James, elsewhere you wrote: "We don't have an absolute disconnect that
I can see, Will. We interpret one passage differently, but both
believe the leap brings about an absolute change."
I can think of one absolute disconnect we have, the question of
whether or not we have an absolute disconnect; I say that we do and
you say that we do not. Since the structure of this situation is the
same structure I used to create the apple pile dichotomy, let me spell
it out; I can see that it might be useful here. I will create a
dichotomy that you will declare a false dichotomy, and all else will
follow from that.
Let us say that a given authorship may be interpreted in diverse ways
and that those diverse ways may be categorized so that what we have is
two categories of interpretation which are incommensurable one with
the other. We could even say that they are separated by an 'infinitely
broad ditch' and that to get from one interpretation to another
requires an absolute leap. Let one category be X and the other
category Y. We could represent their infinite separation by setting
one at right angles to another, call their intersection the 'moment,'
and call one the real axis and the other the imaginary axis, but we
I see both X and Y as possible interpretations. You see X as the only
possible interpretation that makes sense, which is to say that you
reject Y as a viable interpretation. This point is why I chose to
piggyback my response to this particular message; one in which Mederic
made the perfect metaphor; it's the engine baby. You said:
<So back to my point, what's going in the leap is at once both
absolute and relative, otherwise Kierkegaard's language makes no
You do not see an absolute disconnect between our interpretations
because you do not see Y as viable; it creates what you called a false
dichotomy. Therefore, you must subsume Y in X, which means that
anytime the suggestion of Y appears in what SK says, it is subsumed in
X and your contention that the leap is at once absolute and relative
is posited as fact. If there were no Y as standing alone, you would be
correct, and that is where the matter would stand. As you have
suggested to Mederic:
<May need to consider the possibility that Kierkegaard didn't think in
Either/Or terms about everything, but sometimes in both/and terms.>
Is there a Y standing alone? For me there is. There is a change that
can only be described as a change in one's grasp of oneself as
oneself. When it comes to be seen that one's sense of self is
engendered by a reflection, and one then reflects upon that change, a
paradox rises that brings the one doing the reflecting to an end. When
I then came across SK, that Y immediately caught my attention. I see
that Y as running through his corpus like a singular thread that ties
it all of a piece. Delusion? Always possible, i.e., undecided; 'no'
being speculation. The only way I will know is in the waking from it.
But that is how the Y came into being, so maybe there is a delusion to
the second power as there is a subjectivity to the second power.
For my part, it's all about the self, and the reflection in which the
self is given. It is the self that must change absolutely, and that is
the core of the absolute apple. Sure, there is a body around, but the
subject of subjectivity is the self. The question that remains is
whether or not his whole authorship was grounded in the rhetorical; if
so, then there is only X, with its subsumed Y, and you are correct.
But still, an entire corpus dedicated to the rhetorical? If there were
such a leap, only one who has taken it could say that there was such a
leap; but to deny the possibility of it, does seem to me to be an
irrational stance. It is either 'yes' because it is yes, or it is
undecided; 'no' being speculation.
I do understand that what I have written only continues our dilemma,
but I needed to lay our a structure for our difference that I saw as
capturing it. It's simply that I leave Y in a different universe from
X and you place that Y in your universe of X. Where I see movement
from X to Y as a leap, you see an inner movement as a leap that brings
Y into being within X. I don't think it is possible to take the
movement from X to Y as other than concrete. That surely would bring
another dimension into being to contain such a movement. Fascinating.
I'll cut this off here and look some more at the movements suggested
by our different placing of Y in relation to X. Willy
--- In email@example.com
, "<none>" <jamesrovira@y...>
> That was a good response but my God, Mr. Laitier, you mean the
> comparison isn't perfect? :). Come, is any? Of course the
> breaks down between things and people -- it was only relevant to one
> point: Mr. Brown's implicit assertion that there's a difference
> the "core" of a person and the person themselves (hence the apple
> analogy). Substance and accidens. Ok, we've changed the apple
> is the apple skin still the same? You know all about this. If you
> want to abandon analogy, let's just stick with something like
> Kierkegaard's language, then:
> The individual experiences a qualitative change in the leap.
> "The individual."
> Is the "individual" a constant on both sides of the leap? If not,
> you'd have to assert that the previous individual ceases to exist
> an entirely new individual comes into being.
> But if that is the case, you cannot say "the individual" experiences
> anything in the leap - because the individual ceases to
> Mid leap?
> So the individual must be the numerically one before and after the
> leap, simply a changed "one."
> So back to my point, what's going in the leap is at once both
> and relative, otherwise Kierkegaard's language makes no sense.
> Absolute in relationship to some facets of a person, relative in
> relationship to another. On the most surface level the individual
> has made the leap still has the same complexion, hair color, voice,
> history, etc. The change, as I described in my last post, has to do
> with the relationship of spirit to mind and body -- but even then,
> three components still exist.
> May need to consider the possibility that Kierkegaard didn't think
> Either/Or terms about everything, but sometimes in both/and terms.
> Jim Rovira
> --- Médéric Laitier <mederic.laitier@t...> wrote:
> > Dear None,
> > 'You can change the engine in a car, but the car is still the same
> > car.'