- Hello, Peter

> There is de facto agreement about mathematical results inasmuch

OOPS! Ask a bunch of mathematicians who do pure mathematics (as

> as all mathematicians operate on the same axioms

apposed to applied), and you will find out that this is not the case

beyond the principal of non-contradiction.

> (which is not 100%).

I don't understand this parenthetical remark -- how are axioms

assigned a percentage? That is not what you mean, I am sure, so I

would be grateful for an explanation.

David the (sometimes pedantic) Nomad - On 04 Aug 2008, at 18:18, Peter D Jones wrote:

> > > 1) Mathematical structrures are no help in explaining qualia.

Materialist which are serious about the mind body problem are either

> >

> > And physical structure does?

>

> Materialism opens up a number of ways of addressing this issue. Qualia

> could be basic properties of matter, or emerge from basic

> properties, and so on.

force to develop varieties of dualism or mind-eliminativism. Most

agree that the mind-body problem is not yet solved.

If qualia are considered as basic properties of matter, then you are

lead to panpsychism. If qualia emerge from basic properties of matter,

then you should say which one, and you have to make them non Turing

emulable, like Penrose suggests.

All this is very speculative compare to the idea that the

manifestation of the mind is related (albeit not in a one-one way) to

information handling in the brain.

> > If you try to use matter to instantiate consciousness with matter,

This is indeed far from obvious, and I can only refer you to my papers

> you

> > will have to make them both actually infinite.

>

> I cannot remotely see why that should be the case.

(see my Sane04 in my web page).

In a nutshell, this is due to the fact that if you instantiate

consciousness with a finite piece of matter, that consciousness will

be Turing emulable and will be attached, from the conscious first

person point of view to an infinity of different computations: those

going through that Turing states (up to some equivalence relation). It

is a non obvious consequence of the first person computationalist

indeterminacy. Machine cannot know which computations supports them,

and their personal future depends on a realtive measure put on all

those computations.

> > Could you conceive that the instantiation itself could be a

Assuming digital mechanism, the math is of the kind of theoretical

> > mathematical phenomenon?

>

> Of what kind?

computer science. The science of what universal machines can belief

in, can know, can infer, can observe, can deduce, can communicate, can

do, or cannot ...

> THere is also the mismatch between the tradtional contingency of

The first person indeterminacy, be it through Everett-Deutsch

> existence, and the equally traditional necessity of mathematics.

formulation of Quantum Mechanics, or be it through universal

dovetailing on all computations, explains very well, it seems to me,

that a necessity leads to contingencies, once we distinguish first and

third person points of view. Now the incompleteness phenomenon,

(through its intensional variants (because I agree with Torkel

Franzen's remarks on that point)) can be used to provide mathematical

justification of those contingencies.

> > If not your notion of instantiation will lead to the Mallah-

I agree with you. But I was alluding only to the difficulty of just

> Chalmers-

> > Putnam

> > implementation problem.

>

> If you are alluding to the idea that any physical process

> implements every computation: it is wrong.

defining implementation once we try to make it "substantial".

(It is more a Mallah question than one by Chalmers or Putnam. My fault).

> > Using substance to actualize a reality is a sort of "Bohmian move",

See above: you are already suggesting yourself that qualia could be a

> > and it leads to

> > panpsychisme. You have to make matter conscious per se.

>

> That is completely unproven.

basic property of matter when I ask you to explain how matter could be

needed to instantiate consciousness.

"Substance" is a powerful meme that we share probably with most

animals, but through the notion of dream or shared video-game you

could easily grasp that substance is a first person construct, like

the collapse in QM. Many problems remain, for sure, but we are going

to a coherent picture where the problem can be formulated and worked

out.

Bruno

http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/

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