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The Warsaw Rising, seen from Soviet archives

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  • Danuta Janina Wójcik
    The Warsaw Rising, seen from Soviet archives 30.07.2010 07:53 The recently published The Warsaw Rising seen from Moscow by Russian author Nikolai Ivanov, based
    Message 1 of 3 , Jul 30, 2010
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      The Warsaw Rising, seen from Soviet archives

      30.07.2010 07:53

      The recently published The Warsaw Rising seen from Moscow by Russian author Nikolai Ivanov, based on previously unseen archives in Moscow, shows that the Red Army failed to assist the Polish home army for political, not military, reasons.



      The book is the first to be base its sources on Soviet archives, inaccessible for Polish or other historians outside Russia and is published on the eve of the anniversary of the start of the uprising on August 1.



      Jan Malicki from the Eastern Studies Center said at this week’s promotion of the book held in the Warsaw Rising Museum that the work clearly analyses and proves that arguments of a supposed Nazi counteroffensive or lack in supplies that stopped the Red Army form helping the Warsaw insurgents of 1944, were merely Soviet propaganda.



      The archives reportedly prove that the Red Army was well-armed and supplied and was not repelling Nazi attacks as it sat on the other side of the Vistula river as German forces crushed the uprising and then destroyed Warsaw before retreating. On the contrary the book shows that the time spent by the Red Army watching the uprising from the right bank of river allowed the German troops to strengthen forces , which led to a very brutal offensive in January 1945.



      Nikolai Ivanov said during the book launch in Warsaw that holding back the offensive on Warsaw’s right bank was absurd from a strategic point of view as it gave the Nazis the time to prepare their defence. Leaving the Warsaw Rising to itself was a cold political calculation, said Ivanov.



      The book, which is an analysis of the attitude of the Soviet authorities to the Warsaw Rising, was written to inform the Russian geberal public understand the situation of September 1944, says the author. In Russia the drive for freedom of the Warsaw insurgents is still perceived as a senseless and doomed attack, not agreed with the Soviet authorities, with the Red Army unable to come to the rescue.



      The Warsaw Rising seen from Moscow, published in Poland several days before the 66th anniversary of the Warsaw Rising, will appear in Russia in 2011. (pg/ab)



      http://www.thenews.pl/international/artykul136680_the-warsaw-rising--seen-from-soviet-archives.html


      [Non-text portions of this message have been removed]
    • Laurence
      I can find no information about Nikolai Ivanov, the author of _The Warsaw Rising_. If anybody has his C.V. please provide it. From:
      Message 2 of 3 , Jul 30, 2010
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        I can find no information about Nikolai Ivanov, the author of _The Warsaw Rising_. If anybody has his C.V. please provide it.





        From:

        http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Warsaw_Uprising


        The role of the Red Army during the Warsaw Uprising remains controversial and is still disputed by historians.[23] The Uprising started when the Red Army appeared on the city's doorstep, and the Poles in Warsaw were counting on Soviet aid coming in a matter of days. This basic scenario of an uprising against the Germans launched a few days before the arrival of Allied forces played out successfully in a number of European capitals, notably Paris[103] and Prague. However, despite retaining positions south-east of Warsaw barely 10 km from the city center for about 40 days, the Soviets did not extend effective aid to the desperate city. The sector was held by the understrength German 73rd Infantry Division, destroyed many times on the Eastern Front and recently reconstituted.[104] The division, though weak, did not experience significant Soviet pressure during that period. The Red Army was fighting intense battles to the south of Warsaw, to seize and maintain bridgeheads over the Vistula river, and to the north, to gain bridgeheads over the river Narew. The best German armored divisions were fighting on those sectors. Despite that, both of these objectives had been mostly secured by early September. The Soviet 47th army did not move into Praga, on the right bank of the Vistula, until the 11th of September. In three days the Soviets gained control of the suburb, a few hundred meters from the main battle on the other side of the river, as the resistance by the German 73rd division collapsed quickly. If the Soviets had reached this stage in early August, the crossing of the river would have been easier, as the Poles then held considerable stretches of the riverfront. However, by mid-September a series of German attacks had reduced the Poles to holding one narrow stretch of the riverbank, in the district of Czerniaków. The Poles were counting on the Soviet forces to cross to the left bank where the main battle of the uprising was occurring. Though Berling's 1st Polish army did cross the river, their support from the Soviets was inadequate and the main Soviet force did not follow them.[105]

        One of the reasons given for the failure of the uprising was the reluctance of the Soviet Red Army to help the Resistance. On 1 August, only several hours prior to the outbreak of the uprising, the Soviet advance was halted by a direct order from the Kremlin.[106] Soon afterwards the Soviet tank units stopped receiving any oil from their depots.[106] By then the Soviets knew of the planned outbreak from their agents in Warsaw and, more importantly, from the Polish prime minister Stanisław Mikołajczyk, who informed them of the Polish plans a few hours before.[106][107] The Red Army's order to halt just a short distance away on the right bank of the Vistula, and not to link up with or in any way assist the Resistance forces, is blamed on post-war political considerations and malice by Stalin.[10] According to this opinion, by ordering his forces to halt before entering the city, Stalin ensured that the Home Army would not succeed. Had the Home Army triumphed, the Polish government-in-exile would have increased their political and moral legitimacy to reinstate a government of its own, rather than accept a Soviet regime. The destruction of Polish resistance guaranteed that they could not resist Soviet occupation, that it would be the Soviets who "liberated" Warsaw, and that Soviet influence would prevail over Poland.[10] At times during the uprising the NKVD actively arrested Home Army forces in the East of Warsaw and a large proportion of RAF losses were caused by Soviet anti-aircraft fire.[citation needed] This appears to strengthen the claim that the Western Allies were deliberately blocked from providing support to the Poles so that any independent-minded Polish forces were destroyed before the arrival of Soviet troops.


        Polish-controlled area after the fall of the Old Town, around 10 SeptemberOne way or the other, the presence of Soviet tanks in nearby Wołomin 15 kilometers to the east of Warsaw had sealed the decision of the Home Army leaders to launch the uprising. However, as a result of the initial battle of Radzymin in the final days of July, these advance units of the Soviet 2nd Tank Army were pushed out of Wołomin and back about 10 km.[108][109][110] On 9 August, Stalin informed Premier Mikołajczyk that the Soviets had originally planned to be in Warsaw by 6 August, but a counter-attack by four Panzer divisions had thwarted their attempts to reach the city.[111] By 10 August, the Germans had enveloped and inflicted heavy casualties on the Soviet 2nd Tank Army at Wołomin.[23] When Stalin and Churchill met face-to-face in October 1944, Stalin told Churchill that the lack of Soviet support was a direct result of a major reverse in the Vistula sector in August, which had to be kept secret for strategic reasons.[112] All contemporary German sources assumed that the Soviets were trying to link up with the insurgents, and they believed it was their defense that prevented the Soviet advance rather than a reluctance to advance on the part of the Soviets.[113] Nevertheless, as part of their strategy the Germans published propaganda accusing both the British and Soviets of abandoning the Poles.[114]


        Picture of the Uprising taken from the opposite side of the Vistula river. Kierbedź Bridge viewed from Praga district towards Royal castle and burning Old Town.The Soviet units which reached the outskirts of Warsaw in the final days of July 1944 had advanced from the 1st Belorussian Front in Western Ukraine as part of the Lublin-Brest Offensive Operation, between the Lvov-Sandomierz Operation on its left and Operation Bagration on its right.[23] These two flanking operations were colossal defeats for the German army and completely destroyed a large number of German formations.[23] As a consequence, the Germans at this time were desperately trying to put together a new force to hold the line of the Vistula, the last major river barrier between the Red Army and Germany proper, rushing in units in various stages of readiness from all over Europe. These included many infantry units of poor quality,[115] and 4…quot;5 high quality Panzer Divisions in the 39th Panzer Corps and 4th SS Panzer Corps[23] pulled from their refits.[115]

        Other possible explanations for Soviet conduct are possible. The Red Army geared for a major thrust into the Balkans through Romania in mid-August and a large proportion of Soviet resources was sent in that direction, while the offensive in Poland was put on hold.[116] Stalin had made a strategic decision to concentrate on occupying Eastern Europe, rather than on making a thrust toward Germany.[117] The capture of Warsaw was not essential for the Soviets, as they had already seized a series of convenient bridgeheads to the south of Warsaw, and were concentrating on defending them against vigorous German counterattacks.[23] Finally, the Soviet High Command may not have developed a coherent or appropriate strategy with regard to Warsaw because they were badly misinformed.[118] Propaganda from the Polish Committee of National Liberation minimized the strength of the Home Army and portrayed them as Nazi sympathizers.[119] Information submitted to Stalin by intelligence operatives or gathered from the frontline was often inaccurate or omitted key details.[120] Possibly because the operatives were unable, as part of a repressive totalitarian regime, to express opinions or report facts which diverged from the party line, they "deliberately resorted to writing nonsense".[121]

        According to David Glantz, the Red Army was simply unable to extend effective support to the uprising, which began too early, regardless of Stalin's political intentions.[23] German military capabilities in August…quot;early September were sufficient to halt any Soviet assistance to the Poles in Warsaw, were it intended.[23] In addition, Glantz argued that the Warsaw would be a costly city to clear it of Germans and unsuitable location as a start point for subsequent Red Army offensives.[23]





        --- In GaliciaPoland-Ukraine@yahoogroups.com, Danuta Janina Wójcik <sandlily@...> wrote:
        >
        > The Warsaw Rising, seen from Soviet archives
        >
        > 30.07.2010 07:53
        >
        > The recently published The Warsaw Rising seen from Moscow by Russian author Nikolai Ivanov, based on previously unseen archives in Moscow, shows that the Red Army failed to assist the Polish home army for political, not military, reasons.
        >
        >
        >
        > The book is the first to be base its sources on Soviet archives, inaccessible for Polish or other historians outside Russia and is published on the eve of the anniversary of the start of the uprising on August 1.
        >
        >
        >
        > Jan Malicki from the Eastern Studies Center said at this week’s promotion of the book held in the Warsaw Rising Museum that the work clearly analyses and proves that arguments of a supposed Nazi counteroffensive or lack in supplies that stopped the Red Army form helping the Warsaw insurgents of 1944, were merely Soviet propaganda.
        >
        >
        >
        > The archives reportedly prove that the Red Army was well-armed and supplied and was not repelling Nazi attacks as it sat on the other side of the Vistula river as German forces crushed the uprising and then destroyed Warsaw before retreating. On the contrary the book shows that the time spent by the Red Army watching the uprising from the right bank of river allowed the German troops to strengthen forces , which led to a very brutal offensive in January 1945.
        >
        >
        >
        > Nikolai Ivanov said during the book launch in Warsaw that holding back the offensive on Warsaw’s right bank was absurd from a strategic point of view as it gave the Nazis the time to prepare their defence. Leaving the Warsaw Rising to itself was a cold political calculation, said Ivanov.
        >
        >
        >
        > The book, which is an analysis of the attitude of the Soviet authorities to the Warsaw Rising, was written to inform the Russian geberal public understand the situation of September 1944, says the author. In Russia the drive for freedom of the Warsaw insurgents is still perceived as a senseless and doomed attack, not agreed with the Soviet authorities, with the Red Army unable to come to the rescue.
        >
        >
        >
        > The Warsaw Rising seen from Moscow, published in Poland several days before the 66th anniversary of the Warsaw Rising, will appear in Russia in 2011. (pg/ab)
        >
        >
        >
        > http://www.thenews.pl/international/artykul136680_the-warsaw-rising--seen-from-soviet-archives.html
        >
        >
        > [Non-text portions of this message have been removed]
        >
      • Laurence
        / Capturing Berlin, not Warsaw, was the objective of the Soviets. Why should Russians shed blood to capture Warsaw? The Polish Home Army provided no indiction
        Message 3 of 3 , Aug 1, 2010
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          /

          Capturing Berlin, not Warsaw, was the objective of the Soviets.

          Why should Russians shed blood to capture Warsaw?

          The Polish Home Army provided no indiction that they would shed blood to help capture Berlin.
          _______

          Lavrentiy





          --- In GaliciaPoland-Ukraine@yahoogroups.com, Danuta Janina Wójcik <sandlily@...> wrote:
          >
          > The Warsaw Rising, seen from Soviet archives
          >
          > 30.07.2010 07:53
          >
          > The recently published The Warsaw Rising seen from Moscow by Russian author Nikolai Ivanov, based on previously unseen archives in Moscow, shows that the Red Army failed to assist the Polish home army for political, not military, reasons.
          >
          >
          >
          > The book is the first to be base its sources on Soviet archives, inaccessible for Polish or other historians outside Russia and is published on the eve of the anniversary of the start of the uprising on August 1.
          >
          >
          >
          > Jan Malicki from the Eastern Studies Center said at this week’s promotion of the book held in the Warsaw Rising Museum that the work clearly analyses and proves that arguments of a supposed Nazi counteroffensive or lack in supplies that stopped the Red Army form helping the Warsaw insurgents of 1944, were merely Soviet propaganda.
          >
          >
          >
          > The archives reportedly prove that the Red Army was well-armed and supplied and was not repelling Nazi attacks as it sat on the other side of the Vistula river as German forces crushed the uprising and then destroyed Warsaw before retreating. On the contrary the book shows that the time spent by the Red Army watching the uprising from the right bank of river allowed the German troops to strengthen forces , which led to a very brutal offensive in January 1945.
          >
          >
          >
          > Nikolai Ivanov said during the book launch in Warsaw that holding back the offensive on Warsaw’s right bank was absurd from a strategic point of view as it gave the Nazis the time to prepare their defence. Leaving the Warsaw Rising to itself was a cold political calculation, said Ivanov.
          >
          >
          >
          > The book, which is an analysis of the attitude of the Soviet authorities to the Warsaw Rising, was written to inform the Russian geberal public understand the situation of September 1944, says the author. In Russia the drive for freedom of the Warsaw insurgents is still perceived as a senseless and doomed attack, not agreed with the Soviet authorities, with the Red Army unable to come to the rescue.
          >
          >
          >
          > The Warsaw Rising seen from Moscow, published in Poland several days before the 66th anniversary of the Warsaw Rising, will appear in Russia in 2011. (pg/ab)
          >
          >
          >
          > http://www.thenews.pl/international/artykul136680_the-warsaw-rising--seen-from-soviet-archives.html
          >
          >
          > [Non-text portions of this message have been removed]
          >
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