On 31 Dec 2009, at 01:18, Elliot Temple wrote:
> On Dec 30, 2009, at 8:37 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
> > if all is but a web of woven guesses, we have the right to be
> > interested in who make the guesses
> That is a non-sequitur. We may have that right, but what rights we
> have doesn't follow from what is a web of woven guesses.
Perhaps. In which theory?
I don't see how we can be sure on anything here.
> Perhaps more importantly, I don't agree that the source of a guess
> is relevant to much of anything.
I don't follow. The fact that the source of the guesses is God, a
primitive physical universe, or a web of arithmetical relations
*could* have some relevance for the search of an explanation, or a
search for solving a problem, like the consciousness/reality (or mind-
> What's relevant is if we see a problem with the guess, or not, and
> if it solves a problem we have, or not.
Ultra mathematicalist Platonists, like Xeusippe, have seen at once the
big problem with Aristotle Naturalism. This has not prevent its
widespread acceptation, up to the point of putting the big problem it
raises under the rug.
For example, physics is good in prediction, and probably in explaining
material organizations, but it may be misleading for the search of a
general explanation including consciousness.
It seems to me that if there are guesses in the natural world, it is
part of the attempt to unify our knowledge (in a coherent whole) to be
interested in the guessing phenomenon, including the question of who
guess, and what makes the guess possible. It seems relevant for the
mind body problem. But it is relevant also for "matter". For example,
Everett guessed that the observer is some sort of memory machine,
obeying itself to QM, and this led him to abandon the wave collapse
and so he found the many-worlds quantum theory.
I guess that the observer is a digital machine, and this leads a
priori to a many computations view of reality, which explains many
things, yet is today (and for some time) clearly difficult to use for
predicting quickly new natural features in the world, except for the
logic of observation.
To say that the "woven web of guess" is not worth to be studied seems
arbitrary to me. It could depend on the choice of a theory, and of the
problem we want to be addressed. The choice of problem in which we are
interested is personal, and should be theory independent, like love
and things like that.
[Non-text portions of this message have been removed]