Questions:

·        I assume the distinction between “necessities of nature” and “formal necessities” is similar to the one that Kripke made. What do you think? (para 1)

·        In (para 2) Ross supplies a list of the difference between necessities of nature and formal necessities, and I do not understand several of the differences that he lists. He says he will clarify them later, but James if you can clarify them for me right now, please do so. In particular, he states that formal & natural necessities have:

> different referents, common vs. proper names. I assume he means that formal necessities do not involve proper names. Do you agree?
> opposed existential commitments. What existential commitments, if any, do you think are implied by formal necessities?
> divergent conditions of certification. I have no idea what this means. Do you?
> I do recall the notion of formal truth being a kind of production by inflation, and that proves to be very significant for understanding some of the confusions people have about necessity.

·        (para 3): Concerning the nature of “true” and “necessary” as “pliant”, “polymorphous” concepts that are “semantically captured” by the contexts in which they are used, wouldn’t you say that these statements contain the germ of the entire book? All necessity flows from what is *real* and our truncated abstractions get us in trouble because they produce unmanageable “overflow necessities”. “Analogue notions are not prior to experience (either in discourse or observation) but the result of it.” Ross’ work on analogy, Portraying Analogy, has some relevance here, as well.

(i) different sorts of truth-making, (ii) different "compliant-realities" (one spatio-temporal, the other immaterial), (iii) vastly different "objects" (referents of common and proper names), (iv) opposed existential commitments, (v) divergent conditions of certification, and (vi) truth is earned by necessities of nature, and made by inflation for formal truths.

James Barham and I couldn’t decide whether to start a slow read of Thought and World or Christians Get the Best of Evolution, so I think I start two threads, one for each work. This is intended to be a SLOW, leisurely read. We all have limited time.

Thought and World (a.k.a. Hidden Necessities), Chap. 1, Section 1:

Table of Contents

Chapter 1 - Necessities of Nature, Formal Truths and the Blur in Between. 1

I. Contrasting Natural Necessities with Formal Necessities. 1

1. Natural necessities are true of physical objects. Formal necessities are true of ideal objects. 2

2. Necessities of nature earn their truth. 5

3. Many kinds of necessities besides. 7

4. Necessities of nature exhaust the relevant content. 8

5. Transcendent determinacy. 9

6. Conceptual nesting. 11

7. Web of belief. 12

8. Immunity to observation. 13

9. Packed virtuality. 14

10. Forms of thought that make their objects, make their truths. 15

11. Outcome. 15

I. Contrasting Natural Necessities with Formal Necessities

(1) The necessities of nature are notably unlike formal necessities. I talk first about statements not about the realities stated. Contrast: "Magnets attract iron," "E=MC²," "F=MA," "copper corrodes," "water conducts electricity," with "[(pv - p) (p pv - p)]," "A² + B² = C²," and "not: xⁿ + yⁿ = zⁿ, where x, y, and z are non-zero integers and n is an integer greater than 2"; and "the bisector of the angle at the apex of an isosceles triangle perpendicularly bisects the base." The first group, though diverse in itself, contrasts with the second, which is also internally diverse.

(2) The two kinds of statements are true and necessary in different senses because they have (i) different sorts of truth-making, (ii) different "compliant-realities" (one spatio-temporal, the other immaterial), (iii) vastly different "objects" (referents of common and proper names), (iv) opposed existential commitments, (v) divergent conditions of certification, and (vi) truth is earned by necessities of nature, and made by inflation for formal truths. I will examine each of those points.

(3) Still, "true" applies to "2+2=4" and "falling objects accelerate," under common umbrella notions, protean, plastic notions, like "the truth is what to believe," "the truth is what is so," and "it is what is right to say and right to think." Similarly, "necessary" applies to both under umbrella notions, like "what has to be," "what couldn't fail to be," but means different things and has different explanations. These are what Gilbert Ryle called polymorphous concepts. Such general conceptions are the outcome of our understanding how to use "true" and "necessary" in varied contexts where the words are semantically captured and differentiated into meanings that are prior to the pliant notion. As a result, our acquisition of such notions is dependent on our knowing how to use the words in differentiating contexts, and not the reverse (as philosophers have usually supposed). So, we have to explain the meanings in particular contexts from the peculiarities of that kind of discourse (say about numbers, or being, or opinions, or experience), and not, chiefly, from the pliant common notions. Analogue notions are not prior to experience (either in discourse or observation) but the result of it.

C