Ø

[Summa I, Q. 84., Article 3.]

So back to your friend's conclusion and your suggestion, requote:-

FRIEND:
Knowledge is sort of the analytical unravelling of understanding.

JOHN:
Maybe we could say that the judgment present in understand(ing) is similiar to the judgment of the sensitive soul in that the judgment itself is not discursive. What do you think?

REPLY:
I think not, for the following reasons.  First, sensory judgments are attributable to the composite of "sensitive-soul-and-body". And as I tried to point out, previously, there is movement associated with such judgments (my mention of moving waves of localized depolarization).  Your friend's analogy of science likened to a climb up a hill also indicates movement.  For example, if one joined a walking club dedicated to hill-climbing, one could correctly assert that, "We go on climbing excursions."  So when you say that the judgment itself is not discursive, what do you mean?

Judgments are end points, or stopping points, I agree.  But if you come to rest in a judgment, the very fact of stopping or coming to rest, indicates previous movement.  eg. Any time the syllable "cur" enters into discourse (same root), as in the words "excursion, discursion, current, curriculum or even cursor (on your computer screen)", one is indicating some sort of movement with that syllable.  Likewise your friend's analogy of science being like climbing up a hill also indicates movement.

And climbing a hill, is hardly the same thing as gazing down from a climbed hill.  But even with his movement analogy, I don't really like the comparison of movement to understanding and understanding to science, as the same thing, because Aquinas likens understanding to having "the habit of 1st Principles", whereas science is the application of 1st Principles to both the knowledge and the understanding of different kinds of objects and their "natures".

One key word in Aquinas's distinctions between Wisdom, Science (or knowledge) and Understanding is habit.  Aquinas distinguishes these 3 intellectual virtues (and virtues are good habits) from each other in Summa I-II, Q. 57., Article 2.

So if one returns to your man's analogy of science to climbing and understanding to looking down from the heights, in light of Aquinas's emphasis on habits, one can almost see why your friend made the analogy, because having 1st principles does give anyone a clearer view of all the details.  But the term habit, which your man doesn't mention in his analogy, causes me to think about climbers who have good habits and equipment vs. climbers who don't have good habits or equipment, in addition to all the climbers who work together on, e.g., an "Everest Expedition".

To do justice to your consideration that understanding is not discursive, similar to the senses not being discursive in apprehending a color, sound, etc., the analogy seems to be in accord with what Aquinas means by apprehending a self-evident rational principle.  One either "gets" them or doesn't.  But let's hear what Aquinas has to say about the distinctions (ie. differences) between Wisdom, Science and Undertanding, since his overall conclusion is that they are not "the same" as your friend suggested in his analogy.

Summa I-II, Q. 57. Article 2.

AQUINAS:

Whether there are only three habits of the speculative intellect,
viz. wisdom, science and understanding?

Objection 1. It would seem unfitting to distinguish three virtues of the speculative intellect, viz. wisdom, science and understanding. For a species should not be co-divided with its genus. But wisdom is a science, as stated in Ethics (Bk VI, Ch. 7. 1141a line 19). Therefore wisdom should not be co-divided with science among the intellectual virtues.

Objection 2. Further, in differentiating powers, habits and acts in respect of their objects, we consider chiefly the formal aspect of these objects, as we have already explained (Summa I-II, Q. 54 Art. 2. Ad.1; Summa I, Q. 77, Art. 3). Therefore habits are diversifed, not according to their material objects, but according to the formal aspect of their objects. Now the principle of a demonstration is the cause of having a science of conclusions  . Therefore the understanding of principles should not be set down as a habit or virtue distinct from the science of conclusions.

[ie. Your friend's argument put more "abstractly" by St. Thomas; KB]

Objection 3. Further, an intellectual virtue is one which resides in the essentially rational part of the soul. Now even the speculative reason employs the dialectical syllogism in its reasoning, just as it employs the demonstrative syllogism. Therefore just as science, which is the result of a demonstrative syllogism, is considered to be an intellectual virtue, so also should opinion be.

On the CONTRARY, The Philosopher (Ethic. vi, 1, according to New Advent; My "precis" of parts of The Summa footnotes Nich. Ethics Bk VI., Chpts 3 and 7 KB) reckons these three alone as being intellectual virtues, viz. wisdom, science and understanding.

I answer that, As already stated (S. I-II Q. 57., Article 1), the virtues of the speculative intellect are those which perfect the speculative intellect for the consideration of truth: for this is its good work.  Now truth is subject to a twofold consideration, namely, as known in itself, and as known through another. What is known in itself, is as a "principle," and is at once understood by the intellect: and that is why the habit that perfects the intellect for the consideration of such truth is called "understanding," which is the habit of principles.

[Very close to your non-discursive point! KB]

On the other hand, a truth which is known through another, is understood by the intellect, not at once, but by means of the reason's inquiry, and is as a term.

[NOTE:-  Discursive reason; cw. Aquinas's "inquiry" above. KB]

AQUINAS (continues):
This may happen in two ways: first, so that it is the last in some particular genus; secondly, so that it is the ultimate term of all human knowledge. And, since "things that are knowable last from our standpoint, are knowable first and chiefly in their nature" (Aristotle Physics Bk I, Ch. 1, 184a line 18); hence that which is last with respect to all human knowledge, is that which is knowable first and chiefly in its nature. And about these is wisdom, which considers the highest causes, as stated in Metaph. i, (Bk I, Ch.1, 981b line 28; Ch. 2. 982b line 2). Therefore it (wisdom) rightly judges all things and sets them in order, because there can be no perfect and universal judgment that is not based on the first causes. But in regard to that which is last in this or that genus of knowable truths, it is science that perfects the intellect. Therefore according to the different genera (kinds) of knowable truths, there are diverse habits of the sciences; whereas there is but one wisdom.

Reply to Objection 1. Wisdom is a science, in so far as it has that which is common to all the sciences; viz. to demonstrate conclusions from principles. But since it has something proper to itself above the other sciences, inasmuch as it judges of them all, not only as to their conclusions, but also as to their first principles, therefore it is a more perfect virtue than science.

Reply to Objection 2. When the formal aspect of the object is referred to a power or habit by one and the same act, there is no distinction of habit or power in relation to the formal aspect and the material object.  Thus it belongs to the same power of sight to see both color and light, which is the formal aspect under which color is seen, and (light KB) is seen at the same time as the color. On the other hand, the principles of a demonstration can be considered by themselves, without the conclusion being considered at all. They can also be considered together with the conclusions, in so far as the principles are extended to lead to the conclusions (ie. conclusions can be deduced from principles KB).  Accordingly, to consider the principles in this second way (principle plus conclusion), belongs to science, which considers the conclusions also: while to consider the principles in themselves belongs to understanding.

Consequently, if we consider the point rightly, these three virtues are not distinguished as being on a par with one another, but in a certain order. The same is to be observed in potential wholes, wherein one part is more perfect than another; for instance, the rational soul is more perfect than the sensitive soul; and the sensitive, than the vegetative soul. For it is thus that science depends on understanding as on a virtue of higher degree.  So too, both of these depend on wisdom, as obtaining the highest place; for it contains beneath itself both understanding and science, as judging both of the conclusions of sciences, and of the principles on which they are based.

Reply to Objection 3. As stated above (Summa I-II, Q. 55, Articles 3 and 4), a virtuous habit has a fixed relation to good, and is nowise referable to evil. Now the good of the intellect is truth, and falsehood is its evil. Therefore those habits alone are called intellectual virtues, whereby we express the truth and never a falsehood. But opinion and surmise (suspicion) can be about both truth and falsehood: and so, as stated in Ethic. vi, 3 (1139b line 17), they are not intellectual virtues.

[Summa I-II. Q. 57. Article 2.]

COMMENT:
John!  You have homed-in upon some of the finest "hair splitting" which both Aquinas and Aristotle delved into (and/or speculated about).  You don't even get a translation of Aristotle's terminology into the English term understanding, until Bk VI, Ch. 10. of The Nichomachean Ethics, where he and Aquinas are in agreement per the above article, when Aquinas says understanding grasps 1st principles, but doesn't necessarily follow through to conclusions, as do the demonstrative sciences.

Aristotle preliminarily describes (after considering the major virtues and vices) the intellectual virtues as (my brackets), "...5 in number, ie. (1) art, (2) scientific knowledge, (3) practical wisdom, (4) philosophic wisdom (and 5) intuitive reason; we do not include judgment and opinion because in these we may be mistaken.

Those 5 virtues [cw. Aquinas's 3 virtues of the speculative intellect, because Aristotle's (1) Art and (3) Practical wisdom belong to the (3) practical and (1) productive powers of human intellects] which Aristotle mentions as "states by virtue of which the soul possesses truth, by way of affirmation and denial" don't seem to include the English expression understanding.  So here is what Aristotle says about understanding in Bk VI, Ch. 10, of the Nich. Ethics, quote

ARISTOTLE:
"Understanding, also, and goodness of understanding, in virtue of which men are said to be men of understanding or of good understanding, are neither entirely the same as opinion or scientific knowledge (for at that rate all men would have been men of understanding; Aristotle's bracket) ---[He says that because all men have either mere opinions or actual knowledge KB] --- nor are they [ie. men of good understanding KB] one of the particular sciences, such as medicine, the science of things connected with health or geometry, the science of spatial magnitudes.  For understanding is neither about things that are always and are unchangeable [eg. The cosmos; the nature of a triangle or a circle KB], nor about any and every one of the things which come into being (eg sickness or death from health and health from a recovering/ed sick person ; as in medicine KB), but about things which may become subjects of questioning and deliberation.

Hence it (understanding KB) is about the same objects as practical wisdom; but understanding and practical wisdom are not the same. [More "hair-splitting" KB] For practical wisdom issues commands, since its end is what ought to be done or not done; but understanding only judges (Understanding is identical with goodness of understanding; Aristotle's bracket KB).  Now understanding is neither the having, nor the acquiring of practical wisdom (as per artists and moralists KB), but as learning is called understanding, when it means the exercize of the faculty of knowledge, so 'understanding' is applicable to the exercize of the faculty of opinion for the purpose of judging what someone else says about matters with which practical wisdom is concerned --- and of judging soundly; for 'well' and 'soundly' are the same thing.  And from this (faculty KB) has come the name 'understanding', viz. from the application of the word to the grasping of scientific truth; for we often call such grasping (by the name) UNDERSTANDING.

[Aristotle N.E. BK VI; Ch. 10.]

Thus Aquinas calls understanding the habit of principles.  But to see exactly why Aquinas places understanding among his 3 virtues of the speculative (power of) our intellects, one, arguably, has to observe the number of times and places where Aristotle attributes the grasp of the 1st Principles of diverse sciences to his 5th enumerated virtue, which is translated above as (5) intuitive reason, and immediately above we have Aristotle's mention of grasping scientific truth, with respect to the virtue of understanding.

All the "hair splitting" may be less tedious if you backtrack to the beginning of the Summa where Aquinas writes, quote:-

AQUINAS:
Sciences are diversified according to the diverse nature of their knowable objects.

[Summa I, Q. 1, Article 2. Reply/(Ad.) Obj. 2.]

And if you follow Aristotle in The Metaphysics he talks about the "special sciences" cutting off portions of being and examining those parts by themselves or in relation to the same kinds of parts, as do the mathematician and the physicist.  The parts they study have peculiar properties.  So, too, does being have peculiar properties, when wholes are considered, rather than mere "parts" of being.

So another way of considering all the "hair-splitting" is simply to consider how some people are good at some school subjects, but not at other school subjects.  Some people are "naturally good" at athletics, but not so good at "academic" subjects.  Some people who may seem "dumb" at school, can tear down a car engine and rebuild it way better than before, over a few evenings and weekends.

Such engine rebuilders are not "dumb" people.  Speculative subjects simply bore them.  They don't understand the point of such subjects --- there is no practical wisdom or "practical application" for them.  However, the guys who originally built the first automobile motors knew the practical application of mathematics and physics to the initial production of the original internal combustion engine/s (ie. literally derived from the term "engineering").

Their modern descendants (who can't or won't pass algebra) do know "mathematics" which they can actually see in action in an engine.  They may know as much about cubic inches, horse power, cylinder firing orders, timing and miniscule valve and piston-ring clearances as abstract mathematicians know about prime numbers.  Learning applied math/physics by working on car engines becomes their habit.

If old Leo' DaVinci came back he would probably be as interested in some of the California motor cylcle building shops, as in modern universities, because the "bikes" some of these guys design are modern art works, including both sculptures in metal and examples of "fine-art-painting".  The mechanics would fascinate him.  Plato would be interested in all the applied geometry.  Socrates would learn many fine things from them, which he did not know (but he'd drive some modern philosophy professors to distraction about the things they think they know, but do not know.).

Each to his own.  As Aristotle teaches, all the arts are more necessary (than speculative science), but none is better.

Kevin