I think that we should remember that when Rosecrans took over the Army of the
Ohio, renamed the 14th Corps, it was not in very good shape. Cavalry in the
14th Corps was practically was....well...not cavalry. Rosecrans first
assessment of his command was that he needed more cavalry. Any movement that
Rosecrans made inland increased the lines of communications that needed
protection from Morgan, Wheeler, and what was that other guy's name...oh yea
Forrest. In addition, he would be advancing over land that had been
previously occupied by the Confederates, either Bragg or Johnston. Just look
what happened to Grant in Nov/Dec 1862 when he tried to advance inland....Van
Dorn put a halt to that pretty quickly. Also remember that Grant's line of
communications was the Mississippi River, protected by a very strong
USN....much easier to proceed with multiple operations then what was
available for Ol' Rosy.
All of course IMHO. :)
Kevin S. Coy
> A more worthy target would be Meade who truly missed an opportunity
> when Longstreet moved west, but we can't duscuss that here!
> You are correct that Rosecrans should have kept up more pressure. I'm
> not that sure what/how Grant would have know that Rosey was in need of
> more troops without any sort of request from above...
> I recall, and I think someone else recently posted, that Grant was
> considering a move into the interior of MS and AL and eventually to
> Mobile (Mobile held a particular fascination with Grant; he was still
> considering army operations towards it in May 1864).