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Poindexter out after "bet on terrorist" scheme / Waxman on Rice

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  • Aniruddha Das
    1: Poindexter is out after the futures market on terrorism scheme comes to light 2: Rep Henry Waxman s detailed challenge to Condi Rice: a long piece, but
    Message 1 of 1 , Jul 31, 2003
    • 0 Attachment
      1: Poindexter is out after the "futures market on terrorism" scheme comes
      to light
      2: Rep Henry Waxman's detailed challenge to Condi Rice: a long piece, but
      worth reading.

      Poindexter Bails Out of Pentagon Amid Controversy

      Jul 31, 4:34 pm ET

      By Will Dunham WASHINGTON (Reuters) - John Poindexter, the Iran-Contra
      scandal figure who headed two criticized Pentagon projects, including one
      that would have enabled investors to profit by predicting terrorist
      attacks, will quit his post within weeks, U.S. defense officials said on

      Poindexter, a retired U.S. Navy admiral, "expects to, within a few weeks,
      offer his resignation," a senior defense official, speaking on condition of
      anonymity, told reporters.

      Disclosure of his planned departure from the Defense Department came just
      two days after Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld terminated a Defense
      Advanced Research Projects Agency, or DARPA, project supervised by
      Poindexter for a potential futures trading market in predictions of
      assassinations, terrorism and other events in the Middle East.

      The program was derided by Democrats and Republicans in Congress, some of
      whom called it "bizarre," "unbelievably stupid" and "offensive." Rumsfeld
      himself said he canceled the program "an hour after I read about it."

      Poindexter earlier spearheaded a computerized surveillance project to
      collect information about potential terrorist threats by scouring private
      databases containing mountains of information about millions of people,
      drawing fire from privacy advocates.

      The official indicated that Poindexter had become a lightning rod for
      criticism, but did not answer directly when asked whether Rumsfeld forced
      his resignation.

      Poindexter served as President Ronald Reagan's national security adviser in
      the 1980s. He became a central figure in the Iran-contra scandal in which
      Reagan administration officials diverted cash from secret sales of arms to
      Iran to bankroll Nicaraguan guerrillas at a time when such aid was
      forbidden by Congress.

      He was convicted of lying to Congress, but the conviction later was set aside.


      "Everybody certainly recognizes Admiral Poindexter's background. And in the
      context of that background, it became in some ways very difficult for him
      to receive an objective reading of work that he was doing on behalf of
      finding terrorists," the official said.

      Poindexter has worked for DARPA since January 2002, serving as director of
      its Information Awareness Office, and earns an annual salary of $142,500,
      the Pentagon said.

      Among the lawmakers who expressed concern about the DARPA projects, Vermont
      Democratic Sen. Patrick Leahy, said, "The problem is that these projects
      were just fine with the administration until the public found out about
      them. ... The lesson seems to be that you can do whatever you want quietly,
      so long as it doesn't become a public embarrassment."

      DARPA had said the $8 million Policy Analysis Market project was meant to
      explore the power of futures markets to predict and possibly prevent
      terrorist attacks, arguing that futures projects had a track record of
      being good at predicting events such as election results.

      Poindexter also was embroiled in controversy over the surveillance project
      previously called Total Information Awareness. After a wide range of
      critics blasted the project's potential for invasion of privacy, lawmakers
      and the Defense Department established limits on the scheme.

      The senior defense official said Poindexter possesses "a very creative
      intellect," but noted that he had been involved in "a couple of programs of
      varying degrees of merit that have been seen as certainly unorthodox" and
      beyond merely being "cutting-edge."

      The official said he did not anticipate Poindexter working even as a
      consultant to the Pentagon after his departure.


      Rep. Henry Waxman vs. Condoleeza Rice and Dick Cheney

      by Michael Ruppert

      History will record that it was Rep. Henry Waxman (D-Ca) who laid
      the meticulous groundwork for the unraveling of the Bush Administration.
      As the White House acts as if the Iraqi evidence scandal is over, the
      reality is that the quicksand of lies is getting more dangerous and more
      focused. The kind of work done by Waxman in this meticulous research is
      exactly the kind of work FTW has done from its inception; the factual
      comparison of government documents and official statements, against what
      is prepared and offered for public consumption, against the actual actions
      of the guilty. It has been the research style of all of our post-9/11
      reporting. This is the way prosecutors demolish dishonest witnesses on the
      stand. This is the way that the truth is made undeniable.

      As time will tell, it is also the kind of research and writing
      against which there is no defense. It works. The only thing required for
      its success is that those engaging in it persist and that they have access
      to a public forum where the work cannot be ignored. As Rice is lined up as
      one of the "President's Men" to take the next fall, Dick Cheney moves ever
      more certainly into the crosshairs of history.

      While this is all good news, it is not cause for celebration. The
      more subtle neoliberal methodology waiting to replace the
      blatant, neoconservative Bush Reich will still pursue the same goals and
      move inexorably in the same directions. It is, however, in the transition
      where our greatest opportunities for real change await.


      Here is the story on Waxman's website:

      July 29, 2003

      More Questions for NSA Rice

      Rep. Waxman asks National Security Advisor Condoleezza Rice to
      answer questions about the extent of her knowledge of Iraq nuclear claims,
      whether there were White House efforts to mislead the public, and how
      the discredited uranium claim got into the NIE.


      The following is the text of the letter: ------------------------------------
      July 29, 2003 The Honorable Condoleezza Rice
      Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
      The White House
      Washington, DC 20500

      Dear Dr. Rice:

      On June 10, 2003, I wrote to you to seek answers to basic
      questions regarding the Bush Administration's repeated claims that Iraq
      sought uranium from Africa. I asked why you claimed on national television
      that no White House officials "knew that there were doubts and suspicions"
      about these claims when both the CIA and the State Department's
      intelligence bureau had raised significant concerns with White House
      officials prior to the President's State of the Union address. I also
      wanted to know who in the Administration had expressed doubts about the
      information, who had been briefed on those concerns, and what role Vice
      President Cheney or his office played in this matter.

      To date, I have received no response to these inquiries. Therefore, I
      am writing to renew my request that you answer these questions and provide
      the information requested.

      In addition, since my June 10, 2003, letter to you, there have been
      a number of significant new developments. The conflict between
      your statements and those of your deputy, Stephen Harley, raise new issues
      about what you knew about the discredited uranium claim and whether you
      and other White House officials have sought to mislead the public about
      this matter. Moreover, the newly released National Intelligence Estimate
      contains an inexplicable sentence about the uranium claim. I ask that you
      respond to additional questions about these developments.

      Your Knowledge of the CIA Doubts about the Uranium Claim

      One important new development is the conflict between your
      public statements and those of your primary deputy, Stephen Hadley, the
      Deputy National Security Advisor. You have asserted repeatedly that no
      doubts or suspicions about the uranium claims or the underlying documents
      were communicated to senior officials in the Bush Administration before
      the President's State of the Union address. For example, when you were
      asked about this issue on June 8, 2003, on Meet the Press, you made the
      following statement:

      "We did not know at the time no one knew at the time, in our circles
      maybe someone knew down in the bowels of the agency, but no one in our
      circles knew that there were doubts and suspicions that this might be a
      forgery. Of course, it was information that was mistaken." 1

      Similarly, when you appeared on This Week with George Stephanopoulos on
      the same day, you repeated this statement:

      "George, somebody, somebody down may have known. But I will tell you
      that when this issue was raised with the intelligence community.. .
      [t]he intelligence community did not know at that time, or at levels that
      got to us, that this, that there was serious questions about this report."2

      You continued to make similar statements in the following weeks. On
      July 13, 2003, for example, you made this statement on Face the Nation:

      "Had there been even a peep that the agency did not want that sentence
      in or that George Tenet did not want that sentence in.. . it would have
      been gone."3

      The next day, the President himself repeated this claim. At a
      press briefing on July 14, 2003, President Bush stated: "Subsequent to
      the speech, the CIA had some doubts. But when they talked about the speech
      and when they looked at the speech, it was cleared."4

      Your statements directly contradict those of your deputy, Stephen
      Hadley. On July 22, 2003, Mr. Hadley held a press conference in which
      he acknowledged receiving two memos from the CIA raising doubts about
      the uranium claim being included in the President's October 7 speech
      in Cincinnati over three months before the State of the
      Union address.5 According to Mr. Hadley, "the October 5 CIA memorandum
      asked that we remove the sentence." Mr. Hadley said the second memo was
      sent to the White House Situation Room on October 6 to "provide some
      additional rationale for the removal of the uranium reference." According
      to Mr. Hadley, the memo "describes some weakness in the evidence" and
      "stated that the CIA had been telling Congress that the Africa story was
      one of two issues where we differed with the British intelligence."

      According to Mr. Hadley, the October 6 memo was sent both to him and
      to you. When asked whether you read the memo, Mr. Hadley replied: "it's
      sent to Dr. Rice, it's sent and that's it. You know, I can't tell you she
      read it. I can't even tell you she received it. But in some sense, it
      doesn't matter. Memo sent, we're on notice."6

      In addition to the two memos, Mr. Hadley confirmed that CIA Director
      Tenet personally called him on October 7 and asked him to remove the
      uranium reference from the speech. Mr. Hadley stated: "George Tenet had a
      brief telephone conversation with me during the clearance process for the
      October 7 Cincinnati speech. This was the one he asked that any reference
      to Iraq's attempt to purchase uranium from sources from Africa to be
      deleted from the speech."7

      The obvious conflicts between your public explanations and Mr.
      Hadley's statements raise several questions about what you knew at
      important times. I therefore request answers to the following questions:

      (1) Did you read the memo from the CIA addressed to you on October 6?
      If so, when did you read it? Did Mr. Hadley or other National Security
      Council staff brief you on the content of this memo? When did any such
      briefing occur?

      (2) Did you read the memo from the CIA addressed to Mr. Hadley on
      October 5? If so, when did you read it? Did Mr. Hadley or other National
      Security Council staff brief you on the content of this memo? When did any
      such briefing occur?

      (3) To support its assertions, the White House declassified and
      released portions of the NIB. Will you declassify and release the October
      5 and October 6 memos? Alternatively, please provide the memos to me
      without declassification.

      (4) Did Mr. Hadley or other National Security Council staff brief
      you regarding the content of the October 7 phone call between Mr. Tenet
      and Mr. Hadley? When did any such briefing occur?

      (5) You highlighted the claim that Iraq sought uranium from
      foreign countries in your January 23, 2003, op ed piece for the New York
      Times. The op ed was titled "Why We Know Iraq Is Lying," and the first
      example you gave of Iraq's deceptions was that Iraq's arms declaration
      "fails to account for or explain Iraq's efforts to get uranium from abroad."8

      (a) Did you discuss with Mr. Hadley or did Mr. Hadley review the
      inclusion of the uranium claim in your January 23, 2003, New York Times op
      ed piece at any time during the preparation of the piece? If so, describe
      the content of such discussions or review.

      (b) Did you discuss the inclusion of the uranium claim in your January
      23, 2003, op ed with any other National Security Council staff,
      National Security Council members, officials from the CIA, the State
      Department, or the Department of Defense, or anyone else during the
      preparation of the piece? Please name all individuals with whom you had
      such discussions and describe the content of the discussions.

      (c) Please describe all the evidence on which you based the uranium
      claim in your op ed.

      Your Knowledge of the INR Doubts about the Uranium Claim

      The release of portions of the classified NEE on July 18 also
      raises additional questions about what you knew about the uranium
      claim. Previously, you have acknowledged that the State Department's
      intelligence arm, the Bureau of Intelligence and Research (1NR), dissented
      from the uranium claim in the NIE. Your explanation for not knowing about
      the INR objections was that they were included as a "footnote" to the
      National Intelligence Estimate. On July 11, 2003, you stated:

      "All that I can tell you is that if there were doubts about the
      underlying intelligence in the NIE, those doubts were not communicated to
      the President. The only thing that was there in the NIB was a kind of
      a standard JNR footnote, which is kind of 59 pages away from the bulk of
      the NIB. That's the only thing that's there. And you have footnotes all
      the time in CIA I mean, in NIBs. So if there was a concern about the
      underlying intelligence there, the President was unaware of that concern
      and as was I ....

      "[W]hat INR did not take a footnote to is the consensus view that
      the Iraqis were actively trying to pursue a nuclear weapons
      program, reconstituting and so forth."9

      Now that portions of the NIB have been declassified, however, we know
      this description is not accurate. For instance, there are no footnotes in
      the NIB. Instead, there are several pages in an annex setting forth
      strenuous objections from the State Department. We also know that these
      objections were not buried in the document. To the contrary, they are
      referenced in the very first paragraph of the section on "Key Judgments."
      Specifically, the first paragraph of the NIB reads:

      "We judge that Iraq has continued its weapons of mass destruction
      (WMD) programs in defiance of UN resolutions and restrictions .... {I]f
      left unchecked, it probably will have a nuclear weapon during this
      decade." (See INR alternative view at the end of these Key Judgments.)

      Moreover, contrary to your statement, we also know that the
      State Department disagreed with the view that Iraq was actively pursuing
      a nuclear weapons program. In a three paragraph section highlighted in
      block, the NIB explained in detail that while the State Department
      believed Iraq "may" be seeking to develop a nuclear program, "INR
      considers the available evidence inadequate to support such a judgment."
      The INR went on to explain that "1NR is unwilling to speculate that such
      an effort began soon after the departure of UN inspectors or to project a
      timeline for the completion of activities it does not now see happening."

      As National Security Advisor, one of your primary responsibilities is
      to understand areas of conflict between the different intelligence
      agencies and to mediate these differences. This makes your claim that you
      were unaware of the [NR views hard to understand, particularly given
      their prominence in the classified NEE. I therefore request answers to
      the following questions:

      (1) Did you read the opening paragraph of the NIB? Please state
      which portions of the NIE, if any, that you read.

      (2) At any time, did you receive a briefing on the NIB that included
      a description of the NR's views specifically regarding the claim that
      Iraq sought uranium in Africa and generally regarding whether Iraq was
      actively pursuing a nuclear weapons program? If so, when did you receive
      such a briefing?

      Your Actions Following the Disclosure of the Fraudulent Documents

      Another important set of questions concerns whether you have
      participated in an effort to mislead the public and Congress about what
      the White House knew about the discredited uranium claim.

      As you know, on March 7, 2003, IAEA Director Mohamed BIB aradei made
      a formal report to the U.N. Security Council, stating:

      "Based on thorough analysis, the IAEA has concluded, with the
      concurrence of outside experts, that these documents which formed the
      basis for the reports of recent uranium transactions between Iraq and
      Niger are in fact not authentic. We have therefore concluded that these
      specific allegations are unfounded .... There is no indication that Iraq
      has attempted to import uranium since 1990."10

      The forged documents described by the IAEA constituted the only
      evidence the Administration provided the TABA regarding the
      Administration's claim that Iraq sought uranium from Africa.11

      This disclosure by the IAEA called into doubt one of the claims made
      by President Bush in the State of the Union address. In fulfilling
      your responsibilities as National Security Adviser, this would obviously
      be a significant development. The statutory purpose of the National
      Security Council is to give the President accurate advice on important
      national security matters such as Iraq's efforts to obtain nuclear
      weapons.12 It is difficult to imagine that you would not have taken this
      breakdown in the process seriously and asked for a full investigation of
      the matter.

      Moreover, regardless of whether you initiated an investigation after
      the IAEA's March 7 announcement, you had numerous other opportunities to
      do so before you appeared on national television on June 8 to claim that
      no one in the White House was aware of doubts about the uranium claim. In
      fact, it seems inconceivable that an official at your level would appear
      on national television on a matter of this importance without having been
      thoroughly briefed on what the White House knew.

      Further, Vice President Cheney discussed the IAEA's findings on Meet
      the Press on March 16, asserting:

      "[H]e has, in fact, reconstituted nuclear weapons. I think Mr.
      ElBaradei frankly is wrong. And I think if you look at the track record of
      the International Atomic Energy Agency and this kind of issue, especially
      where Iraq's concerned, they have consistently underestimated or missed
      what it was Saddam Hussein was doing. I don't have any reason to believe
      they're any more valid this time than they've been in the past."13

      Presumably you would have been involved in briefing Vice President
      Cheney for this television appearance and would have had some
      responsibility for his dismissal of the IAEA's findings.

      Yet if you had asked for even a minimal investigation, surely you
      would have learned about the CIA and INR doubts, the CIA memos to you and
      Mr. Hadley, and CIA Director George Tenet's phone call to Mr. Hadley on
      October 7.

      These circumstances raise obvious questions about whether your
      public statements were intended to mislead. I therefore request answers to
      the following questions:

      (1) At any time following the IAEA's March 7 announcement of its
      findings regarding the forged evidence, did you discuss with Mr. Hadley
      how this evidence had been analyzed and characterized to White House
      officials by agencies and departments within the Administration? If so,
      please describe when such discussions occurred and the content of such
      discussions. If not, please explain why you did not ask Mr. Hadley whether
      he had been informed of doubts about the evidence.

      (2) At any time following the IAEA's March 7 announcement, did you
      discuss with any other NSC staff, members, or any other Administration
      officials how the evidence had been analyzed and characterized to White
      House officials by agencies and departments within the Administration? If
      so, state the names of such individuals, when such discussions occurred,
      and the content of such discussions.

      (3) At any time following the IAEA's March 7 announcement, did
      you otherwise investigate how the evidence was analyzed and characterized
      by agencies and departments within the Administration? If so, please
      describe the nature of such an investigation, when it occurred, and the
      conclusions that resulted.

      The Inexplicable Sentence in the NIE

      The NIE was delivered to Congress on October 1, 2002, about a week
      before Congress voted on the resolution to authorize the use of force in
      Iraq. The classified document included the following statement under the
      heading "uranium acquisition": "Iraq also began vigorously trying to
      procure uranium ore and yellowcake." The only items offered to support
      this claim were foreign government reports that Iraq was seeking uranium
      from Niger and a single line regarding "reports" about Congo and Somalia.

      Given what we know now, this statement is impossible to
      understand. Contrary to the assertion in the NIE, the CIA repeatedly urged
      you, your staff, and the British government not to use the uranium claim
      in public in the days immediately before and after the NIB was issued. On
      September 24, 2002, for example, the British government issued a dossier
      with the first public allegation of Iraq's attempt to obtain uranium from
      Africa. We now know that the CIA told the British not to use the claim in
      its dossier. According to CIA Director Tenet:

      "{I]n the fall of 2002, our British colleagues told us they were
      planning to publish an unclassified dossier that mentioned reports of
      Iraqi attempts to obtain uranium in Africa. Because we viewed the
      reporting on such acquisition attempts to be inconclusive, we expressed
      reservations about its inclusion, but our colleagues said they were
      confident in their reports and left it in their document."14

      Director Tenet's statement demonstrates that the CIA did not
      have confidence in the claim prior to the issuance of the NIB, at least
      based on evidence available to the agency. According to the Washington
      Post, the CIA also warned Britain that its analysts considered the
      "reports on other African countries to be 'sketchy.'"15 Yet the claim
      somehow made it into the ME.

      After the NIE was issued, the CIA immediately began raising objections
      to the uranium claim. On October 4, 2002, the CIA issued a White Paper
      that was derived from the text of the NIE. This White Paper excised
      specific sections based on classification concerns. The uranium allegation
      was taken out, not because of classification issues, but because the CIA
      did not have confidence in its accuracy. According to CIA Director Tenet:

      "An unclassified CIA White Paper in October made no mention of the
      issue... because we had questions about some of the reporting. For the
      same reasons, the subject was not included in many public speeches,
      Congressional testimony and the Secretary of State's United Nations
      presentation in early 2003."16

      It is unclear how the CIA could be so certain about the uranium claim
      on October 1 when it delivered the NIE, and yet argue so strenuously
      against using it just three days later in the White Paper. The CIA also
      raised more objections to the public use of this claim in the days that
      followed the release of the White Paper. We know from Mr. Hadley, for
      example, that the CIA raised repeated concerns with the President using
      the allegation in his October 7 speech in Cincinnati. As described above,
      these concerns were set forth in two memos to you and your staff on
      October 5 and 6. CIA Director Tenet apparently felt so strongly about the
      questionable nature of the allegation that he telephoned Mr. Hadley
      personally on October 7 to ensure that the allegation did not appear in
      the President's public speech. I therefore request answers to the following

      (1) What role, if any, did you and your staff play in drafting,
      editing, reviewing, or approving the uranium statement in the NIE before
      it was delivered to Congress?

      (2) What role, if any, did officials from the Department of Defense play
      in drafting, editing, reviewing, or approving the uranium statement in the
      NIB before it was delivered to Congress?

      (3) What role, if any, did the Vice President or his staff play
      in drafting, editing, reviewing, or approving the uranium statement in the
      NIB before it was delivered to Congress?

      (4) Based on your investigation of this matter since it was revealed
      that the Niger documents were forgeries, how do you explain that the
      uranium statement was included in the NIB in such strong terms, while the
      CIA simultaneously objected to the claim in the British dossier, in memos
      to you and your staff, and in a telephone conversation to your deputy?

      The State Department Fact Sheet

      Just as the uranium claim mysteriously appeared in the NIB despite
      the CIA's protestations about its accuracy, the claim also appeared in a
      State Department Fact Sheet two months later despite objections from the
      State Department's own intelligence bureau. The Fact Sheet,
      entitled "illustrative Examples of Omissions From the Iraqi Declaration to
      the United Nations Security Council," was issued on December 19, 2002.17
      It listed eight key areas in which the Bush Administration found fault
      with the weapons declaration that Iraq submitted to the United Nations
      on December 7, 2002. Under the heading "Nuclear Weapons," the Fact Sheet

      "The Declaration ignores efforts to procure uranium from Niger. Why is
      the Iraqi regime hiding their uranium procurement?"

      As you know, the Bureau of Intelligence and Research is the
      State Department office responsible for analyzing intelligence and
      making recommendations to the Secretary of State. According to Greg
      Thielmann, a former director of Strategic, Proliferation, and Military
      Affairs at INR, his office "had concluded that the purchases were
      implausible and made that point clear to Powell's office." 18

      The declassification of the NIB confirmed that the State Department
      made these conclusions as early as October two months prior to the release
      of the Fact Sheet. According to sections now publicly available, the
      NIB stated that intelligence officials at the State Department believed
      "claims of Iraqi pursuit of natural uranium in Africa are... highly

      On April 29, 2003, Paul V. Kelly, Assistant Secretary of State
      for Legislative Affairs, stated in a letter to me that the State
      Department's December 19 Fact Sheet including the claim referring to Niger
      "was a product developed jointly by the CIA and the State Department."20
      Contrary to this account, however, the CIA has denied that it had a role
      in the creation of the Fact Sheet. Senior CIA officials told the
      Washington Post that they objected to including the Niger claim:

      "When the State Department on Dec. 19, 2002, posted a reference to Iraq
      not supplying details on its uranium purchases, the CIA raised an
      objection, 'but it came too late' to prevent its publication, the senior
      intelligence official said."21

      As in the case of the NEE, these circumstances indicate that
      an unidentified Bush Administration official or officials succeeded
      in inserting the suspect uranium claim into a State Department document in
      the face of objections from the Department's own intelligence analysts.
      There appears to be a continuing dispute between the State Department and
      the CIA over who was responsible.

      I therefore request answers to the following questions:

      (1) Were any National Security Council officials or staff involved in
      the creation or editing of the Fact Sheet? If so, identify these
      individuals and describe their involvement and responsibility with respect
      to the Fact Sheet.

      (2) Are you aware of any other officials that were involved in the
      creation or editing of the Fact Sheet? Please identify any such officials
      and describe their involvement and responsibility with respect to the Fact

      (3) Who cleared the Fact Sheet's section relating to Niger?

      (4) What communications, if any, did National Security Council
      officials have with State Department, CIA, or Defense Department officials
      regarding the Niger claim being included in the Fact Sheet, both before
      and after it was issued? Please describe the content of any such
      communications, and between whom and when such communications took place.


      I look forward to your response to the questions in this letter and my
      June 10 letter.

      Henry A. Waxman
      Ranking Minority Member

      1 Meet the Press, NBC News (June 8, 2003).
      2 This Week with George Stephanopoulos, ABC News (June 8, 2003).
      3 Face the Nation, CBS News (July 13, 2003).
      4 President Defends Allegation on Iraq, Washington Post (July 15, 2003).
      5 Dan Bartlett and Steve Hadley Hold Press Briefing on Iraq Weapons of
      MassDestruction and the State of the Union Speech, FDCH Political
      Transcripts (July 22, 2003).
      6 Id.
      7 Id.
      8 Why We Know Iraq Is Lying, New York Times (Jan. 23, 2003).
      9 The White Rouse, Press Gaggle with An Fleischer and Dr. Condoleeza Rice
      aboard Air Force One en Route to Entebbe, Uganda (July 11, 2003).
      10 International Atomic Energy Agency, The Status of Nuclear Inspections in
      Iraq: An Update (Mar. 7, 2003) (online at
      http://www.iaea.org/worldatom/Press/Statements/ 2003/ebsp2003nOO6.shtml).
      11 Letter from Piet de Klerk, Director, Office of External Relation and
      Policy Coordination, IAEA, to Rep. Henry A. Waxman (June 20, 2003). See
      also What Little Intelligence Was New on Iraq 's Suspected Weapons Has Been
      Called into Question, Associated Press (July 13, 2003).
      12 See 5OU.S.C.A. ยง 402.
      13 Meet the Press, NBC News (Mar. 16, 2003).
      14 Central Intelligence Agency, Statement by George J. Tenet, Director of
      Central Intelligence (July 11, 2003) (online at
      http://www.cia.gov/cialpublic_affairs/ press_release/2003/prO7 112003 .html).
      15 CIA Asked Britain To Drop Iraq Claim; Advice on Alleged Uranium Buy Was
      Refused, Washington Post (July 11, 2003).
      16 Central Intelligence Agency, supra note 14.
      17 US Department of State, Illustrative Examples of Omissions from the Iraqi
      Declaration to the United Nations Security Council (Dec. 19, 2002) (online
      at www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2002/l 611 8pflhtm).
      18 (Over)selling the World on War, Newsweek (June 9, 2003).
      19 Uranium Claim Was Known for Months to Be Weak; Intelligence Officials
      Say 'Everyone Knew' Then What White House Knows Now about Niger Reference,
      Washington Post (July 20, 2003).
      20 Letter from Paul V. Kelly, Assistant Secretary of State for Legislative
      Affairs, to Rep. Henry A. Waxman (Apr. 29, 2003).
      21 CIA Says It Cabled Key Data to White House; But Officials Say Document
      Lacked Conclusion on Iraqi Uranium Deal, Washington Post (June 13, 2003).
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