## Re: Closer To Truth interview

Expand Messages
• ... I can t remember the context in which I said that but it ll be something like this: 10^23 is the number of molecules in a mole (which actually occupies
Message 1 of 22 , May 8, 2013
On 8 May 2013, at 22:23, Steve <sonatine123@...> wrote:

> Hello David
>
> Thanks for this link - what an interesting website!
>
> I have a question about one of your videos. In 'Many Worlds Of Quantum Theory' you state a figure of 10 raised to 10 raised to the power of 23 as the number of histories involved when considering a cubic metre of air molecules. How, in principle at least, is this figure derived ?
>
> Incidentally I have read both of your books, and know a little about the 'Many Worlds Interpretaion' of quantum mechanics.

I can't remember the context in which I said that but it'll be something like this: 10^23 is the number of molecules in a mole (which actually occupies 22.4 litres, not a cubic metre, but never mind). If each molecule is in n different places at once, mostly uncorrelated with the others, then there are about n^(10^23) different histories under way. We can let n be 10 quite arbitrarily because with huge numbers like that, the topmost power is pretty much all that counts for purposes of envisaging it.

So it's a ballpark estimate raised to the power of a ballpark estimate raised to the power of a ballpark estimate.

-- David Deutsch
• ... Why don t these histories become fungible on a higher level?
Message 2 of 22 , May 9, 2013
--- In Fabric-of-Reality@yahoogroups.com, David Deutsch <david.deutsch@...> wrote:
>
>
> On 8 May 2013, at 22:23, Steve <sonatine123@...> wrote:
>
> > Hello David
> >
> > Thanks for this link - what an interesting website!
> >
> > I have a question about one of your videos. In 'Many Worlds Of Quantum Theory' you state a figure of 10 raised to 10 raised to the power of 23 as the number of histories involved when considering a cubic metre of air molecules. How, in principle at least, is this figure derived ?
> >
> > Incidentally I have read both of your books, and know a little about the 'Many Worlds Interpretaion' of quantum mechanics.
>
> I can't remember the context in which I said that but it'll be something like this: 10^23 is the number of molecules in a mole (which actually occupies 22.4 litres, not a cubic metre, but never mind). If each molecule is in n different places at once, mostly uncorrelated with the others, then there are about n^(10^23) different histories under way. We can let n be 10 quite arbitrarily because with huge numbers like that, the topmost power is pretty much all that counts for purposes of envisaging it.
>
> So it's a ballpark estimate raised to the power of a ballpark estimate raised to the power of a ballpark estimate.
>
> -- David Deutsch
>

Why don't these histories become fungible on a higher level?
• ... Or maybe that s the answer for where your fungible worlds come from. The events with emergent properties in this universe (that by your own example, say,
Message 3 of 22 , May 9, 2013
--- In Fabric-of-Reality@yahoogroups.com, "hibbsa" <hibbsa@...> wrote:
>
>
>
> --- In Fabric-of-Reality@yahoogroups.com, David Deutsch <david.deutsch@> wrote:
> >
> >
> > On 8 May 2013, at 22:23, Steve <sonatine123@> wrote:
> >
> > > Hello David
> > >
> > > Thanks for this link - what an interesting website!
> > >
> > > I have a question about one of your videos. In 'Many Worlds Of Quantum Theory' you state a figure of 10 raised to 10 raised to the power of 23 as the number of histories involved when considering a cubic metre of air molecules. How, in principle at least, is this figure derived ?
> > >
> > > Incidentally I have read both of your books, and know a little about the 'Many Worlds Interpretaion' of quantum mechanics.
> >
> > I can't remember the context in which I said that but it'll be something like this: 10^23 is the number of molecules in a mole (which actually occupies 22.4 litres, not a cubic metre, but never mind). If each molecule is in n different places at once, mostly uncorrelated with the others, then there are about n^(10^23) different histories under way. We can let n be 10 quite arbitrarily because with huge numbers like that, the topmost power is pretty much all that counts for purposes of envisaging it.
> >
> > So it's a ballpark estimate raised to the power of a ballpark estimate raised to the power of a ballpark estimate.
> >
> > -- David Deutsch
> >
>
> Why don't these histories become fungible on a higher level?
>

Or maybe that's the answer for where your fungible worlds come from. The events with emergent properties in this universe (that by your own example, say, allow us to explain boiling water as always the) create a load of universes in your multiverse, but which end up being fungible up a level, which then provides that level with the materials allowing the higher level abstractions independence in their own right to influence reality (by differentiating in different directions)

Directions which within themselves involve a load more events that create a load more fungible universes, providing a new batch of material for the multiverse.
• ... It s because different-histories-becoming-fungibe is an interference phenomenon that requires fine-tuning in the interaction. Assuming that the atoms in
Message 4 of 22 , May 10, 2013
On 9 May 2013, at 13:44, hibbsa <hibbsa@...> wrote:

> --- In Fabric-of-Reality@yahoogroups.com, David Deutsch <david.deutsch@...> wrote:
>>
>>
>> On 8 May 2013, at 22:23, Steve <sonatine123@...> wrote:
>>
>>> Hello David
>>>
>>> Thanks for this link - what an interesting website!
>>>
>>> I have a question about one of your videos. In 'Many Worlds Of Quantum Theory' you state a figure of 10 raised to 10 raised to the power of 23 as the number of histories involved when considering a cubic metre of air molecules. How, in principle at least, is this figure derived ?
>>>
>>> Incidentally I have read both of your books, and know a little about the 'Many Worlds Interpretaion' of quantum mechanics.
>>
>> I can't remember the context in which I said that but it'll be something like this: 10^23 is the number of molecules in a mole (which actually occupies 22.4 litres, not a cubic metre, but never mind). If each molecule is in n different places at once, mostly uncorrelated with the others, then there are about n^(10^23) different histories under way. We can let n be 10 quite arbitrarily because with huge numbers like that, the topmost power is pretty much all that counts for purposes of envisaging it.
>>
>> So it's a ballpark estimate raised to the power of a ballpark estimate raised to the power of a ballpark estimate.
>>
> Why don't these histories become fungible on a higher level?

It's because different-histories-becoming-fungibe is an interference phenomenon that requires 'fine-tuning' in the interaction. Assuming that the atoms in question start out un-entangled and with (say) approximately sharp positions and momenta and hence in approximately a single history, generic (non-fine-tuned) interactions will tend to entangle them more and more as they bounce around.

-- David Deutsch
• ... Yet we do seem to have fungible worlds one level up. I m just wondering how all these concepts might fit together slightly differently. You ve already got
Message 5 of 22 , May 11, 2013
--- In Fabric-of-Reality@yahoogroups.com, David Deutsch <david.deutsch@...> wrote:
>
> On 9 May 2013, at 13:44, hibbsa <hibbsa@...> wrote:
>
> > --- In Fabric-of-Reality@yahoogroups.com, David Deutsch <david.deutsch@> wrote:
> >>
> >>
> >> On 8 May 2013, at 22:23, Steve <sonatine123@> wrote:
> >>
> >>> Hello David
> >>>
> >>> Thanks for this link - what an interesting website!
> >>>
> >>> I have a question about one of your videos. In 'Many Worlds Of Quantum Theory' you state a figure of 10 raised to 10 raised to the power of 23 as the number of histories involved when considering a cubic metre of air molecules. How, in principle at least, is this figure derived ?
> >>>
> >>> Incidentally I have read both of your books, and know a little about the 'Many Worlds Interpretaion' of quantum mechanics.
> >>
> >> I can't remember the context in which I said that but it'll be something like this: 10^23 is the number of molecules in a mole (which actually occupies 22.4 litres, not a cubic metre, but never mind). If each molecule is in n different places at once, mostly uncorrelated with the others, then there are about n^(10^23) different histories under way. We can let n be 10 quite arbitrarily because with huge numbers like that, the topmost power is pretty much all that counts for purposes of envisaging it.
> >>
> >> So it's a ballpark estimate raised to the power of a ballpark estimate raised to the power of a ballpark estimate.
> >>
> > Why don't these histories become fungible on a higher level?
>
> It's because different-histories-becoming-fungibe is an interference phenomenon that requires 'fine-tuning' in the interaction. Assuming that the atoms in question start out un-entangled and with (say) approximately sharp positions and momenta and hence in approximately a single history, generic (non-fine-tuned) interactions will tend to entangle them more and more as they bounce around.
>
> -- David Deutsch
>

Yet we do seem to have fungible worlds one level up. I'm just wondering how all these concepts might fit together slightly differently. You've already got diversity within fungibility. What's to say that isn't a scale-free phenomenon, such that the next level up is fungible, and the level below represents diversity within that fungibility?

One benefit from that would be a mechanism for actually producing your fungible universes. I.e. the mole creates however many universes, but one level up they are all fungible, thus creating the physical material allowing abstractions to be real and dynamical things (i.e. a shedload of fungible worlds for diversification )
• ... DD...maybe fungibility is the wrong word here. But would you say 10^23 instances of the same mole in this universe would result in the same emergent
Message 6 of 22 , May 15, 2013
--- In Fabric-of-Reality@yahoogroups.com, David Deutsch <david.deutsch@...> wrote:
>
> On 9 May 2013, at 13:44, hibbsa <hibbsa@...> wrote:
>
> > --- In Fabric-of-Reality@yahoogroups.com, David Deutsch <david.deutsch@> wrote:
> >>
> >>
> >> On 8 May 2013, at 22:23, Steve <sonatine123@> wrote:
> >>
> >>> Hello David
> >>>
> >>> Thanks for this link - what an interesting website!
> >>>
> >>> I have a question about one of your videos. In 'Many Worlds Of Quantum Theory' you state a figure of 10 raised to 10 raised to the power of 23 as the number of histories involved when considering a cubic metre of air molecules. How, in principle at least, is this figure derived ?
> >>>
> >>> Incidentally I have read both of your books, and know a little about the 'Many Worlds Interpretaion' of quantum mechanics.
> >>
> >> I can't remember the context in which I said that but it'll be something like this: 10^23 is the number of molecules in a mole (which actually occupies 22.4 litres, not a cubic metre, but never mind). If each molecule is in n different places at once, mostly uncorrelated with the others, then there are about n^(10^23) different histories under way. We can let n be 10 quite arbitrarily because with huge numbers like that, the topmost power is pretty much all that counts for purposes of envisaging it.
> >>
> >> So it's a ballpark estimate raised to the power of a ballpark estimate raised to the power of a ballpark estimate.
> >>
> > Why don't these histories become fungible on a higher level?
>
> It's because different-histories-becoming-fungibe is an interference phenomenon that requires 'fine-tuning' in the interaction. Assuming that the atoms in question start out un-entangled and with (say) approximately sharp positions and momenta and hence in approximately a single history, generic (non-fine-tuned) interactions will tend to entangle them more and more as they bounce around.
>
> -- David Deutsch
>

DD...maybe fungibility is the wrong word here.

But would you say 10^23 instances of the same mole in this universe would result in the same emergent macroscopic properties, to about the same extent 10^23 multiverse histories of that mole would?

The way I see it, this has to be true, because any one of those multiverse histories can show up in any one of those moles in this universe.

Also....if the same moles didn't result in the same emergent properties, then we wouldn't have a stable deterministic macroscopic reality.

But then....in what sense are these multiverse histories ever macroscopically different worlds?

I mean...with differences that are statistically significant?
• ... p.s. to the other post coming out with this one. It seems to me you need conscious decisions for multiverse histories to see macroscopic divergence of a
Message 7 of 22 , May 15, 2013
--- In Fabric-of-Reality@yahoogroups.com, David Deutsch <david.deutsch@...> wrote:
>
> On 9 May 2013, at 13:44, hibbsa <hibbsa@...> wrote:
>
> > --- In Fabric-of-Reality@yahoogroups.com, David Deutsch <david.deutsch@> wrote:
> >>
> >>
> >> On 8 May 2013, at 22:23, Steve <sonatine123@> wrote:
> >>
> >>> Hello David
> >>>
> >>> Thanks for this link - what an interesting website!
> >>>
> >>> I have a question about one of your videos. In 'Many Worlds Of Quantum Theory' you state a figure of 10 raised to 10 raised to the power of 23 as the number of histories involved when considering a cubic metre of air molecules. How, in principle at least, is this figure derived ?
> >>>
> >>> Incidentally I have read both of your books, and know a little about the 'Many Worlds Interpretaion' of quantum mechanics.
> >>
> >> I can't remember the context in which I said that but it'll be something like this: 10^23 is the number of molecules in a mole (which actually occupies 22.4 litres, not a cubic metre, but never mind). If each molecule is in n different places at once, mostly uncorrelated with the others, then there are about n^(10^23) different histories under way. We can let n be 10 quite arbitrarily because with huge numbers like that, the topmost power is pretty much all that counts for purposes of envisaging it.
> >>
> >> So it's a ballpark estimate raised to the power of a ballpark estimate raised to the power of a ballpark estimate.
> >>
> > Why don't these histories become fungible on a higher level?
>
> It's because different-histories-becoming-fungibe is an interference phenomenon that requires 'fine-tuning' in the interaction. Assuming that the atoms in question start out un-entangled and with (say) approximately sharp positions and momenta and hence in approximately a single history, generic (non-fine-tuned) interactions will tend to entangle them more and more as they bounce around.
>
> -- David Deutsch

p.s. to the other post coming out with this one.

It seems to me you need conscious decisions for multiverse histories to see macroscopic divergence of a significant kind.

Which sort of puts MWI in the dock for one of the problems it claims to solve: putting conscious observers at the heart of things.
>
• ... Does that mean you need conscious decisions for multiverse histories to be conscious of... If so, then yes: consciousness can t exist at all in the
Message 8 of 22 , May 15, 2013
On 15 May 2013, at 20:49, hibbsa <hibbsa@...> wrote:

> It seems to me you need conscious decisions for multiverse histories to see

Does that mean "you need conscious decisions for multiverse histories to be conscious of..."

If so, then yes: consciousness can't exist at all in the absence of consciousness.

> macroscopic divergence of a significant kind.

What does 'seeing macroscopic divergence' mean? Presumably it doesn't mean 'being conscious of more than one universe'. Perhaps it means the existence of apparent randomness affecting macroscopic observables. But you don't need consciousness for that. All you need is amplification, which happens all the time and doesn't need any specially designed equipment.
>
> Which sort of puts MWI in the dock for one of the problems it claims to solve: putting conscious observers at the heart of things.

It sort of puts MWI in the dock for *your* having put conscious observers at the heart of things, contrary to the predictions of quantum theory. Those are that multiple, approximately decoherent histories are a generic phenomenon in the multiverse.

-- David Deutsch
• ... As tBoI explains, nothing genuinely random (does this mean uncaused ?) happens in the multiverse. Everything that happens, happens in accordance with the
Message 9 of 22 , May 15, 2013
On 16/05/2013, at 7:35, "David Deutsch" <david.deutsch@...> wrote:

> On 15 May 2013, at 20:49, hibbsa <hibbsa@...> wrote:
>
> > It seems to me you need conscious decisions for multiverse histories to see
>
> Does that mean "you need conscious decisions for multiverse histories to be conscious of..."
>
> If so, then yes: consciousness can't exist at all in the absence of consciousness.
>
> > macroscopic divergence of a significant kind.
>
> What does 'seeing macroscopic divergence' mean? Presumably it doesn't mean 'being conscious of more than one universe'. Perhaps it means the existence of apparent randomness affecting macroscopic observables. But you don't need consciousness for that.
>
As tBoI explains, nothing genuinely random (does this mean 'uncaused'?) happens in the multiverse. Everything that happens, happens in accordance with the laws of quantum theory. It is just that those laws mandate that all physically possible things happen so to a conscious observer there exists "apparent randomness" (from the perspective of that person).

But what I have said there must be deficient in some way because "apparent randomness" need not have anything to do with consciousness. It is an objective feature of the multiverse and not simply due to the existence of people.

So what would be a better way to understand "apparent randomness". Could it just be a synonym for "uncommon events"?

Brett.
>

[Non-text portions of this message have been removed]
• ... DD...I m finding it hard to understand what you are saying in terms of what I am saying. I think it would help (me) if you answered my first question.
Message 10 of 22 , May 16, 2013
--- In Fabric-of-Reality@yahoogroups.com, David Deutsch <david.deutsch@...> wrote:
>
> On 15 May 2013, at 20:49, hibbsa <hibbsa@...> wrote:
>
> > It seems to me you need conscious decisions for multiverse histories to see
>
> Does that mean "you need conscious decisions for multiverse histories to be conscious of..."
>
> If so, then yes: consciousness can't exist at all in the absence of consciousness.
>
> > macroscopic divergence of a significant kind.
>
>
> What does 'seeing macroscopic divergence' mean? Presumably it doesn't mean 'being conscious of more than one universe'. Perhaps it means the existence of apparent randomness affecting macroscopic observables. But you don't need consciousness for that. All you need is amplification, which happens all the time and doesn't need any specially designed equipment.
> >
> > Which sort of puts MWI in the dock for one of the problems it claims to solve: putting conscious observers at the heart of things.
>
> It sort of puts MWI in the dock for *your* having put conscious observers at the heart of things, contrary to the predictions of quantum theory. Those are that multiple, approximately decoherent histories are a generic phenomenon in the multiverse.
>
> -- David Deutsch
>

DD...I'm finding it hard to understand what you are saying in terms of what I am saying.

I think it would help (me) if you answered my first question. Which I'll restate here, a bit clearer hopefully.

Let's say 10^23 instances of approximately the same mole existed in this universe. I know you'd need more, but let's say each of the 10^23 multiverse histories was represented by each of those moles in this universe.

What extent would all 10^23 (or however many) moles react to exhibit the same emergent properties?

Or said differently, however many instances necessary to represent every multiverse history, of a litre H20 would boil at the same temperature?
• ... That sentence means that we are to consider 10^23 instances of a sample of, say, a gas, each of which would occupy 22.4 litres at standard temperature and
Message 11 of 22 , May 20, 2013
On 17 May 2013, at 00:50, hibbsa <hibbsa@...> wrote:

> --- In Fabric-of-Reality@yahoogroups.com, David Deutsch <david.deutsch@...> wrote:
>>
>> On 15 May 2013, at 20:49, hibbsa <hibbsa@...> wrote:
>>
>>> It seems to me you need conscious decisions for multiverse histories to see
>>
>> Does that mean "you need conscious decisions for multiverse histories to be conscious of..."
>>
>> If so, then yes: consciousness can't exist at all in the absence of consciousness.
>>
>>> macroscopic divergence of a significant kind.
>>
>>
>> What does 'seeing macroscopic divergence' mean? Presumably it doesn't mean 'being conscious of more than one universe'. Perhaps it means the existence of apparent randomness affecting macroscopic observables. But you don't need consciousness for that. All you need is amplification, which happens all the time and doesn't need any specially designed equipment.
>>>
>>> Which sort of puts MWI in the dock for one of the problems it claims to solve: putting conscious observers at the heart of things.
>>
>> It sort of puts MWI in the dock for *your* having put conscious observers at the heart of things, contrary to the predictions of quantum theory. Those are that multiple, approximately decoherent histories are a generic phenomenon in the multiverse.
>>
>> -- David Deutsch
>>
>
> DD...I'm finding it hard to understand what you are saying in terms of what I am saying.
>
> I think it would help (me) if you answered my first question. Which I'll restate here, a bit clearer hopefully.
>
> Let's say 10^23 instances of approximately the same mole existed in this universe.

That sentence means that we are to consider 10^23 instances of a sample of, say, a gas, each of which would occupy 22.4 litres at standard temperature and pressure. You're right that I didn't realise that that is what you were referring to before.

> I know you'd need more,

I don't understand the thought-experiment you're envisaging, so I don't know what you'd need more of them for.

> but let's say each of the 10^23 multiverse histories

I can't tell whether it's a coincidence that you're now envisaging the same number of multiverse histories as the number of separate instances in one universe that that you have just envisaged above, or whether this indicates that I have some misconception about what thought experiment you have in mind. But I assume from the following clause that you do mean both numbers:

> was represented by each of those moles in this universe.
>
OK, we have 10^23 multiverse histories of 10^23 samples, so we are considering 10^46 instances altogether.

> What extent would all 10^23 (or however many) moles react to exhibit the same emergent properties?

Unfortunately I can't parse that sentence. But, first of all, all 10^23 instances in the same universe have *different* emergent properties, such as centre-of-mass position. Also, as I understand the thought-experiment you have set up, none of the 10^46 instances are interacting with each other. So none of them "react to exhibit" anything.
>
> Or said differently, however many instances necessary to represent every multiverse history, of a litre H20 would boil at the same temperature?

Unfortunately I can't parse that sentence either. But if you're asking: what proportion of the multiversal instances of a litre of water boil at the same temperature -- well, that question mixes two levels of explanation. The literal answer is zero: whatever exact microscopic meaning we might artificially attach to the approximate, emergent concepts 'boil' and 'temperature', the probability of a litre of water 'boiling' at exactly that 'temperature' is zero.

-- David Deutsch
• ... DD - I m still thinking about your reply here. There s a communication issue...we aren t talking about the same thing. I think I m talking about the
Message 12 of 22 , May 23, 2013
--- In Fabric-of-Reality@yahoogroups.com, David Deutsch <david.deutsch@...> wrote:
>
> On 17 May 2013, at 00:50, hibbsa <hibbsa@...> wrote:
>
> > --- In Fabric-of-Reality@yahoogroups.com, David Deutsch <david.deutsch@> wrote:
> >>
> >> On 15 May 2013, at 20:49, hibbsa <hibbsa@> wrote:
> >>
> >>> It seems to me you need conscious decisions for multiverse histories to see
> >>
> >> Does that mean "you need conscious decisions for multiverse histories to be conscious of..."
> >>
> >> If so, then yes: consciousness can't exist at all in the absence of consciousness.
> >>
> >>> macroscopic divergence of a significant kind.
> >>
> >>
> >> What does 'seeing macroscopic divergence' mean? Presumably it doesn't mean 'being conscious of more than one universe'. Perhaps it means the existence of apparent randomness affecting macroscopic observables. But you don't need consciousness for that. All you need is amplification, which happens all the time and doesn't need any specially designed equipment.
> >>>
> >>> Which sort of puts MWI in the dock for one of the problems it claims to solve: putting conscious observers at the heart of things.
> >>
> >> It sort of puts MWI in the dock for *your* having put conscious observers at the heart of things, contrary to the predictions of quantum theory. Those are that multiple, approximately decoherent histories are a generic phenomenon in the multiverse.
> >>
> >> -- David Deutsch
> >>
> >
> > DD...I'm finding it hard to understand what you are saying in terms of what I am saying.
> >
> > I think it would help (me) if you answered my first question. Which I'll restate here, a bit clearer hopefully.
> >
> > Let's say 10^23 instances of approximately the same mole existed in this universe.
>
> That sentence means that we are to consider 10^23 instances of a sample of, say, a gas, each of which would occupy 22.4 litres at standard temperature and pressure. You're right that I didn't realise that that is what you were referring to before.
>
> > I know you'd need more,
>
> I don't understand the thought-experiment you're envisaging, so I don't know what you'd need more of them for.
>
> > but let's say each of the 10^23 multiverse histories
>
> I can't tell whether it's a coincidence that you're now envisaging the same number of multiverse histories as the number of separate instances in one universe that that you have just envisaged above, or whether this indicates that I have some misconception about what thought experiment you have in mind. But I assume from the following clause that you do mean both numbers:
>
> > was represented by each of those moles in this universe.
> >
> OK, we have 10^23 multiverse histories of 10^23 samples, so we are considering 10^46 instances altogether.
>
> > What extent would all 10^23 (or however many) moles react to exhibit the same emergent properties?
>
> Unfortunately I can't parse that sentence. But, first of all, all 10^23 instances in the same universe have *different* emergent properties, such as centre-of-mass position. Also, as I understand the thought-experiment you have set up, none of the 10^46 instances are interacting with each other. So none of them "react to exhibit" anything.
> >
> > Or said differently, however many instances necessary to represent every multiverse history, of a litre H20 would boil at the same temperature?
>
> Unfortunately I can't parse that sentence either. But if you're asking: what proportion of the multiversal instances of a litre of water boil at the same temperature -- well, that question mixes two levels of explanation. The literal answer is zero: whatever exact microscopic meaning we might artificially attach to the approximate, emergent concepts 'boil' and 'temperature', the probability of a litre of water 'boiling' at exactly that 'temperature' is zero.
>
> -- David Deutsch
>

There's a communication issue...we aren't talking about the same thing.

I think I'm talking about the reality of abstractions as you describe them in BoI.

It could be you are thinking in terms of there having to be fine tuning for these abstractions to emerge similarly across different multiverse histories of the same object.

I don't understand why this is. Does water boil with similar characteristics in all multiverse histories of the same can of water heated to boiling, with the same sort of diversity of outcome as 10^30 or whatever cans of boiling water in this universe?

I'm sure I'm confused about something here...I just want you to be able to see what I'm confused about, if that's the way things are.
• ... Hi Hibbsa, I think I have an idea what you might be getting at - and I think I even understand your interest in this now. But a couple of questions arising
Message 13 of 22 , May 23, 2013
On 24/05/2013, at 0:13, "hibbsa" <hibbsa@...> wrote:

>
>
> --- In Fabric-of-Reality@yahoogroups.com, David Deutsch <david.deutsch@...> wrote:
> >
> > On 17 May 2013, at 00:50, hibbsa <hibbsa@...> wrote:
> >
> > > --- In Fabric-of-Reality@yahoogroups.com, David Deutsch <david.deutsch@> wrote:
> > >>
> > >> On 15 May 2013, at 20:49, hibbsa <hibbsa@> wrote:
> > >>
> > >>> It seems to me you need conscious decisions for multiverse histories to see
> > >>
> > >> Does that mean "you need conscious decisions for multiverse histories to be conscious of..."
> > >>
> > >> If so, then yes: consciousness can't exist at all in the absence of consciousness.
> > >>
> > >>> macroscopic divergence of a significant kind.
> > >>
> > >>
> > >> What does 'seeing macroscopic divergence' mean? Presumably it doesn't mean 'being conscious of more than one universe'. Perhaps it means the existence of apparent randomness affecting macroscopic observables. But you don't need consciousness for that. All you need is amplification, which happens all the time and doesn't need any specially designed equipment.
> > >>>
> > >>> Which sort of puts MWI in the dock for one of the problems it claims to solve: putting conscious observers at the heart of things.
> > >>
> > >> It sort of puts MWI in the dock for *your* having put conscious observers at the heart of things, contrary to the predictions of quantum theory. Those are that multiple, approximately decoherent histories are a generic phenomenon in the multiverse.
> > >>
> > >> -- David Deutsch
> > >>
> > >
> > > DD...I'm finding it hard to understand what you are saying in terms of what I am saying.
> > >
> > > I think it would help (me) if you answered my first question. Which I'll restate here, a bit clearer hopefully.
> > >
> > > Let's say 10^23 instances of approximately the same mole existed in this universe.
> >
> > That sentence means that we are to consider 10^23 instances of a sample of, say, a gas, each of which would occupy 22.4 litres at standard temperature and pressure. You're right that I didn't realise that that is what you were referring to before.
> >
> > > I know you'd need more,
> >
> > I don't understand the thought-experiment you're envisaging, so I don't know what you'd need more of them for.
> >
> > > but let's say each of the 10^23 multiverse histories
> >
> > I can't tell whether it's a coincidence that you're now envisaging the same number of multiverse histories as the number of separate instances in one universe that that you have just envisaged above, or whether this indicates that I have some misconception about what thought experiment you have in mind. But I assume from the following clause that you do mean both numbers:
> >
> > > was represented by each of those moles in this universe.
> > >
> > OK, we have 10^23 multiverse histories of 10^23 samples, so we are considering 10^46 instances altogether.
> >
> > > What extent would all 10^23 (or however many) moles react to exhibit the same emergent properties?
> >
> > Unfortunately I can't parse that sentence. But, first of all, all 10^23 instances in the same universe have *different* emergent properties, such as centre-of-mass position. Also, as I understand the thought-experiment you have set up, none of the 10^46 instances are interacting with each other. So none of them "react to exhibit" anything.
> > >
> > > Or said differently, however many instances necessary to represent every multiverse history, of a litre H20 would boil at the same temperature?
> >
> > Unfortunately I can't parse that sentence either. But if you're asking: what proportion of the multiversal instances of a litre of water boil at the same temperature -- well, that question mixes two levels of explanation. The literal answer is zero: whatever exact microscopic meaning we might artificially attach to the approximate, emergent concepts 'boil' and 'temperature', the probability of a litre of water 'boiling' at exactly that 'temperature' is zero.
> >
> > -- David Deutsch
> >
>
>
> There's a communication issue...we aren't talking about the same thing.
>
Hi Hibbsa,

I think I have an idea what you might be getting at - and I think I even understand your interest in this now. But a couple of questions arising first...

>
> I think I'm talking about the reality of abstractions as you describe them in BoI.
>
Really? You might have to clarify the connection between *that* and this stuff about moles and cans of water.
>
> It could be you are thinking in terms of there having to be fine tuning for these abstractions to emerge similarly across different multiverse histories of the same object.
>
Do you mean an abstraction like "the mole" or a "can of water" or...?
>
> I don't understand why this is. Does water boil with similar characteristics in all multiverse histories of the same can of water heated to boiling, with the same sort of diversity of outcome as 10^30 or whatever cans of boiling water in this universe?
>
I think the answer is yes.

I understand your question can be put like this, and correct me if I am wrong:

If you could have 10^30 cans of water in this universe and boiled them all and then compared the results to boiling 10^30 cans of water each in a different universe, would the results be the same?

My guess is: yes, very similar indeed. The same laws of physics apply. We should expect some small number in *this* universe to boil almost instantly or not at all. Similarly when boiling one can of water in this universe, some very small number of counterparts in others boil almost instantly or not at all.

But now note this: the experiment is ruled out by what we know about this universe. Namely, there simply is not enough water to do that experiment (the universe is more massive and with fusion, we might be able to get there...) But even if there were sufficient water we could never (a) calculate the results or (b) process the results
The reason for (a) and (b) is that the universe is accelerating and unless something new is discovered, we will run out of time to do the processing before dark energy pushes everything too far away (like the relevant observations you need to make for this experiment). 10^30 cans of water is just too much and would be spread too far and wide for us to ever check. But we don't need to if we just take what the laws of physics say seriously. And I think that is just a "yes" in answer to your question.
>
> I'm sure I'm confused about something here...I just want you to be able to see what I'm confused about, if that's the way things are.
>
I hope my re-statement of your thought experiment helps.

Brett.

[Non-text portions of this message have been removed]
• ... Yes. -- David Deutsch
Message 14 of 22 , May 23, 2013
On 23 May 2013, at 15:05, hibbsa <hibbsa@...> wrote:

> Does water boil with similar characteristics in all multiverse histories of the same can of water heated to boiling, with the same sort of diversity of outcome as 10^30 or whatever cans of boiling water in this universe?

Yes.

-- David Deutsch
• ... DD - I thought it might help things along if I try quoting directly from BoI what it is I am trying to ask you about. In the Reality of Abstractions
Message 15 of 22 , May 24, 2013
--- In Fabric-of-Reality@yahoogroups.com, "hibbsa" <hibbsa@...> wrote:
>
>
>
> --- In Fabric-of-Reality@yahoogroups.com, David Deutsch <david.deutsch@> wrote:
> >
> > On 17 May 2013, at 00:50, hibbsa <hibbsa@> wrote:
> >
> > > --- In Fabric-of-Reality@yahoogroups.com, David Deutsch <david.deutsch@> wrote:
> > >>
> > >> On 15 May 2013, at 20:49, hibbsa <hibbsa@> wrote:
> > >>
> > >>> It seems to me you need conscious decisions for multiverse histories to see
> > >>
> > >> Does that mean "you need conscious decisions for multiverse histories to be conscious of..."
> > >>
> > >> If so, then yes: consciousness can't exist at all in the absence of consciousness.
> > >>
> > >>> macroscopic divergence of a significant kind.
> > >>
> > >>
> > >> What does 'seeing macroscopic divergence' mean? Presumably it doesn't mean 'being conscious of more than one universe'. Perhaps it means the existence of apparent randomness affecting macroscopic observables. But you don't need consciousness for that. All you need is amplification, which happens all the time and doesn't need any specially designed equipment.
> > >>>
> > >>> Which sort of puts MWI in the dock for one of the problems it claims to solve: putting conscious observers at the heart of things.
> > >>
> > >> It sort of puts MWI in the dock for *your* having put conscious observers at the heart of things, contrary to the predictions of quantum theory. Those are that multiple, approximately decoherent histories are a generic phenomenon in the multiverse.
> > >>
> > >> -- David Deutsch
> > >>
> > >
> > > DD...I'm finding it hard to understand what you are saying in terms of what I am saying.
> > >
> > > I think it would help (me) if you answered my first question. Which I'll restate here, a bit clearer hopefully.
> > >
> > > Let's say 10^23 instances of approximately the same mole existed in this universe.
> >
> > That sentence means that we are to consider 10^23 instances of a sample of, say, a gas, each of which would occupy 22.4 litres at standard temperature and pressure. You're right that I didn't realise that that is what you were referring to before.
> >
> > > I know you'd need more,
> >
> > I don't understand the thought-experiment you're envisaging, so I don't know what you'd need more of them for.
> >
> > > but let's say each of the 10^23 multiverse histories
> >
> > I can't tell whether it's a coincidence that you're now envisaging the same number of multiverse histories as the number of separate instances in one universe that that you have just envisaged above, or whether this indicates that I have some misconception about what thought experiment you have in mind. But I assume from the following clause that you do mean both numbers:
> >
> > > was represented by each of those moles in this universe.
> > >
> > OK, we have 10^23 multiverse histories of 10^23 samples, so we are considering 10^46 instances altogether.
> >
> > > What extent would all 10^23 (or however many) moles react to exhibit the same emergent properties?
> >
> > Unfortunately I can't parse that sentence. But, first of all, all 10^23 instances in the same universe have *different* emergent properties, such as centre-of-mass position. Also, as I understand the thought-experiment you have set up, none of the 10^46 instances are interacting with each other. So none of them "react to exhibit" anything.
> > >
> > > Or said differently, however many instances necessary to represent every multiverse history, of a litre H20 would boil at the same temperature?
> >
> > Unfortunately I can't parse that sentence either. But if you're asking: what proportion of the multiversal instances of a litre of water boil at the same temperature -- well, that question mixes two levels of explanation. The literal answer is zero: whatever exact microscopic meaning we might artificially attach to the approximate, emergent concepts 'boil' and 'temperature', the probability of a litre of water 'boiling' at exactly that 'temperature' is zero.
> >
> > -- David Deutsch
> >
>
>
> There's a communication issue...we aren't talking about the same thing.
>
> I think I'm talking about the reality of abstractions as you describe them in BoI.
>
> It could be you are thinking in terms of there having to be fine tuning for these abstractions to emerge similarly across different multiverse histories of the same object.
>
> I don't understand why this is. Does water boil with similar characteristics in all multiverse histories of the same can of water heated to boiling, with the same sort of diversity of outcome as 10^30 or whatever cans of boiling water in this universe?
>
> I'm sure I'm confused about something here...I just want you to be able to see what I'm confused about, if that's the way things are.
>

DD - I thought it might help things along if I try quoting directly from BoI what it is I am trying to ask you about.

In the Reality of Abstractions chapter on page 108 you speak of boiling water for the sake of a cup of tea, in terms of a "class of high level phenomena - including the liquidity of water and the relationship between containers, heating elements, boiling and bubbles - that can be well explained in terms of each other aline, with no direct reference to anything at the atomic level or below. In other words the behaviour of that whole class of high level phenomena is quasi-automonomous - almost self-contained. This resolution into explicability at a higher , quasi-autonomous level is known as emergence"

You go on to explain emergent phenomena are a tiny minority. You explain the reality of the abstract layering in terms of various conceptions of independence (e.g. in terms of predictability of the emergent properties vs predictability of lower level properties. You continue to develop the concept some way forward which I won't try to type given I should think everyone here has the book to hand.

You consistently refer to the emergent properties in context of a purpose or problem (tea making), and by your profile (for me) I'd normally assume you intend significance to be conveyed by that. It does seem to make sense that the specific emergent properties would be goal or purpose oriented. But objective, non human, ways to represent all possible goals/problems by emergent properties seems a readily soluable problem in itself, even if infinite sets were necessary.

So it's exclusively this general set of emergent property I am communicating about. Namely for the same transformation of the same object for a given set of emergent properties arising, is it logically possible for the summation of all the possible multiverse histories associated with that object and that transformation in terms of those emergent properties to be significantly different to...the single-universe 'statistical' description of the object in just this universe?

The best way I can think of to nail this comparison down is by starting with all possible multiverse histories, and comparing that to whatever multitude of that would be necessary for enough objects in this universe to be transformed such that each of the multiverse histories was represented at least once.

I suppose another possible communication problem would be in terms of how same-universe duplicate objects were defined. The best way to kick that aside, I should think, is to regard the definition of the object as a set of emergent properties in their own right. That way, if you wish, it would seem feasible to tie the transformation of the object to those emergent properties (say...if you required the object to be defined in terms of emergent properties resulting from a transformation of itself....there's probably a fine way to do it).

So that's the basic question.

But this is the sort of stream of knock-on questions that seems to fall out of it:

Is it even possible for a multiverse history to break free of its emergent properties, in a way that couldn't be described by the relevant single universe statistics of that same object for those same emergent properties?

If it is possible, then is it possible for a multiverse history to be a physically impossible occurrence in this universe?

If that is possible, is this because a law of physics would be broken?

If that is the reason, is the law of physics broken in the multiverse history it does occur in?

If not then do the laws of physics vary in the multiverse, *differently* to their variance across this universe?

if so, are there variations of the laws of physics in the multiverse that are impossible in this universe?

if so, is that because a higher law of physics would be broken in this universe?

and so on and so forth....as what seems to be an endless loop that goes up through each level of abstraction.

IMPLICATIONS: If these emergent properties are abstract realities, and the possible multiverse histories for the same object/transformation cannot break free of the associated emergent properties, then that seems to place an absolute limit on the total relative divergence possible for any set of multiverse histories in terms of the same common ancestor universe.

Very tightly constrained indeed.

And I do completely recognize and anticipate this is all explained by some hopefully embarrassing misconception myself. But I really need to be told what it is....I don't think I can get past this on my own. I'm too looked into being convinced. I've even halfway finished a mathematical formalism using a mathematical induction variant.
• ... I don t think you d have to be able to check, or actually set all the water up. It all seems pretty friendly to math, and molecular scaling etc. More
Message 16 of 22 , May 24, 2013
--- In Fabric-of-Reality@yahoogroups.com, Brett Hall <brhalluk@...> wrote:
>
> On 24/05/2013, at 0:13, "hibbsa" <hibbsa@...> wrote:
>
> >
> >
> > --- In Fabric-of-Reality@yahoogroups.com, David Deutsch <david.deutsch@> wrote:
> > >
> > > On 17 May 2013, at 00:50, hibbsa <hibbsa@> wrote:
> > >
> > > > --- In Fabric-of-Reality@yahoogroups.com, David Deutsch <david.deutsch@> wrote:
> > > >>
> > > >> On 15 May 2013, at 20:49, hibbsa <hibbsa@> wrote:
> > > >>
> > > >>> It seems to me you need conscious decisions for multiverse histories to see
> > > >>
> > > >> Does that mean "you need conscious decisions for multiverse histories to be conscious of..."
> > > >>
> > > >> If so, then yes: consciousness can't exist at all in the absence of consciousness.
> > > >>
> > > >>> macroscopic divergence of a significant kind.
> > > >>
> > > >>
> > > >> What does 'seeing macroscopic divergence' mean? Presumably it doesn't mean 'being conscious of more than one universe'. Perhaps it means the existence of apparent randomness affecting macroscopic observables. But you don't need consciousness for that. All you need is amplification, which happens all the time and doesn't need any specially designed equipment.
> > > >>>
> > > >>> Which sort of puts MWI in the dock for one of the problems it claims to solve: putting conscious observers at the heart of things.
> > > >>
> > > >> It sort of puts MWI in the dock for *your* having put conscious observers at the heart of things, contrary to the predictions of quantum theory. Those are that multiple, approximately decoherent histories are a generic phenomenon in the multiverse.
> > > >>
> > > >> -- David Deutsch
> > > >>
> > > >
> > > > DD...I'm finding it hard to understand what you are saying in terms of what I am saying.
> > > >
> > > > I think it would help (me) if you answered my first question. Which I'll restate here, a bit clearer hopefully.
> > > >
> > > > Let's say 10^23 instances of approximately the same mole existed in this universe.
> > >
> > > That sentence means that we are to consider 10^23 instances of a sample of, say, a gas, each of which would occupy 22.4 litres at standard temperature and pressure. You're right that I didn't realise that that is what you were referring to before.
> > >
> > > > I know you'd need more,
> > >
> > > I don't understand the thought-experiment you're envisaging, so I don't know what you'd need more of them for.
> > >
> > > > but let's say each of the 10^23 multiverse histories
> > >
> > > I can't tell whether it's a coincidence that you're now envisaging the same number of multiverse histories as the number of separate instances in one universe that that you have just envisaged above, or whether this indicates that I have some misconception about what thought experiment you have in mind. But I assume from the following clause that you do mean both numbers:
> > >
> > > > was represented by each of those moles in this universe.
> > > >
> > > OK, we have 10^23 multiverse histories of 10^23 samples, so we are considering 10^46 instances altogether.
> > >
> > > > What extent would all 10^23 (or however many) moles react to exhibit the same emergent properties?
> > >
> > > Unfortunately I can't parse that sentence. But, first of all, all 10^23 instances in the same universe have *different* emergent properties, such as centre-of-mass position. Also, as I understand the thought-experiment you have set up, none of the 10^46 instances are interacting with each other. So none of them "react to exhibit" anything.
> > > >
> > > > Or said differently, however many instances necessary to represent every multiverse history, of a litre H20 would boil at the same temperature?
> > >
> > > Unfortunately I can't parse that sentence either. But if you're asking: what proportion of the multiversal instances of a litre of water boil at the same temperature -- well, that question mixes two levels of explanation. The literal answer is zero: whatever exact microscopic meaning we might artificially attach to the approximate, emergent concepts 'boil' and 'temperature', the probability of a litre of water 'boiling' at exactly that 'temperature' is zero.
> > >
> > > -- David Deutsch
> > >
> >
> >
> > There's a communication issue...we aren't talking about the same thing.
> >
> Hi Hibbsa,
>
> I think I have an idea what you might be getting at - and I think I even understand your interest in this now. But a couple of questions arising first...
>
> >
> > I think I'm talking about the reality of abstractions as you describe them in BoI.
> >
> Really? You might have to clarify the connection between *that* and this stuff about moles and cans of water.
> >
> > It could be you are thinking in terms of there having to be fine tuning for these abstractions to emerge similarly across different multiverse histories of the same object.
> >
> Do you mean an abstraction like "the mole" or a "can of water" or...?
> >
> > I don't understand why this is. Does water boil with similar characteristics in all multiverse histories of the same can of water heated to boiling, with the same sort of diversity of outcome as 10^30 or whatever cans of boiling water in this universe?
> >
> I think the answer is yes.
>
> I understand your question can be put like this, and correct me if I am wrong:
>
> If you could have 10^30 cans of water in this universe and boiled them all and then compared the results to boiling 10^30 cans of water each in a different universe, would the results be the same?
>
> My guess is: yes, very similar indeed. The same laws of physics apply. We should expect some small number in *this* universe to boil almost instantly or not at all. Similarly when boiling one can of water in this universe, some very small number of counterparts in others boil almost instantly or not at all.
>
> But now note this: the experiment is ruled out by what we know about this universe. Namely, there simply is not enough water to do that experiment (the universe is more massive and with fusion, we might be able to get there...) But even if there were sufficient water we could never (a) calculate the results or (b) process the results
> The reason for (a) and (b) is that the universe is accelerating and unless something new is discovered, we will run out of time to do the processing before dark energy pushes everything too far away (like the relevant observations you need to make for this experiment). 10^30 cans of water is just too much and would be spread too far and wide for us to ever check. But we don't need to if we just take what the laws of physics say seriously. And I think that is just a "yes" in answer to your question.
> >
> > I'm sure I'm confused about something here...I just want you to be able to see what I'm confused about, if that's the way things are.
> >
> I hope my re-statement of your thought experiment helps.
>
> Brett.
>
> [Non-text portions of this message have been removed]
>

I don't think you'd have to be able to check, or actually set all the water up. It all seems pretty friendly to math, and molecular scaling etc.

More generally, the issue about room in this universe seems tied to what if anything limits how generally yet precisely an 'object/transformation/emergent-property' set can be defined. If you can do it scale free, then you can do the math probably within the same dimensions the multiverse histories can fit into.

Not sure...just speculating. This has already gone further than the natural interest my end. But given that it has....I do think mathematical proofs are probably straightforward probably for less than a week hard graft.

This is because I am fairly confident the relation of total multiverse diversity can be related directly to the lowest level of abstraction in terms of the emergent macroscopic reality (the true lowest level can't be determined that I can see)

Likewise a formality of the highest emergent level can be expressed, which again wouldn't be the true highest level.

But then the reason I don't think the formalism would need absolute highest and lowest is because the maximum multiverse diversity would be expressable as a limit, and associated with the lower level of the two. Likewise the maximum abstract level up can be expressed another limit of multiverse diversity. I think the higher one --> 0 definitely and the lower one is indeterminate but >>0

but all that's probably enough for two kinds of proof. Firstly using mathematical induction to show any intermediate level is always between the two extremes, and from that showing the maxiumum multiverse diversity tends to 0 as you progress up the levels of abstraction.

it's worth making clear at this point, I recognize I'm going to be slapped straight about all this. It's just that the communication difficulties led me to thinking all this through....basically as ways and means of getting understood and criticized because I'm too psychological locked in now, to see how I'm wrong.
• ... Does that translate into a maximum possible relative divergence of multiverse histories wrt to a common ancestor universe? (i.e. that divergent histories
Message 17 of 22 , May 24, 2013
--- In Fabric-of-Reality@yahoogroups.com, David Deutsch <david.deutsch@...> wrote:
>
> On 23 May 2013, at 15:05, hibbsa <hibbsa@...> wrote:
>
> > Does water boil with similar characteristics in all multiverse histories of the same can of water heated to boiling, with the same sort of diversity of outcome as 10^30 or whatever cans of boiling water in this universe?
>
> Yes.
>
> -- David Deutsch
>

Does that translate into a maximum possible relative divergence of multiverse histories wrt to a 'common ancestor' universe?

(i.e. that divergent histories must be similar to the extent they all generate the same emergent properties)
• On 24/05/2013, at 22:19, hibbsa wrote ... Snipped ... What is? ... No. ... They do not vary in the multiverse. The laws of quantum theory
Message 18 of 22 , May 24, 2013
On 24/05/2013, at 22:19, "hibbsa" <hibbsa@...> wrote
>
>
> --- In Fabric-of-Reality@yahoogroups.com, "hibbsa" <hibbsa@...> wrote:
> >
> >
> >
>
>
Snipped
>
> I suppose another possible communication problem would be in terms of how same-universe duplicate objects were defined. The best way to kick that aside, I should think, is to regard the definition of the object as a set of emergent properties in their own right. That way, if you wish, it would seem feasible to tie the transformation of the object to those emergent properties (say...if you required the object to be defined in terms of emergent properties resulting from a transformation of itself....there's probably a fine way to do it).
>
> So that's the basic question.
>

What is?
>
> But this is the sort of stream of knock-on questions that seems to fall out of it:
>
> Is it even possible for a multiverse history to break free of its emergent properties, in a way that couldn't be described by the relevant single universe statistics of that same object for those same emergent properties?
>
> If it is possible, then is it possible for a multiverse history to be a physically impossible occurrence in this universe?
>
No.
>
> If that is possible, is this because a law of physics would be broken?
>
> If that is the reason, is the law of physics broken in the multiverse history it does occur in?
>
> If not then do the laws of physics vary in the multiverse, *differently* to their variance across this universe?
>
They do not vary in the multiverse. The laws of quantum theory describe the multiverse.
>
> if so, are there variations of the laws of physics in the multiverse that are impossible in this universe?
>
> if so, is that because a higher law of physics would be broken in this universe?
>
> and so on and so forth....as what seems to be an endless loop that goes up through each level of abstraction.
>
I don't think there is an endless loop. My guess is your questions, as posed in your post, have straight forward answers.

Brett.
>

[Non-text portions of this message have been removed]
• ... Most definitely, one way or the other. For it to go in the direction I think you meant, what will be required - I think - is reasoning from Deutsch
Message 19 of 22 , May 25, 2013
--- In Fabric-of-Reality@yahoogroups.com, Brett Hall <brhalluk@...> wrote:
>
>
> On 24/05/2013, at 22:19, "hibbsa" <hibbsa@...> wrote
> >
> >
> > --- In Fabric-of-Reality@yahoogroups.com, "hibbsa" <hibbsa@> wrote:
> > >
> > >
> > >
> >
> >
> Snipped
> >
> > I suppose another possible communication problem would be in terms of how same-universe duplicate objects were defined. The best way to kick that aside, I should think, is to regard the definition of the object as a set of emergent properties in their own right. That way, if you wish, it would seem feasible to tie the transformation of the object to those emergent properties (say...if you required the object to be defined in terms of emergent properties resulting from a transformation of itself....there's probably a fine way to do it).
> >
> > So that's the basic question.
> >
>
> What is?
> >
> > But this is the sort of stream of knock-on questions that seems to fall out of it:
> >
> > Is it even possible for a multiverse history to break free of its emergent properties, in a way that couldn't be described by the relevant single universe statistics of that same object for those same emergent properties?
> >
> > If it is possible, then is it possible for a multiverse history to be a physically impossible occurrence in this universe?
> >
> No.
> >
> > If that is possible, is this because a law of physics would be broken?
> >
> > If that is the reason, is the law of physics broken in the multiverse history it does occur in?
> >
> > If not then do the laws of physics vary in the multiverse, *differently* to their variance across this universe?
> >
> They do not vary in the multiverse. The laws of quantum theory describe the multiverse.
> >
> > if so, are there variations of the laws of physics in the multiverse that are impossible in this universe?
> >
> > if so, is that because a higher law of physics would be broken in this universe?
> >
> > and so on and so forth....as what seems to be an endless loop that goes up through each level of abstraction.
> >
> I don't think there is an endless loop. My guess is your questions, as posed in your post, have straight forward answers.
>
> Brett.
> >

Most definitely, one way or the other.

For it to go in the direction I think you meant, what will be required - I think - is reasoning from Deutsch thMultivereasoning from Deutsch demonstrating macroscopically divergent universes are theoretically/logically possible.

The reason I think the burden of proof has shifted to Deutsch and MWI is because on my reading we've already gone a long way toward agreeing that for some arbitrary object, the multiverse histories are constrained to generate the same emergent propertites.

The nature of the emergence we are talking about, means - anything we can say about an arbitrary object, we can probably say the same across all reasonable/interesting scenarios.

If the reasoning isn't there ...could be neither is the multiverse.
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