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Re: Emotions (was: Indeterminism

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  • David Nyman
    ... I feel we re getting quite close to any genuine difference between us on these issues, so I ll try my best to clarify. I still believe there are some
    Message 1 of 197 , Jul 31, 2006
      --- In Fabric-of-Reality@yahoogroups.com, Bruno Marchal <marchal@...>
      wrote:

      > At this stage you should try to be specific about the reasons why an
      > hardware independent isomorphism cannot exist, or perhaps you are
      > just saying that "first person feeling" would not be genuine if they
      > were not related to some 'physical reality' in which case I could
      > agree

      I feel we're getting quite close to any genuine difference between us
      on these issues, so I'll try my best to clarify. I still believe
      there are some vocabulary problems, so first I'll have another go at
      pinning these down (sorry, but please be patient!). One thing that
      strikes me is that there are (at least) two distinctly different
      usages of the term `first person':

      `First person 1' (FP1) is used when I mean to indicate my own internal
      centred perspective, `looking out', as it were, on the world. It is
      the word `I' exclusively as used reflexively by a first person about
      him/ herself. As such, it can't be reported in third person
      narrative, only directly *uttered* by some FP1-centred individual. I
      will call it 'FP1-I'.

      `First person 2' (FP2) is used to describe a point-of-view within a
      third person narrative. For example:

      David thought about the problem and realised – "I am confused again!"

      The narrative contains the *description* of a first person
      characterised as `David', whose point-of-view we would call a `first
      person position'. The use of `I' here is understood to be this
      *narrative* David's reference to himself. As such it's 'FP2-I'

      Throughout these discussions, when I have used terms such as `first
      person, `personal, or `presence' to describe the context within which
      `individual first persons' IMO could arise, I have meant the sense
      given in FP1. The intuition that I have is that even when you `strip
      away' the structuring that provides the perceptual mechanism and its
      experiential content, what remains must be an FP1-type context – the
      `Big `I', if you like, the `arena' within which all else takes place.
      And this 'Big I' could only be 'directly uttered' - metaphorically in
      this case - by a 'Big FP1'. It is *not* an FP2-type description in
      a third person narrative.

      The intuition at the heart of this is that if what I'm calling an
      FP1-type context is the fundamental ontology, then there is no
      requirement for the 'FP1-I' to suddenly `spring into existence' when
      FP2-describable points-of-view subsequently emerge as a consequence of
      third-person structuring. The idea of such an otherwise completely
      novel ontology `springing into being' in this way has always struck me
      as fundamentally incoherent.

      From this perspective, the discourses of QM, MW, mathematics, comp
      etc. take place in terms of `third person' structuring of an FP1-type
      context. Direct FP1-type experience is derived from the global
      `self-intimacy' of this context with a particular sort of structural
      content (what I have termed `perceiver/ percept' dyads). Why
      `self'-intimacy? To eliminate any notion of `observers'. By
      `self-intimacy I mean to say that such knowledge is an immediate
      apprehension by the context of its own content, which is why I've
      termed it an `equivalence', not a `property'. Consequently, individual
      FP1-type content (`experience') is the direct, immediate acquaintance
      of demarcated perceivers with aspects of their own structure.

      `Third person' is then just a narrative or description of this same
      structure. The world outside the individual, containing other first
      persons and all manner of additional paraphernalia, is likewise `third
      person' when read as narrative by first persons (including, of course,
      their individual representations of shared interpersonal discourse).
      Notwithstanding this, all of it exists fundamentally `in its own
      right' as FP1-type context+content (i.e. not just the regions of it
      that happen to be demarcated `first persons').

      I think I'm also able to clarify here why I believe that a certain
      kind of `structural isomorphism' is the underlying basis of our own
      phenomenal experience. Since the FP1-type context is, as it were, a
      superposition of all activity (including that activity read as
      `experience' by perceivers), we must hypothesise within it organising
      schemas that demarcate different functional levels. It seems clear
      that within the `physical' domain, such schemas are supported by the
      physical `laws of form'. Consequently, IMO, such `laws of form' must
      be established (and within the comp hypothesis, this could be by
      `physical substrate emulation') to establish the structural
      relationships which are read by the `perceiver' component of the
      structure as `experiential content'. By contrast, if the behaviour of
      the `substrate' at this level is unconstrained (e.g. because the
      `code' can be run on an arbitrary set of hardwares conforming to a
      common syntactical rule-set), the `semantic coherence' at this level
      of the FP1-type context would IMO be undefined.

      > I am not sure. Feel free to dig in that direction, but it seems to
      > me it is easier to accept some sharable part of 3-mathematics and
      > build from that. Especially when we have an unavoidable
      > self-reference for a vast class of machines. Thanks to Turing & Co.
      > we can see, like Godel already saw in 1933, that godelian
      > self-reference cannot describe a knower, but then, using some math
      > trick we can define a knower in term of self-reference+ truth which
      > provides a good candidate for a notion of first person (even
      > unameable by the machine). Somehow a "physical reality" is what
      > Number-Nature needs for entangling closely enough the many possible
      > independent computations, so as to made first person stable and
      > partially sharable. *many*-worlds prevent such approaches against
      > solipsism. Perhaps I agree that the context in which particular
      > personhood arises is first person (plural), but the context in which
      > personhood per se arise is eventually "reducible" to the behavior of
      > the roots of a universal diophantine polynomial (or choose your
      > favorite turing universal systems).

      We appear to be more or less agreeing here, especially what you say
      about '"physical reality" is what Number-Nature needs for entangling
      closely enough the many possible independent computations, so as to
      made first person stable and partially sharable' - which is more or
      less what I meant by 'organising schemas' necessary for 'semantic
      coherence' above. However, again based on my 'FP1-type' idea above, I
      would have to say that 'the behavior of the roots of a universal
      diophantine polynomial' would be an aspect of a fundamentally
      FP1-type context - perhaps what you so delightfully term
      'Number-Nature' - the 'ultimate FP1'.

      > That eventually there is a duality making it possible to choose the
      > first person point of view as the most basic one cannot yet be
      > entirely ruled out for sure, but comp and the quantum without
      > collapse makes it as unlikely imo.

      Do you still feel this notwithstanding my FP1/ FP2 distinction? We
      would be saying that whatever we take to be basic must be an 'FP1-type
      context', for the reasons I argue above.

      > OK, but do you see this moves invite you to provide a definition of
      > "first person" in third person term. Comp succeeds partially, but
      > then justified completely why its success cannot be but partial.
      > Indeed eventually the physical appearances emerges from the never
      > completely specifiable border of the person. The platonic number
      > does not emerge, and I agree they are mysterious, but here too we
      > can understand that we cannot infer our beliefs in them from any
      > weaker beliefs.

      I agree that 'first person' (i.e. FP2 according to my schema) can be
      defined in third person terms. However IMO FP1 cannot be so 'defined'
      but only 'directly uttered'. This means that the manifest existence
      of FP1 entails that we assign primacy to something that is capable of
      such 'direct utterance'. I agree that (per comp) the Platonic number
      'does not emerge' - i.e. has primacy - and that consequently its basic
      ontology in my terms must be FP1.

      > If this is wishful thinking, then this an example of recursion. But
      > then that's not wishful thinking, so it is not an example of
      > recursion. But then it is wishful thinking ... ... and then it is
      > certainly an example of meta-recursion

      Mmmm..

      > ... (I will stop here ;)

      Ah! Does this prove you're not a TM?

      David
    • David Nyman
      ... I feel we re getting quite close to any genuine difference between us on these issues, so I ll try my best to clarify. I still believe there are some
      Message 197 of 197 , Jul 31, 2006
        --- In Fabric-of-Reality@yahoogroups.com, Bruno Marchal <marchal@...>
        wrote:

        > At this stage you should try to be specific about the reasons why an
        > hardware independent isomorphism cannot exist, or perhaps you are
        > just saying that "first person feeling" would not be genuine if they
        > were not related to some 'physical reality' in which case I could
        > agree

        I feel we're getting quite close to any genuine difference between us
        on these issues, so I'll try my best to clarify. I still believe
        there are some vocabulary problems, so first I'll have another go at
        pinning these down (sorry, but please be patient!). One thing that
        strikes me is that there are (at least) two distinctly different
        usages of the term `first person':

        `First person 1' (FP1) is used when I mean to indicate my own internal
        centred perspective, `looking out', as it were, on the world. It is
        the word `I' exclusively as used reflexively by a first person about
        him/ herself. As such, it can't be reported in third person
        narrative, only directly *uttered* by some FP1-centred individual. I
        will call it 'FP1-I'.

        `First person 2' (FP2) is used to describe a point-of-view within a
        third person narrative. For example:

        David thought about the problem and realised – "I am confused again!"

        The narrative contains the *description* of a first person
        characterised as `David', whose point-of-view we would call a `first
        person position'. The use of `I' here is understood to be this
        *narrative* David's reference to himself. As such it's 'FP2-I'

        Throughout these discussions, when I have used terms such as `first
        person, `personal, or `presence' to describe the context within which
        `individual first persons' IMO could arise, I have meant the sense
        given in FP1. The intuition that I have is that even when you `strip
        away' the structuring that provides the perceptual mechanism and its
        experiential content, what remains must be an FP1-type context – the
        `Big `I', if you like, the `arena' within which all else takes place.
        And this 'Big I' could only be 'directly uttered' - metaphorically in
        this case - by a 'Big FP1'. It is *not* an FP2-type description in
        a third person narrative.

        The intuition at the heart of this is that if what I'm calling an
        FP1-type context is the fundamental ontology, then there is no
        requirement for the 'FP1-I' to suddenly `spring into existence' when
        FP2-describable points-of-view subsequently emerge as a consequence of
        third-person structuring. The idea of such an otherwise completely
        novel ontology `springing into being' in this way has always struck me
        as fundamentally incoherent.

        From this perspective, the discourses of QM, MW, mathematics, comp
        etc. take place in terms of `third person' structuring of an FP1-type
        context. Direct FP1-type experience is derived from the global
        `self-intimacy' of this context with a particular sort of structural
        content (what I have termed `perceiver/ percept' dyads). Why
        `self'-intimacy? To eliminate any notion of `observers'. By
        `self-intimacy I mean to say that such knowledge is an immediate
        apprehension by the context of its own content, which is why I've
        termed it an `equivalence', not a `property'. Consequently, individual
        FP1-type content (`experience') is the direct, immediate acquaintance
        of demarcated perceivers with aspects of their own structure.

        `Third person' is then just a narrative or description of this same
        structure. The world outside the individual, containing other first
        persons and all manner of additional paraphernalia, is likewise `third
        person' when read as narrative by first persons (including, of course,
        their individual representations of shared interpersonal discourse).
        Notwithstanding this, all of it exists fundamentally `in its own
        right' as FP1-type context+content (i.e. not just the regions of it
        that happen to be demarcated `first persons').

        I think I'm also able to clarify here why I believe that a certain
        kind of `structural isomorphism' is the underlying basis of our own
        phenomenal experience. Since the FP1-type context is, as it were, a
        superposition of all activity (including that activity read as
        `experience' by perceivers), we must hypothesise within it organising
        schemas that demarcate different functional levels. It seems clear
        that within the `physical' domain, such schemas are supported by the
        physical `laws of form'. Consequently, IMO, such `laws of form' must
        be established (and within the comp hypothesis, this could be by
        `physical substrate emulation') to establish the structural
        relationships which are read by the `perceiver' component of the
        structure as `experiential content'. By contrast, if the behaviour of
        the `substrate' at this level is unconstrained (e.g. because the
        `code' can be run on an arbitrary set of hardwares conforming to a
        common syntactical rule-set), the `semantic coherence' at this level
        of the FP1-type context would IMO be undefined.

        > I am not sure. Feel free to dig in that direction, but it seems to
        > me it is easier to accept some sharable part of 3-mathematics and
        > build from that. Especially when we have an unavoidable
        > self-reference for a vast class of machines. Thanks to Turing & Co.
        > we can see, like Godel already saw in 1933, that godelian
        > self-reference cannot describe a knower, but then, using some math
        > trick we can define a knower in term of self-reference+ truth which
        > provides a good candidate for a notion of first person (even
        > unameable by the machine). Somehow a "physical reality" is what
        > Number-Nature needs for entangling closely enough the many possible
        > independent computations, so as to made first person stable and
        > partially sharable. *many*-worlds prevent such approaches against
        > solipsism. Perhaps I agree that the context in which particular
        > personhood arises is first person (plural), but the context in which
        > personhood per se arise is eventually "reducible" to the behavior of
        > the roots of a universal diophantine polynomial (or choose your
        > favorite turing universal systems).

        We appear to be more or less agreeing here, especially what you say
        about '"physical reality" is what Number-Nature needs for entangling
        closely enough the many possible independent computations, so as to
        made first person stable and partially sharable' - which is more or
        less what I meant by 'organising schemas' necessary for 'semantic
        coherence' above. However, again based on my 'FP1-type' idea above, I
        would have to say that 'the behavior of the roots of a universal
        diophantine polynomial' would be an aspect of a fundamentally
        FP1-type context - perhaps what you so delightfully term
        'Number-Nature' - the 'ultimate FP1'.

        > That eventually there is a duality making it possible to choose the
        > first person point of view as the most basic one cannot yet be
        > entirely ruled out for sure, but comp and the quantum without
        > collapse makes it as unlikely imo.

        Do you still feel this notwithstanding my FP1/ FP2 distinction? We
        would be saying that whatever we take to be basic must be an 'FP1-type
        context', for the reasons I argue above.

        > OK, but do you see this moves invite you to provide a definition of
        > "first person" in third person term. Comp succeeds partially, but
        > then justified completely why its success cannot be but partial.
        > Indeed eventually the physical appearances emerges from the never
        > completely specifiable border of the person. The platonic number
        > does not emerge, and I agree they are mysterious, but here too we
        > can understand that we cannot infer our beliefs in them from any
        > weaker beliefs.

        I agree that 'first person' (i.e. FP2 according to my schema) can be
        defined in third person terms. However IMO FP1 cannot be so 'defined'
        but only 'directly uttered'. This means that the manifest existence
        of FP1 entails that we assign primacy to something that is capable of
        such 'direct utterance'. I agree that (per comp) the Platonic number
        'does not emerge' - i.e. has primacy - and that consequently its basic
        ontology in my terms must be FP1.

        > If this is wishful thinking, then this an example of recursion. But
        > then that's not wishful thinking, so it is not an example of
        > recursion. But then it is wishful thinking ... ... and then it is
        > certainly an example of meta-recursion

        Mmmm..

        > ... (I will stop here ;)

        Ah! Does this prove you're not a TM?

        David
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