Re: AD HOMINEM (was: Tone, Criticism)
- On Mar 31, 2011, at 3:19 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>No and no. Please be more careful to quote DD when making statements about what he said. You've misunderstood his post and now reported your misunderstanding as his view.
> On 31 Mar 2011, at 01:19, Elliot Temple wrote:
>> On Mar 30, 2011, at 11:51 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>> On 30 Mar 2011, at 07:45, Elliot Temple wrote:
>>>> On Mar 29, 2011, at 12:12 PM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>>>> On 29 Mar 2011, at 01:26, Elliot Temple wrote:
>>>>>> On Mar 28, 2011, at 9:55 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>>>> I am willing to use "conjecture" instead of "induction", or
>>>> But that would just be a change of vocabulary without changing your
>>>> underlying ideas. It's the substance of your underlying ideas
>> that I
>>>> disagree with.
>>> I have not yet understood what is the substantial issue where we
>> Yes and that lack of understanding is a type of disagreeing -- you
>> see the issues differently than I do.
> A misunderstanding is not a disagreement. That is what DD said
> recently about Popper and evolution.
When a person doesn't understand X then he thinks differently than a person who does -- they have a different way of seeing the world -- they are not in agreement -- they disagree.
Kolya I think it was said that disagreement is a special case of not understanding. This insight is part of the DD worldview. It is an issue about which you disagree with us.
>>If you don't like DD's kind of arguments, and don't want to engage with his text, and think his arguments are un-stragiht, I don't think we're going to get anywhere and I don't know why you're here.
>> I've tried to explain it before without success. Maybe let's try
>> again after you read BoI. If you could mark down specific
>> epistemology quotes from BoI as you read, which you don't agree with
>> or don't understand, I think that would help get a discussion going.
> I prefer straight arguments, involving only logic and shared hypothesis.
Or maybe I've misunderstood your meaning. But are you really refusing to have a discussion in which you quote the passages from BoI that you disagree with? You don't think engaging with quotes would help deal with misunderstandings?
>>This is deeply ambiguous. Try to be clearer?
>>> (except probably the falsity of physicalism in the comp
>>> theory: but this is not a disagreement, it is just that you are not
>>> aware of new results in the field).
>>> Of course we do disagree on some point, and not always with the same
>>> level of agreement on the disagreement.
>>>>>>> You might not be so easy to persuade. (Which reminds me I have a
>>>>>>> question for Alan on the fallibility issue, so we might come
>>>> back on
>>>>>>> some unfinished discussions).
>>>>>> Like most of the people here, I started with a non-DD, non-FoR
>>>>>> worldview. But unlike some people here I was persuaded.
>>>>> But not *completely* persuaded, I hope.
>>>> OK, yes.
>>>>> You would stop to be fallibilist.
>>>> Fallibilism and persuasion are compatible.
>>> Hmm... I can say "yes", of course, by a slight weakening of the
>>> meaning of the term "persuasion", but that seems to me a 1004
>>> (premature precision), at least with respect to pedagogy.
>> What do you think persuasion is?
> We are completely persuaded when we think we are true on something.
>>>>> And here I have to say that I tend to agree with Peter. If we are
>>>>> fallibilist, we can only find a theory plausible,
>>>> Here you disagree with me/dd/popper.
>>>> As I've said, we disagree. I don't know what's so hard about
>>>> accepting that we disagree.
>>>> This position you are advocating is not our position. We have
>>>> arguments against it. We think it is a mistake.
>>> I suspect you are, consciously or unconsciously, referring to truth,
>>> in a way which I find incompatible with fallibilism.
>> then we disagree about fallibilism.
> We can refer to truth in the sense that we can hope our theories are
> true. Not in the sense that we know for sure that our theories are true.
>You cannot infer from not answering everything that I agree.
>>>>> with some fuzzy
>>>>> degree, given that we admit we are sure of nothing. Such degree
>>>>> not need to be a number. In formal approach on this we choose
>>>>> in some partial order structure.
>>>> This idea you are expressing, no matter what words you try to use
>>>> express it, is incompatible with Popper/DD epistemology. It's one
>>>> the things we believe we have refuted.
>>> Not clearly enough for making me realize that I am mistaken. But I
>>> would prefer to illustrate this on a tangible example (like the
>>> refutation of the conjunction of materialism and computationalism,
>>> than in an abstract discussion.
>> You say our refutations are not clear enough. Could you give a quote
>> of one that you think is not clear enough and say what is unclear
>> about it and what it's missing?
> A long time ago you just fail to answer some question, which makes me
> think we agree. This happens again. See below.
And you didn't answer a bunch of what I said. Shrug.
>Except that you propose exceptions to it involving arithmetic and consciousness. So we disagree.
>>>> So what?
>>> I am not sure something can be known-for-sure as objectively true,
>> Nothing can be.
> We agree on this.
>Perhaps the moon is made of cheese.
>>> except perhaps elementary arithmetic.
>> This exception is criticized in FoR in the chapter about math!
> I said perhaps.
Adding a perhaps before a false statement is no excuse. You were wrong (I think). Don't just hedge about whether you meant it or not.
> I can hardly doubt that 24 is even, but I am open toOf course we should never use "that might be false" as an argument. it is no argument for falsity.
> be wrong, even on that. But to progress, we should agree not to rise
> doubt over and over on what we found extremely plausible, like the
> parity of little integers, for example.
>No because it requires knowing-for-sure as a basic property of knowledge. It defines knowledge in an impossible way.
>>> Many people believe that the existence of a *primary* physical
>>> universe is objectively true. But such an existence is refuted in
>>> comp theory of mind.
>>> Could you help me by giving an example of an objectively true
>>> statement (beyond arithmetic)?
>> I'm a fallibilist. I don't know-for-sure anything. There is
>> objective truth but I don't know for sure which of my statements are
> Perfect. But then the classical theory of knowledge make sense.
> I knowNeeds more clarity. Assumes the reader knows/agrees-with too much at the start.
> p means by definition in that theory that I conjecture p, and it
> happens (God knows why) that p is objectively true (but I don't know
> Keep in mind that I am using that theory. It does not refute anything
> in FOR (except in the long run the physicalism).
>>>> You've brought them up abruptly and I don't know why.
>>> It might be an excellent test case. A way to illustrate science and
>> It will only work as a good test case if you explain yourself more.
>> You keep referring to stuff I'm not familiar with. Maybe you
>> published about it somewhere but I haven't read that.
> You might read my paper here:
>>>> I also don't know the difference between "weak materialism" and
>>>> normal materialism. I take it the difference is important since you
>>> Normal materialism is often described as the doctrine that only
>>> primary matter exists and that the rest can be described as
>>> interacting or interfering primary matter.
>> This is false (by the DD/Popper view). What exists are the things
>> required to exist by our explanations.
> Again an important point where we agree.
>>too many fancy words strung together. need more clarity to understand you. i know all of them individually but i can't tell what you mean by them. for example "realist idealism" is a contradiction. so either it's wrong or it needs a bunch of further explanation.
>> Also note Popper's worlds 2 and 3.
>>> The epistemological
>>> correspondent of normal materialism is physicalism: the idea that
>>> physics is the fundamental science, and that, at least in principle,
>>> all other science can be reduced to physics. Normal materialism is a
>>> monism, with matter constituting the fundamental ontology.
>>> Weak materialism is the doctrine asserting that primary matter
>> Of course matter exists (I don't know what the word "primary" is
>> for). Are you advocating idealism or something? Do you have a
>> criticism of DD's realist views?
> I can explain that comp makes a form of ontological realist idealism
> Matter exists, but not ontologically.what? you need to explain what you're talking about not just make terse statements.
> The existence of theQuantum Physics is wrong, you say? What?
> appearance of matter is a theorem in the comp theory. Like we don't
> need an ontological collapse, we cannot need the QM theory. The QM
> theory is false or redundant, or comp is false.
>Do you think atoms exist?
>> Are you really denying that my iMac (which is made of matter)
>> exists? If so, how do you suppose I sent this email?
> I don't deny that your iMac exists. I deny that your iMac is made of
> elementary objects eventually described by physics. The material
> reality is a pattern emerging from addition and multiplication on the
> non negative integers.
If you're just replacing subatomic particles with something else, but allowing for emergence, then atoms and matter still exist because they figure into our non-reductionist explanations.
You said above you agreed with the DD way of determining what exists. But it doesn't look to me like you are using it now.
>>So why are you saying it doesn't exist if it does?
>>> Both a normal materialist and a dualist believes (or assumes- weak
>>> materialism. The falsity of weak materialism is spiritual or
>>> immaterial monism. Tegmark, for example, proposes, or acn be
>>> interpreted as proposing that the fundamental reality is
>>> like the "Mathematicians" in the school of Plato (Xeusippes, for
>>> example). I have myself shown that if we take seriously even a very
>>> weak version of the computationalist hypothesis in the philosophy of
>>> mind, then the ontology can be reduced to (mathematical) computer
>>> science or arithmetic. The coupling consciousness/realities emerge
>>> from the additive and multiplicative structure of the integers, in a
>>> way which is testable, and already tested. Indeed computationalism
>>> explains most of the quantum weirdness. Such a theory is not
>>> but my point is just that such a theory is a necessary logical
>>> consequence of the idea that the brain functions like a digital
>>> The advantage is that by applying literally the classical theory of
>>> knowledge (exposed by Plato in the Theaetetus) we get a theory of
>>> qualia and quanta. We get an almost complete explanation of
>>> consciousness and matter, except for a remaining gap. But here, we
>>> also a meta-explanation why, as far as we are correct ourselves, we
>>> can't bridge that tiny but important remaining gap.
>>> I know that this is closer to John Archibald Wheeler than to David
>>> Deutsch. But that is why it is interesting to discuss this here.
>>> Some people pretends to see flaw but fails to say where, and
>> resume in
>>> mockery, or ad hominem dismiss, or worst, simple ignorance. But
>>> computationalism and weak materialism are just not compatible with
>>> each other (adding very weak form of Occam). The proof is
>>> constructive: it shows how the physical laws emerges from the
>>> numbers and addition, and multiplication.
>> I don't think a constructive proof of that kind can show that matter
>> doesn't exist. It could show that matter isn't totally fundamental.
>> But it would still exist as an emergent property. Right?
> This has been proved to be necessarily the case, once weNo. Every time I disagree with you you look for red herrings to blame. I got your point but we really truly think that way of thinking is all wrong.
> accept the comp explanation, in the seventies (and published in the
> eighties, and defend as a PhD in the nineties).
> The advantage is that we get a theory of qualia, + an explanation of
> quanta as particular (sharable) qualia. Physics becomes a branch of
> machine psychology, or better machine's theology, or number's
> theology. It is very close to Plotinus picture of reality.
> This extends Everett's idea to treat the scientist as an object in his
> theory, and it corrects the Penrose abuse of Gödel, and it makes
> fallibility a fundamental feature of both the emergence of qualia and
>>>>> Besides that, and what I take (sorry) as vocabulary issues, I find
>>>>> quite coherent on the big picture. I too look for an explanation,
>>>>> not just a good predictive tool.
>>>>> I think that here you might fail to appreciate how much close I am
>>>>> Deutsch. For the fundamental things I agree that there is no
>>>>> support, only refutation. But it is a complex subject, and some
>>>>> nuances are hard to express.
>>>> Previously when I spoke with you about this, I asked you a series
>>>> questions and you made it clear that you do believe in positive
>>>> support, and also that you were happy to change the name of it to
>>>> "confirmation" or "corroboration" or various other things. And you
>>>> seemed to think that changing your vocabulary would solve the
>>>> problem, and that me/DD/Popper didn't really mean that *all
>>>> support is a mistake* but meant something lesser.
>>> Because 0 is a number (I am a mathematician). I take an absence of
>>> refutation as a positive support. When I go out of my bed in the
>>> morning, I put my right foot on the ground, I wait bit to test my
>>> theory that there is crocodile under my bed, and when I got no
>>> confirmation of that theory, I dare to put my second foot on the
>>> ground. I do it because I got a positive support of the theory
>>> according to which there is no crocodile under my bed. But I am
>>> fallibilist. May be the crocodile was sleeping, or sick.
>>> For the applied science, we use positive support all the time. For
>>> fundamental science, positive support is usually wrong: things in
>>> long run are not like we are programmed to believe in the short run.
>> This is a position that Popper thinks is completely wrong. Which is
>> why I think we disagree a lot.
> I realize my example can be slightly misleading.
You on the other hand can't yet conceive of any other way of thinking so you can't believe we don't agree with you. But we don't. We have a different approach.
This is a large and fundamental disagreement.
>>>>For example one mistake is that positive support is impossible. You haven't posted any criticism of our arguments to this effect. You haven't explained what you mean by "positive support" in your passage. All you've really done here is post a vague, short, ambiguous assertion. You don't say *why* you think this stuff, you just assert it.
>>>> You expressed doubt that Popper could have possibly meant the
>>>> position I attributed to him. You found it a bit inconceivable. To
>>>> me that looks like you disagree *a lot* since you don't just think
>>>> Popper was wrong but have a hard time believing what his views even
>>> Because I take absence of refutation as positive support. It is
>>> because it helps me to progress in daring to put my second foot on
>>> grounds more quickly.
>>> Suppose a cat smells the odor of a mouse. This is also a case of
>>> positive support for the theory "there might be a mouse nearby". If
>>> the cat dismisses positive support, he might be starving.
>>> Suppose the cat smells nothing. In both case the theory "there is a
>>> mouse nearby" is not refuted, but in the case of smelling the mouse,
>>> the theory that there is a mouse nearby is made more plausible, by a
>>> positive support. Where is the mistake?
> Where is the mistake? (this is an example of what I say above). In
> what sense the smell of a mouse cannot be seen as a positive support
> for the idea that there is a mouse in the neighborhood?
>>Describe the thing I'm supposed to want to explain without the word "qualia". Point out to me what needs explaining, what you mean by the word "qualia".
>>> I suggest you study the history of cannabis illegality. There is a
>>> deliberate lie right at the start, including a resunion of industry
>>> people having "competion" problem with Hemp (Oil, pharmacetutical,
>>> paper, etc.) and money funding for the propaganda. You can see
>>> all propaganda movie on Youtube. No one can say "we don't know".
>>> are no mistake. 30 years ago the americans have discovered that
>>> cannabis can cure some cancers. They have been obliged to abandon
>>> research(*). The results have been destroyed. Only five years ago
>>> spanish have rediscovered this, and it still does not make the
>>> of the newspapers. As a teacher, I have learned to be very patient.
>>> But when people does "mistakes" continuously during a century,
>>> all know facts, and that you can see the amount of work to hide the
>>> mistake. No, it *is* a conspiracy. It is not a mistake. The
>> mistake is
>>> in believing that it is a mistake. If it was a mistake, all
>>> would say "sorry, we were obviously mistaken on that", and they
>>> legalize cannabis in the second.
>>> (*) http://www.mapinc.org/newstcl/v01/n572/a11.html
>>>> This is an example of how fallibilism means different things to you
>>>> and to me.
>>> I don't see the relevance on this remark. There is no
>> "fallibilism" in
>>> a conspiracy.
>> The relevance is that DD-type fallibilists consider mistakes common
>> and are perfectly willing to believe that big mistakes can be
>> mistakes -- they don't require a conspiracy. We don't get
>> incredulous and think "no one would make those mistakes, he must be
>> doing it on purpose".
> The point is that in the cannabis file we have strong evidence (proof
> in the sense of the laws) that people did meet and organize the lies
> purposefully, and develop a campaign to make people believed that
> cannabis is dangerous. This has nothing to do with fallibilism. It has
> to do with the use of the press and the media for spreading a lie. We
> know that Harry Anslinger ordered a study on cannabis, and when the
> results was that cannabis is not dangerous (La Guardia Report), he
> hides it and ordered another fake study. We do have all the papers,
> etc. If that is not a conspiracy, then I am not sure what you need. It
> is not a case where fallibilism applies, because fallibilism supposes
> a mistake, not a lie.
> So that we do agree on fallibilism. We 'just' don't agree about the
> point that all conspiracy theories are wrong, which is more out-of
>>>>> Plato academy by Constantine in Athena, about 500 after JC).
>>>> If you want to convince me about qualia, or to have a discussion
>>>> that seems fruitful to me, I think you should start at the
>>>> beginning, with the basics. First, say what problem/question we
>>>> which we cannot answer without qualia (what do we need the concept
>>>> of qualia for?). Second, say what qualia are.
>>> We don't need the concept of qualia. But we are living them most of
>>> the time.
>> Are we? What am I living that I cannot explain without mentioning
> The qualia themselves.
To me, you may as well be saying that beezzzesjkldfjsdlkfs exist. You have some letters in a string but you don't say what it is.
> The subjective sensation when drinking coffee,I don't think I have any subjective sensation when drinking coffee. I think hallucinations and dreams are objective.
> etc. All hallucinations, dreams, are full of qualia, etc.
e.g. when you take LSD you hallucinate b/c of things that actually objectively exist. stuff really happens in the physical world. LSD hallucinations can be explained by empirical science.
>>I specifically said they do not suffer.
>> You said that you doubt the "sanity, honesty, rationality, or just
>> humanity" of any people who disagree with you about certain
>> attributes of cows.
> Yes. But this does not apply to you given that you are open to the
> idea that animals suffers
You don't listen very well.
And you haven't understood my point at all, which is that IF a person thought animals can't feel pain (for example) THEN you would doubt his sanity/etc... So you are closed minded, intolerant, and have a fallibilist attitude.
If you disagreed with a person about that issue you would not treat it as a disagreement to deal with by truth seeking. It's completely irrelevant whether you are intolerant of me, you *would be intolerant of some people*, purely over philosophical differences, which is anti-fallibilist.
> ... or at least can feel pain, which areNo. Don't say that I mislead you. The problem is you don't listen. You don't respect the distinctions I make and interpret my words in your own terminology. In order to understand what I mean you must interpret my words in my own terminology, not yours.
> typical qualia. I don't want to introduce the distinction you made
> between pain and suffering which is useful to study sado-maso
> behaviors, but is misleading for the consciousness question of
> animals. Indeed you did mislead most of us on this.
>You discover what you think is a mistake. But you might be wrong and the other guy might be right.
>>>> I think mistakes are commonplace and are not shameful. Your view on
>>>> fallibilism differs.
>>> Not at all. I told you many times I am with you on this.
>> But you said just above about doubting sanity/etc...
> It is not because mistaken are common and even should be encouraged,
> than we should not correct them when we discover them. Doing a mistake
> is an act of intelligence. Doing the same mistake again and again by
> denying the evidences is an act of stupidity, cowardliness or special
What's needed is not to correct mistaken other people but to have a *truth seeking process* where you figure out who is mistaken rather than just assuming it's not you.
You haven't grasped the basic ideas of fallibilism or liberalism.
>>In our worldview, we treat disagreements as opportunities to seek the truth, not opportunities to call people we disagree with liars.
>>> The ability
>>> to do mistaken is the mark of the intelligence. Mistaken are not at
>>> all shameful. I don't see what I have said which makes you think I
>>> not a lover of mistake.
>> It was the part I repeated in quote marks!
> I love mistakes. I hate lies (with very few exceptions).
We do not argue by psychological attacks about the motives behind people's arguments.
>> That is a *big* disagreement with Popper/DD who think it'sYou think I'm wrong. OK. Whatever. We disagree. Happy?
>> completely wrong... You have a totally different worldview, on
>> epistemology, if you agree with the classical theory of knowledge.
>> You're in a completely different camp from us.
> The difference is only in the wording, and in the failure of your
> appreciation of the Theatetus' ideas,
> especially when recasted throughBecause of all the stuff in Popper's books which you aren't engaging with at all.
> computer science.
> Once you accept there is a notion of truth, or objective truth, and
> that we never know that our theories are correct, the remaining
> difference is in the use of plausibility. And you have not answered my
> question of why a cat is mistaken by taking the smell of the mouse as
> making more plausible the presence of the mouse in its neighborhood.
How can you claim to agree with us when you don't even know what our positions are? You need to read our ideas and engage with them...
>>More clarity needed.
>>> Well, I have not yet too much insist on this. I thought you knew
>>> I am a classical thinker. I love the classical theory of
>> knowledge. If
>>> you can recover it from Popper, that is only a bad news fro
>>> But as far as I understand Deutsch, I think that what he says can be
>>> recasted in the classical theory.
>> He doesn't think so. So you disagree with him in what he considers a
>> major way.
> I guess that he does not take into account the fact that theoretical
> computer science make the classical theory of knowledge fallibilist,
> even extreme fallibilist! Note that the shadow of that fallibilism
> appears already in the Theaetetus, and in Plotinus' use of the
> Theaetetus to define the 'universal soul' (the universal machine
> first person in m translation of Plotinus in arithmetic).
>>Denying that Popperian-knowledge is genuine knowledge is a serious attack on Popperism -- it is a claim that we are skeptics.
>> "The final truth" or "absolute truth" or "certain truth" or
>> "infallible truth".
> So you see, you have the concept, and we differ only on the vocabulary.
> What you call knowledge, I call it belief.
> What you call "infallible truth", I call it knowledge.
People don't do this purely as a vocabulary issue. It has a meaning.
>Where "machine" means what? You may so many wild claims without explaining what you mean.
> But I would not identify it with the absolute truth like you do here.
> With comp, this one is just not knowable.
> If you identify "infallible knowledge" with "absolute truth", then I
> can prove that you are not a machine.
> Contradicting the comp trend inAre you saying I have a soul?
> FOR. The universal machine makes a distinction there (basically, in
> Plotinus' terminology: the distinction between the ONE and the
> Universal Soul, or between God and the Inner God).
That would be another huge disagreement with the DD worldview.
>>>>We aren't agreeing on much of what me and DD consider important and distinctive about our worldview.
>>>> Your view here is that only the final truth qualifies as knowledge.
>>> Final, or initial, or serendipitous, or occasional, or never ...
>>> I say that a machine believes p if the machine asserts p.
>>> And I say that a machine knows p if the machine asserts p in a
>>> state/situation where p is true.
>>> Even if the machine believes p for a wrong reason, if she is in the
>>> world where p is true, I will say that she knows p.
>>> This is a key to understand the logic of the qualia, and why even
>>> 'undoubtable qualia' can be false, in some situation.
>>>> That is a view which is compatible with the standard "knowledge is
>>>> justified, true belief" point of view (the crucial one, currently,
>>>> being the "true" part) and which is thoroughly incompatible with
>>>> Popper and DD.
>>> Yes. It is the classical theory of knowledge. I think Popper
>>> misunderstands it,
>> See, you know we disagree about so much stuff. I don't know why you
>> sometimes deny it.
> If we were agreeing on everything, we would not discuss.
We agree on plenty of basics that most civilized people agree on.
>>>You asked how someone could think a certain way. I answered. Now you argue we're wrong. But your question remains answered. That's how we can think this way. It being wrong (you think) doesn't prevent people from thinking it.
>>>> And when you say "except our own consciousness" that is another
>>>> disagreement. We do not make any exceptions for fallibility and we
>>>> do not agree with Descartes.
>>> See my recent post to Alan. I don't understand how someone could
>>> his own doubting.
>> People are wrong about the contents of their minds all the time.
> Yes. But not on the fact that they have a mind. That they are
> conscious. They need it to genuinely assert "I doubt".
And anyway you are just arbitrarily asserting "but not on the fact that they have a mind". You SAY that with NO ARGUMENT. It's a claim that you have not given any argument for. End of story.
>"all the time" is a phrase which means "often". Now that you point it out, it is badly named!
>> They are wrong about their psychology all the time.
> Sure. Well, most of the time (or you are skeptical on psychology)
>You are asserting without argument.
>> They are wrong about what thinking they did all the time.
> They can be wrong indeed. But not on the fact that they are thinking
> in the moment, right now.
>You still have yet to say what they are or answer any basic questions about them.
>> They have false memories which are 3 seconds old all the time.
> That can make sense in some theory. I can accept that.
>> They have false ideas about what happened in their subconscious all
>> the the time, and often the false ideas claim they did something
>> consciously which they didn't.
> That happens. Note your past tense. This does not imply they can doubt
> their own consciousness, when thinking genuinely about it, at that
> Are you denying the existence of qualia?
Don't use strings of letters with no meanings for them provided.
> Are you denying the existence of consciousness?I think that question is meaningless until you say what you mean by the string of letters "consciousness".
> You said that the notion of qualia was a point ofI better not speak for DD about that. I think "qualia" has no meaning unless people say what those letters refer to. And I think the attempts people have made to say what it means are a bunch of incomprehensible nonsense.
> disagreement between you and David, you might elaborate on this perhaps.
-- Elliot Temple
- --- In Fabric-of-Reality@yahoogroups.com, Elliot Temple <curi@...> wrote:
>Yep. That gives you your K and your C. Where's your U?
> On Dec 26, 2011, at 9:26 PM, Peter D wrote:
> > --- In Fabric-of-Reality@yahoogroups.com, Elliot Temple <curi@> wrote:
> >> There's no such thing as this.
> >> Universal knowledge creators can get temporarily stuck, but they are not "unable to circumvent" -- there are many different ways they could circumvent.
> > Presumably that is based on theory, since there is no evidence of UKC's in reality.
> Does anyone else think this reply is contributing to the list or discussion?
> If so can they explain?
> There is evidence that humans exist in reality. And there is evidence they create tons of knowledge.
There is not the slightest
evidence that our finite and haphazardly-evolved brains have the
ability to generate every and any kind of knowledge. It is difficult
to see how we could even test the claim.
>Is Peter not counting that? Why not?No. I was chiding you for stating theory as if it were fact.
> Theory is used, too, as it always must be. What is this, some generic objection to Popper
>(and, more specifically, Deutsch's anti-empiricism arguments in BoI), targeted at whatever the current topic is? And without any details or substance (why does Peter think BoI is wrong about empiricism, what rival epistemology does he want us to adopt, etc?)It's a criticism. Don't you welcome them?
> >> C&R is a universal knowledge creating process. it's not even possible to do it in a lesser way because you run into issues like judging and understanding arbitrary criticisms which takes (universal) knowledge creation to be able to do.
> > There's not the slightest evidence that humans can formulate
> > or understand arbitrary criticisms.
> So, again, how is this contributing anything?
>It doesn't engage with Deutsch's discussion of universality at all.No reason it should.
> And BoI explains this is completely the wrong way to judge argumentsWhat? It is wrong to point out flaws?
>(FoR does too, though it gets less emphasis). Does Peter disagree with Deutsch? Why? What epistemology does he favor? He doesn't say or discuss it.The UKC theory is a bad theory as a theory. I don't care
> To me, it looks like he's just kinda complaining at me for agreeing with Deutsch. Does anyone else see merit or value here?
who holds it.
> >>> No. Universality requires positive feedback to overcome obstacles ( what I have been calling gfinitenessh). For a mixture of anatomical and brain function reasons (mostly brain function), dogs are not over this threshold.It is a criticism of the argument that entities without
> > How do you know THAT?
> I didn't write "THAT". Peter has misquoted me and then yelled at me over it. (I am the only author attributed at the top and his use of "you" seems to still be talking to me).
> Do others agree with me that misquoting people is disruptive to discussion? It can, for example, confuse and mislead people and create miscommunications and misunderstandings.
> >> To have a negative opinion about something (pain sensations or anything else) requires having opinions at all.
> > To suffer is not just to have an opinion.
> How is this bald assertion supposed to advance the discussion?
the ability to form opinions cannot suffer, which
seems to underlie the silly dog-torturing claim.
> > Assuming it is true that UKC is an all-or-nothing thingIf you sincerely believe otherwise, I have a bridge to sell you.
> > like Turing-completeness. But there is not a scrap of
> > proof of that.
> And "not a scrap of proof" is supposed to be a bad thing?
>Has Peter still never heard of *conjectural knowledge* or *fallibilism*?Yes. The version that says you can just conjecture something
and immediately treat is as true is not seriously held by any
If you wish to explain how the UKC thesis survived testing,
please go right ahead.
> What is the value in Peter repeating the same objections he had when he joined the group, simply applied directly to the current topic?That would be in the various posts where I have offered
> When is the part where he carefully reads FoR and comments on which parts he disagrees with or doesn't understand -- using extensive quotes, perhaps -- and begins a discussion to get his issues resolved?
substantive comments. The vast majority of that
material has gone unanswered.
>But he doesn't want to do something productive like that, instead he wants to hit reply to me and make irrelevant and repetitive complaints about my agreement with Deutsch and Popper.I did. You snipped it.
> >> Which is just impossible (ignoring some irrelevant and very picky technicalities about hardcoding
> > Very relevant technicalities, actually.
> Another bald assertion. I'm very wrong but Peter doesn't care to include a word of topical explanation.
> Can anyone point out some value in Peter's mix of arbitrary assertions and chronic anti-Popperian epistemology?
> -- Elliot Temple