Carl, Lee most certainly recognized Hood s weaknesses for army command and was up front about it with Davis. Whether he felt this way about Longstreet I don tMessage 1 of 34 , Oct 13, 2003View SourceCarl,
Lee most certainly recognized Hood's weaknesses for army command and
was up front about it with Davis. Whether he felt this way about
Longstreet I don't know. Perhaps he already recognized Longstreet's
penchant for "pouting" and blaming others instead of accepting the
full responsibilities of his command. It is my opinion that
Longstreet could have done a much better job defending the Missionary
Ridge line than Bragg, and may even have repulsed Grant with heavy
losses. But I also think this would have just delayed the
inevitable. More Union reinforcements would come in and "Bulldog"
Grant would have just tried some other approach (perhaps the same
type of flanking maneuvers that forced Bragg out of Chattanooga the
If Longstreet had remained in command after this, odds are we would
just see the same repetition of the Atlanta campaign. Longstreet was
a JEJ disciple after all. You are no doubt correct in asserting
there never would have been a Franklin type of battle.
--- In firstname.lastname@example.org, "carlw4514" <carlw4514@y...>
> That Longstreet never became an army commander has to be one of theso
> biggest blunders of the Confederate side. Of course we are looking
> back with 20-20 hindsight, but considering that Davis felt he was
> limited in his choices that he had to recycle people he felt hadas
> failed, how could this choice have really been missed?
> -If it was due to an insistence from Lee that he needed Longstreet
> a Corp commander, perhaps this is just another example of how Leeme
> possibly helped lose the war in subtle ways.
> -for a little perspective: Hood was ready and Longstreet not? give
> a break!
With all due respect, James, I think you have this slightly wrong. Pemberton was a lieutenant general in search of a command. He had been paroled after theMessage 34 of 34 , Oct 21, 2003View SourceWith all due respect, James, I think you have this slightly wrong.
Pemberton was a lieutenant general in search of a command. He had
been paroled after the surrender of Vicksburg, and awaiting
The record is pretty clear that Davis toyed with the idea of putting
Pemberton in place of Polk, and it's pretty obvious this was one more
example of Davis being totally out of touch with the Twilight Zone
that operated west of the Allegheny Mountains.
Davis went west with the intention of sustaining Bragg, and hoped
he'd find the situation such that he, as President, could influence
the senior leadership in the AoT to come around to his way of
thinking. He was wrong, of course - totally misguided in his
understanding of the situation.
--- In email@example.com, "james2044" <james2044@h...>
> > What often gets lost in this, but is illustrative of how clueless
> > seemed to be about just how bad the situation was, is the fact
> that Davis
> > had brought Pemberton with him with the intent of placing him at
> the head
> > of Polks' corps. At that particular time, just months after the
> fall of
> > Vicksburg, this choice seems bizarre in an army environment in
> > everyone seemed to be questioning everyone else's fitness for
> IMO, Davis never planned on placing Pemberton in command of
> anything. However, Pemberton was even less acceptable than Bragg
> everyone. If Davis had given a choice of Bragg vs Polk, JEJ or
> Longstreet, Bragg was gone. But, if the choice is Bragg vs
> Pemberton, Bragg wins. Davis wanted Bragg in command, that was his
> choice and he didn't want to be wrong. Pemberton's feelings were a
> very small price for Davis to be right.
> Davis did everything possible to keep the truth from coming out,
> including putting Bragg in the room! Nothing worked but Pemberton.