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  • 2byteme@bellsouth.net
    Project Whitecoat The Adventist Contribution to Biowarfare A U.S. Army project that ended over 25 years ago is once again the subject of scrutiny. Project
    Message 1 of 1 , Sep 1, 2000
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      Project Whitecoat
      The Adventist Contribution to Biowarfare

      A U.S. Army project that ended over 25 years ago is once again the
      subject of scrutiny. Project Whitecoat was the Army's code name for a
      series of germ warfare studies conducted on about 2,300 Seventh-day
      Adventist servicemen from 1954 to 1973. Now the Army is investigating
      the
      long-term effects the project may have had on participants. Whitecoat
      veterans gathered recently for a reunion in Frederick, Maryland. Most
      are
      proud of the role they played in the nation's defense and report little
      or
      no adverse impact on their health, according to recent stories by the
      Associated Press[1] and National Public Radio[2]. While there may be few

      who support the use of human guinea pigs in biowarfare research, there
      are
      larger issues that are once again emerging from Project Whitecoat. They
      center around the role the Seventh-day Adventist Church played in the
      U.S.
      Army's development of chemical and biological weapons (CBW) of mass
      destruction.

      Under strict secrecy, the U.S. Army established Camp Detrick
      outside
      of Frederick, Maryland during World War II for the sole purpose of
      developing germ weapons. The program was controlled by the Army's
      Chemical
      Warfare Service, a branch that had worked with gas weapons that were
      used
      by the U.S. in World War I. The Army began to study both the offensive
      and
      defensive aspects of biowarfare.

      In 1952 the Army Medical Corps stationed a medical unit at Fort
      Detrick and in 1954 this unit began using Seventh-day Adventist soldiers

      in its research, presumably in the defensive aspects of germ warfare. In

      1956 the medical unit was reorganized into a permanent and independent
      unit named the United States Army Medical Unit, Fort Detrick. In 1969
      the
      name was changed again to the United States Army Medical Research
      Institute of Infectious Diseases (USAMRIID). Fort Detrick was home to
      what
      became known as "Project Whitecoat," the code name for the group of
      Seventh-day Adventist soldiers who were used as human guinea pigs in
      biowarfare research.

      Human Guinea Pigs Supplied by Adventist Church
      Project Whitecoat was unique in the armed forces in that it
      exclusively used as test subjects soldiers who were Seventh-day
      Adventists. These young Adventist men had been drafted into the army and

      registered as "conscientious objectors," those who refused to perform
      combat roles on religious grounds. These objectors were given a 1-A-O
      classification and sent to the U.S. Army Medical Training Center at Fort

      Sam Houston, Texas. There they trained to be Army medics. It was from
      this
      non-combatant medical corps that the Army selected its test subjects for

      Project Whitecoat.

      If only half of the non-combatants training at Fort Sam Houston
      were
      Seventh-day Adventists, why were Adventists the only ones selected from
      that pool of soldiers? The reason for this was a "handshake" agreement
      Adventist leaders had with the army. Spectrum magazine reported:

      In October 1954 then Surgeon General George Armstrong sent a letter to
      Theodore R. Flaiz, secretary of the General Conference Medical
      Department,
      in which he noted that Lieutenant Colonel W. D. Tigertt, commanding
      officer of the medical unit at Fort Detrick, had been invited 'to
      present
      to representatives of the Seventh-day Adventist Conference a request for

      their assistance in the conduct of a study of the highest importance to
      our nation's health. Only through the use of volunteers can the
      necessary
      information be obtained.' [3] (emphasis supplied)

      A warm reply from Doctor Flaiz was dated the following day. In that

      letter he acknowledged receiving Gen. Armstrong's letter and hearing the

      presentation by Col. Tigertt. Flaiz wrote:

      We feel that if anyone should recognize a debt of loyalty and service
      for
      the many courtesies and considerations received from the Department of
      Defense, we, as Adventists, are in a position to feel a debt of
      gratitude
      for these kind considerations. The type of voluntary service which is
      being offered to our boys in this research problem offers an excellent
      opportunity for these young men to render a service which will be of
      value
      not only to military medicine but to public health generally. I believe
      I
      speak not only the sentiments of our administrative group in this
      office,
      but also of our Adventist young men in the services, in observing that
      it
      should be regarded as a privilege to be identified with the significant
      advanced step in clinical research. [4] (emphasis supplied)

      It is clear that the army's correspondence with the church
      portrayed
      this joint venture as an important public health project which would
      yield
      "a significant advanced step in clinical research." For a denomination
      that prides itself for its emphasis on health, the opportunity to
      highlight their "humanitarian" zeal may have been too good to pass up.
      The
      Adventist Review later explained why the army sought the help of
      Adventists in its germ warfare program. The 1969 article states:

      Adventist medical servicemen were known to be highly motivated for
      humanitarian service. Thus the Seventh-day Adventist Church was
      approached
      to ascertain whether this would be considered something an Adventist
      serviceman might be able to volunteer for. After thorough study, the
      Medical Department of the General Conference and the General Conference
      Committee agreed that this was humanitarian service of the highest type,

      and that any Adventist serviceman might feel free to volunteer.[5]

      Colonel Dan Crozier, then commander of USAMRIID stated earlier that

      "because of high principles and temperate living, Adventist men are more

      nearly uniform in physical fitness and mental outlook. We find
      [Adventist]
      soldiers to be cooperative and willing to serve."[6]

      Adventists' good health and humanitarianism did not render them
      immune to army flattery, according to Neil C. Livingston, a Seventh-day
      Adventist living in Spokane, Washington who has researched and written
      about Project Whitecoat. "They were flattered into this by the army," he

      said. "It was a big snow job."

      After church officials agreed that Adventist draftees could
      participate in the research at Fort Detrick, Gen. Armstrong praised
      their
      belief in "the benefit of all mankind." Livingston contends that "the
      real
      opinion of the Army is that Seventh-day Adventists are the only ones
      dumb
      enough to volunteer their youth for such a dangerous ... project."

      Road to Biological Warfare Paved with Good Intentions
      "...entirely...defensive...and thus humanitarian."

      The potential dangers of Project Whitecoat, as well as its
      relationship to offensive biological warfare are issues that were raised

      by several groups during the 1960's. In 1962 the Canadian news magazine
      Macleans reported:

      Using human volunteers to test new chemical and biological agents is not

      without risk. The English experiments have resulted in at least one
      death
      which was discussed in the House of Commons. During the past ten years,
      in
      the American program, it is reported that there have been at least three

      deaths, and some 715 cases of illness and injury of "varying intensity."

      The American volunteers are recruited from the penitentiaries and the
      armed forces. Many of the human guinea pigs in the latter group have
      been
      young Seventh-Day Adventists. Pacifists by conviction, they prefer to
      engage in nonmilitant activities while in the army. [7]

      Adventist church officials and the army insist that Project
      Whitecoat
      volunteers were used solely in defensive biological warfare research, or

      in the research of "infectious diseases" as they put it, and that
      USAMRIID
      was completely partitioned from offensive biological research at Fort
      Detrick. Army officials claim that Whitecoat volunteers contributed to
      the
      development of vaccines for yellow fever, hepatitis A, anthrax and
      plague,
      as well as still-experimental vaccines for tularemia, Q fever, and
      Venezuelan equine encephalitis.[8]

      Clark Smith, former Director of the (Adventist) National Service
      Organization (NSO), a military chaplaincy department in the General
      Conference, reported that from 1956 to 1969 USAMRIID had published 160
      papers in the professional journals of many countries. The unit's
      research
      is not classified and is freely available in any adequate medical
      library,
      supposedly making Project Whitecoat a significant contributor in the
      fight
      against infectious diseases around the world. [9]

      The estimate of 160 research papers is misleading, however, in that

      this pertains to all research done at USAMRIID between 1956 and 1969.
      Project Whitecoat, a part of USAMRIID and the only program at Fort
      Detrick
      to use human guinea pigs, produced only five published research papers
      during the first twelve years of the project, and a total of 23 by the
      time the project closed in 1973.[10] The facade of "public health
      research" and "military medicine" was attempted by army and church
      officials but failed to hold up. Even Smith departed from the "public
      health" nonsense when he admitted:

      [Project Whitecoat] goes back to the 1953-1954 period with the original
      concept for study to determine the vulnerability of man to attack with
      biological weapons and to test the efficacy of Q fever and tularemia
      vaccines.... [a concept carried forward to 1973].

      It should be pointed out that since the published work of USAMRIID is
      freely available, those working in the offensive field may utilize this
      information as any other interested party might do. [A back door way of
      admitting the research benefited the offensive field].

      However, in the opinion of this study committee the work of the
      Adventist
      volunteers in USAMRIID is entirely in the defensive area of biological
      warfare and thus humanitarian in nature. The committee feels that the
      efforts and sacrifices of these volunteers are perfectly proper for the
      Christian who wishes to enter this field. (emphasis supplied) [He admits

      Adventists were involved in biological warfare research].[11]

      At this point the reasoning mind may have some difficulty
      reconciling
      "humanitarian" with "biological warfare." The question arises now as it
      did in the 60's: In what area of biological warfare should a Christian
      church involve itself?

      Recruiting the Lambs
      "...good old Adventist salesmanship"

      The Seventh-day Adventist Encyclopedia states: "Another example of
      noncombatant heroism while in the service of their country is 'Operation

      Whitecoat', a project involving medical experimentation, staffed
      entirely
      by SDA volunteers.... " [12] (emphasis supplied) While that ratio may be

      due in part to the USAMRIID's partiality to Adventist specimens,
      statements by church officials and volunteers indicate the church was
      actively involved in recruiting Adventist boys into the project.

      Along with his above statements, NSO director Clark Smith stated
      that
      Whitecoat "volunteers are recruited from military personnel during basic

      and Advanced Individual Training at the U.S. Army Medical Training
      Center,
      Fort Sam Houston, Texas." [13] (emphasis supplied)

      A 1963 Youth's Instructor article said that "during this period of
      training the Adventist draftees are given information concerning
      Operation
      Whitecoat. Two or three times each year the director of the project,
      Colonel Dan Crozier, of Frederick, Maryland, and Elder J. R. Nelson,
      secretary of the National Service Organization of the General Conference

      of Seventh-day Adventists travel to Texas to interview possible
      volunteers
      for the project." [14] (emphasis supplied)

      "A friend of mine was attending Mount Ellis [Adventist] Academy in
      Bozeman, Montana," Neil Livingston told The WINDS. "When he graduated in

      1957, he was recruited by NSO representatives..." into Project
      Whitecoat.[15]

      Whitecoat veteran Cesar Vega wrote, "I did have a little college
      experience at La Sierra [Adventist] College. During that time I was told

      of the experiment for the first time (it wasn't called the Whitecoat
      Project yet and I was one of the very first to take part in the
      experiment).... Why I did it I still don't know. I'm sure it was mostly
      peer pressure and good old Adventist salesmanship." [16] (emphasis
      supplied)

      Whitecoat veteran G. R. Bietz stated: "I don't recall how they
      recruited us ... I remember a man from the conference, I can still see
      his
      face, but I don't recall his name." [17] (emphasis supplied)

      An article in an Adventist periodical states: "A colonel and a
      representative of the General Conference National Service Organization
      appeared at a special meeting [of draftees] and talked about an unusual
      medical research project and asked for volunteers." [18]

      A General Conference man, along with a high official of the army, came
      to
      Fort Sam Houston to seek volunteers for a secret government program
      called
      "Project Whitecoat." It sounded like a good way to serve my country,
      and,
      after all, the program was endorsed by the Seventh-day Adventist Church.

      [19]

      From the testimonies of church officials and draftees alike, it
      appears the role the General Conference of Seventh-day Adventists played

      in Operation Whitecoat was not merely a passive sanctioning of church
      member participation. It appears, rather, that they actively recruited
      for
      the USAMRIID, acting in an adjunct capacity.

      Were They Really Volunteers?
      "The truth is, we were getting killed pretty good over there in
      Vietnam..."

      The word "volunteer" runs throughout articles and documentation
      surrounding Project Whitecoat and, indeed, those that participated did
      "volunteer" for the project. After signing on, they remained free to
      withdraw from the project at any time. In accordance with the 1947
      Nuremberg Code, Whitecoat volunteers were fully informed by competent
      physicians about the possible effects each experiment could have on
      their
      bodies. After becoming infected, volunteers were provided with excellent

      medical care and, yet, in spite of apparent quality assurances, it's
      clear
      that it was coercion that held the project together.

      "The church had agreed with the government to convince these young
      men they should do this so they don't have to go to Vietnam," Livingston

      told the Associated Press in October [20]. It was the fear of facing
      combat duty as field medics in Vietnam or Korea that kept Project
      Whitecoat flush with new Adventist volunteers.

      "We were told that if we did not volunteer we would receive combat
      duty overseas," one volunteer told Livingston in a telephone interview.
      "I
      volunteered for this experiment so I would not be sent overseas," wrote
      Wilson Wynn, another volunteer. [21] "The truth is, we were getting
      killed
      pretty good over there in Vietnam .... There's not too many of us
      [Adventists], I would think, that wouldn't have gone to Vietnam if we
      hadn't volunteered [for Whitecoat]," explained Whitecoat veteran Lester
      Bartholomew in an interview with The WINDS. [22]

      "Most of the men who took part were draftees who chose Whitecoat
      rather than go to Korea or Vietnam", wrote John E. Keplinger, Chaplain
      (COL.) AUS, Ret. [23]

      Evidently, it was fear rather than "humanitarian ideals" that kept
      Adventist's draftees in Project Whitecoat because as soon as the draft
      ended, the project folded, apparently for want of "volunteers," "The
      Whitecoat project was terminated in January 1973 with the end of the
      draft," wrote former USAMRIID commanding officer Col. Dan Crozier. [24]
      (emphasis supplied)


      Q Fever Battlefield Simulations at Dugway
      "We were not told this was a 'germ warfare' project..."

      Tom Kopko was an Adventist who was drafted into the Army in 1954.
      He
      volunteered for Project Whitecoat and was among the first group of
      Adventist servicemen "to serve a highly classified experimental germ
      warfare project conducted at Fort Dugway, Utah," according to a
      statement
      he signed in 1989. [25] (emphasis supplied). "It sounded like a good way

      to serve my country, and, after all, the program was endorsed by the
      Seventh-day Adventist Church," he wrote. The project was a Q fever
      experiment performed on human test subjects at the Dugway Proving Ground

      where the Army conducts CBW testing. This is where many of the first
      Project Whitecoat volunteers were sent.

      Kopko and his fellow volunteers were separated into eight groups of

      about ten soldiers each and transported to test locations about 25 miles

      out on the Utah salt flat. They were made to sit in chairs situated at
      different levels on a high wooden platform. Around them were cages of
      mice, monkeys and guinea pigs. Just after midnight, when wind conditions

      were right, the officers put on their gas masks and the test began. A
      cool
      mist laden with the infectious Q fever virus was dispersed on the
      volunteers by large fans or reportedly dropped from aircraft overhead.
      After becoming infected, the soldiers were flown back to Fort Detrick
      for
      tests and observation. Some soldiers did not go to Dugway to be exposed
      but, instead, inhaled the Q fever virus from a face mask at Fort
      Detrick.

      Kopko reported getting mildly sick while there were others who got
      "deathly sick" from the experiment. "We had to pass by their rooms very
      quietly because the slightest noise would drive them crazy," he wrote.
      One
      of those was Cesar Vega, a Whitecoat volunteer from Riverside,
      California.
      He said that he was fine for a week after being contaminated at Dugway,
      but then came down with a terrible fever and lost consciousness. He
      awoke
      two days later to find the medical staff had covered him with ice in
      attempts to bring his fever down. He was sick for the next three weeks.
      The Q fever experiments at Dugway were conducted at the beginning of
      Project Whitecoat, while subsequent tests were done at the USAMRIID
      headquarters at Fort Detrick, Maryland.

      "We were not told this was a 'germ warfare' project as I understand

      it really was," wrote Whitecoat veteran Harry V. Wiant, Jr., who
      participated in the Dugway Q fever experiments. [26]

      Experiments with Tularemia
      After initial experiments with Q fever, Project Whitecoat moved on
      to
      a host of other exotic diseases such as yellow fever, anthrax and
      tularemia, all potentially fatal. Lester Bartholomew was a 20-year old
      Seventh-day Adventist when he was drafted in the mid-sixties. He told
      The
      WINDS that he volunteered for Project Whitecoat while in basic training
      at
      Fort Sam Houston. After transferring to the Whitecoat unit at Fort
      Detrick, he participated in three projects where he was infected with
      tularemia, black plague and rabbit fever. During the first project he
      was
      infected by breathing from a face mask. The next two were administered
      by
      injection.

      Bartholomew said he became extremely ill, coming down with a fever
      of
      106 degrees at one point. The medical staff packed him in ice and took
      frequent blood samples. Bartholomew was hospitalized and recovered, but
      experienced reoccurring fever and fatigue after being discharged.

      Thomas Ford is another Whitecoat veteran who was infected with
      tularemia. He, too, recovered after hospitalization, but after being
      discharged, he experienced a relapse of "high fever, chills and malaise"

      as well as "a chronic rapid heartbeat." [27]

      About 2,300 Adventists were involved with Project Whitecoat between

      1954 and 1973. The Veterans Administration has reportedly not recognized

      any claims related to the program.

      The Big Lie
      "My primary objection to the Q fever project was that it was
      misrepresented to us as a humanitarian undertaking, not germ warfare."
      Harry V. Wiant, Jr.

      USAMRIID and the Seventh-day Adventist Church both have claimed the

      research performed on Adventist volunteers was purely defensive and
      yielded important vaccines and data. They have emphasized the separation

      between the offensive and defensive aspects of biowarfare, calling
      Project
      Whitecoat "the study of infectious diseases," a phrase that carries a
      purely medical connotation. But is "defensive" and "offensive" CBW
      research as separate as black and white? Isn't "germ warfare" another
      way
      of saying "infectious disease warfare?"

      The advent of Project Whitecoat in 1954 corresponded with the U.S.
      Army's increasing reliance on CBW as a viable component of its overall
      strategy. In 1959 the Army commissioned a public relations campaign code

      named "Operation Blue Skies" that was intended to create a positive
      image
      of CBW in the public mind. Alarmed by the trend, Wisconsin Congressman
      Kastenmeir introduced a resolution reaffirming the U.S. policy since
      WWII
      that this country would not use CBW first in military conflict. In a
      speech on the floor he warned that the army was trying to reverse this
      policy. His resolution failed, largely because of the active opposition
      of
      the Departments of Defense and State.

      Corresponding with the army's "Blue Skies" campaign was a series of

      articles by Don A. Roth in the Youth's Instructor, an Adventist
      periodical, in October 1963. Roth related the story of young army
      private
      Tom Kopko, a Whitecoat volunteer, who had just boarded an army air
      transport headed for Fort Dugway, Utah. While in his seat the young
      private thought back to his basic training. Roth wrote:

      The place was Fort Sam Houston, Texas, and he had nearly completed his
      post induction basic training. A colonel and a representative of the
      General Conference National Service Organization appeared at a special
      meeting and talked about an unusual medical research project and asked
      for
      volunteers. He did not then quite understand all of the fine details
      about
      the program, but he felt that he should join the project. The full and
      complete answer to his queries gave him assurance that this was a
      worthwhile undertaking. His patriotic blood surged through him as he
      anticipated doing something of material benefit for his country. His
      name
      went on the dotted line. [28]

      When compared to Kopko's 1989 statement, it is clear this story was

      a
      sanitized promotion of Adventist participation in CBW research. In a
      second article Roth wrote:

      The project simply involves medical experimentation. But as a result of
      this activity the Army Medical Service has made material advances in the

      development of suitable methods of prevention and treatment of
      infectious
      diseases. As these studies reach completion the information gained is
      reported directly to the medical profession of the United States. Thus
      all
      citizens benefit from the program, not only members of the armed forces.

      [29]

      However, some army physicians apparently had more scruples than the

      Seventh-day Adventist Church as to the possible implications of "medical

      experimentation." This led USAMRIID commander Col. Tigertt, in an
      article
      published in Military Medicine the same year, to criticize physicians
      who
      balked because of the moral implications. He wrote:

      What is surprising is that many physicians have refused to deal with the

      [research] problem. They explain their apathy by stating that ethics
      prohibit their participation in any endeavor, the derivatives of which
      might be used to produce suffering or cause loss of life.... Such
      attitudes, whether fully developed or not, cannot be ignored because
      they
      seriously hamper efforts to get appropriate investigations under way.
      [30]
      (emphasis supplied)

      This apparent "apathy" targeted by Col. Tigertt was caused by that
      Hippocratic oath which says:

      I will use treatment to help the sick according to my ability and
      judgment, but never with a view to injury and wrongdoing. Neither will I

      administer poison to anybody when asked to do so, nor will I suggest
      such
      a course. (emphasis supplied)

      Perhaps the Code of Ethics in Wartime of the World Medical
      Association also dampened research enthusiasm by stating: "It is deemed
      unethical for doctors to weaken the physical and mental strength of a
      human being without therapeutic justification and to employ scientific
      knowledge to imperil health or destroy life." [31] (emphasis supplied)

      Was this the same Col. Tigertt, so eager to subvert the oath to "do

      no harm," the one who swept Adventists off their feet by offering the
      opportunity to participate "in the conduct of a study of the highest
      importance to our nation's health?" It was and, yet, the "humanitarian"
      veneer is so thin that this program's fangs protrude at almost every
      point.

      A Nerve Gas Accident and More Lies
      Five years after the Col. Tigertt and Youth's Instructor articles
      appeared, uncomfortable questions arose over CBW and its support from
      "medical research." This began with an apparent accident at the Dugway
      Proving Grounds, the same installation where Project Whitecoat
      volunteers
      were infected with the Q fever virus.

      On March 24, 1968 the Associated Press reported that on March 13 a
      mist of lethal nerve gas "was blown 30 miles from a top-secret army
      chemical warfare test area ... killing 6,400 sheep in western Utah's
      Skull
      Valley." [32]

      The accident may have served to awaken some people about the
      potentially devastating effects of CBW. Almost a year later, NBC's First

      Tuesday ran a segment on the topic of CBW. The program showed the effect

      of various agents on animals, and then interviewed a young Seventh-day
      Adventist man who had been a Project Whitecoat volunteer.

      In July, 1969 CBS's 60 Minutes examined the subject of CBW. Again a

      young Project Whitecoat volunteer was interviewed. Evidently, the news
      media wasn't buying the "we're only involved in defensive research"
      line.
      This troubled the Adventist leadership, which responded with two
      articles
      in the Adventist Review defending the church's participation in Project
      Whitecoat. The article in the March 20, 1969 issue reads:

      The United States Government decided that as soon as a definitive
      treatment could be developed for a disease, the findings would be given
      wide publicity in medical journals around the world. This publicity
      would
      effectively remove that particular disease from the potential arsenal of

      biological warfare. At the same time it would also spread medical
      knowledge on treatment worldwide, so that those presently afflicted by
      that particular disease could be helped.

      The author of the Review article defends the research conducted at
      USAMRIID on the premise that as treatments are developed for a
      particular
      disease, it would be removed from the potential arsenal of biological
      warfare. Thus non-combatants and the Adventist Church at large would
      help
      eradicate biological warfare by participating in the defensive research
      at
      USAMRIID, according to the Review. Perhaps this author also had some
      swamp
      land and a bridge to sell.


      Project Whitecoat Essential to Offensive Biowarfare
      A Spectrum magazine article invites a far different conclusion, one

      that suggests that Project Whitecoat has actually served to expand the
      CBW
      arsenal. Martin Turner wrote in 1970:

      As we have already seen, it is not certain that the existence of an
      effective treatment or vaccine for a disease is sufficient to ensure its

      removal "from the potential arsenal of biological warfare." In fact,
      such
      treatment must exist for the disease to be included in that arsenal.
      (emphasis supplied)

      The U.S. Army learned well in World War I, a war that produced over

      a
      million casualties from gas weapons alone, that any unforeseen shift in
      the wind brings your agent right back on your own men. Biological
      warfare
      is the same. An army's leadership would be criminally negligent to use a

      biological agent anywhere near their own personnel unless
      bio-countermeasures like vaccines were logistically in place. Launching
      CB
      weapons without these would be the same as shooting one's self in the
      foot, except on a much larger and deadlier scale.

      The value of "defensive" measures such as vaccines to a CBW
      offensive
      was underscored by microbiologist Ivan Malek who said, "In the case of
      intended microbiological attack it is possible to prepare one's own
      personnel, for instance, by vaccination against selected microorganisms,

      so that they would not be seriously endangered when entering the
      infected
      area." [33] In other words, before launching anthrax at the enemy, our
      soldiers would be inoculated with vaccines which may have been tested on

      Project Whitecoat volunteers at USAMRIID.

      Martin Turner confirmed this with Project Whitecoat commander Col.
      Crozier, who admitted the integral role USAMRIID played in the offensive

      CBW mission. Turner wrote:

      The medical unit furnishes the offensive research laboratory with
      vaccines
      developed through experiments on Whitecoat volunteers. Colonel Crozier
      acknowledged that these vaccines are indispensable to the work of the
      researchers in the offensive area and that they would have to develop
      the
      vaccines themselves if the medical service did not. He saw no ethical
      problem, however, and explained that "we are engaged only in the study
      of
      infectious diseases and we can't help what use others may make of our
      work. I have no problem at all reconciling my work here with medical
      ethics, none at all." (emphasis supplied)

      The fuzzy line dividing the apparent "offensive" and "defensive"
      sides of germ warfare all but disappears, leaving even casual observers
      to
      conclude that they are one and the same. This was the conclusion of Dr.
      Malek who said:

      One of the characteristic features of biological weapons is that it is
      difficult to distinguish work done purely for defensive ends from that
      which is mainly offensive .... That is why military establishments
      working
      on the development of these weapons do it mostly under the label of
      defense. [34] (emphasis supplied)

      Turner also quoted from CBW expert Elinor Langer who said:

      With few exceptions, such as development of detection and protective
      equipment, little CBW research can be accurately described as
      defensive.... Because of the nature of chemical and biological weapons,
      research even in seemingly 'pure' areas, such as the development of
      vaccines, has at least equal implications for offensive and defensive
      use.
      [35]

      Perhaps the clearest evidence pointing to the true mission of
      Project
      Whitecoat may be found in an army CBW manual which states clearly that
      "CB
      defense is a prerequisite to attack capability." [36]

      While doing research for the Spectrum article, Turner interviewed
      Congressman Richard McCarthy who was an opponent of CBW in the late
      sixties. Turner wrote of McCarthy:

      At a conference on CBW in December [1969] he stated that he was
      convinced
      by his investigation that Project Whitecoat was being used for offensive

      rather than defensive purposes. "The whole thrust of it in its essential

      conception was a deterrent one, an offensive one, that we threaten to
      use
      a disease on somebody else if they use it on us. Now what they have done

      of a defensive nature is minimal and they even admit it themselves. We
      don't have any measures to inoculate the American people against this
      kind
      of germ warfare.... My knowledge of [Project Whitecoat], and I base that

      on the statements made by very responsible people, is that it is
      offensive
      not defensive and that the Seventh-day Adventists are being duped."
      (emphasis supplied)

      Whitewash, Stonewall and Lie, Lie, Lie
      On November 27, 1969, the Adventist Review printed an interview
      with
      (Adventist) National Service Organization director Clark Smith. Smith's
      comments echoed the statements made in the Review article of March 20
      that
      not only defended church participation in Project Whitecoat but, in so
      many words, defended the entire CBW program at Fort Detrick. Smith's
      apparent damage control was strangely absent of the slightest open
      mindedness toward the charge that Project Whitecoat might be aiding
      offensive capability in some way. Absent was even the slightest
      disapproval towards the development of germ weapons that he conceded
      were
      being developed at Fort Detrick. It is apparent that the church
      leadership
      lacked any sort of healthy distrust of the government's secret germ
      warfare program.

      In his defense of Project Whitecoat, Smith relied heavily on a
      Clintonesque legal definition of defensive and offensive research at
      Fort
      Detrick, i.e., USAMRIID and offensive research were under different
      commands and in completely separate buildings on the base. He said the
      only connection between the two was "a piece of experimental equipment
      costing in excess of a million dollars" that they shared, and he almost
      praised the "financial prudence" of the army for not duplicating this
      expenditure.

      Smith also asserted that USAMRIID facilities were "open" to any
      visitor "with a purpose" and that its research findings were released to

      the public, whereas the offensive research unit was enclosed behind a
      fence, open only to those with the proper clearance, its findings
      classified. All clerical paperwork connected with Project Whitecoat was
      completed by Adventist officials "so that there is nothing secretive
      about
      the entire project," Smith claimed. [37] Smith criticized the "current
      agitation" of those who questioned the church's contribution to CBW
      research, scolding them over "the importance of getting the facts and
      getting them straight."

      It is quite clear that if Seventh-day Adventists believed their
      leadership, they didn't get the facts straight. Their leaders failed to
      reveal the cozy relationship between defensive and offensive CBW
      research
      which has been evidenced by qualified experts. When questions arose
      within
      the denomination, the General Conference appointed a committee to
      investigate. In 1969 this committee went to then USAMRIID commander Col.

      Dan Crozier who assured them that Project Whitecoat was purely
      defensive.
      Col. Crozier even went so far as to claim that "no serviceman has ever
      received any vaccine until he and some of his staff of researchers had
      tried it in their own bodies for any untoward effects," a preposterous
      falsehood Smith passed on to church congregations with a straight face.

      Instead of investigating further, the committee stopped with their
      interview with Col. Crozier and issued the conclusion that "the work of
      the Adventist volunteers in USAMRIID is entirely in the defensive area
      of
      biological warfare and thus humanitarian in nature." It is the opinion
      of
      some Adventists that this is the conclusion the church leadership
      sought.
      In other words, it was a whitewash.

      Needless to say, the separation between the two CBW programs was
      not
      as airtight as the church led its members to believe. Whitecoat veteran
      Tom Kopko, in his 1989 statement, said that the Q fever experiments he
      participated in were "secret" or classified and hidden from the public,
      just as the offensive program was. "We were ordered not to say anything
      for ten years," he said. In fact, all Adventist volunteers in Project
      Whitecoat had to receive a "secret" security clearance before going "on
      project."

      Whitecoat veteran Lester Bartholomew told The WINDS that he had to
      wait for five months before receiving his security clearance. He and one

      other Adventist were then assigned to work in building 427 which housed
      the virology division of the offensive CBW research unit, a "hot area"
      requiring a top secret clearance. This was his "duty station" between
      projects. Bartholomew said that his job was to ship the "bad stuff,"
      glass
      vials containing biological agents, to military posts around the world
      including Fort Dugway, Utah and Guam which was a supply staging area for

      the Vietnam War. Bartholomew suspects much of the "bad stuff" he
      packaged
      and shipped was used in Vietnam. At one point, a virology staffer told
      him
      that if he dropped the two vials he was handling, he would "wipe out the

      state of Maryland."

      Bartholomew realized that Project Whitecoat was really offensive in

      nature when he was "on project." In the clinic he spent an entire week
      before a box that flashed lights and numbers, requiring him to do quick
      calculations to test his mental reflexes. The tests were repeated after
      he
      had been infected with tularemia. At one point, Bartholomew asked one of

      the people administering the test what it was all about. "Well, if we've

      got the enemy sick, we can tell how it will effect them," was the
      response. "Since then, I tell you what, I don't trust the government and

      I
      don't trust the church because they both lied to me," Bartholomew told
      The
      WINDS.

      Why the Seventh-day Adventist Church?
      The Seventh-day Adventist Church places great emphasis on health,
      perhaps more than any other Christian denomination. Its system of
      hospitals and clinics can be found in many countries, and it is proud of

      its achievements in medical research and health education. Adventist
      teachings warn against the use of alcohol, tobacco and flesh meats, and
      abstinence from these are generally required for church membership.
      Historically, the church has anticipated a threat to their religious
      liberties from the circles of government, making even greater the
      following dichotomy: how does a Christian church that places such strong

      emphasis on health, that anticipates a threat from government, be found
      at
      the forefront of a germ warfare research program in partnership with the

      government?

      "It seemed like they were just trying to get along with the
      government and stroke the government so they wouldn't have any
      problems,"
      Lester Bartholomew told The WINDS. "As a church we really want to get
      along with you, we don't want to be known as a cult, and so we provide
      you
      with guinea pigs," was the church's reasoning.

      Other Adventists point to the mid-fifties when this shift occurred
      in
      the thinking of Adventist leadership. The church historically remained
      separate from the other Christian denominations, but changed that stance

      when it joined the Evangelical conferences of 1955-56. This move into
      the
      ecumenical movement coincided with the advent of Project Whitecoat, both

      a
      result of the church's quest for acceptance in the mainstream.

      "No other church would have gotten away with this," Neil Livingston

      told The WINDS. He points to court cases in the 70's and 80's
      establishing
      that "the Seventh-day Adventist Church is the most centralized of all
      major Christian denominations in this country."[33] Livingston asserts
      that the church is hierarchical rather than congregational, with power
      flowing from the top down rather than the other way around. This made
      Adventist leaders in Takoma Park, Maryland useful agents to military
      brass
      in nearby Frederick and Washington. Centralized church government gave
      NSO
      officials the leverage they needed to recruit Adventist boys into
      Project
      Whitecoat. "Other denominations would have never tolerated this type of
      outside interference" from church leaders, said Livingston, citing the
      loose, congregational type structure of other Protestant denominations.

      Livingston also cited the Adventist educational system's impact on
      the church culture as another reason for their usefulness to the army.
      "From the time these youngsters enter high school, they are away from
      home," he said. Many Adventist children go away to church boarding
      school
      and then to college where they live in dormitories. "The church has them

      from a young age ... and this has caused them to look at the leadership
      with awe," thus making them more vulnerable to suggestions from the top
      as
      happened with Project Whitecoat.

      Responsibility
      Project Whitecoat ended 25 years ago with the end of the draft. It
      would seem that time has relegated this subject to the "case closed"
      file,
      a footnote to the Vietnam era and the Cold War. This may be so, but it
      still provides an interesting lesson on how the Christian churches in
      the
      United States have sold out to the ruling powers behind the scenes.
      Project Whitecoat was only one step on that road upon which the
      Adventist
      church and its fellow Protestants have traveled far. It may be safe to
      say
      they have reached the end of that road -- the end of their usefulness to

      those in power.

      Another reason Project Whitecoat remains worthy of examination is
      the
      issue of responsibility, from which no person or church can escape. Even

      though a biological weapons convention (BCW) was signed in 1972, it
      lacks
      verification and enforcement and permits "defensive" research. This
      research speeds along, producing such nightmare weapons as Israel's
      "ethnic bullet" that targets only the Arab genetic structure.
      Bio-technologies such as these are the cutting edge, and how much of it
      builds upon the research done at USAMRIID prior to 1973?

      There are enormous stockpiles of an aging generation of CBW
      ordinance, much of it produced during the heyday of Project Whitecoat.
      This ordinance is now unstable, as are the world's political structures.

      Only one or a number of calamities working together could release a
      deadly
      pestilence. The Seventh-day Adventist Church, because of its phony
      pretense to good health and good works, would share a large portion of
      the
      curse such a disaster would bring.

      The issues surrounding CBW are myriad. There are moral issues at
      stake over the manipulation of life forms for the purpose of mass
      killing.
      There are the issues of when to use them if they are available. There
      are
      issues over compensation to its victims, both civilian and military. All

      of these continue to remain unsettled, as are the mysterious illnesses
      and
      deaths surrounding several Whitecoat veterans and, more recently,
      thousands of Gulf War veterans.

      Hypocrisy
      The issues that loom larger than everything else is the spectre of
      hypocrisy, the weightiest crime in the cosmic scales. Some may see no
      issue; Adventists merely traded the battlefield for a research
      laboratory.
      While this may be true for those who believe in war, it is not true for
      Seventh-day Adventists who historically refused to participate in war.
      In
      1864 their General Conference wrote to Michigan governor Austin Blair
      stating the Adventists take the Bible as their guide and "are unanimous
      in
      their views that its teachings are contrary to the spirit and practice
      of
      war. ... Hence our people have not felt free to enlist into the
      service."

      The following year their General Conference issued a statement
      which
      declared that Adventists "acknowledge the justice of rendering tribute,
      custom, honor, and reverence to the civil power, as enjoined in the New
      Testament. While we thus cheerfully render to Caesar the things which
      the
      Scriptures show to be his, we are compelled to decline all participation

      in acts of war and bloodshed, as being inconsistent with the duties
      enjoined upon us by our divine Master toward our enemies and toward all
      mankind."

      This is the true meaning of "conscientious objector" -- one who
      refuses to participate in war on grounds of conscience, but Adventists
      stretched this meaning over the years to permit service as field medics
      and Whitecoat volunteers, even though the Army field manual clearly
      stated
      that "the mission of the medical service in a theatre of operations is
      to
      contribute to the success of the military effort." [38] Thus, by
      maintaining a benevolent exterior and while purchasing peace from the
      government, Adventists abstained from having to kill a few of the enemy
      on
      the battlefield in favor of assisting in the killing of potential
      millions. This is worthy of our strongest condemnation. We will borrow
      Martin D. Turner's closing paragraphs in the Spectrum article where he
      wrote:

      A conscience that is sensitive to the dangers of coffee and wedding
      rings,
      but fails to be concerned with the moral implications of participation
      in
      biological warfare research, and in war itself, must seem paradoxical to

      a
      great many thinking people. [Then Turner quotes Dr. Malek:]

      The guardians of the Adventist Church ... are content with a morality of

      form without substance, one in which the arts of disease can be
      presented
      as the healing arts, and in which germ warfare can be embraced in pious
      obedience to divine injunction against death. [39]

      Notes:

      Adventists debate church role in Vietnam-era warfare research, David
      Dishneau, Associated Press, October 8, 1998.
      All Things Considered, National Public Radio, October 13, 1998.
      (Requires
      RealAudio player).
      PROJECT WHITECOAT, Martin D. Turner, Spectrum magazine, Summer, 1970.
      ibid.
      PROJECT WHITECOAT, Adventist Medics in America volunteer to Serve
      Humanity, Adventist Review, March 20, 1969
      OPERATION WHITECOAT (part II), Don A. Roth, The Youth's Instructor,
      October 15, 1963.
      PSYCHOCHEMICAL WEAPONS, Sydney Katz, Associate Editor of Macleans, April

      21, 1962.
      see reference 1.
      PROJECT WHITECOAT, An Interview with CLARK SMITH, Director of the
      National
      Service Organization, Adventist Review, November 27, 1969.
      see reference 3.
      see reference 9.
      Seventh-Day Adventist Encyclopedia, Second Revised Edition, Art.
      "Noncombatancy."
      see reference 9.
      see reference 6.
      Letters and statements related to Project Whitecoat obtained from Neil
      C.
      Livingston who contributed some of his research to this report.
      Letter from Cesar Vega dated 10-12-89 (ref. 15).
      Telephone interview with G. R. Bietz, 11-9-89 (ref. 15).
      OPERATION WHITECOAT (part I), Don A. Roth, The Youth's Instructor,
      October
      8, 1963.
      Statement by Whitecoat veteran Thomas Kopko, signed October 10, 1989
      (ref.
      15).
      See reference 1.
      Letter from Wilson Wynn dated 10-12-89 (ref. 15).
      Lester Bartholemew of Oregon in phone interview with The WINDS,
      10-19-98.
      Letter from John E. Keplinger, Chaplain (COL.) AUS, Ret. dated 10-12-89
      (ref. 15).
      Letter from Colonel Dan Crozier, USA MC, Ret.CommandingOfficer, USAMRIID

      [Project Whitecoat] dated 11-7-89 (ref. 15).
      See reference 19.
      Letter from Harry V. Wiant, Jr. dated 11-15-89 (ref. 15).
      See reference 1.
      See reference 18.
      See reference 6.
      W. D. Tigertt, Status of Medical Research Effort, Military Medicine, pp.

      142, 143, (February 1963) in Turner (ref. 3).
      World Medical Association, Code of Ethics in Wartime (New York: 1956) in

      Turner (ref. 3).
      Associated Press as printed in the Newark Sunday News, Sec. 1, March 24,

      1968.
      Dr. Ivan Malek quoted by Stephen Rose (editor), CBW: Chemical and
      Biological Warfare (Boston: Beacon Press 1969), p. 124. in Turner (ref.
      3).
      ibid.
      Elinor Langer, Chemical and Biological Warfare, Science 155, 174-179 and

      299-305 (January 13 and 20, 1969) in Turner (ref. 3).
      United States Army Field Manual FM 101-140, Armed Forces Doctrine for
      Chemical and Biological Weapons Employment (1962), p.10.
      See references 3 and 9.
      Army Field Manual FM 8-10, Medical Service Theatre of Operations.
      Reference 3, Turner also quotes from reference 33 in final paragraph.
      Written 11/08/98

      Copyright © 1998 The WINDS. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED.
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