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Re: Travelling to a different universe

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  • Marchal
    ... Mmh... I guess you mean his 1998 The Interpretation of Quantum mechanics: Many Worlds or Many Words? (quant-ph/9709032) Note that I have *published* the
    Message 1 of 90 , Dec 31, 1969
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      Russell Standish wrote:

      >NILANJAN wrote:
      >>
      >> Hi,
      >>
      >> Could you please tell , who first introduced this notion of
      >> *quantum-suicide* ,and where?
      >
      >Max Tegmark introduced the suicide experiment as a test of many worlds
      >interpretation in his 1998 "Is an ensemble theory the ultimate TOE?"
      >paper.

      Mmh... I guess you mean his 1998 "The Interpretation of Quantum
      mechanics: Many Worlds or Many Words?" (quant-ph/9709032)

      Note that I have *published* the argument on the quantum suicide (as
      a test for Everett) ten years before Tegmark in my 1988 Toulouse
      paper (ref in my thesis loadable at my URL below).
      .
      I have also shown that surviving quantum suicide is a particular case of
      surviving "comp suicide". This is quasi-obvious because quantum
      computational states *are* (among the set of all) computational states.
      (and comp entails that our mind supervenes on all computational
      states: that is why we must still justify why the quantum state win the
      "empirical apparence game").

      Bruno


      http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal
    • Pierre-Normand Houle
      ... Although I agree with much of what David Deutsch says in answer to the question How are moral assertions connected with the world of facts? , I feel
      Message 90 of 90 , Jan 16, 2002
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        David Deutsch wrote:

        > My reply to the Edge Foundation's question for 2002 "What is your
        > question ... why?" is "How are moral assertions connected with the
        > world of facts?" and can be seen at:
        >
        > http://www.edge.org/q2002/q_deutsch.html

        Although I agree with much of what David Deutsch says in answer to the
        question "How are moral assertions connected with the world of
        facts?", I feel somewhat uneasy with his dichotomizing of "facts" and
        "moral assertions". It seems to me one can naturally broaden the scope
        of factuality, as a general concept, so as to make it apply to the
        content of true judgements about ethics, aesthetics or any other
        normative yet potentially objective domain. And this is not mere
        semantic quibble.

        The important point of irreducibility can be maintained, I thing, even
        if we accept a broadened definition of factuality as corresponding to
        truth conditions for judgements in whatever domain where an
        apearance-reality distinction can be drawn.

        Sir Karl Popper talks in chapter five of his _Open Society_ vol. 1,
        about a dualism of facts and decisions. His point is that however
        things are we can judge that they ought rather be different (whether
        or not it is in our power to change them).

        But, in any particular case, would we be *right* (morally) in wishing
        things to be different than they are? (or to wish for the status quo?)
        If we are not free to edict whatever moral principle happen to please
        us then there is room for objectivity, and hence for factuality, it
        seems to me.

        Another problem with a norm free notion of factuality is that once
        we acknowledge the irreducibility of the individuating criteria of
        objects of the common sense macroscopic and social world -- such as
        tables, cats or dollar bills -- to the language of basic physics, then
        it is not clear why moral facts should be singled out on one side of
        the above mentioned dichotomy. For if we don't want to say that "the cat
        is on the table" and "I paid my scarf 12$" are non factual judgements
        why would we want to say so for moral judgments?

        One nice attack on the fact and value dichotomy is Hilary Putnam
        "Reason, Truth and History", chapter six. Putnam emphasizes the value
        ladenness of scientific enquiry in a way that should be congenial to
        Deutsch, for it is quite consonant with the Bronowski quote in his
        answer.
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