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RE: Extension of Notion-Domain to Multiverse

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  • Charles Goodwin
    ... My point was actually that the idea is meaningless anyway. I ve never come across a definition of FW that makes sense given *any* laws of physics (any
    Message 1 of 409 , Mar 31, 2005
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      > From: Peter D Jones [mailto:peterdjones@...]
      > > Okay, now it sounds to me as though you find "free will",
      > > "choice", "free choice", "could have done differently",
      > > and so on, as strictly meaningless, given our scientific
      > > understanding of the world. Isn't that true?
      >
      > (Aaaagh! verificationists!)
      >
      > No empirical discovery renders and idea meaningless -- it just renders
      > it false, or fictitious or unrealisable. If could-have-done-
      > differently is part of our idea of FW, then the *truth* of
      > FW is incompatible with ****some***** physical theories (classical
      > determinism and MW). OTOH, if the universe is indetermininstic
      > (if CI or soemthing similar is true) then it isn't.

      My point was actually that the idea is meaningless anyway. I've never come
      across a definition of FW that makes sense given *any* laws of physics (any
      suggestions are welcome).

      Charles
    • Eric Cavalcanti
      ... But I never met a conscious person who does not believe in anything. We could start by saying that a consciousness-moment is defined by their set of
      Message 409 of 409 , May 2, 2005
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        Bruno Marchal wrote:

        > I don't think you can really start with the assumption of
        > consciousness. I have never met two different conscious people who
        > agree on what that term means. I almost define consciousness by what
        > machine knows (in Rafe Champion's large sense, not in the theatetus
        > sense!!!) but cannot talk about.

        But I never met a conscious person who does not believe in anything.
        We could start by saying that a consciousness-moment is defined by
        their set of beliefs, including their belief about what the term
        consciousness means (memories could be reduced to beliefs about the
        past, together with a belief about what 'past' means).

        > You would more easily convince Alan by accepting some level of
        > "absolute truth" (like relation between numbers) and the explain how
        > the "illusion" of the physical emerges. Like (to simplify myself a
        > bit): reality is a video game and the primary tortoise/computer is the
        > absolute arithmetical truth (or part of it).

        I'm not saying that you cannot do that. But if I don't believe comp,
        or if I don't believe arithmetical realism, I don't see how *I* could
        do that. I would like to get a different route to similar conclusions,
        with a different set of basic postulates, which would be more easily
        accepted by people like me.

        Eric.
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