Re: Travelling to a different universe
- Russell Standish wrote:
>NILANJAN wrote:Mmh... I guess you mean his 1998 "The Interpretation of Quantum
>> Could you please tell , who first introduced this notion of
>> *quantum-suicide* ,and where?
>Max Tegmark introduced the suicide experiment as a test of many worlds
>interpretation in his 1998 "Is an ensemble theory the ultimate TOE?"
mechanics: Many Worlds or Many Words?" (quant-ph/9709032)
Note that I have *published* the argument on the quantum suicide (as
a test for Everett) ten years before Tegmark in my 1988 Toulouse
paper (ref in my thesis loadable at my URL below).
I have also shown that surviving quantum suicide is a particular case of
surviving "comp suicide". This is quasi-obvious because quantum
computational states *are* (among the set of all) computational states.
(and comp entails that our mind supervenes on all computational
states: that is why we must still justify why the quantum state win the
"empirical apparence game").
- David Deutsch wrote:
> My reply to the Edge Foundation's question for 2002 "What is yourAlthough I agree with much of what David Deutsch says in answer to the
> question ... why?" is "How are moral assertions connected with the
> world of facts?" and can be seen at:
question "How are moral assertions connected with the world of
facts?", I feel somewhat uneasy with his dichotomizing of "facts" and
"moral assertions". It seems to me one can naturally broaden the scope
of factuality, as a general concept, so as to make it apply to the
content of true judgements about ethics, aesthetics or any other
normative yet potentially objective domain. And this is not mere
The important point of irreducibility can be maintained, I thing, even
if we accept a broadened definition of factuality as corresponding to
truth conditions for judgements in whatever domain where an
apearance-reality distinction can be drawn.
Sir Karl Popper talks in chapter five of his _Open Society_ vol. 1,
about a dualism of facts and decisions. His point is that however
things are we can judge that they ought rather be different (whether
or not it is in our power to change them).
But, in any particular case, would we be *right* (morally) in wishing
things to be different than they are? (or to wish for the status quo?)
If we are not free to edict whatever moral principle happen to please
us then there is room for objectivity, and hence for factuality, it
seems to me.
Another problem with a norm free notion of factuality is that once
we acknowledge the irreducibility of the individuating criteria of
objects of the common sense macroscopic and social world -- such as
tables, cats or dollar bills -- to the language of basic physics, then
it is not clear why moral facts should be singled out on one side of
the above mentioned dichotomy. For if we don't want to say that "the cat
is on the table" and "I paid my scarf 12$" are non factual judgements
why would we want to say so for moral judgments?
One nice attack on the fact and value dichotomy is Hilary Putnam
"Reason, Truth and History", chapter six. Putnam emphasizes the value
ladenness of scientific enquiry in a way that should be congenial to
Deutsch, for it is quite consonant with the Bronowski quote in his