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GLOBAL FUTURES BULLETIN #124

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  • mtneuman@juno.com
    _______________________________________________________ ******************************************************** GLOBAL FUTURES BULLETIN #124 ... ISSN
    Message 1 of 1 , Aug 1, 2004
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      GLOBAL FUTURES BULLETIN #124

      ---01 Aug, 02004---
      ISSN 1328-5157

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      ---

      Institute for Global Futures Research (IGFR).

      P.O. Box 263E, Earlville, QLD 4870, Australia.

      E-mail: <igfr@...>.

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      *

      *

      INDEX

      . Erratum

      . IPCC forecasts and oil/gas reserves

      . World energy sources

      Energy � fork in the road

      . Goals of Islamic militants

      . Islam and scenarios to 2050

      . World trends in guerilla activity

      . Calendar

      *

      *

      *

      ERRATUM

      In Global Futures Bulletin #123 15 Jul 2004, �Kyoto Protocol update� it

      was stated:

      per capita 2002 � per capita emissions CO2 in 2002



      This should read:

      per capita 2002 � per capita emissions tonnes Carbon in 2002

      *

      *

      *

      IPCC FORECASTS AND OIL/GAS RESERVES

      Colin Campbell along with colleagues Anders Sivertsson and Kjell

      Aleklett at Uppsala University, Sweden, are arguing that there is not

      enough oil and gas reserves for even the most optimistic scenarios of

      the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) to eventuate.

      Campbell et al estimate combined oil and gas reserves at 3,500 billion

      barrels [476 billion tonnes of oil equivalent - bTOE], while the IPCC

      best case scenario assumes 5,000 billion barrels [680 bTOE], and their

      worst case assumes 18,000 billion barrels [2449 bTOE] [1].



      What also needs to be considered is the level of coal consumption that

      has been factored into the IPCC scenarios and the prospect that if oil

      and gas reserves are lower than expected, what is the likelihood of

      higher coal consumption ? Coal has the potential to substitute for oil
      if

      it is used to produce hydrogen for transport.



      Nebojsa Nakicenovic of the IPCC explains that their estimates are

      drawn from more internationally accepted ranges, and that coal can be

      used to make up the difference [2].



      Campbell et al base part of their argument for lower estimations of oil

      reserves on the assertion that OPEC countries artificially raised their
      oil

      reserve estimates in the 1980s by as much as 100% and 200% in some

      cases, increasing world oil reserves by a non-existent 41 billion tonnes

      oil, in order to protect their production quotas [3]. Also reserve
      growth

      from projected advances in extraction technology is now being revised

      downwards.



      Estimates of ultimate remaining reserves of (conventional) oil, gas and

      coal (billion tonnes of oil equivalent bTOE) [4] and Fossil Carbon

      reserves (billion tonnes Carbon btC):

      Note - conventional reserves only

      Raskin et al* Campbell**
      USGS #

      oil reserves 217 bTOE 134 bTOE
      411 bTOE

      169 btC 101 btC
      320 btC



      gas reserves 219 bTOE 130 bTOE 403
      bTOE

      (incl LNG) 137 btC 81 btC
      251 btC



      coal reserves 900 bTOE 700 bTOE ?
      ##

      958 btC 745 btC



      * Raskin P, Gallopin G, et al 'Bending the Curve Toward Global

      Sustainability - Report to the Global Scenario Group' (1998)

      http://www.gsg.org pA-14



      ** Campbell C, Sunworld v19 no2 1995, p16-19; Campbell C, �The

      imminent peak of global oil production� Mar 2000

      www.feasta.org/documents/feastareview/campbell.htm - ultimate

      remaining reserves 984 b barrels 827 bb + 157 bb yet-to-find implies

      134 bTOE.



      # USGS World Petroleum Assessment 2000

      http://pubs.usgs.gov/dds/dds-060/ESpt4.html#TOP



      ## The US Dept of Energy quotes coal reserves at 1089 b tons, which is

      988 b tonnes, or 520 bTOE. Ultimate coal reserves estimates are

      inconclusive. However as recovery rates for coal are low � about 20%,

      they are likely to increase � �reserve growth� � just as recovery rates

      and hence reserves for oil increased when artificial pressure was

      applied to the oil wells. Therefore ultimate recoverable reserves for

      coal could be 1000 � 1500 bTOE or 1063 - 1595btC.



      According to Wolfgang Schollnberger, senior BP executive who is also

      the Chairman of the International Association of Oil and Gas Producers

      (OGP), ultimate remaining reserves of oil is 242 bTOE � 136 bTOE

      proven, 68 bTOE undiscovered and 38 bTOE improved recovery [5].



      Note:

      ultimate remaining reserves = proven remaining reserves +

      undiscovered reserves

      ultimate reserves = ultimate remaining reserves + extracted reserves



      total resources = unrecoverable resources + ultimate reserves





      In the last few years 1998-2002 oil production has leveled off (but may

      increase again in the shortrun).



      Regular Oil and Natural Gas production projections

      Campbell et al [6] IEA [7]

      2000 3.67 bTOE 5.85
      bTOE

      2010 4.08 bTOE 7.07
      bTOE

      2020 3.54 bTOE 8.70
      bTOE

      2030 2.72 bTOE 9.98
      bTOE

      2040 2.18 bTOE

      2050 1.77 bTOE



      Note: there is a major discrepancy not only in future projections, but in


      the historic 2000 data�



      Peak of oil and natural gas supply [8]

      US 1971

      Europe 2000

      Russia 1987

      M. East 2024

      Heavy oil 2050 +

      Deepwater oil 2010

      Polar oil 2020

      Polar natural gas liquids 2040

      Other 2001





      Radiative forcing of greenhouse gases [9]

      CO2 60% 1.5 watts/m2

      CH4 20% 0.5 watts/m2

      Halocarbons 15% 0.375 watts/m2

      N2O 5% 0.125 watts/m2



      Note: There are other causes of radiative forcing besides greenhouse

      gases including other anthropogenic and natural causes. Also there are

      natural and anthropogenic causes of negative radiative forcing

      (cooling).



      The 40 SRES scenarios of the IPCC Third Assessment Report (2001),

      assume total CO2 emissions in a range between 773 btC and 2538 btC,

      and best case scenario 2001-2100 is approx 713 btC.



      Current world CO2 emissions from coal is ~2.5 btC/an. If we assume

      world population stabilises at 12 billion 2050, we might guestimate

      total CO2 emissions from coal 2001-2100 at around 375 btC. (GFB

      has not yet managed to obtain data on coal emissions assumptions for

      IPCC SRES scenarios).



      Total CO2 emissions oil & gas IPCC best scenario 338 btC

      Total CO2 emissions oil & gas IPCC worst scenario >2000 btC

      Raskin et al ultimate reserves oil and gas 306
      btC

      Campbell et al ultimate reserves oil and gas 182
      btC

      USGS ultimate reserves oil and gas
      571 btC



      It appears that the IPCC worst case scenario of 2538 btC for all fossil

      fuels is unlikely given highly optimistic ultimate reserve scenarios of

      2166 btC where at least 75% comes from coal (coal currently

      comprises 27% of fossil fuel consumption).



      The best case scenario could eventuate given USGS ultimate reserve

      estimates, but coal consumption would need to increase by about 6%

      over business-as-usual estimates for the Raskin et al scenario, and by

      41% over business-as-usual in the Campbell scenario.



      CO2 is responsible for about 60% of positive radiative forcing

      (warming) due to greenhouse gases which reduces the significance of

      possible unrealistic IPCC ultimate oil and gas reserve estimates. There

      are other -/+ve radiative forcing factors both natural and anthropogenic.



      So what is the significance ? It appears that CO2 emission scenarios by

      IPCC may be somewhat unrealistic. It suggests that the IPCC needs to

      review its 40 SRES scenarios and make changes if necessary.



      However, given the level of uncertainty of global warming science and

      of fossil fuel ultimate reserves amongst other factors, and the

      potentially disastrous effects of global warming, we need to continue

      towards a no-regrets precautionary approach and cut back oil and gas

      consumption (which is unsustainable in the medium term anyway).



      Another reason to reduce our reliance on oil and gas is the strong

      possibility of a sharp shortfall in supply relative to demand in the next


      5-15 years, with the potential for major disruption to the global

      economy and human systems. (For those advocating a steady-state

      global economy, it would be preferable to realize this through a

      deliberate transition rather than through a sudden crisis).



      The threat to oil supply not only consists of limited remaining reserves

      (over-estimates of reserves, over-estimates of reserve growth from

      technological advances in extraction, and over-estimates of

      undiscovered reserves), but also vulnerability due to increased

      concentration of remaining reserves (eg oil in Saudi Arabia and Iraq).

      *

      [1] Coghlan, Andy 'Too little oil for global warming� New Scientist 05

      Oct 2003 www.newscientist.com/news/news.jsp?id=ns99994216

      [2] Coghlan, Andy op cit.

      [3] Aleklett,K; Cambell C J �The peak and decline of world oil and gas

      production� p8 www.isv.uu.se/UHDSG/articles/OilpeakMineralsEnergy.doc

      [4] Cited in Global Futures Bulletin #99, 01 Jan 2000 �Fossil carbon

      reserves and the carbon cycle� Note � figures have been converted

      using:

      1 trillion cubic feet of gas (tcf) = 23.31 million tonnes of oil
      equivalent.

      1 cu m approx equals 37 cu ft.

      assume global average of 1.9 tonnes coal per tonne oil equivalent.

      7.35 barrels oil = 1 tonne oil.

      [5] quoted in Assn for the Study of Peak Oil

      www.asponews.org/ASPO.newsletter.015.php

      [6] �Key world energy statistics 2003� p44 International Energy

      Agency IEA www.iea.org

      [7] �Key world energy statistics 2003� p8, p46 International Energ

      [8] Aleklett,K; Cambell C J �The peak and decline of world oil and gas

      production� p13

      www.isv.uu.se/UHDSG/articles/OilpeakMineralsEnergy.doc

      [9] IPCC www.grida.no/climate/ipcc_tar/slides/06.01.htm

      *

      *

      *

      WORLD ENERGY SOURCES

      World total primary energy supply * [1]:

      1973
      2001

      Oil 45.1%
      35.0% 3.510 bTOE

      Coal 24.8%
      23.3% 2.337 bTOE

      Natural gas 16.2% 21.2%
      2.126 bTOE

      Combustible renewables

      and waste 11.1% 10.9%
      1.093 bTOE

      Nuclear 0.9%
      6.9% 0.692 bTOE

      Hydro 1.8%
      2.2% 0.221 bTOE

      Other (geothermal,

      solar, wind, heat) 0.1% 0.5%
      0.050 bTOE



      Total energy production 6.034 bTOE 10.029
      bTOE

      Total energy consumption 4.548 bTOE 6.995
      bTOE



      * excludes international marine bunkers and electricity trade.



      The difference between total primary energy production and total

      energy consumption is energy lost in conversion (eg coal to electricity)

      and in transmission.



      Note � another source puts total coal production (both hard and brown

      coal) at 2.019 bTOE [2].



      Energy consumption has been growing at an average of 1.83%/an

      1973-2001. Population has been growing at an average rate of about

      1973-2002. 1.8%/an during this time (with current population growth

      1973-2003. rate at about 1.6%/an) [3].



      Production growth rates 1973-2002 [4]

      Oil 0.75%/an

      Natural gas 2.65%/an

      Coal 1.89%/an

      Nuclear 9.6%/an (1973-2001)



      IEA world energy scenario [5]

      2001* bTOE 2010 bTOE
      2030 bTOE

      Oil 35.0% 3.510 35.3% 4.271
      35.4% 5.770

      Coal 23.3% 2.337 22.3% 2.698
      22.1% 3.602

      Natural gas 21.2% 2.126 23.1% 2.795 25.8%
      4.205

      Nuclear 6.9% 0.692 6.2% 0.750
      4.3% 0.701

      Hydro 2.2% 0.221 2.3% 0.278
      2.2% 0.359

      Other** 11.4% 1.143 10.9% 1.319 10.1%
      1.646



      World total 10.029 12.100
      16.300



      * excludes international bunker fuels

      ** geothermal, solar, wind, heat, combustable renewables and waste



      Suggests a steady world energy production growth rate of 1.58% 2000-

      2030.





      Production of hydro energy [6]:

      TWh % of domestic
      electricity gen.

      Canada 333 56.7

      China 277 18.9

      Brazil 268 81.7

      US 223 5.7

      Russia 176 19.7

      Norway 124 99.3

      Japan 94 9.0

      Sweden 79 49.0

      France 79 14.3

      India 74 12.8

      Rest of world 919 16.5*



      World 2646 17.0*



      * hydro producing countries only.





      Nuclear energy production Terawatt hours (TWh) [7]:

      TWh % of domestic
      electricity gen.

      US 808 21%

      France 421 77%

      Japan 320 31%

      Germany 171 30%

      Russia 137 15%

      Korea 112 40%

      UK 90 23%

      Canada 77 13%

      Ukraine 76 44%

      Sweden 72 45%

      Rest of world 369 9%



      World 2653 17%



      World electricity generation [8]

      % total
      energy consumption

      world
      OECD

      1973 6,117 TWh 9.6% 11.4%

      2001 15,476 TWh 15.6% 19.1%



      World electricity generation as been growing steadily at about

      3.37%/an 1973-2001.



      In Global Futures Bulletin #123 15 Jul 2004, Sweden and Switzerland

      were cited as having low CO2 emissions per capita. In Sweden�s case

      45% of its electricity comes from nuclear and 49% from hydro. In

      Switzerland�s case 60% comes from hydro and 37% from nuclear [9].

      However, electricity typically constitutes only about 19% of OECD

      countries� total energy consumption. Canada on the otherhand

      generates 57% electricity from hydro and 13% from nuclear, but it has

      the world�s third highest per capita CO2 emissions.

      *

      [1] �Key world energy statistics 2003� p8 International Energy Agency

      www.iea.org

      [2] �Key world energy statistics 2003� p15 op cit. assuming global

      average of 1.9 tonnes coal to 1.0 tonne oil equivalent (TOE).

      [3] �Carrying capacity� Global Futures Bulletin #04 15 Jan 1996

      [4] �Key world energy statistics 2003� pp10-14 op cit.

      [5] �Key world energy statistics 2003� p8, p46 op cit.

      [6] �Key world energy statistics 2003� p19 op cit.

      [7] �Key world energy statistics 2003� pp10-14 op cit.

      [8] �Key world energy statistics 2003� op cit.

      [9] Nationmaster database www.nationmaster.com/country/sz/Energy

      *

      *

      *

      ENERGY - FORK IN THE ROAD

      The oil/gas energy road is coming to an end.



      We can expect greater pressure for a renaissance of the nuclear industry

      in the coming years even though uranium reserves offer only a few

      decades of energy. This resource window could be extended if fast-

      breeder reactors were used, but this carries the risk of proliferation of


      weapons-grade plutonium and nuclear accidents.



      James Lovelock, one of the key authors of the Gaia concept (Earth

      functions as a single self-regulating organism) supports the expansion

      of nuclear energy: �There is no sensible alternative to nuclear power if

      we are to sustain civilization.� [1]



      There seem to be few protests to prevent the construction of new

      nuclear power plants. This could be because:

      - there are few under construction

      - those under construction are in countries with limited anti-nuclear

      activism

      - the anti-nuclear movement has waned as there have been relatively

      few major accidents since Three Mile Island and Chernobyl.



      Costs of decommissioning nuclear reactors and longterm storage of

      nuclear waste must be factored into cost/benefit analyses, along with

      risk factors.



      Two basic (ideological) views on the way forward -



      High Road:

      Expand nuclear energy, including fast-breeders; invest more in nuclear

      fusion research; develop carbon sequestration to allow greater

      exploitation of coal. Minimal use of policy instruments in market.



      Low Road:

      Develop both decentralized and centralized solar, wind, geothermal,

      tidal, mini and micro-hydro, biofuels; focus on energy conservation

      (insulation etc) and energy efficiency (factor 4-10); some change to

      lifestyles (eg greater emphasis on shared transit over personal transit

      systems, travel/telecommunications substitution); stabilize global

      population as quickly as possible. High use of policy instruments in

      market.



      Both the High Road and Low Road approaches would develop

      hydrogen and other types of fuel cells.



      Due to relatively fixed investment available, we cannot take both the

      High Road and Low Road in developing new energy sources, but we

      can invest half in High Road and half in Low Road.

      *

      [1] World Nuclear Association www.world-nuclear.org

      *

      *

      *

      GOALS OF ISLAMIC MILITANTS

      There is little discussion in mainstream media about the grievances and

      demands of Islamic militants.



      1. Are the grievances of Islamic militant groups specific ? Could they

      possibly be addressed ?



      2. Are the demands reasonably consistent amongst Islamic militant

      groups ?



      3. Do Islamic militant groups have significant popular support ?



      General grievances championed by militant Islamic groups might

      include:

      1. erosion of Islamic religion, culture and values by Western

      liberal/consumer culture and values.



      2. areas of what is regarded as social decadence that need to be

      outlawed include prostitution, pornography, adultery and sexual

      profligacy, dealing and use of drugs, and usury (banks charging interest

      on loans rather than providing interest-free loans).



      3. political-economic control of Islamic nations by powerful Western

      nations such as the G7 - US, Japan, Germany, France, UK, Italy, and

      Canada through the process of economic globalisation [1].



      4. failure of Israel to return occupied territory (eg West Bank, East

      Jerusalem) to the Palestinians, and continuing political and economic

      support of Israel by the US. (It should be pointed out that many

      Islamic militant groups still commit to the complete elimination of the

      state of Israel).



      5. political interference by the US and other Western states (regarded as


      Christian states, but also criticized for their secularism and lack of

      religious values) in the self-determination of Islamic states such as

      Afghanistan, Iraq, and possibly other states such as Algeria, Egypt,

      Indonesia etc where Islamic fundamentalists wish to create religious

      states based on Islamic Shari�ah law. This interference is part of a
      long

      history of imperialism by the UK, France and the US toward Islamic

      nations.



      Undeclared grievances might include the impact of Western culture on

      gender relations in Islamic societies, ie the emancipation of women

      may threaten traditional gender roles.



      It is important to remember that there are hundreds of Islamic

      organizations around the world working non-violently, within the

      political process to protect, and in some cases expand the cultural space


      of Islam. Some of these organizations, though non-violent themselves,

      give moral support to the targeted use of violence, while others are

      explicitly opposed to the use of violence.



      Osama bin Ladin views a conflict between �Muslim believers vs.

      heretics� where �heretics� ��embraces the �pragmatic� Arab regimes

      (including his homeland, Saudi Arabia), and the US, which he sees as

      taking over the Muslim holy sites of Mecca and Medina, and assisting

      the Jews in their conquest of Palestine. Throughout bin Ladin�s public

      statements and declarations runs one fundamental and predominant

      strategic goal: the expulsion of the American presence, military and

      civilian, from Saudi Arabia and the whole Gulf region .�[2]



      Public support for Islamic militant groups varies considerably from

      country to country. In the Palestinian territories, support for both

      Hamas and the PLO is high (though the PLO has been losing some

      support recently). In Iraq, one opinion poll suggested Iraqi society was


      evenly split between support for and opposition to militants responsible

      for car bomb attacks and hostage murders etc.



      In Turkey, Algeria and Egypt public support fluctuates. It is suggested

      Al-Gama'a al-Islamiyya lost much public support after a series of nail-

      bomb attacks in poor suburbs of Cairo in June 1993, as well as the

      death of a schoolgirl during an attack on the Egyptian Prime Minister

      Atef Sidki [3].



      Main Islamic militant groups [4]:


      Main base

      Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG), Al-Harakatul Islamia Philippines

      Al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigade (likely PLO linked) Palestine

      Al-Gama'a al-Islamiyya (The Islamic Group, IG) Egypt

      Al-Qa'ida (The Base), Maktab al-Khidamat (MAK

      - Services Office), International Islamic Front for

      Jihad Against the Jews and Crusaders
      Afghanistan

      Ansar al Islam
      Iraq

      Armed Islamic Group (GIA)
      Algeria

      Fatah - Revolutionary Council (Abu Nidal Org.), no

      attacks since 1990
      Syria

      Fatah Tanzim (PLO)
      Palestine

      Force 17 (PLO)
      Palestine

      Great East Islamic Raiders Front (IBDA-C) Turkey

      Hamas (Islamic Resistance Movement), Harakat

      al-Muqawamah al-Islamiyya
      Palestine

      Harakat ul-Mujahedin (HUM)
      Pakistan

      Hezbul Tehrir
      Pakistan

      Hizballah (Party of God)
      Lebanon

      Hizb-ul Mujehideen
      India (Kashmir)

      Jamiat ul-Ansar
      Pakistan

      Jamaat ul-Fuqra
      Pakistan / US

      Jihad Group
      Egypt

      Jemaah Islamiah
      Indonesia

      Khudam ul-Islam
      Pakistan

      Lashkar-e-Toiba
      Pakistan

      Millat-e-Islami
      Pakistan

      Moro Islamic Liberation Front
      Philippines

      Moroccan Islamic Combatant Group Morocco

      Mujahedin-e Khalq Organization Iran

      Palestine Liberation Front (not active since 1990 ?) Iraq

      Palestinian Islamic Jihad
      Palestine

      Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine Palestine

      Popular Front for the Liberation of

      Palestine - General Command
      Syria

      Popular Struggle Front (not active since 1989 ?) Lebanon

      Revolutionary People's Liberation Party/Front Turkey

      Sipah-e-Sahaba Pakistan
      Pakistan

      Students Islamic Movement of India (SIMI) India

      Tehreek-e-Islami
      Pakistan

      Tehreek-e-Jaferia Pakistan (TJP)
      Pakistan



      In 1998, Osama bin Ladin announced the formation of an umbrella

      organization called �The Islamic World Front for the struggle against

      the Jews and the Crusaders� (Al-Jabhah al-Islamiyyah al-`Alamiyyah

      li-Qital al-Yahud wal-Salibiyyin) which comprises a number of groups

      including Al-Qa'ida, al-Gama�a al-Islamiyya, the Jihad Group, the

      Pakistan Scholars Society, the Partisans Movement (Kashmir), Harakat

      ul-Ansar, and the Jihad Movement (Bangladesh) [5].



      Many of the grievances of militant Islamic groups are general, but

      could be addressed with specific measures:



      1. The US and other related countries could undertake to reduce

      political interference in the domestic affairs of Islamic countries.



      2. The US and other related countries could exert political and

      economic pressure on Israel, not by interference, but simply by

      withdrawing support, until Occupied Territories are returned to the

      Palestinians and East Jerusalem is also handed over to Palestinian

      control [6]. Perhaps Israel could be rewarded by the international

      community in some way for relinquishing territory, and Palestine

      rewarded for recognizing the state of Israel.



      3. The international community could make more of an effort to find

      durable solutions to India-Pakistani tensions and conflict, particularly

      with regard to Kashmir. (There appears to be currently a de-escalation

      of tensions along the Pakistan-Kashmir Line of Control).



      4. Support for self-determination in Iraq rather than manipulation to

      ensure a suitable client state.



      It is possible that many countries which are predominantly Muslim are

      quite polarised between those desiring a more fundamentalist Islamic

      state and those desiring a secular state. The outcome must ultimately

      be decided by a democratic process, but encouraging greater public

      dialogue can expand the common ground.



      We must avoid situations, as in Algeria, where the largest Islamic

      party, the Islamic Salvation Front (FIS) won the first round of the 1991

      legislative elections, elections which were then annulled by the ruling

      secular government. According to the US State Dept. this led directly

      to the first violent activities of the Armed Islamic Group (GIA) in

      Algeria in 1992 [7].



      Many of the above grievances (eg cultural, religious and economic

      domination) are shared by other cultures around the world but they

      have not organized into armed resistance. Islamic militant activity

      could in part be due to:

      - values of zeal and self-sacrifice that can be found in Islamic
      religious

      culture

      - militarism that sprang from the imposition of the state of Israel after


      WWII, and the militarism generated by superpower rivalry in

      Afghanistan,

      - funding from state sources as well as wealthy Muslim benefactors

      whose wealth can often be traced back to oil revenue.

      *

      [1] In Egypt, it is suggested that militants escalated their campaign of

      violence partly in response to social hardships resulting from a new

      economic structural adjustment policy and to foot-dragging on the

      democratization process. There has also been massive unemployment

      amongst university and college graduates. International Policy Institute


      for Counter-Terrorism, Israel www.ict.org.il

      [2] �Al-Qaida (The Base)� International Policy Institute for Counter-

      Terrorism, Israel www.ict.org.il

      [3] �Al-Gama'a al-Islamiyya� International Policy Institute for

      Counter-Terrorism, Israel www.ict.org.il

      [4] International Policy Institute for Counter-Terrorism, Israel

      www.ict.org.il

      [5] �Al-Qa'ida (The Base)� op cit.

      [6] Proposing a return of the Occupied Territories and handing control

      of East Jerusalem to the Palestinians may appear presumptuous and

      biased against the Israelis. However, it is suggested that this is the

      most obvious solution, and an attempt to avoid another 40 years of

      haggling and bloodshed.

      [7] �Patterns of Global Terrorism� US State Dept. cited in �Armed

      Islamic Group� International Policy Institute for Counter-Terrorism,

      Israel www.ict.org.il

      *

      *

      *

      ISLAM AND SCENARIOS TO 2050

      We can consider several basic scenarios to 2050:

      #1. Islamic guerilla attacks continue but are stable with the occasional

      major sabotage. Some conflict in Israel/Palestine continues. Some

      Islamic countries fluctuate between Islamic and secular government.



      #2. The US alliance �War on Terrorism� succeeds in repressing and/or

      destroying Islamic militant groups. Security and surveillance systems

      post 2001 continue to be upgraded with new surveillance technologies

      despite calls from re-emerging civil rights groups in the West for their

      downgrading.



      #3. The Islamic world achieves greater strength � resolution of the

      Israel-Palestinian conflict, independence for Jammu-Kashmir, Northern

      Sudan, and Chechnya, greater autonomy for Xinjiang Province (China)

      and Mindanao (Philippines). Saudi Arabia is ruled by an Islamic

      government independent of the Saudi royal family which now plays a

      purely symbolic role. (Kurdistan becomes an independent pluralist

      state while the Indian Sikh state of Punjab is renamed Khalistan and

      gains greater autonomy). Sporadic, low-level conflict continues.



      #4. As oil production peaks, US and other foreign intervention in the

      Middle East grows in order to guarantee continued supply. The Israel-

      Palestine remains bitterly unresolved. Islamic militant groups are

      stronger and better organized, benefiting from greater protection and

      funding from a number of Islamic countries, including Iran, Iraq, Saudi

      Arabia, Pakistan, Kazakhstan, Tajikistan, Syria, Libya and Egypt,

      which are now more united in their resistance to Western control.

      Attacks by Islamic militant groups escalate including some limited use

      of nuclear, chemical or biological weapons. Clashes between India and

      Pakistan escalate. Detonation of a tactical nuclear weapon by a militant


      group but blamed on Pakistan results in a brief exchange of tactical

      nuclear weapons which fortunately is contained. Western armed forces

      invade different territories in the Islamic sphere to destroy Islamic

      militant bases and capture militants. The world economy enters an

      extended period of recession.



      Of these hypothetical scenarios, the most preferable scenario is #3. The


      underlying assumption in #3 and #4 is that greater repression of Islamic

      expansionism in what is possibly a long-cycle renaissance of Islamic

      culture is unlikely to be successful but rather generate greater
      violence.

      Allowing for greater space for Islamic cultural expression, with greater

      inter-cultural dialogue and events, could offer the best prospects for

      pluralism, the well-being of non-Muslim minorities, the emancipation

      of women, and the recognition of the state of Israel.



      Fatima Mernissi argues that Islam does not necessarily imply

      repression for women, but on the contrary, the original teaching of

      Islam emphasises equality [1]. Sohail Inayatullah suggests that many

      Muslim women do not aspire to the Western model of feminism but

      look to a form of feminism expressed within the metaphors of Islam

      [2].



      The US is accused by the International Islamic Front for Jihad Against

      the Jews and Crusaders (al-Qaida et al) of controlling Mecca and

      Medina. Although Western powers were highly influential in installing

      the Saudi royal family, (as they were in installing the Shah of Iran), it


      could be argued that the US has merely cultivated good relations with

      the Saudi royal family, and that Islamic values remain strong in Saudi

      Arabia (respectful facilitation of pilgrims to Mecca, dress code,

      restrictions toward drugs and alcohol, conservative norms regarding

      sexuality, traditional Islamic gender roles, work patterns which cater to


      call to prayer etc).



      We must also gauge to what extent militant Islamic fundamentalists are

      attempting to impose, through violence, values and political control

      over a population majority that desires a more liberal social milieu and

      democratic system.



      In Iraq, the US is attempting to create a secular government but also

      with religious representation. Many are calling for a UN Peacekeeping

      Force to replace the US Alliance forces. Another option would be to

      transfer resources to certain Islamic countries, such as Jordan, Eqypt,

      Morocco, Pakistan, Malaysia, Indonesia, perhaps Syria and Saudi

      Arabia, so they could provide an effective peace-keeping force.



      Tensions between Western-Christian Civilisation and Islamic

      Civilisation have manifested in conflict in Israel (Jewish-Western

      alliance), Lebanon, Iraq/Kuwait, Bosnia, Kosovo, Algeria, Egypt, Iran,

      Libya, Sudan, Cyprus, Philippines, Indonesia, East Timor, Somalia,

      Ethiopia, Uganda, Russia (Chechnya), Armenia/Azerbaijan,

      Afghanistan, Nigeria and in many other states [3].



      In terms of World crises, the threat posed by Islamic militant groups to

      Western countries is more of a symbolic and a potential nature than an

      actual or substantial nature. Deaths of Westerners due to guerilla

      activity would amount to less than 10,000 since 1970, whereas fighting

      in Kashmir, for example, has led to over 65,000 deaths 1989-2004 [4].



      The most significant Islamic militant attacks on Western targets

      (deaths):

      World Trade Center [5] 2001 2752

      Pam Am Lockerbie sabotage [6] 1988 270

      US Marines compound Beirut [7] 1983 241

      Pentagon [8] 2001 216

      US Embassy, Nairobi bombing [9] 1998 213 (291 [10] )

      Bali bombing [11] 2002 202

      Madrid train bombings [12] 2004 191

      *

      [1] Mernissi, Fatima 'Women and Islam', Oxford, Basil Blackwell,

      1987 and Mernissi, Fatima, 'The Forgotton Queens of Islam'.

      Cambridge, Polity Press, 1993 cited in Inayatullah, Sohail

      �Emancipation of women, ad Islam� Global Futures Bulletin #116 15

      Sep 2000.

      [2] Inayatullah, Sohail �Emancipation of women, ad Islam� Global

      Futures Bulletin #116 15 Sep 2000.

      [3] �Defusing Global Tensions� Global Futures Bulletin #72, 15 Nov

      1998.

      [4] Jihad Watch 27 Feb 2004

      www.jihadwatch.org/dhimmiwatch/archives/000993.php

      [5] American Outlook Fall 2003 p46-52 Hudson Institute, US

      www.hudson.org/files/publications/m urdocksaddamarticle.pdf

      [6] American Outlook Fall 2003 p46-52 op cit.

      [7] Information Please www.infoplease.com/ipa/A0001454.html

      [8] American Outlook Fall 2003 p46-52 op cit.

      [9] �Report of the Accountability Review Boards� cited on

      www.fas.org/irp/threat/arb/board_nairobi.html

      [10] �Overview of Terrorism in 1998� Jewish Virtual Library

      www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/jsource/Terrorism/terror_over98.html

      [11] �Bali death toll set at 202� BBC News world edition, 19 Feb 2003,

      news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/2778923.stm

      [12] �Madrid bombing suspects arrested in Italy, Belgium� CBC News

      www.cbc.ca/stories/2004/06/08/world/milan_madrid040608

      *

      *

      *

      WORLD TRENDS IN GUERILLA ACTIVITY

      Total number of guerilla attacks has declined from a peak in 1987 [1]

      1981 489 1992 363

      1982 487 1993 431

      1983 497 1994 322

      1984 565 1995 440

      1985 635 1996 296

      1986 612 1997 304

      1987 665 1998 274

      1988 605 1999 395

      1989 375 2000 426

      1990 437 2001 355

      1991 565 2002 199





      Casualties (dead and wounded) from international guerilla attacks [2]:



      1997 1998 1999 2000 2001
      2002 2003

      Africa 28 5379 185 102 150
      67 14

      Asia 334 635 690 904 651
      1283 1427

      Eurasia 27 12 8 103 0
      615 0

      L. Am. 11 195 10 20 7
      54 79

      M E 480 68 31 78 513
      1047 1823

      N. Am. 7 0 0 0
      4465 0 0

      W Eur 17 405 16 5 20
      6 928



      Total 904 6694 940 1212 5806
      3072 4271



      L. Am � Latin America; M.E. � Middle East; N. Am. � North America;

      W Eur � Western Europe.





      Since the sabotaging of the World Trade Center in 2001 by al-Qa�ida,

      the world has taken a quantum step towards Police State status with

      upgraded security measures, surveillance, profiling and screening.

      Policing and security agencies are programmed to maximize social

      control, limited only by Civil Rights, Privacy Acts and related

      legislation, and by funding constraints. The continuing development of

      telematics technology, and other surveillance technologies such as

      DNA identification also accelerates the trend toward a World Police

      State.



      Once perceived threats are no longer active (eg Cold War, militant

      socialist groups etc) it is difficult to step down security and
      surveillance

      measures.



      We must remember that it is an important Quality of Life indicator, and

      a hallmark of an advanced civilization (global) or society (national),

      when high levels of security and surveillance are not required.

      *

      [1] �Total international terrorist attacks, 1981-2002� Patterns of Global


      Terrorism 2002, US State Dept.

      www.infoplease.com/ipa/A0001454.html

      [2] �Total international casualties by region 1997-2002 �Patterns of

      Global Terrorism 2002� US State Dept.

      www.state.gov/s/ct/rls/pgtrpt/2002/html/19997.htm

      *

      *

      *

      CALENDAR

      5-9 Sep 2004 2004 World Energy Congress, (triennial) Sydney,

      Australia, World Energy Council, www.worldenergy.org/wec-

      geis/news_events/19th_congress/19th_congress.asp



      13 Sep 2004 World Urban Forum Barcelona, Spain.

      www.unhabitat.org/wuf/2004/default.asp



      19-24 Sep 2004 World Water Congress, Marrakech, Morocco,

      sponsored by the International Water Association (IWA)

      www.iwa2004marrakech.com/



      02 Oct 2004 CITES 13th COP (Convention on International Trade in

      Endangered Species of Wild Flora and Fauna) Bangkok, Thailand

      www.cites.org



      04 Oct 2004 World Habitat Day www.unhabitat.org/whd/



      05 Oct 2004 Fourth International Forum for Social Development

      �Equity, Inequalities and Interdependence� New York

      www.un.org/esa/socdev/IFSD/4thmeeting.htm



      16 Oct 2004 World Food Day www.fao.org/wfd/index_en.asp



      18 Oct 2004 Second International Parliamentarians� Conference for the

      Implementation of the ICPD Programme of Action (IPCI/ICPD)

      International Conference on Population and Development, Strasbourg,

      France www.unfpa.org/icpd/10/#parliamentarian



      23-28 Oct 2004 World Youth Peace Summit: Voices of the Next

      Generation. Nairobi, Kenya www.wyps.org/regional_nairobi.php

      *

      *

      ________________________________________________________

      ********************************************************

      The Global Futures Bulletin is produced by the Institute for Global

      Futures Research (IGFR) twice monthly. Readers are welcome to

      submit material such as succinct letters, articles and other useful

      information. Indicate whether you would like your name attached to

      the submitted material. All communications should be directed to the

      Editor, Geoff Holland e-mail <igfr@...>. Copyright (c) 2004

      Institute for Global Futures Research (IGFR). All rights reserved.

      ________________________________________________________

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