Re: Free Will
- --- In Fabric-of-Reality@yahoogroups.com, Bruno Marchal <marchal@...>
>No form of arithmetic proves Platonism.
> Le 28-sept.-08, à 15:45, Peter D Jones a écrit :
> > Show me an immaterial machine. You always have to assume
> > something for which there is no evidence, immaterial existence, in
> > order
> > to argue against matter.
> I assume Robinson Arithmetic. I have many evidences.
> >that we
> > >What does matter add?
> > > Have you a problem with the physicist notion of block universe,
> > where
> > > time does not "really" exist. It is a step for understanding
> > > don't need "real" space or matter either, I think.Maybe you shoulod ask Alan about that!
> > Blimey, you just eliminated everything!
> I don't eliminate numbers, nor people, nor consciousness, nor
> experiences nor even sharable results of experiments..
> I eliminate only the metaphysical assumption of matter, which has never
> been used by physicist,
> except as methodological background sinceHere's the error: substitutible doesn't mean substituted,
> As I intend to explain to H. Sturman in my reply to hos post, all what
> I say is that mechanism is incompatible with naturalism. I am aware
> that almost all naturalist today are mechanist, and that is what my
> work is probably a bit startling. Mechanistic materialism (or
> mechanistic naturalism, or mechanistic physicalism) is (are)
> inconsistent. That's all.
> Mechanism is an hypothesis in cognitive science: it says that my
> consciousness is invariant for a local functional substitution made at
> some level of personal description. It is the belief in a form of
> reincarnation. Materialism/physicalism/naturalism is an hypothesis in
> metaphysics according to which there is a fundamentally-material
> universe, and that all science are reductible in principle to physics.
> Dennett for example, like many others, believes in both naturalism and
> mechanism, but such a conjunction has been shown inconsistent.
> I have heard many times about an error in my reasoning, but nobody has
> ever been able to tell me where, and I'm afraid it is just hand waving
> rumors, but if you know better I would be glad to be informed.
and here is no first-peson inderminacy wihout actual substitution.
- ----- "RayMondor" <raymondor@...> wrote:
> Gary:IANAP, but here's my take on it:
> > ...giving real meaning to probabilities and counterfactuals): it
> > provides a valid and strong physical basis for free will.
> Gary, I don't follow your logic. How can MWI allow free will if every
> outcome that is physically possible MUST occur in some "universes"?
> Isn't it the case that each possibility is individually determined?
1: each possibility is not individually determined; you don't know which universe you'll end up in. That's what traditionally shows up as "randomness" in QM experiments.
2: a single-valued static block universe explicitly disallows any possibility of free will; there is exactly one continuer from each current state. MWI, even seen as a multi-valued static block universe, is thus less restrictive against free will than SWI (single-world interpretation).
3: MWI allows for the possibility that the "will" influences the resulting probabilities: if you decide to drink coffee rather than tea, the continuers of your current state will be dominated by the coffee-drunk ones. Of course there will be ones where you die first, etc, but considering only the relative measures of the continuers where you drank the coffee and the tea ones, the coffee ones will be of greater measure.
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Gary Oberbrunner garyo@...
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