RE: Extension of Notion-Domain to Multiverse
> From: Peter D Jones [mailto:peterdjones@...]My point was actually that the idea is meaningless anyway. I've never come
> > Okay, now it sounds to me as though you find "free will",
> > "choice", "free choice", "could have done differently",
> > and so on, as strictly meaningless, given our scientific
> > understanding of the world. Isn't that true?
> (Aaaagh! verificationists!)
> No empirical discovery renders and idea meaningless -- it just renders
> it false, or fictitious or unrealisable. If could-have-done-
> differently is part of our idea of FW, then the *truth* of
> FW is incompatible with ****some***** physical theories (classical
> determinism and MW). OTOH, if the universe is indetermininstic
> (if CI or soemthing similar is true) then it isn't.
across a definition of FW that makes sense given *any* laws of physics (any
suggestions are welcome).
- Bruno Marchal wrote:
> I don't think you can really start with the assumption ofBut I never met a conscious person who does not believe in anything.
> consciousness. I have never met two different conscious people who
> agree on what that term means. I almost define consciousness by what
> machine knows (in Rafe Champion's large sense, not in the theatetus
> sense!!!) but cannot talk about.
We could start by saying that a consciousness-moment is defined by
their set of beliefs, including their belief about what the term
consciousness means (memories could be reduced to beliefs about the
past, together with a belief about what 'past' means).
> You would more easily convince Alan by accepting some level ofI'm not saying that you cannot do that. But if I don't believe comp,
> "absolute truth" (like relation between numbers) and the explain how
> the "illusion" of the physical emerges. Like (to simplify myself a
> bit): reality is a video game and the primary tortoise/computer is the
> absolute arithmetical truth (or part of it).
or if I don't believe arithmetical realism, I don't see how *I* could
do that. I would like to get a different route to similar conclusions,
with a different set of basic postulates, which would be more easily
accepted by people like me.