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Verificationism and Christianity

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  • Aleksandar Katanovic
    What do you think, is verificationism compatible with Christian view of reality (that there is God who is transcendent)? Verificationism is a view on what
    Message 1 of 12 , Dec 12, 2000
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      What do you think, is verificationism compatible with Christian view of
      reality (that there is God who is transcendent)? Verificationism is a view
      on what constitute meaning of our statements, namely that understanding a
      statement consists in grasping what information states would verify it.

      Regards,
      Kalkas


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    • David R. Block
      Hey there, ... Help me with the definition of verificationism that you give. Let me show you how I read it and you can tell me where I ve gone wrong.
      Message 2 of 12 , Dec 12, 2000
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        Hey there,

        > -----Original Message-----
        > From: Aleksandar Katanovic [mailto:akatanov@...]
        >
        > What do you think, is verificationism compatible with
        > Christian view of
        > reality (that there is God who is transcendent)?
        > Verificationism is a view
        > on what constitute meaning of our statements, namely that
        > understanding a
        > statement consists in grasping what information states
        > would verify it.

        Help me with the definition of verificationism that you give. Let me
        show you how I read it and you can tell me where I've gone wrong.

        "Verificationism is a view on what constitute[s] meaning of our
        statements, namely that understanding a statement consists in grasping
        what information [data, meaning or content] states would verfiy it."

        Now, if you are talking about "information states" as a term, then
        there is another term you need to define here, because I don't get it.

        Thanks,

        David

        ICQ# 76248872
        "If builders built buildings the way programmers wrote programs, then
        the first woodpecker that came along would destroy
        civilization"--Murphy's Laws of Computer Programming.
      • Kyle Witten
        Could you go into more detail regarding verificationism, its meaning, theological ramifilations, etc.? Kyle
        Message 3 of 12 , Dec 13, 2000
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          Could you go into more detail regarding verificationism, its meaning, theological ramifilations, etc.?

          Kyle

          Aleksandar Katanovic wrote on 12/12/00 4:41:

          >
          >What do you think, is
          >verificationism compatible
          >with Christian view of reality
          >(that there is God who is
          >transcendent)?
          >Verificationism is a view on
          >what constitute meaning of
          >our statements, namely
          >that understanding a
          >statement consists in
          >grasping what information
          >states would verify it.
          >
          >Regards,
          >Kalkas
          >
          >
          >*******************
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          >Site of Anabaptist House
          >Churches:
          >www.house-church.net
          >
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          >1)
          >http://www.egroups.com/gr
          >oup/christian-philosophy
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          >oup/anabaptist
          >3)
          >http://www.egroups.com/gr
          >oup/true-worship
          >
          >*******************
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          >
        • Aleksandar Katanovic
          Thanks for your responses! I will in a few days be back, because at the moment I am reading for some exams, and they make me quite nervous:) Be back soon. Alex
          Message 4 of 12 , Dec 13, 2000
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            Thanks for your responses!

            I will in a few days be back, because at the moment I am reading for some
            exams, and they make me quite nervous:)

            Be back soon.

            Alex
          • Aleksandar Katanovic
            ... Hi Kyle Well, Verificationism has many forms depending on what kind of notion of verification is accepted. But the common thing is that Verificationism is
            Message 5 of 12 , Dec 15, 2000
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              At 04:30 13.12.00 -0800, you wrote:
              >Could you go into more detail regarding verificationism, its meaning,
              >theological ramifilations, etc.?
              >
              >Kyle


              Hi Kyle

              Well, Verificationism has many forms depending on what kind of notion of
              verification is accepted. But the common thing is that Verificationism is a
              view on language where it is thought that the meaning of statements consist
              in their method of verification.

              I will give a brief historic account on how Verificationism started, and
              much is taken from _The Oxford Companion to Philosophy_.

              Verificationism started as a philosophical program among one group of
              philosophers, known as Vienna Circle. The Circle emerged from discussions
              beginning in 1907, between Otto Neurath, a sociologist, Hans Hahn, a
              mathematician, and Philip Frank, a physicist. Like its founders, most
              Circle members, including its philosophers, had considerable scientific and
              mathematical training. The Circle flourished under the leadership of Moritz
              Schlik, who filled Ernst Mach's chair at the University of Vienna in 1922.
              But the rise of Nazism in the 1930s led to a diaspora of the Circle's
              members, many of whom were Jewish, Marxist, or both. For instance, Rudolf
              Carnap, who came to Vienna in 1926, left in 1931. He was installed at the
              University of Chicago in 1936, the year Schlik was assassinated in Vienna
              on the university steps. In 1938 the Circle's last Vienna organization was
              officially dissolved, Neurath and Friedrich Waismann went to Oxford. and
              Kurt Gödel went to Princeton.

              Tarski's work on the semantics of formal languages and Popper's attempts to
              explain the difference between real and spurious science were important
              influences on the Circle. Another was the work of Wittgenstein. His
              _Tractatus_ was read aloud and studied line by line by Vienna Circle members.

              From these discussions emerged a strong version of the 'verification
              principle' according to which the significance of statements depends upon
              whether they can be tested, and utterances which are neither analytic nor
              empirically testable are meaningless. Different versions of this principle
              are distinguished by the strengths of their testability requirements.

              There are two forms of the Verification Principle.
              1) The meaning of a statement is the method of its verification
              2) A statement is meaningful if and only if it is in principle verifiable.

              (1) implies (2) but not all recognize the converse implication.

              Verification may cover only observational procedures, in which case the
              principle is applied only to 'factual' statements. Mathematical statements,
              as analytic statements, are treated differently.

              Members of Vienna Circle called their philosophical position as Logical
              Positivism, also called Logical Empiricism. Logical Positivism is the
              earliest version of Verificationism, and it is the most extreme version.
              For them, sentences (statements, propositions) are meaningful if they can
              be assessed either by an appeal directly (or indirectly) to some
              foundational form of sense-experience or by an appeal to the meaning of the
              words and the grammatical structure that constitute them. If the sentences
              under examination fail to meet verifiability test, they are labelled
              meaningless. Such sentences are said to be neither true nor false.

              Famously, some say infamously, many positivists classed metaphysical,
              religious, aesthetic, and ethical claims as meaningless.

              My reason for having interest in Verificationism, is that I endorse a
              constructivist view of mathematics. Constructivists would say that
              mathematical objects are existing objects in so far they can be
              constructed. It denies the Platonist conception of mathematical objects,
              where under Platonist conception, mathematical objects (numbers, geometric,
              etc.) exist independently of our mind.

              It is obvious that Logical Positivism is incompatible with Christian
              metaphysics. However, is every version of Verificationism incompatible with
              Christian view? What if we have more flexible notion of verification, where
              we idealize cognitive capacities of the agent? Would idealized
              Verificationism be incompatible with Christianity?

              Regards,
              Alex
            • Kyle Witten
              ... Alex, I am going to have to confess that I lack sufficient understanding to contribute inteligently to this thread, but I look forward to seeing some of
              Message 6 of 12 , Dec 15, 2000
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                >It is obvious that Logical
                >Positivism is incompatible
                >with Christian metaphysics.
                >However, is every version of
                >Verificationism incompatible
                >with Christian view? What if
                >we have more flexible notion
                >of verification, where we
                >idealize cognitive capacities
                >of the agent? Would
                >idealized Verificationism be
                >incompatible with
                >Christianity?
                >
                >Regards,
                >Alex

                Alex, I am going to have to confess that I lack sufficient understanding to contribute inteligently to this thread, but I look forward to seeing some of the other responses.

                Kyle
              • Ron Hokanson
                Alex, Shalom! My initial objection to Verificationism came when I read your statement, For them, sentences (statements, propositions) are meaningful if they
                Message 7 of 12 , Dec 16, 2000
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                  Alex,

                  Shalom!

                  My initial objection to Verificationism came when I read your statement,
                  "For them, sentences (statements, propositions) are meaningful if they can
                  be assessed either by an appeal directly (or indirectly) to some
                  foundational form of sense-experience..." Is this not a naturalistic
                  presupposition? Further, it might appear to me that Verificationism
                  necessarily conflicts with inductive (though not deductive) reasoning. As
                  you know, in deductive reasoning the conclusion of the argument is viewed
                  correct if its two supporting premises are demonstrably correct, while with
                  inductive logic we can only suspect that our conclusion is correct if the
                  premises are valid. I cannot "know" that all ravens are black simply because
                  all observed ravens are black, but my statement that all ravens are black,
                  while not guaranteed verification, is logically valid.

                  I suggest that validity is more essential for our purposes than truth, for
                  what is truth cannot necessarily be known (as Paul said, "for now I know in
                  part and see in part..."), but validity can be demonstrated. I question the
                  idea of confining validity to "some sense experience".

                  Nevertheless, I am intrigued by your question, "What if we have a more
                  flexible notion of verification, where we idealize cognitive capacities of
                  the agent? Would idealized Verificationism be incompatible with
                  Christianity?"

                  I am inclined to suspect that Verificationism, if re-defined as you suggest,
                  would accept Dembski's work on Design Inference. Are you familar with Brian
                  Dembski? Simply speaking, Dembski demonstrates that an event must be
                  considered designed if it is complex and specified. Dembski then proves that
                  complex, specified information (CSI) is necessarily detachable from the
                  event, much as the formula for bread exists indepently from the bread
                  itself. Once CSI is both identified and detached, we have a kind of raw
                  information. Information is a closed system that cannot mutate or add to
                  itself. Information is not affected by time, elements, radiation and the
                  like (though information's storage units may be so affected). At most,
                  information can only be compromised or deningrated.

                  Dembski brilliantly domonstrates that this is not "idealization" per se, but
                  rather a pragmatic application already in use in fields such as archaeology,
                  forensics, cryptology (code breaking), SETI (Search for Extra-Terrestrial
                  Intelligence), and artificial intelligence, to name a few. I might add that
                  Dembski has atheists in full retreat pretty much everywhere, though I have
                  not seen many Christian apologists make use of this tool yet.

                  -Ron

                  _________________________________________________________________
                  Get your FREE download of MSN Explorer at http://explorer.msn.com
                • Aleksandar Katanovic
                  ... Hi David You actually ask good questions, because one of the disputes between Platonists and Constructivists (who are verificationist inclined thinkers in
                  Message 8 of 12 , Dec 16, 2000
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                    At 19:59 12.12.00 -0600, you wrote:
                    >Hey there,
                    >
                    > > -----Original Message-----
                    > > From: Aleksandar Katanovic [mailto:akatanov@...]
                    > >
                    > > What do you think, is verificationism compatible with
                    > > Christian view of
                    > > reality (that there is God who is transcendent)?
                    > > Verificationism is a view
                    > > on what constitute meaning of our statements, namely that
                    > > understanding a
                    > > statement consists in grasping what information states
                    > > would verify it.
                    >
                    >Help me with the definition of verificationism that you give. Let me
                    >show you how I read it and you can tell me where I've gone wrong.
                    >
                    >"Verificationism is a view on what constitute[s] meaning of our
                    >statements, namely that understanding a statement consists in grasping
                    >what information [data, meaning or content] states would verfiy it."
                    >
                    >Now, if you are talking about "information states" as a term, then
                    >there is another term you need to define here, because I don't get it.


                    Hi David

                    You actually ask good questions, because one of the disputes between
                    Platonists and Constructivists (who are verificationist inclined thinkers
                    in the philosophy of mathematics) is on the interpretation of the term
                    'information state'. *Some* platonists in the philosophy of mathematics
                    would say that Skorupski's characterization of verification (the above
                    definition) is compatible with Platonist truth-conditional analysis of
                    meaning. That's funny because Platonists are *not* verificationists at all:)

                    Neutrally understood, the term 'information state' is a state of mind which
                    possesses some information (cognitive content).

                    The extreme verificationist interpretation is a requirement of being in
                    such state of mind. However, a platonist would insists that there is a
                    distinction between *grasping what information state would verify a
                    mathematical sentence* and *being in that information state*. If the
                    verificationist requirement is interpreted as *grasping what information
                    state would verify a mathematical sentence* (or other assertoric statement)
                    then a platonist could endorse verificationist position. However, some
                    verificationists, notably Michael Dummett, would say that platonist
                    interpretation is unintelligible because it can be argued that platonist
                    truth-conditional semantics would violate the Wittgensteinian principle
                    "meaning is use." I think that Dummett is right, but I will not go in
                    detail why I think so. Let this be further explored in next posts.

                    Alex
                  • David R. Block
                    Hello Alex, Judging from how this looks, it s time to change the options on Outlook again! ... From: Aleksandar Katanovic [mailto:akatanov@bigfoot.com] ...
                    Message 9 of 12 , Dec 17, 2000
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                      Hello Alex,

                      Judging from how this looks, it's time to change the options on
                      Outlook again!

                      -----Original Message-----
                      From: Aleksandar Katanovic [mailto:akatanov@...]
                      At 19:59 12.12.00 -0600, you wrote:
                      >Hey there,
                      >
                      > > -----Original Message-----
                      > > From: Aleksandar Katanovic [mailto:akatanov@...]
                      > >
                      > > What do you think, is verificationism compatible with
                      > > Christian view of
                      > > reality (that there is God who is transcendent)?
                      > > Verificationism is a view
                      > > on what constitute meaning of our statements, namely that
                      > > understanding a
                      > > statement consists in grasping what information states
                      > > would verify it.
                      >
                      >Help me with the definition of verificationism that you give. Let me
                      >show you how I read it and you can tell me where I've gone wrong.
                      >
                      >"Verificationism is a view on what constitute[s] meaning of our
                      >statements, namely that understanding a statement consists in
                      grasping
                      >what information [data, meaning or content] states would verfiy it."
                      >
                      >Now, if you are talking about "information states" as a term, then
                      >there is another term you need to define here, because I don't get
                      it.

                      Alex:
                      You actually ask good questions, because one of the disputes between
                      Platonists and Constructivists (who are verificationist inclined
                      thinkers
                      in the philosophy of mathematics) is on the interpretation of the term
                      'information state'. *Some* platonists in the philosophy of
                      mathematics
                      would say that Skorupski's characterization of verification (the above
                      definition) is compatible with Platonist truth-conditional analysis of
                      meaning. That's funny because Platonists are *not* verificationists at
                      all:)

                      Neutrally understood, the term 'information state' is a state of mind
                      which
                      possesses some information (cognitive content).

                      David:

                      "Information state" is the state of information in our own minds,
                      then. This renders verification somewhat subjective then, doesn't it?
                      If so, then verification varies between individuals, since all people
                      do not have the same knowledge base upon which to verify given
                      statements. I find that to be problematic.

                      Alex:
                      The extreme verificationist interpretation is a requirement of being
                      in
                      such state of mind. However, a platonist would insists that there is a
                      distinction between *grasping what information state would verify a
                      mathematical sentence* and *being in that information state*. If the
                      verificationist requirement is interpreted as *grasping what
                      information
                      state would verify a mathematical sentence* (or other assertoric
                      statement)
                      then a platonist could endorse verificationist position. However, some
                      verificationists, notably Michael Dummett, would say that platonist
                      interpretation is unintelligible because it can be argued that
                      platonist
                      truth-conditional semantics would violate the Wittgensteinian
                      principle
                      "meaning is use." I think that Dummett is right, but I will not go in
                      detail why I think so. Let this be further explored in next posts.

                      David:
                      You have a boatload of stuff in that paragraph there, Alex!
                      Verificationism presupposes a varificationist interpretation? That
                      implies a tautology or circular reasoning. This would work fairly well
                      in mathematics or physics, where there are grounding laws for
                      mathematical operations and physical laws in the area of optics and
                      gravity, etc. Extending it much beyond that, like into religion for
                      example, is not so well grounded. Christians and Muslims (or any
                      religion with a written "standard") each have their scripture upon
                      which to base or guide their 'information state.' Yet many Christians
                      and Muslims would not see the other side as being verifiable. It
                      sounds extremely subjective to me.

                      Peace,

                      David

                      ICQ# 76248872
                      "If builders built buildings the way programmers wrote programs, then
                      the first woodpecker that came along would destroy
                      civilization"--Murphy's Laws of Computer Programming.
                    • Aleksandar Katanovic
                      ... Why, David? The information state is just what information we have to possess in order to verify some statement. For instance, observations are information
                      Message 10 of 12 , Dec 17, 2000
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                        At 14:32 17.12.00 -0600, you wrote:
                        >David:
                        >
                        >"Information state" is the state of information in our own minds,
                        >then. This renders verification somewhat subjective then, doesn't it?

                        Why, David?
                        The information state is just what information we have to possess in order
                        to verify some statement. For instance, observations are information
                        states. Why would this imply subjectivism?

                        >If so, then verification varies between individuals, since all people
                        >do not have the same knowledge base upon which to verify given
                        >statements. I find that to be problematic.

                        Why? I just want to know more of your intuition behind your view.

                        >Alex:
                        >The extreme verificationist interpretation is a requirement of being
                        >in
                        >such state of mind. However, a platonist would insists that there is a
                        >distinction between *grasping what information state would verify a
                        >mathematical sentence* and *being in that information state*. If the
                        >verificationist requirement is interpreted as *grasping what
                        >information
                        >state would verify a mathematical sentence* (or other assertoric
                        >statement)
                        >then a platonist could endorse verificationist position. However, some
                        >verificationists, notably Michael Dummett, would say that platonist
                        >interpretation is unintelligible because it can be argued that
                        >platonist
                        >truth-conditional semantics would violate the Wittgensteinian
                        >principle
                        >"meaning is use." I think that Dummett is right, but I will not go in
                        >detail why I think so. Let this be further explored in next posts.
                        >
                        >David:
                        >You have a boatload of stuff in that paragraph there, Alex!
                        >Verificationism presupposes a varificationist interpretation?

                        The point is how should we *understand* the verificationist requirement,
                        since there is a possibility of some *interpretation* of the *formulated*
                        requirement that would be be inconsistent with many versions of
                        verificationism.

                        Peace,
                        Alex
                      • Aleksandar Katanovic
                        ... Hi Ron Well, yes, I think you are right. Logical positivism, the early version of Verificationism, is quite influenced by empiricism. ... It is permitted
                        Message 11 of 12 , Dec 17, 2000
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                          At 03:28 16.12.00 -0500, you wrote:
                          >Alex,
                          >
                          >Shalom!
                          >
                          >My initial objection to Verificationism came when I read your statement,
                          >"For them, sentences (statements, propositions) are meaningful if they can
                          >be assessed either by an appeal directly (or indirectly) to some
                          >foundational form of sense-experience..." Is this not a naturalistic
                          >presupposition?

                          Hi Ron

                          Well, yes, I think you are right. Logical positivism, the early version of
                          Verificationism, is quite influenced by empiricism.

                          >Further, it might appear to me that Verificationism
                          >necessarily conflicts with inductive (though not deductive) reasoning. As
                          >you know, in deductive reasoning the conclusion of the argument is viewed
                          >correct if its two supporting premises are demonstrably correct, while with
                          >inductive logic we can only suspect that our conclusion is correct if the
                          >premises are valid. I cannot "know" that all ravens are black simply because
                          >all observed ravens are black, but my statement that all ravens are black,
                          >while not guaranteed verification, is logically valid.

                          It is permitted that our verifications can be corrected. Verification of
                          some statement does not imply that the statement cannot be refuted by
                          subsequent data. So, evidence supporting that all ravens are black are
                          accepted for verificationists.

                          >I suggest that validity is more essential for our purposes than truth, for
                          >what is truth cannot necessarily be known (as Paul said, "for now I know in
                          >part and see in part..."), but validity can be demonstrated. I question the
                          >idea of confining validity to "some sense experience".

                          I agree that such form of Verificationism has much problems. For one thing,
                          it leads to phenomenalism, namely that we have indirect epistemic access to
                          the world; that the only direct epistemic access is our sense-impressions,
                          sense-data. But not all form of Verificationism has such narrow idea of
                          experience.

                          >Nevertheless, I am intrigued by your question, "What if we have a more
                          >flexible notion of verification, where we idealize cognitive capacities of
                          >the agent? Would idealized Verificationism be incompatible with
                          >Christianity?"
                          >
                          >I am inclined to suspect that Verificationism, if re-defined as you suggest,
                          >would accept Dembski's work on Design Inference. Are you familar with Brian
                          >Dembski?

                          No, I am not so familiar with his work.

                          >Simply speaking, Dembski demonstrates that an event must be
                          >considered designed if it is complex and specified. Dembski then proves that
                          >complex, specified information (CSI) is necessarily detachable from the
                          >event, much as the formula for bread exists indepently from the bread
                          >itself.

                          I do not understand your sentence: "... information (CSI) is necessarily
                          detachable from the event, ..."

                          >Once CSI is both identified and detached, we have a kind of raw
                          >information. Information is a closed system that cannot mutate or add to
                          >itself. Information is not affected by time, elements, radiation and the
                          >like (though information's storage units may be so affected). At most,
                          >information can only be compromised or deningrated.

                          What is information?

                          >Dembski brilliantly domonstrates that this is not "idealization" per se, but
                          >rather a pragmatic application already in use in fields such as archaeology,
                          >forensics, cryptology (code breaking), SETI (Search for Extra-Terrestrial
                          >Intelligence), and artificial intelligence, to name a few. I might add that
                          >Dembski has atheists in full retreat pretty much everywhere, though I have
                          >not seen many Christian apologists make use of this tool yet.

                          Ron, I am afraid that I do not understand Dembski's framework. I would like
                          to hear more about it.

                          Regards,
                          Alex
                        • David R. Block
                          Hello Alex, ... Er, because of my misunderstanding of the definition. See what my first sentence back there said? Your answer to my subjective charge seems to
                          Message 12 of 12 , Dec 18, 2000
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                            Hello Alex,

                            > -----Original Message-----
                            > From: Aleksandar Katanovic [mailto:akatanov@...]
                            > At 14:32 17.12.00 -0600, you wrote:
                            > >David:
                            > >
                            > >"Information state" is the state of information in our own minds,
                            > >then. This renders verification somewhat subjective then,
                            > doesn't it?
                            >
                            > Why, David?
                            > The information state is just what information we have to
                            > possess in order
                            > to verify some statement. For instance, observations are
                            > information
                            > states. Why would this imply subjectivism?

                            Er, because of my misunderstanding of the definition. See what my
                            first sentence back there said? Your answer to my subjective charge
                            seems to say that the content of the information we possess is the
                            information state. What I was trying to get at, rather poorly, was
                            that information state was defined as our knowledge of whether or not
                            the information that we possess is true or not.

                            > >If so, then verification varies between individuals, since
                            > all people
                            > >do not have the same knowledge base upon which to verify given
                            > >statements. I find that to be problematic.
                            >
                            > Why? I just want to know more of your intuition behind your view.

                            Everyone does not have the same base of information to work with. Some
                            of the information that I may possess could be completely incorrect.
                            Therefore, I could verify a falsehood based upon my own false
                            information. To use a totally "off the wall," yet seasonal example: I
                            could verify the existence of Santa Claus, Saint Nicholas, what have
                            you, based upon the faulty information that he passes out presents all
                            over the world on December 24. Little do I know that my parents, wife,
                            or other person could be responsible for the gifts arriving at my
                            house. They get there, and I erroneously believe that Santa Claus is
                            the reason.

                            With mathematics, I fully believe verificationism is valid. The
                            equations either will or will not work. In religion, our faith is
                            grounded upon our information state, but in some areas such as the
                            resurrection, we believe that it occurred * in spite * of most
                            information that it is impossible or unlikely.

                            > >Alex:
                            > >The extreme verificationist interpretation is a
                            > requirement of being
                            > >in
                            > >such state of mind. However, a platonist would insists
                            > that there is a
                            > >distinction between *grasping what information state would verify a
                            > >mathematical sentence* and *being in that information
                            > state*. If the
                            > >verificationist requirement is interpreted as *grasping what
                            > >information
                            > >state would verify a mathematical sentence* (or other assertoric
                            > >statement)
                            > >then a platonist could endorse verificationist position.
                            > However, some
                            > >verificationists, notably Michael Dummett, would say that platonist
                            > >interpretation is unintelligible because it can be argued that
                            > >platonist
                            > >truth-conditional semantics would violate the Wittgensteinian
                            > >principle
                            > >"meaning is use." I think that Dummett is right, but I
                            > will not go in
                            > >detail why I think so. Let this be further explored in next posts.
                            > >
                            > >David:
                            > >You have a boatload of stuff in that paragraph there, Alex!
                            > >Verificationism presupposes a varificationist interpretation?
                            >
                            > The point is how should we *understand* the verificationist
                            > requirement,
                            > since there is a possibility of some *interpretation* of
                            > the *formulated*
                            > requirement that would be be inconsistent with many versions of
                            > verificationism.

                            It appears that I do not understand it very well at all, that's how!
                            ;-)

                            Peace,

                            David

                            ICQ# 76248872
                            "If builders built buildings the way programmers wrote programs, then
                            the first woodpecker that came along would destroy
                            civilization"--Murphy's Laws of Computer Programming.
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