On Sun, Mar 11, 2001 at 05:47:47PM -0500, Matthew Potter wrote:
> At 10:11 AM 2/27/01, you wrote:
> >At 04:07 PM 2/12/01 -0500, you wrote:
> >attenuation. This assumes that the shielding is for a specific unit (eg
> >the enclosure of a STUIII phone), or that there is some limit to what could
> >be installed in a walkin enclosure.
> Totally off topic.
> You think the crypto algorithm in the STU-III is backdoored so the .gov can
> decrypt their own signals if they suspect abuse?
The key management is such that the key material usually
originates from a KDC (Key Distribution Center) and presumably copies of
it are kept there so post facto decryption of calls can done if needed.
It is possible to use key exchange protocols (such as Diffie
Hellman) that can be used to exchange random keys between individuals
which can then be forgotten and erased, yielding something called
forward secrecy but AFAIK the normal mode of key exchange in STU and STE
phones doesn't work that way and working keys are recoverable by NSA.
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Dave Emery N1PRE, die@...
DIE Consulting, Weston, Mass.
PGP fingerprint = 2047/4D7B08D1 DE 6E E1 CC 1F 1D 96 E2 5D 27 BD B0 24 88 C3 18