--- In email@example.com
, "sauwelios" <sauwelios@...>
> --- In firstname.lastname@example.org, "pandemonium19"
> <pandemonium19@> wrote:
> > "That idea is due to what Nietzsche called "the soul superstition".
> > There is no matter and no void; there is only force."
> > What is force?
> Oh, the soul superstition is necessary to describe it, if that's your
> point. But this doesn't mean "souls" (in whichever form) really exist
> (a most Nietzschean observation!).
To support this I want to quote the following section in full:
"In order to think and infer it is necessary to assume beings: logic
handles only formulas for what remains the same. That is why this
assumption would not be proof of reality: "beings" are part of our
perspective. The "ego" as a being (--not affected by becoming and
The fictitious world of subject, substance, "reason," etc., is
needed--: there is in us a power to order, simplify, falsify,
artificially distinguish. "Truth" is the will to be master over the
multiplicity of sensations:--to classify phenomena into definite
categories. In this we start from a belief in the "in-itself" of
things (we take phenomena as *real*).
The character of the world in a state of becoming as incapable of
formulation, as "false," as "self-contradictory." Knowledge and
becoming exclude one another. Consequently, "knowledge" must be
something else: there must first of all be a will to make knowable, a
kind of becoming must itself create the deception of beings."
[The Will to Power, section 517 (1887), entire.]
This last remark may clarify something I argued over with Moody,
starting with message # 100. In this message, Moody wrote:
> I say that the will to power has become, this is not to say that it is
> just another 'becoming' , it is rather the source of all becoming, as
> you say.
> But this is not to say that it is a Being- rather, as Nietzsche says in
> the piece you quote, it is called a pathos here.
> And what qualities does pathos have? Is it an eternal universal
> No - it is something shifting, unpredictable, irrational and changing.
> Pathos is a Becoming.
This was in response to my argument:
> If the will to power has become, then it is a becoming: something
> fixed cannot become, something cannot become fixed.
But as we see in the above quote, Nietzsche describes the "will to
make knowable", which is a "will to be master", as "a kind of
becoming". So if we identify this "will to be master" with the will to
power, it follows that a pathos is indeed "a kind of becoming".
However, this description is necessarily vague: for, as I said in
message # 109, "Becoming presupposes Being, because Becoming is always
a becoming-a-being. But Being is a wishful envisioning by the will to
power. In truth there is no Being, nor a Becoming(-a-being), but only
will to power. The will to power wills to see a Becoming(-a-being)
into itself, and into that Becoming, in turn, a Being."
The will to power is a kind of becoming, but it is also a kind of
being. Note that "kind of" is not meant literally, as "species of",
but descriptive, as "more or less" -- "kind" here means what
Merriam-Webster calls "a doubtful or barely admissible member of a
So far the *will* to power. Now as for power itself. I agree with
Moody that Nietzsche's philosophy is not so much a Will philosophy as
a Power philosophy. The will to power presupposes what I have called
"the power to will". A pathos must arise from somewhere; it cannot
arise ex nihilo. Thus Nietzsche says "there is in us a power [Macht]
to order, simplify, falsify, artificially distinguish." [ibid.] This
power is power of *pathos* -- strength of will, of passion -- a *dynamis*.
But it was precisely to this *dynamis* that an "inner quality" -- an
"inner will" -- needed to be ascribed according to Nietzsche. This is
because it is in itself unintelligible to us.
Nietzsche repeatedly said that "will" was only a word. Well, "power",
too, is only a word. Power implies freedom. The power of life and
death implies the freedom to *choose* between life and death -- in a
deterministic world, there can be no power. We know, however, from
experience that an urge or compulsion can arise into our seeming
freedom, wiping it away. Nietzsche's idea, then, is to explain
*everything* as such an urge or compulsion. Thus the *pathos* that is
the will to power *is* power -- it is the force of said compulsion.
Thus the will to power is really a will to will, or a passion for
passion. This gives a hint as to the recurrent nature of this
occurrence, this *pathos* (*pathos* means "event, occurrence" as well
The will to power is an urge or compulsion to the invention of a
fantasy world -- a world of Being, freedom, etc. I have already called
it "a passion for eternity"; I can now call it "a passion for
freedom". How romantic these phrases sound!