GLOBAL FUTURES BULLETIN #124
GLOBAL FUTURES BULLETIN #124
---01 Aug, 02004---
Institute for Global Futures Research (IGFR).
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. IPCC forecasts and oil/gas reserves
. World energy sources
Energy � fork in the road
. Goals of Islamic militants
. Islam and scenarios to 2050
. World trends in guerilla activity
In Global Futures Bulletin #123 15 Jul 2004, �Kyoto Protocol update� it
per capita 2002 � per capita emissions CO2 in 2002
This should read:
per capita 2002 � per capita emissions tonnes Carbon in 2002
IPCC FORECASTS AND OIL/GAS RESERVES
Colin Campbell along with colleagues Anders Sivertsson and Kjell
Aleklett at Uppsala University, Sweden, are arguing that there is not
enough oil and gas reserves for even the most optimistic scenarios of
the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) to eventuate.
Campbell et al estimate combined oil and gas reserves at 3,500 billion
barrels [476 billion tonnes of oil equivalent - bTOE], while the IPCC
best case scenario assumes 5,000 billion barrels [680 bTOE], and their
worst case assumes 18,000 billion barrels [2449 bTOE] .
What also needs to be considered is the level of coal consumption that
has been factored into the IPCC scenarios and the prospect that if oil
and gas reserves are lower than expected, what is the likelihood of
higher coal consumption ? Coal has the potential to substitute for oil
it is used to produce hydrogen for transport.
Nebojsa Nakicenovic of the IPCC explains that their estimates are
drawn from more internationally accepted ranges, and that coal can be
used to make up the difference .
Campbell et al base part of their argument for lower estimations of oil
reserves on the assertion that OPEC countries artificially raised their
reserve estimates in the 1980s by as much as 100% and 200% in some
cases, increasing world oil reserves by a non-existent 41 billion tonnes
oil, in order to protect their production quotas . Also reserve
from projected advances in extraction technology is now being revised
Estimates of ultimate remaining reserves of (conventional) oil, gas and
coal (billion tonnes of oil equivalent bTOE)  and Fossil Carbon
reserves (billion tonnes Carbon btC):
Note - conventional reserves only
Raskin et al* Campbell**
oil reserves 217 bTOE 134 bTOE
169 btC 101 btC
gas reserves 219 bTOE 130 bTOE 403
(incl LNG) 137 btC 81 btC
coal reserves 900 bTOE 700 bTOE ?
958 btC 745 btC
* Raskin P, Gallopin G, et al 'Bending the Curve Toward Global
Sustainability - Report to the Global Scenario Group' (1998)
** Campbell C, Sunworld v19 no2 1995, p16-19; Campbell C, �The
imminent peak of global oil production� Mar 2000
www.feasta.org/documents/feastareview/campbell.htm - ultimate
remaining reserves 984 b barrels 827 bb + 157 bb yet-to-find implies
# USGS World Petroleum Assessment 2000
## The US Dept of Energy quotes coal reserves at 1089 b tons, which is
988 b tonnes, or 520 bTOE. Ultimate coal reserves estimates are
inconclusive. However as recovery rates for coal are low � about 20%,
they are likely to increase � �reserve growth� � just as recovery rates
and hence reserves for oil increased when artificial pressure was
applied to the oil wells. Therefore ultimate recoverable reserves for
coal could be 1000 � 1500 bTOE or 1063 - 1595btC.
According to Wolfgang Schollnberger, senior BP executive who is also
the Chairman of the International Association of Oil and Gas Producers
(OGP), ultimate remaining reserves of oil is 242 bTOE � 136 bTOE
proven, 68 bTOE undiscovered and 38 bTOE improved recovery .
ultimate remaining reserves = proven remaining reserves +
ultimate reserves = ultimate remaining reserves + extracted reserves
total resources = unrecoverable resources + ultimate reserves
In the last few years 1998-2002 oil production has leveled off (but may
increase again in the shortrun).
Regular Oil and Natural Gas production projections
Campbell et al  IEA 
2000 3.67 bTOE 5.85
2010 4.08 bTOE 7.07
2020 3.54 bTOE 8.70
2030 2.72 bTOE 9.98
2040 2.18 bTOE
2050 1.77 bTOE
Note: there is a major discrepancy not only in future projections, but in
the historic 2000 data�
Peak of oil and natural gas supply 
M. East 2024
Heavy oil 2050 +
Deepwater oil 2010
Polar oil 2020
Polar natural gas liquids 2040
Radiative forcing of greenhouse gases 
CO2 60% 1.5 watts/m2
CH4 20% 0.5 watts/m2
Halocarbons 15% 0.375 watts/m2
N2O 5% 0.125 watts/m2
Note: There are other causes of radiative forcing besides greenhouse
gases including other anthropogenic and natural causes. Also there are
natural and anthropogenic causes of negative radiative forcing
The 40 SRES scenarios of the IPCC Third Assessment Report (2001),
assume total CO2 emissions in a range between 773 btC and 2538 btC,
and best case scenario 2001-2100 is approx 713 btC.
Current world CO2 emissions from coal is ~2.5 btC/an. If we assume
world population stabilises at 12 billion 2050, we might guestimate
total CO2 emissions from coal 2001-2100 at around 375 btC. (GFB
has not yet managed to obtain data on coal emissions assumptions for
IPCC SRES scenarios).
Total CO2 emissions oil & gas IPCC best scenario 338 btC
Total CO2 emissions oil & gas IPCC worst scenario >2000 btC
Raskin et al ultimate reserves oil and gas 306
Campbell et al ultimate reserves oil and gas 182
USGS ultimate reserves oil and gas
It appears that the IPCC worst case scenario of 2538 btC for all fossil
fuels is unlikely given highly optimistic ultimate reserve scenarios of
2166 btC where at least 75% comes from coal (coal currently
comprises 27% of fossil fuel consumption).
The best case scenario could eventuate given USGS ultimate reserve
estimates, but coal consumption would need to increase by about 6%
over business-as-usual estimates for the Raskin et al scenario, and by
41% over business-as-usual in the Campbell scenario.
CO2 is responsible for about 60% of positive radiative forcing
(warming) due to greenhouse gases which reduces the significance of
possible unrealistic IPCC ultimate oil and gas reserve estimates. There
are other -/+ve radiative forcing factors both natural and anthropogenic.
So what is the significance ? It appears that CO2 emission scenarios by
IPCC may be somewhat unrealistic. It suggests that the IPCC needs to
review its 40 SRES scenarios and make changes if necessary.
However, given the level of uncertainty of global warming science and
of fossil fuel ultimate reserves amongst other factors, and the
potentially disastrous effects of global warming, we need to continue
towards a no-regrets precautionary approach and cut back oil and gas
consumption (which is unsustainable in the medium term anyway).
Another reason to reduce our reliance on oil and gas is the strong
possibility of a sharp shortfall in supply relative to demand in the next
5-15 years, with the potential for major disruption to the global
economy and human systems. (For those advocating a steady-state
global economy, it would be preferable to realize this through a
deliberate transition rather than through a sudden crisis).
The threat to oil supply not only consists of limited remaining reserves
(over-estimates of reserves, over-estimates of reserve growth from
technological advances in extraction, and over-estimates of
undiscovered reserves), but also vulnerability due to increased
concentration of remaining reserves (eg oil in Saudi Arabia and Iraq).
 Coghlan, Andy 'Too little oil for global warming� New Scientist 05
Oct 2003 www.newscientist.com/news/news.jsp?id=ns99994216
 Coghlan, Andy op cit.
 Aleklett,K; Cambell C J �The peak and decline of world oil and gas
production� p8 www.isv.uu.se/UHDSG/articles/OilpeakMineralsEnergy.doc
 Cited in Global Futures Bulletin #99, 01 Jan 2000 �Fossil carbon
reserves and the carbon cycle� Note � figures have been converted
1 trillion cubic feet of gas (tcf) = 23.31 million tonnes of oil
1 cu m approx equals 37 cu ft.
assume global average of 1.9 tonnes coal per tonne oil equivalent.
7.35 barrels oil = 1 tonne oil.
 quoted in Assn for the Study of Peak Oil
 �Key world energy statistics 2003� p44 International Energy
Agency IEA www.iea.org
 �Key world energy statistics 2003� p8, p46 International Energ
 Aleklett,K; Cambell C J �The peak and decline of world oil and gas
 IPCC www.grida.no/climate/ipcc_tar/slides/06.01.htm
WORLD ENERGY SOURCES
World total primary energy supply * :
35.0% 3.510 bTOE
23.3% 2.337 bTOE
Natural gas 16.2% 21.2%
and waste 11.1% 10.9%
6.9% 0.692 bTOE
2.2% 0.221 bTOE
solar, wind, heat) 0.1% 0.5%
Total energy production 6.034 bTOE 10.029
Total energy consumption 4.548 bTOE 6.995
* excludes international marine bunkers and electricity trade.
The difference between total primary energy production and total
energy consumption is energy lost in conversion (eg coal to electricity)
and in transmission.
Note � another source puts total coal production (both hard and brown
coal) at 2.019 bTOE .
Energy consumption has been growing at an average of 1.83%/an
1973-2001. Population has been growing at an average rate of about
1973-2002. 1.8%/an during this time (with current population growth
1973-2003. rate at about 1.6%/an) .
Production growth rates 1973-2002 
Natural gas 2.65%/an
Nuclear 9.6%/an (1973-2001)
IEA world energy scenario 
2001* bTOE 2010 bTOE
Oil 35.0% 3.510 35.3% 4.271
Coal 23.3% 2.337 22.3% 2.698
Natural gas 21.2% 2.126 23.1% 2.795 25.8%
Nuclear 6.9% 0.692 6.2% 0.750
Hydro 2.2% 0.221 2.3% 0.278
Other** 11.4% 1.143 10.9% 1.319 10.1%
World total 10.029 12.100
* excludes international bunker fuels
** geothermal, solar, wind, heat, combustable renewables and waste
Suggests a steady world energy production growth rate of 1.58% 2000-
Production of hydro energy :
TWh % of domestic
Canada 333 56.7
China 277 18.9
Brazil 268 81.7
US 223 5.7
Russia 176 19.7
Norway 124 99.3
Japan 94 9.0
Sweden 79 49.0
France 79 14.3
India 74 12.8
Rest of world 919 16.5*
World 2646 17.0*
* hydro producing countries only.
Nuclear energy production Terawatt hours (TWh) :
TWh % of domestic
US 808 21%
France 421 77%
Japan 320 31%
Germany 171 30%
Russia 137 15%
Korea 112 40%
UK 90 23%
Canada 77 13%
Ukraine 76 44%
Sweden 72 45%
Rest of world 369 9%
World 2653 17%
World electricity generation 
1973 6,117 TWh 9.6% 11.4%
2001 15,476 TWh 15.6% 19.1%
World electricity generation as been growing steadily at about
In Global Futures Bulletin #123 15 Jul 2004, Sweden and Switzerland
were cited as having low CO2 emissions per capita. In Sweden�s case
45% of its electricity comes from nuclear and 49% from hydro. In
Switzerland�s case 60% comes from hydro and 37% from nuclear .
However, electricity typically constitutes only about 19% of OECD
countries� total energy consumption. Canada on the otherhand
generates 57% electricity from hydro and 13% from nuclear, but it has
the world�s third highest per capita CO2 emissions.
 �Key world energy statistics 2003� p8 International Energy Agency
 �Key world energy statistics 2003� p15 op cit. assuming global
average of 1.9 tonnes coal to 1.0 tonne oil equivalent (TOE).
 �Carrying capacity� Global Futures Bulletin #04 15 Jan 1996
 �Key world energy statistics 2003� pp10-14 op cit.
 �Key world energy statistics 2003� p8, p46 op cit.
 �Key world energy statistics 2003� p19 op cit.
 �Key world energy statistics 2003� pp10-14 op cit.
 �Key world energy statistics 2003� op cit.
 Nationmaster database www.nationmaster.com/country/sz/Energy
ENERGY - FORK IN THE ROAD
The oil/gas energy road is coming to an end.
We can expect greater pressure for a renaissance of the nuclear industry
in the coming years even though uranium reserves offer only a few
decades of energy. This resource window could be extended if fast-
breeder reactors were used, but this carries the risk of proliferation of
weapons-grade plutonium and nuclear accidents.
James Lovelock, one of the key authors of the Gaia concept (Earth
functions as a single self-regulating organism) supports the expansion
of nuclear energy: �There is no sensible alternative to nuclear power if
we are to sustain civilization.� 
There seem to be few protests to prevent the construction of new
nuclear power plants. This could be because:
- there are few under construction
- those under construction are in countries with limited anti-nuclear
- the anti-nuclear movement has waned as there have been relatively
few major accidents since Three Mile Island and Chernobyl.
Costs of decommissioning nuclear reactors and longterm storage of
nuclear waste must be factored into cost/benefit analyses, along with
Two basic (ideological) views on the way forward -
Expand nuclear energy, including fast-breeders; invest more in nuclear
fusion research; develop carbon sequestration to allow greater
exploitation of coal. Minimal use of policy instruments in market.
Develop both decentralized and centralized solar, wind, geothermal,
tidal, mini and micro-hydro, biofuels; focus on energy conservation
(insulation etc) and energy efficiency (factor 4-10); some change to
lifestyles (eg greater emphasis on shared transit over personal transit
systems, travel/telecommunications substitution); stabilize global
population as quickly as possible. High use of policy instruments in
Both the High Road and Low Road approaches would develop
hydrogen and other types of fuel cells.
Due to relatively fixed investment available, we cannot take both the
High Road and Low Road in developing new energy sources, but we
can invest half in High Road and half in Low Road.
 World Nuclear Association www.world-nuclear.org
GOALS OF ISLAMIC MILITANTS
There is little discussion in mainstream media about the grievances and
demands of Islamic militants.
1. Are the grievances of Islamic militant groups specific ? Could they
possibly be addressed ?
2. Are the demands reasonably consistent amongst Islamic militant
3. Do Islamic militant groups have significant popular support ?
General grievances championed by militant Islamic groups might
1. erosion of Islamic religion, culture and values by Western
liberal/consumer culture and values.
2. areas of what is regarded as social decadence that need to be
outlawed include prostitution, pornography, adultery and sexual
profligacy, dealing and use of drugs, and usury (banks charging interest
on loans rather than providing interest-free loans).
3. political-economic control of Islamic nations by powerful Western
nations such as the G7 - US, Japan, Germany, France, UK, Italy, and
Canada through the process of economic globalisation .
4. failure of Israel to return occupied territory (eg West Bank, East
Jerusalem) to the Palestinians, and continuing political and economic
support of Israel by the US. (It should be pointed out that many
Islamic militant groups still commit to the complete elimination of the
state of Israel).
5. political interference by the US and other Western states (regarded as
Christian states, but also criticized for their secularism and lack of
religious values) in the self-determination of Islamic states such as
Afghanistan, Iraq, and possibly other states such as Algeria, Egypt,
Indonesia etc where Islamic fundamentalists wish to create religious
states based on Islamic Shari�ah law. This interference is part of a
history of imperialism by the UK, France and the US toward Islamic
Undeclared grievances might include the impact of Western culture on
gender relations in Islamic societies, ie the emancipation of women
may threaten traditional gender roles.
It is important to remember that there are hundreds of Islamic
organizations around the world working non-violently, within the
political process to protect, and in some cases expand the cultural space
of Islam. Some of these organizations, though non-violent themselves,
give moral support to the targeted use of violence, while others are
explicitly opposed to the use of violence.
Osama bin Ladin views a conflict between �Muslim believers vs.
heretics� where �heretics� ��embraces the �pragmatic� Arab regimes
(including his homeland, Saudi Arabia), and the US, which he sees as
taking over the Muslim holy sites of Mecca and Medina, and assisting
the Jews in their conquest of Palestine. Throughout bin Ladin�s public
statements and declarations runs one fundamental and predominant
strategic goal: the expulsion of the American presence, military and
civilian, from Saudi Arabia and the whole Gulf region .�
Public support for Islamic militant groups varies considerably from
country to country. In the Palestinian territories, support for both
Hamas and the PLO is high (though the PLO has been losing some
support recently). In Iraq, one opinion poll suggested Iraqi society was
evenly split between support for and opposition to militants responsible
for car bomb attacks and hostage murders etc.
In Turkey, Algeria and Egypt public support fluctuates. It is suggested
Al-Gama'a al-Islamiyya lost much public support after a series of nail-
bomb attacks in poor suburbs of Cairo in June 1993, as well as the
death of a schoolgirl during an attack on the Egyptian Prime Minister
Atef Sidki .
Main Islamic militant groups :
Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG), Al-Harakatul Islamia Philippines
Al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigade (likely PLO linked) Palestine
Al-Gama'a al-Islamiyya (The Islamic Group, IG) Egypt
Al-Qa'ida (The Base), Maktab al-Khidamat (MAK
- Services Office), International Islamic Front for
Jihad Against the Jews and Crusaders
Ansar al Islam
Armed Islamic Group (GIA)
Fatah - Revolutionary Council (Abu Nidal Org.), no
attacks since 1990
Fatah Tanzim (PLO)
Force 17 (PLO)
Great East Islamic Raiders Front (IBDA-C) Turkey
Hamas (Islamic Resistance Movement), Harakat
Harakat ul-Mujahedin (HUM)
Hizballah (Party of God)
Pakistan / US
Moro Islamic Liberation Front
Moroccan Islamic Combatant Group Morocco
Mujahedin-e Khalq Organization Iran
Palestine Liberation Front (not active since 1990 ?) Iraq
Palestinian Islamic Jihad
Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine Palestine
Popular Front for the Liberation of
Palestine - General Command
Popular Struggle Front (not active since 1989 ?) Lebanon
Revolutionary People's Liberation Party/Front Turkey
Students Islamic Movement of India (SIMI) India
Tehreek-e-Jaferia Pakistan (TJP)
In 1998, Osama bin Ladin announced the formation of an umbrella
organization called �The Islamic World Front for the struggle against
the Jews and the Crusaders� (Al-Jabhah al-Islamiyyah al-`Alamiyyah
li-Qital al-Yahud wal-Salibiyyin) which comprises a number of groups
including Al-Qa'ida, al-Gama�a al-Islamiyya, the Jihad Group, the
Pakistan Scholars Society, the Partisans Movement (Kashmir), Harakat
ul-Ansar, and the Jihad Movement (Bangladesh) .
Many of the grievances of militant Islamic groups are general, but
could be addressed with specific measures:
1. The US and other related countries could undertake to reduce
political interference in the domestic affairs of Islamic countries.
2. The US and other related countries could exert political and
economic pressure on Israel, not by interference, but simply by
withdrawing support, until Occupied Territories are returned to the
Palestinians and East Jerusalem is also handed over to Palestinian
control . Perhaps Israel could be rewarded by the international
community in some way for relinquishing territory, and Palestine
rewarded for recognizing the state of Israel.
3. The international community could make more of an effort to find
durable solutions to India-Pakistani tensions and conflict, particularly
with regard to Kashmir. (There appears to be currently a de-escalation
of tensions along the Pakistan-Kashmir Line of Control).
4. Support for self-determination in Iraq rather than manipulation to
ensure a suitable client state.
It is possible that many countries which are predominantly Muslim are
quite polarised between those desiring a more fundamentalist Islamic
state and those desiring a secular state. The outcome must ultimately
be decided by a democratic process, but encouraging greater public
dialogue can expand the common ground.
We must avoid situations, as in Algeria, where the largest Islamic
party, the Islamic Salvation Front (FIS) won the first round of the 1991
legislative elections, elections which were then annulled by the ruling
secular government. According to the US State Dept. this led directly
to the first violent activities of the Armed Islamic Group (GIA) in
Algeria in 1992 .
Many of the above grievances (eg cultural, religious and economic
domination) are shared by other cultures around the world but they
have not organized into armed resistance. Islamic militant activity
could in part be due to:
- values of zeal and self-sacrifice that can be found in Islamic
- militarism that sprang from the imposition of the state of Israel after
WWII, and the militarism generated by superpower rivalry in
- funding from state sources as well as wealthy Muslim benefactors
whose wealth can often be traced back to oil revenue.
 In Egypt, it is suggested that militants escalated their campaign of
violence partly in response to social hardships resulting from a new
economic structural adjustment policy and to foot-dragging on the
democratization process. There has also been massive unemployment
amongst university and college graduates. International Policy Institute
for Counter-Terrorism, Israel www.ict.org.il
 �Al-Qaida (The Base)� International Policy Institute for Counter-
Terrorism, Israel www.ict.org.il
 �Al-Gama'a al-Islamiyya� International Policy Institute for
Counter-Terrorism, Israel www.ict.org.il
 International Policy Institute for Counter-Terrorism, Israel
 �Al-Qa'ida (The Base)� op cit.
 Proposing a return of the Occupied Territories and handing control
of East Jerusalem to the Palestinians may appear presumptuous and
biased against the Israelis. However, it is suggested that this is the
most obvious solution, and an attempt to avoid another 40 years of
haggling and bloodshed.
 �Patterns of Global Terrorism� US State Dept. cited in �Armed
Islamic Group� International Policy Institute for Counter-Terrorism,
ISLAM AND SCENARIOS TO 2050
We can consider several basic scenarios to 2050:
#1. Islamic guerilla attacks continue but are stable with the occasional
major sabotage. Some conflict in Israel/Palestine continues. Some
Islamic countries fluctuate between Islamic and secular government.
#2. The US alliance �War on Terrorism� succeeds in repressing and/or
destroying Islamic militant groups. Security and surveillance systems
post 2001 continue to be upgraded with new surveillance technologies
despite calls from re-emerging civil rights groups in the West for their
#3. The Islamic world achieves greater strength � resolution of the
Israel-Palestinian conflict, independence for Jammu-Kashmir, Northern
Sudan, and Chechnya, greater autonomy for Xinjiang Province (China)
and Mindanao (Philippines). Saudi Arabia is ruled by an Islamic
government independent of the Saudi royal family which now plays a
purely symbolic role. (Kurdistan becomes an independent pluralist
state while the Indian Sikh state of Punjab is renamed Khalistan and
gains greater autonomy). Sporadic, low-level conflict continues.
#4. As oil production peaks, US and other foreign intervention in the
Middle East grows in order to guarantee continued supply. The Israel-
Palestine remains bitterly unresolved. Islamic militant groups are
stronger and better organized, benefiting from greater protection and
funding from a number of Islamic countries, including Iran, Iraq, Saudi
Arabia, Pakistan, Kazakhstan, Tajikistan, Syria, Libya and Egypt,
which are now more united in their resistance to Western control.
Attacks by Islamic militant groups escalate including some limited use
of nuclear, chemical or biological weapons. Clashes between India and
Pakistan escalate. Detonation of a tactical nuclear weapon by a militant
group but blamed on Pakistan results in a brief exchange of tactical
nuclear weapons which fortunately is contained. Western armed forces
invade different territories in the Islamic sphere to destroy Islamic
militant bases and capture militants. The world economy enters an
extended period of recession.
Of these hypothetical scenarios, the most preferable scenario is #3. The
underlying assumption in #3 and #4 is that greater repression of Islamic
expansionism in what is possibly a long-cycle renaissance of Islamic
culture is unlikely to be successful but rather generate greater
Allowing for greater space for Islamic cultural expression, with greater
inter-cultural dialogue and events, could offer the best prospects for
pluralism, the well-being of non-Muslim minorities, the emancipation
of women, and the recognition of the state of Israel.
Fatima Mernissi argues that Islam does not necessarily imply
repression for women, but on the contrary, the original teaching of
Islam emphasises equality . Sohail Inayatullah suggests that many
Muslim women do not aspire to the Western model of feminism but
look to a form of feminism expressed within the metaphors of Islam
The US is accused by the International Islamic Front for Jihad Against
the Jews and Crusaders (al-Qaida et al) of controlling Mecca and
Medina. Although Western powers were highly influential in installing
the Saudi royal family, (as they were in installing the Shah of Iran), it
could be argued that the US has merely cultivated good relations with
the Saudi royal family, and that Islamic values remain strong in Saudi
Arabia (respectful facilitation of pilgrims to Mecca, dress code,
restrictions toward drugs and alcohol, conservative norms regarding
sexuality, traditional Islamic gender roles, work patterns which cater to
call to prayer etc).
We must also gauge to what extent militant Islamic fundamentalists are
attempting to impose, through violence, values and political control
over a population majority that desires a more liberal social milieu and
In Iraq, the US is attempting to create a secular government but also
with religious representation. Many are calling for a UN Peacekeeping
Force to replace the US Alliance forces. Another option would be to
transfer resources to certain Islamic countries, such as Jordan, Eqypt,
Morocco, Pakistan, Malaysia, Indonesia, perhaps Syria and Saudi
Arabia, so they could provide an effective peace-keeping force.
Tensions between Western-Christian Civilisation and Islamic
Civilisation have manifested in conflict in Israel (Jewish-Western
alliance), Lebanon, Iraq/Kuwait, Bosnia, Kosovo, Algeria, Egypt, Iran,
Libya, Sudan, Cyprus, Philippines, Indonesia, East Timor, Somalia,
Ethiopia, Uganda, Russia (Chechnya), Armenia/Azerbaijan,
Afghanistan, Nigeria and in many other states .
In terms of World crises, the threat posed by Islamic militant groups to
Western countries is more of a symbolic and a potential nature than an
actual or substantial nature. Deaths of Westerners due to guerilla
activity would amount to less than 10,000 since 1970, whereas fighting
in Kashmir, for example, has led to over 65,000 deaths 1989-2004 .
The most significant Islamic militant attacks on Western targets
World Trade Center  2001 2752
Pam Am Lockerbie sabotage  1988 270
US Marines compound Beirut  1983 241
Pentagon  2001 216
US Embassy, Nairobi bombing  1998 213 (291  )
Bali bombing  2002 202
Madrid train bombings  2004 191
 Mernissi, Fatima 'Women and Islam', Oxford, Basil Blackwell,
1987 and Mernissi, Fatima, 'The Forgotton Queens of Islam'.
Cambridge, Polity Press, 1993 cited in Inayatullah, Sohail
�Emancipation of women, ad Islam� Global Futures Bulletin #116 15
 Inayatullah, Sohail �Emancipation of women, ad Islam� Global
Futures Bulletin #116 15 Sep 2000.
 �Defusing Global Tensions� Global Futures Bulletin #72, 15 Nov
 Jihad Watch 27 Feb 2004
 American Outlook Fall 2003 p46-52 Hudson Institute, US
 American Outlook Fall 2003 p46-52 op cit.
 Information Please www.infoplease.com/ipa/A0001454.html
 American Outlook Fall 2003 p46-52 op cit.
 �Report of the Accountability Review Boards� cited on
 �Overview of Terrorism in 1998� Jewish Virtual Library
 �Bali death toll set at 202� BBC News world edition, 19 Feb 2003,
 �Madrid bombing suspects arrested in Italy, Belgium� CBC News
WORLD TRENDS IN GUERILLA ACTIVITY
Total number of guerilla attacks has declined from a peak in 1987 
1981 489 1992 363
1982 487 1993 431
1983 497 1994 322
1984 565 1995 440
1985 635 1996 296
1986 612 1997 304
1987 665 1998 274
1988 605 1999 395
1989 375 2000 426
1990 437 2001 355
1991 565 2002 199
Casualties (dead and wounded) from international guerilla attacks :
1997 1998 1999 2000 2001
Africa 28 5379 185 102 150
Asia 334 635 690 904 651
Eurasia 27 12 8 103 0
L. Am. 11 195 10 20 7
M E 480 68 31 78 513
N. Am. 7 0 0 0
4465 0 0
W Eur 17 405 16 5 20
Total 904 6694 940 1212 5806
L. Am � Latin America; M.E. � Middle East; N. Am. � North America;
W Eur � Western Europe.
Since the sabotaging of the World Trade Center in 2001 by al-Qa�ida,
the world has taken a quantum step towards Police State status with
upgraded security measures, surveillance, profiling and screening.
Policing and security agencies are programmed to maximize social
control, limited only by Civil Rights, Privacy Acts and related
legislation, and by funding constraints. The continuing development of
telematics technology, and other surveillance technologies such as
DNA identification also accelerates the trend toward a World Police
Once perceived threats are no longer active (eg Cold War, militant
socialist groups etc) it is difficult to step down security and
We must remember that it is an important Quality of Life indicator, and
a hallmark of an advanced civilization (global) or society (national),
when high levels of security and surveillance are not required.
 �Total international terrorist attacks, 1981-2002� Patterns of Global
Terrorism 2002, US State Dept.
 �Total international casualties by region 1997-2002 �Patterns of
Global Terrorism 2002� US State Dept.
5-9 Sep 2004 2004 World Energy Congress, (triennial) Sydney,
Australia, World Energy Council, www.worldenergy.org/wec-
13 Sep 2004 World Urban Forum Barcelona, Spain.
19-24 Sep 2004 World Water Congress, Marrakech, Morocco,
sponsored by the International Water Association (IWA)
02 Oct 2004 CITES 13th COP (Convention on International Trade in
Endangered Species of Wild Flora and Fauna) Bangkok, Thailand
04 Oct 2004 World Habitat Day www.unhabitat.org/whd/
05 Oct 2004 Fourth International Forum for Social Development
�Equity, Inequalities and Interdependence� New York
16 Oct 2004 World Food Day www.fao.org/wfd/index_en.asp
18 Oct 2004 Second International Parliamentarians� Conference for the
Implementation of the ICPD Programme of Action (IPCI/ICPD)
International Conference on Population and Development, Strasbourg,
23-28 Oct 2004 World Youth Peace Summit: Voices of the Next
Generation. Nairobi, Kenya www.wyps.org/regional_nairobi.php
The Global Futures Bulletin is produced by the Institute for Global
Futures Research (IGFR) twice monthly. Readers are welcome to
submit material such as succinct letters, articles and other useful
information. Indicate whether you would like your name attached to
the submitted material. All communications should be directed to the
Editor, Geoff Holland e-mail <igfr@...>. Copyright (c) 2004
Institute for Global Futures Research (IGFR). All rights reserved.
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