Special Order #8 was very important and needs to studied. It controlled the army in the road march and the deployment into lines abreast, as in a wave. AsMessage 1 of 31 , Nov 8, 2007View SourceSpecial Order #8 was very important and needs to studied. It controlled the army in the road march and the deployment into lines abreast, as in a wave. As bad as the arrangements were for the road march, the army still tried to follow orders and maintain the time schedule. It proved beyond the capacity of the army to meet the time deadlines. They were volunteers unuse to the conditions they encountered and lacked discipline for the requirements of the road march. The bad weather was a great factor in delaying the road march and many units fell behind the schedule. Despite all this, the army did try to follow orders.This same order was responsible for the arrangement into the series of waves which was not really that bad except it was a single corps stretched along the single wave. Now this was very bad and the waves merged together when the army moved forward. The troops did advance but suffered from leaders who knew little more than the men. Actually, I believe that the rebel brigades did a good job, given the conditions, of entering the battle. The group of brigades on the Western Corinth road were delayed by Sherman but the units that moved on the Bark Road and the Eastern Corinth road advanced and were only stopped at the sunken road. Withers' and Breckinridge's division moved to the east side of the River road with a total of four brigades and did very well. The confederate brigades were favorable placed to push the union troops in the afternoon and actually started to do this. Withers moved up and attacked into the Cloud field about 5:30 pm then moved to the Dill Creek ravine. The confederates did not push hard in the middle and the western sectors and this lost them the battle.RegardsRon----- Original Message -----From: James W. DurneySent: Thursday, November 08, 2007 1:35 PMSubject: [civilwarwest] Re: Confederate Battle Plan for Shiloh 1862
--- In civilwarwest@ yahoogroups. com, "William H Keene" <wh_keene@.. .>
> My explanation: terrain and traffic management. The army had
> advanced into a strip of land between two creeks that were about four
> miles apart, though the functional width was probably closer to 2
> miles. The army had advanced in such a way that the Corps were
> positioned in a sequence back along the road. To assign different
> Corps to sectors would have required either (1) a lot of
> rearrangement of position prior to the battle which would have wasted
> a lot of time and created confusion or (2) advancing to engaged the
> enemy in series with the intent to have the Corps move to sectors
> once the terrain opened up more.
I thought the plan of battle was done prior to startting the march to
Shiloh. I checked the Sword & Cunningham books and cannot find that
this was the case. They both talk about the order to advance but
nothing about a battle plan. PGTB & ASJ seem to have stumbled into the
battle with little coordination and less planning then I had thought.
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In a message dated 12/11/2007 12:27:18 A.M. Central Standard Time, firstname.lastname@example.org writes: It is always good to know that there are so many helpful peopleMessage 31 of 31 , Dec 10 10:57 PMView SourceIn a message dated 12/11/2007 12:27:18 A.M. Central Standard Time, perryrgray@... writes:
It is always good to know that there are so many helpful people and what they can provide to help others better appreciate this conflict.Perry: I don't know of a single person in this community that won't jump in to help with whatever. We're all here because we are immersed obscenely in the study and want to draw you in, as well.ken