Re: The Beginning of Infinity Discussion
- --- In Fabric-of-Reality@yahoogroups.com, W.Taylor@... wrote:
> This is a great load of debate about something that can never be
> our lifetimes, or in our great-great-grandchildren's - but hey - suchdebates
> are the source of life on the net, neh!?at
> Quoting hibbsa hibbsa@...:
> > - what you say is also part of the truth, but that doesn't mean that
> > what I'm saying can be dismissed.
> Well let's see now.
> > If I take a photocopy of you and stand
> > you facing to that copy....you are still the same you. You are not
> > both...you can only guess what that copy is thinking when he looks
> > you. Sure, you can guess real good, but that ability to guess willcase
> > diverge with time as that copy makes different decisions.
> > It's not you. It doesn't matter if you are the copy because in that
> > the original isn't you. It doesn't matter if there's no way for a3rd
> > party or some turing-esque arrangement to tell the differencebetween
> > copy and the original, because it isn't about that. It's about, whatis
> > it that is you, or me, in terms of inner experience.say
> I understood that in these "thought experiments", or perhaps we should
> "science fantasies", the conventional agreement was that thetransporter
> actually deconstructed one's body completely, squirted the pureinformation
> through space at the speed of light, and re-constructed your body anewcould be
> from it at the other end. (Even using different atoms in the process!)
> Indeed, in a science fantasy just recently proposed here, the info
> used to reconstruct people twice or ten times over, and years later.up
> (I suspect that the quantum "no-cloning" theorem would prevent this,
> but what the heck, in a fantasy thought experimemt you can do
> more or less whatever you like.)
> So, the two people who come out of the doubler/transporter, are made
> of atoms that weren't recently in your (now de-constructed) body."doubler",
> All that is left of you is the "formal cause" of your old self,
> in new material. But OC both these fantastically accurate copies of
> your old self have all the same memories etc up to the doubling point,
> and claim to be you, and regard the other as a pleasant-seeming fellow
> who might do as a long-lost identical twin, but is "not really" Hibbs.
> I think this purified fantasy obviates your "photocopy" example,
> which was never that great anyway.
> Now of course, there may be *another* machine, not so much a
> as a "perfect copier". It scans your body and brain with totalaccuracy,
> withOUT destroying it in so doing, (again probably impossible inprinciple
> by no-cloning, but let's blithely ignore these irritating objections),lab
> and knocks up a new version of you in the constructing lab.
> In this example fantasy, I think you want to say that the Hibbs in
> the scanning lab is the "real you", and the Hibbs in the constructing
> is an identical-twin imposter. But is it really different? Theconstructed
> Hibbs will have all your memories and predilections, and claim to bemixed up
> the real Hibbs, and that the lab administrators must have got them
> somehow. And once you are out of the lab, and go down in the lift withpositional
> no-one else in there, and come out having rough-housed several
> swap-overs while inside it, *no-one* can ever tell the difference!lift.)
> (I'm assuming no tiny scars or the like were suffered between lab and
> AND - and this is telling! - if the scanning lab and the
> looked exactly the same right up to the lift door, then neither wouldeither
> of YOU TWO be able to know for sure which was which! Both of you woulddoubler)
> still feel sure that he was "the real Hibbs" - in all innocence!
> The differences between the first example (with the deconstructing
> and the second example (with the nondestructive scanner) arenegligible
> to the point of positivistic equivalence. To insist on a difference isinvolving
> like fiddling with those absurd mathematico-logical "supertasks"
> doing infinitely many discrete tasks in a finite time, and trying topressed,
> deduce something from it. The whole thing is a fantasy, but if
> as I have done, to its logical conclusion, one sees that the idea ofHi Bill - for me the problem is more immediate. I'm left worrying why I
> personal identity is impossible in the presence of such machines.
> Lucky we won't have to bother with this for at least 500 years, then!
> -- Withering William
> ** Not only can you never step into the same river twice,
> ** you are not even the same person stepping in, the second time.
> This message was sent using IMP, the Internet Messaging Program.
think I'm mentioning self-evident considerations, yet people I am
satisfied have more intelligent/highly-developed positions on such
matters see me misconceived.
I'm thinking I'm just out of context on something.....haven't adequately
distinguished the issues being discussed...you agree with what I'm
saying but what I'm saying is irrelevant in the context.
I find that explanation more comforting than the alternatives of either
I am truly plotless, or this is one of the instances that history is
littered with, where the gifted and talented manage to pickle an avenue
of thought by ignoring some glaringly self evident truths..... on
grounds of the truth is not always self evident.
How about the OO distinction between a class and an instantiation of a
You're an instance of your exact biological arrangement. An identical
you is another instance.
It's really not that much more sensible to say a copy of you being
created somewhere else is a good reason for you to be destroyed in the
transporter, than it is to say that because I exist you can safely die
in the transporter. I'm not far off identical to you Bill. A few
differences here and there but we're probably talking 99.x% identical.
What if the transporter creates your copy with just a moleculres in the
wrong order...will it still be you? How much is not enough.
- On 28 Nov 2011, at 19:43, John Clark wrote:
> On Sun, Nov 27, 2011 at 1:22 PM, Bruno Marchal <marchal@...>Let us be clear. I agree, I was saying this for those who introduce
> > "Like in Everett: the duplicated (or differentiated) subject
> > does not feel being duplicated. he continues to feel to be
> > unique, and that is conformed to the mechanist assumption."
> > "There will be not mysterious telepathic connection between the two
> > duplicated
> > person"
> > "making them feeling as one person in two places."
non Turing emulable telepathic connection, ad absurdum.
> Both will feel like they are one person in one place, and if theYes.
> duplicating room is symmetrical there will be 2 brains in that room
> only one mind.
> If you doubt this then perform an experiment, instantlyOr like when the two brains are identical until they interact with
> switch the position of the 2 identical people; the people themselves
> notice no difference because as I've said the room is symmetrical, a
> outside observer would notice no difference because as I've said the
> people were identical, and the very universe itself would notice no
> difference. If objectively it makes no difference and subjectively
> it makes
> no difference then I think it's safe to conclude it just makes no
> difference. Of course if there were a change in the environment that
> things unsymmetrical or there were a random quantum fluctuation that
> the people different then things would be, well, different.
very different environment, like in the duplication thought experiment.
>Sometimes it makes sense, especially when going back in a discussion
> And please please please start trimming quoted material, in long
> and their countless iterations of quotes of quotes of quotes of
> quotes your
> posts are becoming increasingly unreadable. If you doubt this then
> an experiment, look at your post that I'm responding to with fresh
> eyes and
> ask yourself if potential readers would find the prospect of reading
> entire thing inviting. Would you read such a mishmash if it came from
> somebody else?
after some interruption, and when some points refer to old agreements.
But I agree, let us not exaggerate. Sorry.
-- Bruno Marchal
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