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Re: Er... Hello!

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  • David
    Hello, Peter ... OOPS! Ask a bunch of mathematicians who do pure mathematics (as apposed to applied), and you will find out that this is not the case beyond
    Message 1 of 266 , Jun 30, 2008
      Hello, Peter

      > There is de facto agreement about mathematical results inasmuch
      > as all mathematicians operate on the same axioms

      OOPS! Ask a bunch of mathematicians who do pure mathematics (as
      apposed to applied), and you will find out that this is not the case
      beyond the principal of non-contradiction.

      > (which is not 100%).

      I don't understand this parenthetical remark -- how are axioms
      assigned a percentage? That is not what you mean, I am sure, so I
      would be grateful for an explanation.
      David the (sometimes pedantic) Nomad
    • Bruno Marchal
      ... Materialist which are serious about the mind body problem are either force to develop varieties of dualism or mind-eliminativism. Most agree that the
      Message 266 of 266 , Aug 7, 2008
        On 04 Aug 2008, at 18:18, Peter D Jones wrote:


        > > > 1) Mathematical structrures are no help in explaining qualia.
        > >
        > > And physical structure does?
        >
        > Materialism opens up a number of ways of addressing this issue. Qualia
        > could be basic properties of matter, or emerge from basic
        > properties, and so on.



        Materialist which are serious about the mind body problem are either
        force to develop varieties of dualism or mind-eliminativism. Most
        agree that the mind-body problem is not yet solved.
        If qualia are considered as basic properties of matter, then you are
        lead to panpsychism. If qualia emerge from basic properties of matter,
        then you should say which one, and you have to make them non Turing
        emulable, like Penrose suggests.
        All this is very speculative compare to the idea that the
        manifestation of the mind is related (albeit not in a one-one way) to
        information handling in the brain.





        > > If you try to use matter to instantiate consciousness with matter,
        > you
        > > will have to make them both actually infinite.
        >
        > I cannot remotely see why that should be the case.



        This is indeed far from obvious, and I can only refer you to my papers
        (see my Sane04 in my web page).
        In a nutshell, this is due to the fact that if you instantiate
        consciousness with a finite piece of matter, that consciousness will
        be Turing emulable and will be attached, from the conscious first
        person point of view to an infinity of different computations: those
        going through that Turing states (up to some equivalence relation). It
        is a non obvious consequence of the first person computationalist
        indeterminacy. Machine cannot know which computations supports them,
        and their personal future depends on a realtive measure put on all
        those computations.





        > > Could you conceive that the instantiation itself could be a
        > > mathematical phenomenon?
        >
        > Of what kind?


        Assuming digital mechanism, the math is of the kind of theoretical
        computer science. The science of what universal machines can belief
        in, can know, can infer, can observe, can deduce, can communicate, can
        do, or cannot ...




        > THere is also the mismatch between the tradtional contingency of
        > existence, and the equally traditional necessity of mathematics.


        The first person indeterminacy, be it through Everett-Deutsch
        formulation of Quantum Mechanics, or be it through universal
        dovetailing on all computations, explains very well, it seems to me,
        that a necessity leads to contingencies, once we distinguish first and
        third person points of view. Now the incompleteness phenomenon,
        (through its intensional variants (because I agree with Torkel
        Franzen's remarks on that point)) can be used to provide mathematical
        justification of those contingencies.



        > > If not your notion of instantiation will lead to the Mallah-
        > Chalmers-
        > > Putnam
        > > implementation problem.
        >
        > If you are alluding to the idea that any physical process
        > implements every computation: it is wrong.



        I agree with you. But I was alluding only to the difficulty of just
        defining implementation once we try to make it "substantial".
        (It is more a Mallah question than one by Chalmers or Putnam. My fault).



        > > Using substance to actualize a reality is a sort of "Bohmian move",
        > > and it leads to
        > > panpsychisme. You have to make matter conscious per se.
        >
        > That is completely unproven.



        See above: you are already suggesting yourself that qualia could be a
        basic property of matter when I ask you to explain how matter could be
        needed to instantiate consciousness.

        "Substance" is a powerful meme that we share probably with most
        animals, but through the notion of dream or shared video-game you
        could easily grasp that substance is a first person construct, like
        the collapse in QM. Many problems remain, for sure, but we are going
        to a coherent picture where the problem can be formulated and worked
        out.

        Bruno
        http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/





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