, while WC was a perpetrator.)
              Nobody "pursued a policy of cold self-interest" more than WC did - Poland was
              actually a treaty ally of Britain when he stabbed it in the back. His perfidy
              started earlier than I thought as he excused the Soviet aggressor for invading
              Poland less than two weeks after Stalin's cowardly attack.
              Apologists for WC can well and truly claim that he did anything and everything
              for the British empire, readily sacrificing honour for cold self-interest. It
              turns out that WC was personally consistent from beginning to end in throwing
              Poland to the Russian bear.
              John Halucha
              Sault Ste Marie, Canada

              [Non-text portions of this message have been removed]

              No virus found in this incoming message.
              Checked by AVG - www.avg.com
              Version: 9.0.856 / Virus Database: 271.1.1/3149 - Release Date: 10/01/10 07:34:00

              [Non-text portions of this message have been removed]








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            • terry polewski
              Group, In the discussion of Weygand, brought up was Lord d Abernon who wrote a book entitled the 18th Decisive Battle of the World , which he claimed about
              Message 6 of 8 , Oct 15, 2010
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                Group,
                In the discussion of Weygand, brought up was Lord d'Abernon who wrote a book
                entitled "the 18th Decisive Battle of the World", which he claimed about the
                'Battle of Warsaw' and maybe the first to offer this claim  '...had the Soviet
                forces overcome Polish resistance and captured Warsaw, Bolshevism would have
                spread throughout Central Europe, and might well have penetrated the whole
                continent.'  
                 I have a 'pdf' copy of the book and feel safe in offering it to any K-S members
                who might be interested, since it was published in 1920 and so the copyright has
                expired,. It has been a while since I read it but I do recall it being a pretty
                interesting read. Email directly.
                 
                Terry Polewski




                ________________________________
                From: Beata Kalinska <beatakalinska@...>
                To: Kresy-Siberia@yahoogroups.com
                Sent: Wed, October 13, 2010 9:06:07 PM
                Subject: Re: [Kresy-Siberia] A policy of cold self-interest

                 
                The Frenchman I believe you are refering to is General Maurice Weygand.

                For quick and basic information with usual advisement:

                http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Maxime_Weygand

                "Weygand in Poland
                Weygand was briefly sent to Poland as head of the French military mission in
                1920 during the Polish-Soviet War. The mission also included French diplomat
                Jean Jules Jusserand and the British diplomat Lord Edgar Vincent D'Abernon. It
                achieved little; indeed, the crucial Battle of Warsaw was fought and won by the
                Poles before the mission could return and make its report. Subsequently, for
                many years, the myth that the timely arrival of Allied forces saved Poland was
                begun, a myth in which Weygand occupies the central role.
                Weygand travelled to Warsaw in the expectation of assuming command of the Polish

                army, yet he met with a very disappointing reception. His first meeting with
                Piłsudski on 24 July started on the wrong foot, as he had no answer to
                Piłsudski's opening question, "How many divisions do you bring?" Weygand had no

                divisions to offer. On 27 July, he was installed as adviser to the Polish Chief
                of Staff, Rozwadowski, but their cooperation was poor. He was surrounded by
                officers who regarded him as an interloper and who deliberately spoke in
                Polish, depriving him not only of a part in their discussions but even of the
                news from the front. His suggestions for the organization of Poland's defence
                were systematically rejected. At the end of July he proposed that the Poles
                hold the line of the Western Bug; a week later he proposed a purely defensive
                posture along the Vistula. Neither plan was accepted. One of his few
                contributions was to insist that a system of written staff orders should
                replace the existing haphazard system of orders passed by word of mouth. He was
                of special assistance to General Władysław Sikorski, to whom he expounded the
                advantages of the River Wkra. But on the whole he was quite out of his element,
                a man trained to give orders yet placed among people without the inclination to
                obey, a proponent of defence in the company of enthusiasts for the attack. On
                18 August, when he met Piłsudski again he was told nothing of the great
                victory, but was "regaled instead with a Jewish tale". It offended his dignity
                as a "représentant de la France" and he threatened to leave. Indeed there was
                nothing to do but leave. The battle was won; armistice negotiations were
                beginning; the crisis had passed. He urged D'Abernon and Jusserand to pack
                their bags and make as decent an exit as possible. He was depressed by his
                failure and dismayed by Poland's disregard for the Entente. On the station at
                Warsaw on 25 August he was consoled by the award of the medal, the Virtuti
                Militari; at Kraków on the 26th he was dined by the mayor and corporation; at
                Paris on the 28th he was cheered by crowds lining the platform of the Gare de
                l'Est, kissed on both cheeks by the Premier Alexandre Millerand and presented
                with the grand-croix de la légion d'honneur. He could not understand what had
                happened and has admitted in his memoirs that "the victory was Polish, the plan
                was Polish, the army was Polish". He was the first uncomprehending victim, as
                well as the chief beneficiary, of a legend already in circulation that he,
                Weygand, was the victor of Warsaw. This legend persisted for more than forty
                years even in academic circles."

                ________________________________
                From: Barbara Scrivens <scrivs@...>
                To: Kresy-Siberia@yahoogroups.com
                Sent: Wed, October 13, 2010 7:19:41 PM
                Subject: RE: [Kresy-Siberia] A policy of cold self-interest

                Reading Norman Davies’ White Eagle Red Star, it becomes clear that the
                British

                government of Lloyd George had a similarly dismissive attitude towards Poland
                during the 1919-1920 war with the Soviets. Although it was the Poles who won the

                ‘miracle on the Vistula’, for example, credit was given to some
                French

                dignitary who happened to be visiting at the time (and kept away from the action

                so as not to get in the way).

                This lack of support for Poland from the British government was not something
                cooked up quickly. It had been brewing for some time. Churchill would have
                absorbed much of the mis-information, and probably felt justified in what he did

                – no excuse. The age old theme – let’s not allow facts get
                in the way of a

                good story. (Yes, I know I haven’t given the exact name of the French
                guy, but

                at my next read, he’ll be hunted for.)

                Barbara Scrivens

                Auckland

                From: Kresy-Siberia@yahoogroups.com [mailto:Kresy-Siberia@yahoogroups.com] On
                Behalf Of John Halucha
                Sent: Saturday, 2 October 2010 9:10 a.m.
                To: Kresy-Siberia@yahoogroups.com
                Subject: [Kresy-Siberia] A policy of cold self-interest

                This is posted for Oct. 1, 1939 at http://polishgreatness.blogspot.com/

                In his first broadcast of the war, British Lord of the Admiralty Winston
                Churchill stated that the Soviet Union has "pursued a policy of cold
                self-interest" in relation to Poland. He added that "we could have wished that
                the Russian armies should be standing on their present line as friends and
                allies of Poland instead of invaders. But that the Russian armies should stand
                on this line was clearly necessary for the safety of Russia against the Nazi
                menace."

                Maybe Winston is whom Orwell used as a model for doublethink? And it is no
                accident that the protagonist in 1984 was named Winston? (Although Orwell's
                Winston was a victim, while WC was a perpetrator.)
                Nobody "pursued a policy of cold self-interest" more than WC did - Poland was
                actually a treaty ally of Britain when he stabbed it in the back. His perfidy
                started earlier than I thought as he excused the Soviet aggressor for invading
                Poland less than two weeks after Stalin's cowardly attack.
                Apologists for WC can well and truly claim that he did anything and everything
                for the British empire, readily sacrificing honour for cold self-interest. It
                turns out that WC was personally consistent from beginning to end in throwing
                Poland to the Russian bear.
                John Halucha
                Sault Ste Marie, Canada

                [Non-text portions of this message have been removed]

                No virus found in this incoming message.
                Checked by AVG - www.avg.com
                Version: 9.0.856 / Virus Database: 271.1.1/3149 - Release Date: 10/01/10
                07:34:00

                [Non-text portions of this message have been removed]

                [Non-text portions of this message have been removed]



                 Windsor Canada




                [Non-text portions of this message have been removed]
              • Barbara Scrivens
                Hi Beata, Thank you so much for that. Yes, he’s the guy and on pages 221-222 of the book. Thank you so much for saving me the frustration of hunting for the
                Message 7 of 8 , Oct 15, 2010
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                  Hi Beata,



                  Thank you so much for that. Yes, he’s the guy and on pages 221-222 of the book. Thank you so much for saving me the frustration of hunting for the name. I was looking for a more French-sounding one. The Wikipedia extract seemed familiar and almost exactly taken from White Eagle, Red Star, with its own nuances. Your ‘usual advisement’ noted!



                  I’ve taken the extract and added in blue, the words from the book. Also, used parenthesis for Wikipedia’s words. The first paragraph is their summary. Hope the colour comes through.



                  Now that I’ve done it and looked back clinically, it is easy to see how a piece of writing can be edited to take on a different slant. There is a huge difference between ‘adviser’ and adviser, for instance.



                  At the end, I’ve added a couple more extracts from the book.



                  __________________________________________________________________________________

                  From: Kresy-Siberia@yahoogroups.com [mailto:Kresy-Siberia@yahoogroups.com] On Behalf Of Beata Kalinska
                  Sent: Thursday, 14 October 2010 2:06 p.m.
                  To: Kresy-Siberia@yahoogroups.com
                  Subject: Re: [Kresy-Siberia] A policy of cold self-interest





                  The Frenchman I believe you are refering to is General Maurice Weygand.

                  For quick and basic information with usual advisement:

                  http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Maxime_Weygand

                  ("Weygand in Poland
                  Weygand was briefly sent to Poland as head of the French military mission in
                  1920 during the Polish-Soviet War. The mission also included French diplomat
                  Jean Jules Jusserand and the British diplomat Lord Edgar Vincent D'Abernon. It
                  achieved little; indeed, the crucial Battle of Warsaw was fought and won by the
                  Poles before the mission could return and make its report. Subsequently, for
                  many years, the myth that the timely arrival of Allied forces saved Poland was
                  begun, a myth in which Weygand occupies the central role.)



                  What Wikipedia left out:



                  General Weygand’s position was particularly galling. He had (Weygand) travelled to Warsaw in the expectation of assuming command of the Polish army. He was the chief of staff of Marshal Foch, Supreme Commander of the victorious Entente. He could be forgiven for expecting homage and respect. Yet he met nothing but humiliation and insults. (, yet he met with a very disappointing reception.) His first meeting with Piłsudski on 24 July was disastrous (started on the wrong foot, as he) He had no answer to Piłsudski's opening question, ‘Combien de divisions m’apportez-vous?’ ("How many divisions do you bring?" (Weygand) He had no divisions to offer. He had the misfortune to praise two generals whom Piłsudski regarded with the utmost suspicion – Józef Haller, who had made his name in France, and Dowbór-Muśnicki, who had recently refused to serve. On 27 July, he was installed as ‘adviser’ (adviser) to the Polish Chief of Staff. (, Rozwadowski, but their cooperation was poor.) But his relations with Rozwadowski were worse than Piłsudski. He was surrounded by officers who regarded him as an interloper and who deliberately spoke in Polish, depriving him not only of a part in their discussions but even of the news from the front. His suggestions for the organization of Poland's defence
                  were systematically rejected. At the end of July he proposed that the Poles hold the line of the (Western) Bug; a week later he proposed a purely defensive posture along the Vistula. Neither plan was accepted. He has admitted in his memoirs that ‘la victorie était polonaise, le plan polonaise, l’armée polonaise’. One of his few contributions was to insist that a system of written staff orders should replace the existing haphazard system of orders passed by word of mouth. He was of special assistance to General Władysław Sikorski, to whom he expounded the advantages of the River Wkra. But on the whole he was quite out of his element, a man trained to give orders yet placed among people without the inclination to obey, a proponent of defence in the company of enthusiasts for the attack. On 18 August, when he met Piłsudski again he was told nothing of the great victory, but was "regaled instead with a Jewish tale". The snub (It) offended his dignity as a "représentant de la France" and he threatened to leave. Indeed there was nothing to do but leave. The battle was won; armistice negotiations were beginning; the crisis had passed. He urged D'Abernon and Jusserand to pack their bags and make as decent an exit as possible. He was depressed by his failure and dismayed by Poland's disregard for the Entente. On the station at Warsaw on 25 August he was consoled by the award of a (the) medal, the Virtuti Militari; at Kraków on the 26th he was dined by the mayor and corporation; at Paris on the 28th he was cheered by crowds lining the platform of the Gare de l'Est, kissed on both cheeks by (the) Premier (Alexandre) Millerand and presented with the Grand Order of the Legion of Honour. (grand-croix de la légion d'honneur.) He could not understand what had happened. (and has admitted in his memoirs that "the victory was Polish, the plan was Polish, the army was Polish".) He was the first uncomprehending victim, as well as the chief beneficiary, of a legend already in circulation that he, Weygand, was the victor of Warsaw. (This legend persisted for more than forty years even in academic circles.")





                  Norman Davies continues in his book about the battle of the Vistula and Lloyd George’s refusal to accept Piłsudski’s victory.



                  Extract:

                  ....Lloyd George shared the laurels of a battle which he had done everything in his power to prevent.



                  One cannot avoid reflecting what would have happened if Warsaw had actually fallen... The fall of Warsaw would inevitable have produced a call for renewed intervention and for an end to trade with Russia: Curzon and Churchill would surely have had their say. Lloyd George would either have had to resign... or contrive to keep his position by a humiliating admission of failure and a complete reversal of policy. In the event, he was spared the choice. In 1920 Lloyd George did not save Poland; Poland saved Lloyd George.



                  The generally accepted version of the Battle of Warsaw is so far from the truth that one is tempted to attribute it to deliberate and conscious falsification. Yet calculated lies could hardly have been so effective. One is faced with a classic case of universal self-delusion. It is essential to recognise that popular opinion throughout Europe was preconditioned to discount Piłsudski’s success. For as long as his name was known, Piłsudski had been associated with failure and treachery... No one outside Poland saw him as a single-minded patriot battling with changing circumstance. Everyone, from Lenin to Lloyd George, from Pravda to Morning Post regarded him as a military incompetent and a military disgrace... when in the course of a couple of days the Red Army was defeated and repulsed, it was inconceivable that Piłsudski could be responsible. Previous experience made the truth unbearable. As Voltaire might have said, if Weygand had not existed, Weygand would have had to be invented.



                  End of chapter and end of extract.



                  So again, we should not be surprised at Poland’s being hung out to dry time and time again. We have been a useful scapegoat for a series of politicians. But – just because history has been twisted before, does not mean we should allow it to continue to be that way. In as much as I treasure this site and its members for all the guidance and help I have been given in my ongoing research of my family, even greater is my duty to make sure any historical errors regarding the country of my blood, do not continue to be perpetrated.



                  Thanks to those who read to the end of this post.

                  Kind regards

                  Barbara Scrivens

                  Auckland


                  ________________________________
                  From: Barbara Scrivens <scrivs@... <mailto:scrivs%40xtra.co.nz> >
                  To: Kresy-Siberia@yahoogroups.com <mailto:Kresy-Siberia%40yahoogroups.com>
                  Sent: Wed, October 13, 2010 7:19:41 PM
                  Subject: RE: [Kresy-Siberia] A policy of cold self-interest

                  Reading Norman Davies’ White Eagle Red Star, it becomes clear that the British
                  government of Lloyd George had a similarly dismissive attitude towards Poland
                  during the 1919-1920 war with the Soviets. Although it was the Poles who won the
                  ‘miracle on the Vistula’, for example, credit was given to some French
                  dignitary who happened to be visiting at the time (and kept away from the action
                  so as not to get in the way).

                  This lack of support for Poland from the British government was not something
                  cooked up quickly. It had been brewing for some time. Churchill would have
                  absorbed much of the mis-information, and probably felt justified in what he did
                  – no excuse. The age old theme – let’s not allow facts get in the way of a
                  good story. (Yes, I know I haven’t given the exact name of the French guy, but
                  at my next read, he’ll be hunted for.)

                  Barbara Scrivens

                  Auckland

                  From: Kresy-Siberia@yahoogroups.com <mailto:Kresy-Siberia%40yahoogroups.com> [mailto:Kresy-Siberia@yahoogroups.com <mailto:Kresy-Siberia%40yahoogroups.com> ] On
                  Behalf Of John Halucha
                  Sent: Saturday, 2 October 2010 9:10 a.m.
                  To: Kresy-Siberia@yahoogroups.com <mailto:Kresy-Siberia%40yahoogroups.com>
                  Subject: [Kresy-Siberia] A policy of cold self-interest

                  This is posted for Oct. 1, 1939 at http://polishgreatness.blogspot.com/

                  In his first broadcast of the war, British Lord of the Admiralty Winston
                  Churchill stated that the Soviet Union has "pursued a policy of cold
                  self-interest" in relation to Poland. He added that "we could have wished that
                  the Russian armies should be standing on their present line as friends and
                  allies of Poland instead of invaders. But that the Russian armies should stand
                  on this line was clearly necessary for the safety of Russia against the Nazi
                  menace."

                  Maybe Winston is whom Orwell used as a model for doublethink? And it is no
                  accident that the protagonist in 1984 was named Winston? (Although Orwell's
                  Winston was a victim, while WC was a perpetrator.)
                  Nobody "pursued a policy of cold self-interest" more than WC did - Poland was
                  actually a treaty ally of Britain when he stabbed it in the back. His perfidy
                  started earlier than I thought as he excused the Soviet aggressor for invading
                  Poland less than two weeks after Stalin's cowardly attack.
                  Apologists for WC can well and truly claim that he did anything and everything
                  for the British empire, readily sacrificing honour for cold self-interest. It
                  turns out that WC was personally consistent from beginning to end in throwing
                  Poland to the Russian bear.
                  John Halucha
                  Sault Ste Marie, Canada



                  [Non-text portions of this message have been removed]
                • John Halucha
                  Magnificent! Thanks especially for taking so much trouble to show how poor editing or deliberate mis-editing can distort the record. It really makes your point
                  Message 8 of 8 , Oct 15, 2010
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                  • 0 Attachment
                    Magnificent!
                    Thanks especially for taking so much trouble to show how poor editing or
                    deliberate mis-editing can distort the record. It really makes your point about
                    the need for us to demand that the truth be told.
                    Also very interesting is, "In 1920 Lloyd George did not save Poland; Poland
                    saved Lloyd George." What an interesting parallel to the Second World War, when
                    Poland did so much to save Britain while Britain did so little to save Poland.
                    John Halucha
                    Sault Ste Marie, Canada



                    ________________________________
                    From: Barbara Scrivens <scrivs@...>
                    To: Kresy-Siberia@yahoogroups.com
                    Sent: Fri, October 15, 2010 5:16:48 PM
                    Subject: Re: [Kresy-Siberia] A policy of cold self-interest


                    Hi Beata,

                    Thank you so much for that. Yes, he’s the guy and on pages 221-222 of the
                    book. Thank you so much for saving me the frustration of hunting for the name. I
                    was looking for a more French-sounding one. The Wikipedia extract seemed
                    familiar and almost exactly taken from White Eagle, Red Star, with its own
                    nuances. Your ‘usual advisement’ noted!

                    I’ve taken the extract and added in blue, the words from the book. Also, used
                    parenthesis for Wikipedia’s words. The first paragraph is their summary. Hope
                    the colour comes through.

                    Now that I’ve done it and looked back clinically, it is easy to see how a
                    piece of writing can be edited to take on a different slant. There is a huge
                    difference between ‘adviser’ and adviser, for instance.


                    At the end, I’ve added a couple more extracts from the book.

                    __________________________________________________________

                    From: Kresy-Siberia@yahoogroups.com [mailto:Kresy-Siberia@yahoogroups.com] On
                    Behalf Of Beata Kalinska
                    Sent: Thursday, 14 October 2010 2:06 p.m.
                    To: Kresy-Siberia@yahoogroups.com
                    Subject: Re: [Kresy-Siberia] A policy of cold self-interest

                    The Frenchman I believe you are refering to is General Maurice Weygand.

                    For quick and basic information with usual advisement:

                    http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Maxime_Weygand

                    ("Weygand in Poland
                    Weygand was briefly sent to Poland as head of the French military mission in
                    1920 during the Polish-Soviet War. The mission also included French diplomat
                    Jean Jules Jusserand and the British diplomat Lord Edgar Vincent D'Abernon. It
                    achieved little; indeed, the crucial Battle of Warsaw was fought and won by the
                    Poles before the mission could return and make its report. Subsequently, for
                    many years, the myth that the timely arrival of Allied forces saved Poland was
                    begun, a myth in which Weygand occupies the central role.)

                    What Wikipedia left out:

                    General Weygand’s position was particularly galling. He had (Weygand)
                    travelled to Warsaw in the expectation of assuming command of the Polish army.
                    He was the chief of staff of Marshal Foch, Supreme Commander of the victorious
                    Entente. He could be forgiven for expecting homage and respect. Yet he met
                    nothing but humiliation and insults. (, yet he met with a very disappointing
                    reception.) His first meeting with Piłsudski on 24 July was disastrous (started
                    on the wrong foot, as he) He had no answer to Piłsudski's opening question,
                    ‘Combien de divisions m’apportez-vous?’ ("How many divisions do you
                    bring?" (Weygand) He had no divisions to offer. He had the misfortune to praise
                    two generals whom Piłsudski regarded with the utmost suspicion – Józef
                    Haller, who had made his name in France, and Dowbór-Muśnicki, who had recently
                    refused to serve. On 27 July, he was installed as ‘adviser’ (adviser) to the
                    Polish Chief of Staff. (, Rozwadowski, but their cooperation was poor.) But his
                    relations with Rozwadowski were worse than Piłsudski. He was surrounded by
                    officers who regarded him as an interloper and who deliberately spoke in Polish,
                    depriving him not only of a part in their discussions but even of the news from
                    the front. His suggestions for the organization of Poland's defence

                    were systematically rejected. At the end of July he proposed that the Poles hold
                    the line of the (Western) Bug; a week later he proposed a purely defensive
                    posture along the Vistula. Neither plan was accepted. He has admitted in his
                    memoirs that ‘la victorie était polonaise, le plan polonaise, l’armée
                    polonaise’. One of his few contributions was to insist that a system of
                    written staff orders should replace the existing haphazard system of orders
                    passed by word of mouth. He was of special assistance to General Władysław
                    Sikorski, to whom he expounded the advantages of the River Wkra. But on the
                    whole he was quite out of his element, a man trained to give orders yet placed
                    among people without the inclination to obey, a proponent of defence in the
                    company of enthusiasts for the attack. On 18 August, when he met Piłsudski
                    again he was told nothing of the great victory, but was "regaled instead with a
                    Jewish tale". The snub (It) offended his dignity as a "représentant de la
                    France" and he threatened to leave. Indeed there was nothing to do but leave.
                    The battle was won; armistice negotiations were beginning; the crisis had
                    passed. He urged D'Abernon and Jusserand to pack their bags and make as decent
                    an exit as possible. He was depressed by his failure and dismayed by Poland's
                    disregard for the Entente. On the station at Warsaw on 25 August he was consoled
                    by the award of a (the) medal, the Virtuti Militari; at Kraków on the 26th he
                    was dined by the mayor and corporation; at Paris on the 28th he was cheered by
                    crowds lining the platform of the Gare de l'Est, kissed on both cheeks by (the)
                    Premier (Alexandre) Millerand and presented with the Grand Order of the Legion
                    of Honour. (grand-croix de la légion d'honneur.) He could not understand what
                    had happened. (and has admitted in his memoirs that "the victory was Polish, the
                    plan was Polish, the army was Polish".) He was the first uncomprehending victim,
                    as well as the chief beneficiary, of a legend already in circulation that he,
                    Weygand, was the victor of Warsaw. (This legend persisted for more than forty
                    years even in academic circles.")

                    Norman Davies continues in his book about the battle of the Vistula and Lloyd
                    George’s refusal to accept Piłsudski’s victory.


                    Extract:

                    ....Lloyd George shared the laurels of a battle which he had done everything in
                    his power to prevent.

                    One cannot avoid reflecting what would have happened if Warsaw had actually
                    fallen... The fall of Warsaw would inevitable have produced a call for renewed
                    intervention and for an end to trade with Russia: Curzon and Churchill would
                    surely have had their say. Lloyd George would either have had to resign... or
                    contrive to keep his position by a humiliating admission of failure and a
                    complete reversal of policy. In the event, he was spared the choice. In 1920
                    Lloyd George did not save Poland; Poland saved Lloyd George.

                    The generally accepted version of the Battle of Warsaw is so far from the truth
                    that one is tempted to attribute it to deliberate and conscious falsification.
                    Yet calculated lies could hardly have been so effective. One is faced with a
                    classic case of universal self-delusion. It is essential to recognise that
                    popular opinion throughout Europe was preconditioned to discount Piłsudski’s
                    success. For as long as his name was known, Piłsudski had been associated with
                    failure and treachery... No one outside Poland saw him as a single-minded
                    patriot battling with changing circumstance. Everyone, from Lenin to Lloyd
                    George, from Pravda to Morning Post regarded him as a military incompetent and a
                    military disgrace... when in the course of a couple of days the Red Army was
                    defeated and repulsed, it was inconceivable that Piłsudski could be
                    responsible. Previous experience made the truth unbearable. As Voltaire might
                    have said, if Weygand had not existed, Weygand would have had to be invented.


                    End of chapter and end of extract.

                    So again, we should not be surprised at Poland’s being hung out to dry time
                    and time again. We have been a useful scapegoat for a series of politicians. But
                    – just because history has been twisted before, does not mean we should allow
                    it to continue to be that way. In as much as I treasure this site and its
                    members for all the guidance and help I have been given in my ongoing research
                    of my family, even greater is my duty to make sure any historical errors
                    regarding the country of my blood, do not continue to be perpetrated.

                    Thanks to those who read to the end of this post.

                    Kind regards

                    Barbara Scrivens

                    Auckland

                    ________________________________
                    From: Barbara Scrivens <scrivs@... <mailto:scrivs%40xtra.co.nz> >
                    To: Kresy-Siberia@yahoogroups.com <mailto:Kresy-Siberia%40yahoogroups.com>
                    Sent: Wed, October 13, 2010 7:19:41 PM
                    Subject: RE: [Kresy-Siberia] A policy of cold self-interest

                    Reading Norman Davies’ White Eagle Red Star, it becomes clear that the
                    British

                    government of Lloyd George had a similarly dismissive attitude towards Poland
                    during the 1919-1920 war with the Soviets. Although it was the Poles who won the

                    ‘miracle on the Vistula’, for example, credit was given to some
                    French

                    dignitary who happened to be visiting at the time (and kept away from the action

                    so as not to get in the way).

                    This lack of support for Poland from the British government was not something
                    cooked up quickly. It had been brewing for some time. Churchill would have
                    absorbed much of the mis-information, and probably felt justified in what he did

                    – no excuse. The age old theme – let’s not allow facts get
                    in the way of a

                    good story. (Yes, I know I haven’t given the exact name of the French
                    guy, but

                    at my next read, he’ll be hunted for.)

                    Barbara Scrivens

                    Auckland

                    From: Kresy-Siberia@yahoogroups.com <mailto:Kresy-Siberia%40yahoogroups.com>
                    [mailto:Kresy-Siberia@yahoogroups.com <mailto:Kresy-Siberia%40yahoogroups.com> ]
                    On

                    Behalf Of John Halucha
                    Sent: Saturday, 2 October 2010 9:10 a.m.
                    To: Kresy-Siberia@yahoogroups.com <mailto:Kresy-Siberia%40yahoogroups.com>
                    Subject: [Kresy-Siberia] A policy of cold self-interest

                    This is posted for Oct. 1, 1939 at http://polishgreatness.blogspot.com/

                    In his first broadcast of the war, British Lord of the Admiralty Winston
                    Churchill stated that the Soviet Union has "pursued a policy of cold
                    self-interest" in relation to Poland. He added that "we could have wished that
                    the Russian armies should be standing on their present line as friends and
                    allies of Poland instead of invaders. But that the Russian armies should stand
                    on this line was clearly necessary for the safety of Russia against the Nazi
                    menace."

                    Maybe Winston is whom Orwell used as a model for doublethink? And it is no
                    accident that the protagonist in 1984 was named Winston? (Although Orwell's
                    Winston was a victim, while WC was a perpetrator.)
                    Nobody "pursued a policy of cold self-interest" more than WC did - Poland was
                    actually a treaty ally of Britain when he stabbed it in the back. His perfidy
                    started earlier than I thought as he excused the Soviet aggressor for invading
                    Poland less than two weeks after Stalin's cowardly attack.
                    Apologists for WC can well and truly claim that he did anything and everything
                    for the British empire, readily sacrificing honour for cold self-interest. It
                    turns out that WC was personally consistent from beginning to end in throwing
                    Poland to the Russian bear.
                    John Halucha
                    Sault Ste Marie, Canada

                    [Non-text portions of this message have been removed]






                    [Non-text portions of this message have been removed]
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