Loading ...
Sorry, an error occurred while loading the content.

Re: Free will/consciousness/ineffability

Expand Messages
  • Marchal
    ... You can only bet on a level of description. ... But the same can be said about the brain or the body. I don t understand the nature of the difference you
    Message 1 of 7 , Dec 31, 1969
    • 0 Attachment
      Neil Lion wrote:

      >This is true, but the current state of a computer can always be represented
      >within a finite string. Perhaps the computer cannot ever realize this, as
      >the description will be a part of the computer (ad-infinitum), but as long
      >as I see myself as seperate from the process of the computation, I can
      >objectively describe it in a 'total' manner - I can always describe all the
      >constituent parts that satisfy the circumstance of my definition of a
      >computer.


      You can only bet on a level of description.


      >It is by definition, finitely realizable, which isn't really true
      >for things that really exist in the objective world. In reality, I am not
      >completely seperate from the computer as an actual physical object, but it's
      >like an emulation of a computer running on a 'real' computer; code running
      >on the emulated computer, makes no more sense to the actual physical
      >computer its based on than any other arbitrary program would. A physical
      >computer makes no more sense to the 'cosmos' than does any other arbitrary
      >arrangement of objects.


      But the same can be said about the brain or the body. I don't understand
      the nature of the difference you are supposing.


      >So is a physical computer an immaterial machine, or is it just an example of
      >an immaterial machine, that does actually exist in somewhere in Plationia,
      >or is it neither?


      It is neither. The physical aspect of the computer comes from
      the covering of all immaterial description of that computer made
      at all possible correct level of description existing in Platonia.
      (look at the UDA; links at
      http://www.escribe.com/science/theory/m3044.html


      >Seeing that there is no rigerous way to define what
      >actually constitues a physical computer, and what does not, does it make any
      >sense to say "my desktop computer" has become conscious?


      Your desktop computer cannot be conscious, nor can my brain.
      If you succeed putting my mind (software) in your desktop
      computer, your desktop computer will still not be conscious, but
      it will make possible for me to talk with you (as my brain does
      now). Only a person can be said conscious. And person, like
      nation, or game are immaterial (with comp), and not absolutely
      "singularisable" (only relatively).


      >As the entire
      >universe is eventually connected, I could prob. show and almost infinite
      >number of such machines, just by choosing arbitary points in space to
      >represent the various units of my computer.


      Which "entire universe" (quite undefined term for me). Which
      various units of your computer ?

      >OK, so memory may be a first person experience to us, but would it be a
      >first person experience to an actual physical computer? All the parts of a
      >physical computer are mutually exclusive and rely on a specific physical
      >organisation, existing in the third-person in relation to each other.
      >Therefore, there is no real sense in which the physical computer is in the
      >first-person with regards to anything.

      All right, we agree on that. But this reasoning works for brains, bodies,
      universes, etc.

      >It [the computer] is always going to perceive its
      >memory in a third-person sense.


      Why?


      >It perhaps is justified to say that that
      >although this computer specifically is not conscious/1st-person, it is an
      >example of an equivalent that does exist somewhere in the platonic world or
      >in the multiverse, and so in a certain sense, is conscious, but this seems a
      >bit dubious.


      I don't see why. Would you agree to define axiomatise partially
      consciousness as something we anticipate (partially instinctively)
      altough
      we cannot communicate to others that we "feel" ourselves as conscious.


      Neil Lion said in another post:


      > [...] I have tried to draw a
      >distiniction between a computer (a concept) and a brain (a 'thing'). If
      >you like, a physical computer is meaningless to the fundamental process
      >(sorry I lack a better term), whereas a brain is meaningful. I do believe
      >that the brain has a large part to play in the question of consciousness.


      This would entail that a brain is not emulable by a computer.
      And this would entail the existence of a part of brain non emulable
      by a computer. This would entail something like the use of an actual
      infinite somewhere in the brain or the use or some substancial soul.

      What do you mean a brain is meaningful. An hard disk is also
      meaningful. Are you a naturalist?


      Bruno
    • Marchal
      ... But you are postulating some physical or substancial absolute third-person relations. I take for granted *only* relational number theoretical third-person
      Message 2 of 7 , Dec 31, 1969
      • 0 Attachment
        Neil Lion wrote:


        >OK, so memory may be a first person experience to us, but would it be a
        >first person experience to an actual physical computer? All the parts of a
        >physical computer are mutually exclusive and rely on a specific physical
        >organisation, existing in the third-person in relation to each other.


        But you are postulating some physical or substancial absolute third-person
        relations. I take for granted *only* relational number theoretical
        third-person relations. All the rest from quark to hydrogen and dinosaure
        are invariant pattern observable from some sharable point of view.


        >Therefore, there is no real sense in which the physical computer is in the
        >first-person with regards to anything.

        Sure. But there is no physical computer outside your mind. There is only
        type of immaterial relation between possible immaterial computer.
        The physicality is an indexical. A possible world viewed from inside.


        >It is always going to perceive its
        >memory in a third-person sense. It perhaps is justified to say that that
        >although this computer specifically is not conscious/1st-person, it is an
        >example of an equivalent that does exist somewhere in the platonic world or
        >in the multiverse, and so in a certain sense, is conscious, but this seems a
        >bit dubious.

        Let me try to put it in this way. No physical computer will ever been
        able to be conscious. No physical brain, no body nor conglomerate of
        bodies will ever be conscious. Nor will any physical universe be
        able to contain anything conscious.
        Only person or psychological beings can be conscious. Now you can
        associate
        a mind to a body or to a computer, but you cannot associate a computer,
        a body, or a universe to a mind. You can, nevertheless associate an
        infinity of (abstract and possible) body universe or machine to a mind.
        Computationalism
        in the cognitive science entails many-bodies for "unique" mind.
        (almost the opposite of the many-minds interpretation of QM).

        The physico/psycho traditional link does not work with comp, nor does it
        work with the MWI.
        To a 3-describable machine you can associate a mind, It could be polite!
        But to a pure 1-undescribable experience you cannot attach a machine,
        you can just attach a sheaf of similar/locally-fungible computational
        histories. (See links in my URL).

        Bruno


        http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal
      • Marchal
        ... Yes but the computer itself can not find this level in a provable way. This is not obvious (search for benacerraf in the archive). ... Please Neil, I quite
        Message 3 of 7 , Dec 31, 1969
        • 0 Attachment
          Neil Lion wrote:


          >Because the state of a computer exists at a level at which it can be
          >perfectly known, copied or changed.


          Yes but the computer itself can not find this level in a provable way.
          This is not obvious (search for benacerraf in the archive).


          >Without a physical implemenation,
          >computation exists purely in the platonic realm.


          Please Neil, I quite respect the belief in the physical world, but
          I argue since the begining that such a belief is inconsistent
          with comp. Physics supervene on the sharable experience of immaterial
          machines existing in the Platonia.



          >Consistancy (in the way I
          >understand that you to mean it) seems to be something we map onto the
          >external world, rather than something that is inherant in physical nature.
          >Why does matter need to exist at all?


          I don't believe in matter (personal opinion)
          Comp is incompatible (in some sense) with existing matter (my thesis).

          >
          >Although I may not be able to convince anyone else of my perceptions, I
          >can admit to myself that I am sure of them. A computer however, would have
          >to admit, even to itself, that it was not sure that it had actually
          >experienced what its memory dictates that it had experienced.

          Neither are we. I can be sure I feel pain here and now, but not that
          I had experience it. See previous discussions on both lists.

          >There is no
          >way it [the computer] can be certain whatsoever. Why would a computer ever
          >have an infallible 'inner perception'?

          Why not.

          >Let's say we take a snapshot of a consistant conscious computer that's
          >been evolved to a certain point. It's possible for me to have created an
          >identical computer from nothing, without having the need to evolve it. Now
          >the first evolved computer, is consistant and may even have an accurate
          >set of memories, reflecting where it is now, and where is has been, etc...
          >However, the second created machine, which is in *exactly* the same state
          >as the first, has a set of false memories, that we know that it has never
          >actually experienced. Its only resort, on the basis of its 'infallibility'
          >is that it did in fact experience them, but in the platonic (timeless)
          >world and not in our own. The consistancy of the computer has not been
          >contravened, as perhaps it would have been (as you have said previously)
          >if I had simply changed its memory; yet its inner certainty of memory is
          >fallible.


          I agree and that is why I believe that IF we are machine THEN we are
          immaterial machine. We have never leave Plato heaven if you want.
          Now I don't believe "copy of material universe" exists in Platonia.
          Appearance of physical universes emerges on the computational histories.
          To explain appearnance of lawfulness we need to take into account
          *ALL* computational histories.

          You are quite consistent, Neil. You are saying COMP entails we can
          always be 3-person fallible, and I say the same. In my thesis I get
          the 1-person non fallibility simply by defining knowledge by the
          true (by definition) justifiable assertion. The nuance between true
          and provable comes from incompleteness phenomena.

          No doubt comp looks weird, especially for the "religious believer" in
          universes.


          >From where exactly do we get our sense of infallible perception? Are we
          >going to stop short of trying to explain it? I must admit that if there is
          >a wholly classical explanation of my 'inner certainty', then I have none!


          Plato propose one in his Thaetetus, which can be translate in arithmetic
          through Godel, and which explain at least why consistent machine can
          learn to distinguish 1 and 3 person point of view. Actually it explains
          why it is quasi-impossible for a consistent machine to believe that
          it/he/she
          is a consistent machine.


          >>Perhaps we just cannot be sure of that link. This has nothing to do
          >>with infallibility of inner experiences. It is the link between first
          >>person experience and third person "reality" which can be fallible.
          >
          >I agree that there is a problem translating from first person experiene to
          >third person reality. However, I believe that memory is a first-person
          >experience, as opposed to something that is 'out-there', in the
          >'third-person', that has a physical explanation/theory that is more
          >fundamental than the actuality of the experience.


          This confirms what I say, you reason quite correctly. Now comp is
          my working hypothesis (I don't care at all if comp is true or false).
          What I say is that IF comp is true then the apparently 3-person
          physical phenomena are in reality the result of interference and
          partial sharing of many number theoretical machine anticipations.

          But so we agree. If there is a physical universe then comp is false.
          Equivalently if comp is true there is no physical universe.

          Now you could ask me how I can still keep comp because "is it not
          obvious there is a physical universe?" It is not, especially when
          you realise that the incompleteness phenomena is enough rich
          for justifying the appearance of the belief in a universe, without
          any universe. Some quantum weirdness get rather nice explanation,
          even if they are probably very counter-intuitive.

          Bruno

          http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal
        • Neil Lion
          ... From: Marchal To: ; Sent: Monday, October 01, 2001 4:59 PM Subject: Re:
          Message 4 of 7 , Oct 2, 2001
          • 0 Attachment
            ----- Original Message -----
            From: Marchal <marchal@...>
            To: <Fabric-of-Reality@yahoogroups.com>; <everything-list@...>
            Sent: Monday, October 01, 2001 4:59 PM
            Subject: Re: Free will/consciousness/ineffability

            > >Because the state of a computer exists at a level at which it can be
            > >perfectly known, copied or changed.
            >
            > Yes but the computer itself can not find this level in a provable way.
            > This is not obvious (search for benacerraf in the archive).

            This is true, but the current state of a computer can always be represented
            within a finite string. Perhaps the computer cannot ever realize this, as
            the description will be a part of the computer (ad-infinitum), but as long
            as I see myself as seperate from the process of the computation, I can
            objectively describe it in a 'total' manner - I can always describe all the
            constituent parts that satisfy the circumstance of my definition of a
            computer. It is by definition, finitely realizable, which isn't really true
            for things that really exist in the objective world. In reality, I am not
            completely seperate from the computer as an actual physical object, but it's
            like an emulation of a computer running on a 'real' computer; code running
            on the emulated computer, makes no more sense to the actual physical
            computer its based on than any other arbitrary program would. A physical
            computer makes no more sense to the 'cosmos' than does any other arbitrary
            arrangement of objects.

            > >Let's say we take a snapshot of a consistant conscious computer that's
            > >been evolved to a certain point. It's possible for me to have created an
            > >identical computer from nothing, without having the need to evolve it.
            > >Now the first evolved computer, is consistant and may even have an
            > >accurate set of memories, reflecting where it is now, and where is has
            been,
            > >etc... However, the second created machine, which is in *exactly* the
            same state
            > >as the first, has a set of false memories, that we know that it has never
            > >actually experienced. Its only resort, on the basis of its
            > >'infallibility' is that it did in fact experience them, but in the
            platonic (timeless)
            > >world and not in our own. The consistancy of the computer has not been
            > >contravened, as perhaps it would have been (as you have said previously)
            > >if I had simply changed its memory; yet its inner certainty of memory is
            > >fallible.
            >
            > I agree and that is why I believe that IF we are machine THEN we are
            > immaterial machine. We have never leave Plato heaven if you want.
            > Now I don't believe "copy of material universe" exists in Platonia.
            > Appearance of physical universes emerges on the computational histories.
            > To explain appearnance of lawfulness we need to take into account
            > *ALL* computational histories.

            So is a physical computer an immaterial machine, or is it just an example of
            an immaterial machine, that does actually exist in somewhere in Plationia,
            or is it neither? Seeing that there is no rigerous way to define what
            actually constitues a physical computer, and what does not, does it make any
            sense to say "my desktop computer" has become conscious? As the entire
            universe is eventually connected, I could prob. show and almost infinite
            number of such machines, just by choosing arbitary points in space to
            represent the various units of my computer.

            >>I agree that there is a problem translating from first person experiene to
            >>third person reality. However, I believe that memory is a first-person
            >>experience, as opposed to something that is 'out-there', in the
            >>'third-person', that has a physical explanation/theory that is more
            >>fundamental than the actuality of the experience.
            >
            > This confirms what I say, you reason quite correctly. Now comp is
            > my working hypothesis (I don't care at all if comp is true or false).
            > What I say is that IF comp is true then the apparently 3-person
            > physical phenomena are in reality the result of interference and
            > partial sharing of many number theoretical machine anticipations.

            OK, so memory may be a first person experience to us, but would it be a
            first person experience to an actual physical computer? All the parts of a
            physical computer are mutually exclusive and rely on a specific physical
            organisation, existing in the third-person in relation to each other.
            Therefore, there is no real sense in which the physical computer is in the
            first-person with regards to anything. It is always going to perceive its
            memory in a third-person sense. It perhaps is justified to say that that
            although this computer specifically is not conscious/1st-person, it is an
            example of an equivalent that does exist somewhere in the platonic world or
            in the multiverse, and so in a certain sense, is conscious, but this seems a
            bit dubious.
          • Neil Lion
            Message ----- From: Marchal To: Fabric-of-Reality@yahoogroups.com ; everything-list@eskimo.com Sent: Friday, March 02, 2001 4:23 PM Subject: Re: Free
            Message 5 of 7 , Oct 3, 2001
            • 0 Attachment
              Message -----
              From: Marchal
              To: Fabric-of-Reality@yahoogroups.com ; everything-list@...
              Sent: Friday, March 02, 2001 4:23 PM
              Subject: Re: Free will/consciousness/ineffability

              >>OK, so memory may be a first person experience to us, but would it be a
              >>first person experience to an actual physical computer? All the parts of a
              >>physical computer are mutually exclusive and rely on a specific physical
              >>organisation, existing in the third-person in relation to each other.
              >
              >But you are postulating some physical or substancial absolute third-person
              >relations. I take for granted *only* relational number theoretical
              >third-person relations. All the rest from quark to hydrogen and dinosaure
              >are invariant pattern observable from some sharable point of view.

              Well, I didn't mean to formally postulate this, as there can be no such thing as 'third-person' interactions
              without a first-person somewhere in the equation, but for arguments sake, the unit components of the computer could have been regarded as 1st-person observers, such as humans, that are forced to work together to create a net action of a computation. This would entail the same without relying on self-sufficient third-person objects.

              >>Therefore, there is no real sense in which the physical computer is in the
              >>first-person with regards to anything.
              >
              >Sure. But there is no physical computer outside your mind. There is only
              >type of immaterial relation between possible immaterial computer.
              >The physicality is an indexical. A possible world viewed from inside.

              Is there any other mind outside of my mind, or is just meaningless to talk of other minds?

              >>It is always going to perceive its
              >>memory in a third-person sense. It perhaps is justified to say that that
              >>although this computer specifically is not conscious/1st-person, it is an
              >>example of an equivalent that does exist somewhere in the platonic world or
              >>in the multiverse, and so in a certain sense, is conscious, but this seems a
              >>bit dubious.

              >Let me try to put it in this way. No physical computer will ever been
              >able to be conscious. No physical brain, no body nor conglomerate of
              >bodies will ever be conscious. Nor will any physical universe be
              >able to contain anything conscious.

              What exactly do you mean in this case, by physical? My experience of an object, can not be the object itself; I accept that this experience, and the models I draw from it, cannot in themselves become conscious.. they are only descriptions; but they do seem to show an underlying reality, which they are representations of. We can predict a lot about your general state, by examining your brain for example. Without a 'brain', 'you' would not be conscious. Information seem to have a reason to exist and interact in a 3-dimensional world. I think I would need to read more about this to make a proper comment.


              [Non-text portions of this message have been removed]
            Your message has been successfully submitted and would be delivered to recipients shortly.