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Re: Does God not *know* that Pascal doesn't believe sincerely'? (was My Last Christian Story for CED)

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  • Stephen E. Jones
    Group ... CL Before the list terminates, could someone explain something about ... Cliff s first premise is wrong. There is nothing in Pascal s Wager that says
    Message 1 of 1 , Jul 19, 2005
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      On Tue, 19 Jul 2005 12:31:54 -0700, Cliff Lundberg wrote:

      >JD> I mentioned Pascal's Wager

      CL>Before the list terminates, could someone explain something about
      >Pascal's Wager? Does God not *know* that Pascal doesn't believe
      >sincerely--that his respect for religion is a calculated ploy? Or
      >does God not *care*?

      Cliff's first premise is wrong. There is nothing in Pascal's Wager that says
      or implies that "Pascal doesn't believe sincerely". Indeed if "Pascal doesn't
      believe sincerely" then he would be on the atheist's side of Pascal's Wager.

      Pascal's Wager is a specialist apologetic argument between a Christian and
      an atheist. It is not meant to be a general argument (e.g. it would not work
      between a Christian and a Muslim).

      The basic idea of Pascal's Wager is that if the atheist is right, that there is
      no God and Christianity is false, then both the atheist and Christian will
      eventually die, and if the atheist was right that Christianity was false,
      neither would know it. So the atheist has won nothing and the Christian
      has lost nothing.

      OTOH if Christianity is true, that: "God so loved the world that he gave
      his one and only Son, that whoever believes in him shall not perish but
      have eternal life" (John 3:16), then those who believe in Jesus' will
      eternally live with God and those who don't will eternally perish without
      God. So when the atheist and Christian eventually die, both the atheist and
      Christian will know that the Christian was right. But then the atheist
      would have lost everything and the Christian would have gained

      The other point about Pascal's Wager is that we have no choice but to
      wager. That is we *are* in the race of life and each *have* backed a
      `horse' wagering on our eternal destiny.

      Here is a quote about Pascal's Wager by a Roman Catholic philosopher,
      Peter Kreeft, who is among its foremost modern exponents:

      "To understand Pascal's Wager you have to understand the
      background of the argument. Pascal lived in a time of great
      scepticism. Medieval philosophy was dead, and medieval theology
      was being ignored or sneered at by the new intellectuals of the
      scientific revolution of the seventeenth century. Montaigne, the
      great sceptical essayist, was the most popular writer of the day. The
      classic arguments for the existence of God were no longer
      popularly believed. What could the Christian apologist say to the
      sceptical mind of this age? Suppose such a typical mind lacked
      both the gift of faith and the confidence in reason to prove God's
      existence; could there be a third ladder out of the pit of unbelief
      into the light of belief? Pascal's Wager claims to be that third
      ladder. Pascal well knew that it was a low ladder. If you believe in
      God only as a bet, that is certainly not a deep, mature, or adequate
      faith. But it is something, it is a start, it is enough to dam the tide
      of atheism. The Wager appeals not to a high ideal, like faith, hope,
      love, or proof, but to a low one: the instinct for self- preservation,
      the desire to be happy and not unhappy. But on that low natural
      level, it has tremendous force. Thus Pascal prefaces his argument
      with the words, `Let us now speak according to our natural lights.'
      Imagine you are playing a game for two prizes. You wager blue
      chips to win blue prizes and red chips to win red prizes. The blue
      chips are your mind, your reason, and the blue prize is the truth
      about God's existence. The red chips are your will, your desires,
      and the red prize is heavenly happiness. Everyone wants both
      prizes, truth and happiness. Now suppose there is no way of
      calculating how to play the blue chips. Suppose your reason cannot
      win you the truth. In that case, you can still calculate how to play
      the red chips. Believe in God not because your reason can prove
      with certainty that it is true that God exists but because your will
      seeks happiness, and God is your only chance of attaining
      happiness eternally. Pascal says, `Either God is, or he is not. But to
      which view shall we be inclined? Reason cannot decide this
      question. [Remember that Pascal's Wager is an argument for
      sceptics.] Infinite chaos separates us. At the far end of this infinite
      distance [death] a coin is being spun that will come down heads
      [God] or tails [no God]. How will you wager?' ... The most
      powerful part of Pascal's argument comes next. It is not his
      refutation of atheism as a foolish wager (that comes last) but his
      refutation of agnosticism as impossible. Agnosticism, not-
      knowing, maintaining a sceptical, uncommitted attitude, seems to
      be the most reasonable option. The agnostic says, `The right thing
      is not to wager at all.' Pascal replies, `But you must wager. There is
      no choice. You are already committed [embarked].' We are not
      outside observers of life, but participants. We are like ships that
      need to get home, sailing past a port that has signs on it
      proclaiming that it is our true home and our true happiness. The
      ships are our own lives and the signs on the port say `God'. The
      agnostic says he will neither put in at that port (believe) nor turn
      away from it (disbelieve) but stay anchored a reasonable distance
      away until the weather clears and he can see better whether this is
      the true port or a fake (for there are a lot of fakes around). Why is
      this attitude unreasonable, even impossible? Because we are
      moving. The ship of life is moving along the waters of time, and
      there comes a point of no return, when our fuel runs out, when it is
      too late. The Wager works because of the fact of death. ... Once it
      is decided that we must wager; once it is decided that there are only
      two options, theism and atheism, not three, theism, atheism, and
      agnosticism; then the rest of the argument is simple. Atheism is a
      terrible bet. It gives you no chance of winning the red prize. Pascal
      states the argument this way: You have two things to lose: the true
      and the good; and two things to stake: your reason and your will,
      your knowledge and your happiness; and your nature has two
      things to avoid: error and wretchedness. Since you must
      necessarily choose, your reason is no more affronted by choosing
      one rather than the other. That is one point cleared up. But your
      happiness? Let us weigh up the gain and the loss involved in
      calling heads that God exists. Let us assess the two cases: if you
      win, you win everything: if you lose, you lose nothing. Do not
      hesitate then: wager that he does exist. If God does not exist, it
      does not matter how you wager, for there is nothing to win after
      death and nothing to lose after death. But if God does exist, your
      only chance of winning eternal happiness is to believe, and your
      only chance of losing it is to refuse to believe. As Pascal says, `I
      should be much more afraid of being mistaken and then finding out
      that Christianity is true than of being mistaken in believing it to be
      true.' If you believe too much, you neither win nor lose eternal
      happiness. But if you believe too little, you risk losing everything.'"
      (Kreeft P., "Argument from Pascal's Wager," in Kreeft P.,
      "Fundamentals of the Faith: Essays in Christian Apologetics,"
      Ignatius Press: San Francisco CA, 1988.


      PS: More quotes from my Unposted Quotes files.

      "However, because a great deal of important, informative research is
      performed with animals, scientists feel considerable social pressure to
      generalize conclusions based on evidence from animals to the human
      condition. This strategy is successful for many phenomena. Vision and
      hearing, for example, are very similar in monkeys and humans. But equally
      confident generalizations are not possible for all human qualities. Only
      humans engage in symbolic rituals when they bury kin, draw on cave walls,
      hold beliefs about the self and the origin of the world, and worry over their
      loyalty to family members. Thus, it is useful to examine critically the
      generalizability of some current psychological concepts that rely primarily
      on research with animals, in order to decide which extrapolations may have
      gone too far. I suspect that many extrapolations, like Don Quixote's
      conviction that he was attacking giants rather than windmills, will turn out
      to be seriously inaccurate." (Kagan J., "Three Seductive Ideas," Harvard
      University Press: Cambridge, MA, 1998, p.9)

      "Consciousness is best described as a set of emergent phenomena that
      require particular brain processes but are not equivalent to them. A child's
      perception of a gull swooping down on the sea is not synonymous with a
      description of the neural circuits that make that perception possible. The
      forces responsible for atoms and molecules act to preserve them and to
      resist change in the status quo. But living things, which are emergent from
      these atoms and molecules, thrive precisely because of their ability to
      detect both internal and external changes and to react by altering their
      state." Neurons respond to changes in the concentration of
      neurotransmitters and alter their activity; circuits react to changes in
      sensory input and alter their projected targets; organisms respond to energy
      changes in the environment and alter their behavior. Sensitivity to change is
      the key to an organism's survival, yet this quintessential quality is not
      inherent in its constituent atoms and molecules. It is likely that
      consciousness is as fully emergent from activity in neural circuits as the
      circuits themselves are from the atoms and molecules of which they are
      constructed." (Kagan J., "Three Seductive Ideas," Harvard University
      Press: Cambridge, MA, 1998, p.40)

      "The evidence implies a partial autonomy of psychological and biological
      events. No matter how powerful brain scanning machines be come in the
      future, scientists will be unable to determine the specific content of a
      subject's thoughts, neither the mathematical equation he was imagining nor
      the tune he was recalling, even though investigators might be able to infer
      that the person lying quietly in the scanner was generating mathematics
      rather than melodies. But the content of the person's thought will retain
      some unpredictability because each level of analysis strikes a barrier beyond
      which the scientist cannot predict the next emergent event. That is why
      there is a bit of indeterminacy in predicting the speed with which a monkey
      will move its eyes to a spot of light from the rate of change in electrical
      activity in the neurons that permit the eyes to move, and why a cat will stop
      orienting its head to a discrepant tone after only a few presentations, even
      though neurons in the hippocampus continue to react every time the
      unexpected tone occurs. 45 In both of these examples there is a
      dissociation between what is happening in the brain and the animal's
      behavior." (Kagan J., "Three Seductive Ideas," Harvard University Press:
      Cambridge, MA, 1998, pp.43-44)

      "States of consciousness cannot be reduced to the language of physiology
      and must be described in psychological language. The concepts and
      principles that eventually explain awareness will be different from those
      that describe the brain circuits that sustain the varied forms consciousness
      assumes. This position has been pejoratively described as "dualist":
      dualists, it is claimed, are possessed by the devil because they secretly
      believe in two different kinds of events, mental and physical. But biologists
      are not called dualists when they use the language of proteins rather than
      DNA base pairs to describe the constituents of a fertilized egg. Nor are
      physicists dualists when they describe a vessel of water in terms of specific
      gravity, surface tension, and freezing point but de scribe the individual
      water molecules in terms of molecular weight. If a person notices a water
      stain on a tablecloth, would it be reasonable to say to that person that since
      neither hydrogen nor oxygen can stain cloth, their perception must be
      mistaken? I am puzzled by those who are frustrated by the necessity of
      using one language for brain processes and a different vocabulary for
      psychological events. All the phenomena of nature cannot be described in
      one language." (Kagan J., "Three Seductive Ideas," Harvard University
      Press: Cambridge, MA, 1998, pp.44-45)

      "Hollywood does not make expensive movies about cannibalism or a father
      sodomizing his son because those scenes would bother most Americans.
      But dishonesty, torture, murder, arrogance, deceit, and narcissism, which
      are always with us, are being cleansed of some, of their earlier moral
      revulsion. The prevalence of these behaviors has permitted Americans to
      think about these acts and to pass from a state of aversion, terror, or
      disgust to one of curious interest. These themes now sit in a narrow space
      characterized by uncertainty. They titillate us in the same way that films
      filled with carnal sex did in the 1960s. The happy prediction is that we will
      in time become bored with these ideas because they will have exhausted
      their novelty. Indeed, as honesty, politeness, and control of anger become
      less familiar in urban America, they may become the major themes of our
      plays, books, and movies cause they will possess the same degree of
      strangeness that senseless violence does today. Perhaps the current
      popularity of movies based on the novels of Jane Austen and Henry James,
      as well as television dramas about angels, are early signs of the accuracy of
      this prediction." (Kagan J., "Three Seductive Ideas," Harvard University
      Press: Cambridge MA, 1998, pp.168-169)

      "The first signs of a moral competence can be observed in every home with
      children. A two-year-old looks warily toward a parent after spilling juice on
      the floor. The child's face and posture announce that she has committed an
      act that violates what she knows to be proper. One-year olds who spill
      juice do not show this anticipation of parental disapproval, even though
      their parents have chastised them for this act. One year-olds have had many
      opportunities to learn that acts which destroy the integrity of property are
      unacceptable, but their cognitive abilities are simply not mature enough to
      connect the symbolic meaning of their action with adult disapproval.
      Something happens in the mind/brain of children in the second year to
      make them sensitive to the propriety of their behavior. I suspect that the
      psychological changes that occur between one and two years of age are as
      profound as those that occurred when the hominid line split off from its
      closest primate ancestors." (Kagan J., "Three Seductive Ideas," Harvard
      University Press: Cambridge MA, 1998, p.170)

      "The ability to empathize with another who is in distress, which also
      emerges in the second year, has direct relevance for morality. Two boys,
      almost sixteen months old, were fighting over a toy. When one began to
      cry, the other released the toy; but when the boy with the toy continued to
      cry, the other ran to another room, retrieved the crying child's favorite toy,
      and gave it to him. This sequence required the inference that the crying
      child was distressed and could be consoled. The chimps of the Gombe
      National Park, by contrast, reacted to a chimp paralyzed by polio with fear
      and later with attack. Two-year-old children have a capacity to infer the
      thoughts and feelings of another and will show signs of tension if another
      person is hurt, or may offer penance if they caused another's distress. As a
      result, an intention to hurt another leads to an anticipation of the
      unpleasant feelings the other might experience and (more often than not) to
      suppression of the asocial act. This developmental fact is not completely
      consistent with the view, popular among philosophers like David Hume
      and biologists like Jacques Monod, that moral values cannot be derived
      from objective knowledge." The appearance of empathy in all children by
      the end of the second year implies that two-year-olds are prepared by their
      biology to regard hurting others as bad-that is, a moral violation." (Kagan
      J., "Three Seductive Ideas," Harvard University Press: Cambridge MA,
      1998, p.173)

      "Most two-year-olds are also aware of the fact that they are individuals
      with particular characteristics, feelings, and intentions. When this aspect of
      self-awareness appears, children apply the labels good and bad to self, as
      they have been doing for objects and acts during the past six months. If self
      is a bad object, the child is vulnerable to the same feeling states that are
      linked to actions classified as bad. When the child recognizes that she is an
      object for which one of these descriptors is apt, she will try to avoid
      accruing more evidence that might suggest that bad is an appropriate
      adjective for her. She begins to understand that when she is had, she
      produces unpleasant feelings in others in the same way that bad objects or
      events produce unpleasant feelings in herself, and she concludes that, as a
      consequence, others will avoid her. That insight is a seminal origin of the
      moral motive, although it will not be the only basis for morality in later
      years. A desire to avoid, or to deny, the labeling of self as bad increases in
      intensity as the child matures; in time, it will take precedence over fear of
      disapproval or punishment as the primary governor of behavior." (Kagan J.,
      "Three Seductive Ideas," Harvard University Press: Cambridge MA, 1998,

      "Positing a biological foundation for the human moral sense does not imply
      that one particular ethical system is more natural than another, any more
      than positing a biological foundation for language implies a preference for
      one grammar. A concern with right and wrong is an easy classification for
      children to learn because of the fundamental nature of the human brain, but
      the specific actions that are deemed moral vary with cultural conditions
      that lie beyond the genome's reach. Trust, mistrust, brutal honesty, polite
      civility, defending family honor, and turning the other cheek have been
      promoted at different times as compelling moral arguments. Although the
      range of moral choices is limited by our biological nature, the ethical
      possibilities are greater than many suppose. The writer Louis Menand
      reminds us that we have to figure out for ourselves what we ought and
      ought not to do: `Go ahead, ask your genes what to do. You might as well
      be asking Zeus.'" (Kagan J., "Three Seductive Ideas," Harvard University
      Press: Cambridge MA, 1998, p.175)

      "The pop-psychology view of human motivation is that our animal heritage
      imposes on us an irresistible need for power, fame, sex, and property and
      an easy access to anger. If these motives are part of our evolution, the
      argument goes, they should be treated as acceptable. This distortion of
      Darwin's views ignores the fact that humans are also equally capable of
      empathy, shame, and guilt. ... What is historically new but not unique about
      current Western society is that the single-minded seeking of power,
      prestige, wealth, and sexual delight, which earlier centuries had criticized as
      moral flaws, has become for many a modern ethical code that enjoys the
      privilege of being treated as `good.' It is ironic that one of the unanticipated
      consequences of the creative advances in modern biology is the
      rationalization of motives that are, when carried to the extreme, self-
      destructive." (Kagan J., "Three Seductive Ideas," Harvard University Press:
      Cambridge MA, 1998, p.186)

      "Scholars from Aristotle to Kant held that every person has the ability to
      exercise rational control of their desires through a reliance on will.
      Although nineteenth-century writers acknowledged that our species shares
      characteristics with primates, only humans were thought to be in command
      of an ability to choose between morally proper and improper behavior. But
      the century that followed On the Origin of Species produced an increasing
      number of scientists who rejected that argument in favor of the view that
      humans were no more than hairless gorillas." (Kagan J., "Three Seductive
      Ideas," Harvard University Press: Cambridge MA, 1998, pp.186-187)

      "In order to rationalize the blizzard of cruelty, greed, rudeness, and
      dishonesty in contemporary society, we have come to believe that it is not
      always possible or adaptive to control anger, cupidity, rivalry, and jealousy.
      This rationalization mutes feelings of guilt and dilutes a continuing sense of
      personal responsibility for hurting others. Although the population density
      in Japan is far greater than in the United States, the Japanese believe that
      each person is able to control his anger, and the differential frequency of
      violence in the two countries is enormous. The United States reports about
      five times as many violent crimes per capita as does Japan. Apparently, if
      humans believe they can contain their impulses, they do so." (Kagan J.,
      "Three Seductive Ideas," Harvard University Press: Cambridge MA, 1998,

      "The belief that anger, jealousy, self-interest, and competitiveness should
      not be suppressed because they are natural emotions has advantages in a
      society in which a large number of strangers must compete for a small
      number of positions of dignity, status, and economic security. Under these
      conditions it helps to be self-interested, and it is disadvantageous to be too
      cooperative, too loyal, too altruistic, or too reluctant to protest unjust
      advantage taken by another. ... But rather than acknowledge that the
      structure of our society forces each of us to adopt self-interest as the first
      rule, many Americans find it more attractive to believe that this mood,
      along with jealousy, sexual exploitation, hatred, and violence, is an
      inevitable remnant of our animal heritage-and one we must learn to
      accept." (Kagan J., "Three Seductive Ideas," Harvard University Press:
      Cambridge MA, 1998, pp.187-188)

      "Most individuals need some help in rationalizing the fact that they are
      forced by social conditions to violate in excess one or more of their ethical
      standards. When the availability of contraceptives made sexual behavior
      outside of marriage safer, Americans and Europeans wanted to hear that
      illicit sexual liaisons were not morally reprehensible. Freud heard their plea
      and naturalized sex." (Kagan J., "Three Seductive Ideas," Harvard
      University Press: Cambridge MA, 1998, p.189)

      "The phrases `selfish genes' and `inclusive fitness' have the misleading
      implication that proximal causes are less interesting and less important than
      evolutionary ones. But my understanding of why an eighteen-year old girl
      in Bangkok, working as a streetwalker, sends her earnings to the parents
      who sold her into prostitution is not enhanced very much by being told that
      she does so to maximize the reproductive fitness of those who share her
      genes." (Kagan J., "Three Seductive Ideas," Harvard University Press:
      Cambridge MA, 1998, pp.189-190

      "It is an error to assume that any human ethic is a clear derivative of some
      class of animal behavior. During the first three decades of this century,
      eugenicists argued that the facts of evolution have ethical implications; in
      this case their motive was to prevent the reproduction of those who had
      inferior talents or dangerous habits. Today, evolutionary arguments are
      used to cleanse greed, promiscuity, and the abuse of stepchildren of moral
      taint. Although this stance is more liberal, that does not mean it is more
      likely to be correct. The concern with right and wrong, the control of guilt,
      and the desire to feel virtuous are, like the appearance of milk in
      mammalian mothers, a unique event that was discontinuous with what was
      prior. It is not possible to find in fish, frogs, lizards, or birds a basis for the
      fact that mammalian mothers evolved organs that produce milk to nurse
      their young." (Kagan J., "Three Seductive Ideas," Harvard University
      Press: Cambridge MA, 1998, p.190)

      "The continual desire to regard the self as good is a unique feature of
      Homo sapiens. Although it has a firm foundation in the human genome, it
      is not an obvious derivative of the competences of apes and monkeys.
      Should this claim prove to be valid, the use of animal behavior to explain
      human selfishness or altruism is a just-so story." (Kagan J., "Three
      Seductive Ideas," Harvard University Press: Cambridge MA, 1998, p.190)

      "Each person holds a number of ethical beliefs that permit him to decide,
      without too much delay, which action to implement when he has a choice.
      However, most of us would be silent if asked to provide the foundation for
      those beliefs. The inability to justify our deepest moral standards with more
      than "It feels right" is a source of unease. As a result, any person or group
      that announces it can supply an answer to the query 'Why do I believe this
      to be right?" is celebrated. The church was an effective source of
      justification for Europeans for over fifteen hundred years, until science
      began to compete for that role and eventually became a primary arbiter.
      Many contemporary citizens expect the facts of nature, as interpreted by
      scientists, to provide a rationale for human ethics." (Kagan J., "Three
      Seductive Ideas," Harvard University Press: Cambridge MA, 1998, p.190)

      "Humans are selfish and generous, aloof and empathic, hateful and loving,
      dishonest and honest, disloyal and loyal, cruel and kind, arrogant and
      humble, but most feel a little guilt over in excessive display of the first
      member of these seven pairs. The resulting dysphoria, which is
      uncomfortable, is unique to humans, and they are eager to have it
      ameliorated. Confession or psychotherapy is effective for some, especially
      if the priest or therapist is respected. I suspect that some people feel better
      when they learn that their less social urges are natural consequences of
      their phylogenetic history. The current high status of the biological sciences
      has made it possible for students of evolution also to serve as therapists to
      the community." (Kagan J., "Three
      Seductive Ideas," Harvard University Press: Cambridge MA, 1998, p.190)

      "In the final section of a recent book that presents an evolutionary account
      of human ethical behavior, the author surprisingly throws away all the
      examples of animal behavior described in the previous twelve chapters and
      pleads for an ethic that could only occur in humans. 'We must encourage
      social and natural exchange between equals for that is the raw material of
      trust and trust is the foundation of virtue.' (de Waal F., Good NaturedPrecisely! Although I do not
      doubt the essential correctness of modern evolutionary theory, some
      Americans have become too accepting of the view that humans bear the
      indelible stamp of their lowly origins. An uncritical attitude toward that
      assumption could make it a self-fulfilling prophecy. Every time a judge
      excuses a violent act of aggression by a sane adolescent of average
      intelligence because the child grew up under harsh conditions, the court,
      speaking for all of us, declares that no per son subject to extreme cruelty or
      deprivation should be required to use the universal knowledge that
      maliciousness is wrong." (Kagan J., "Three Seductive Ideas," Harvard University Press: Cambridge
      MA, 1998, p.191)

      The biological imperative for all animals is to avoid hunger and harm and to
      reproduce, and adult chimps spend much of each day doing just that. But
      humans in ancient societies established cities, wrote laws for bidding
      certain behaviors, built ships, wore finery, used slaves, attended plays, and,
      in Greece, admired the Parthenon. What is biologically special about our
      species is a constant attention to what is good and beautiful and a dislike of
      all that is bad and ugly. These biologically prepared biases render the
      human experience incommensurable with that of any other species."
      (Kagan J., "Three Seductive Ideas," Harvard University Press: Cambridge
      MA, 1998, p.191)

      "The appeal of the ideas of evolutionary biology, and the elegant discoveries
      in genetics and molecular biology, have persuaded many that fitness in the
      service of reproductive success is the only legitimate definition of
      adaptation. If survival of one's genes, and the genes of one's relatives, is
      treated as the seminal feature of adaptation, then of course maximizing the
      number of offspring in the next generation is the correct criterion to apply.
      But "psychological adaptation" has a different set of features and therefore
      a different definition. It is easy to argue that a subjective feeling of virtue is
      psychologically adaptive because it minimizes distress and contributes, in a
      benevolent way, to health, longevity, and a feeling of well-being-three
      qualities that are critical to psychological adaptation. But most adults who
      conform to a moral standard that respects the dignity of another will be less
      sexually exploitative of others and therefore will be less fecund than those
      who seek a sexual liaison with anyone they can seduce. In this case, the
      criteria for biological and psychological adaptation are inconsistent. But in
      consistencies are common in nature. Red blood cells with a sickled shape
      are not best for absorbing oxygen but they do protect against malaria,
      which is adaptive in some parts of the world. A moral motive and its
      associated emotions are psychologically adaptive features for a species that
      lives in groups and can harm conspecifics, even though these features may
      not maximize the meaning of reproductive fitness held by evolutionary
      biologists." (Kagan J., "Three Seductive Ideas," Harvard University Press: Cambridge
      MA, 1998, p.192)
      Stephen E. Jones, BSc (Biol). http://members.iinet.net.au/~sejones
      Blog: http://creationevolutiondesign.blogspot.com/ Book, "Problems of
      Evolution" http://members.iinet.net.au/~sejones/PoE/PoE00ToC.html
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