--- In firstname.lastname@example.org
, "josepharose" <josepharose@y...>
> --- In email@example.com, "Will" <wh_keene@y...> wrote:
> > --- In firstname.lastname@example.org, "josepharose"
> > wrote:
> > > I trust that you are not stating that Wallace was given no more
> > > explicit instructions than that. Please, tell me where Grant
> > wanted
> > > Wallace to go, and list the evidence which confirms that opinion.
> > As stated above, Grant wished Wallace to march up the River Road
> > Pittsburg Landing. This is the version given by all the actors at
> > the sending end of the message: Grant, Rawlins, Rowley, Baxter,
> > McPherson.
> I maintain that Wallace was ordered to the army's "right." That's
> what he and his aides stated. In the ORs, Grant's aides also stated
> that it was to the right--and not to the Landing, as you maintain--
> that Wallace was ordered.
And Grant and his aides all maintained that Grant's intention was for
Wallace to march to Pittsburg Ldg. and position himself on the right of
the army, NOT march to the right of the army.
Your argument also does not account for the fact that Lew Wallace made
the decision to march along the Shunpike, to the right of the army,
BEFORE he received Grant's orders. Therefore, whatever orders he
received are irrelevant, he had already made his decision. He was
prepared to march out the Shunpike PRIOR to Baxter's arrival, by his
Grant spoke to him at Crump's Ldg. before 9:00 am. Wallace then went
to Stoney Lonesome and ordered his 1st brigrade to march from Crump's
to Stoney Lonesome. Since he later admitted that he didn't know the
River Rd. or that he didn't know about the cross road to the River Rd.
the logical assumption is that he had decided to march out the
Shunpike. IOW, he made the decision to march to the "right of the
army" PRIOR to receiving Grant's orders. So the actual wording of
those orders is irrelevant, he had ALREADY MADE HIS DECISION.
> Rawlins: "You then directed me to return to the river and sent
> Captain A. S. Baxter, assistant quartermaster, U. S. Volunteers, and
> chief of the quartermaster's department in your district, on the
> steamer Tigress, without delay, to Crump's Landing, with orders to
> Major General Lewis Wallace to bring forward his division by the
> River road to Pittsburg Landing to a point immediately in rear of
> the camp of Major C. F. Smith's division, and there his column at
> right angles with the river on the right of our lines and await
> further orders."
Which indicates exactly what Grant's intentions were. Wallace was to
march to WHL Wallace's camps and await orders to be positioned to the
"right of the army".
> McPherson: "He informed me that when he came up from Savannah, at
> 7.30, he notified Major General Lewis Wallace, at Crump's Landing,
> to hold his command in readiness to march at a moment's notice, and
> that immediately on his arrival at Pittsburg Landing, finding that
> the attack was in earnest and not a feint, he had sent Captain
> Baxter, assistant quartermaster, with orders to him to move up
> immediately by the River road and take a position on our right.
> Shortly after this Captain Baxter returned, certainly not later than
> 10.30, and said that he had delivered the order."
Also confirming Grant's intentions for Wallace.
> Rowley: "Upon reaching the Landing General Grant immediately mounted
> his horse and rode the bank, and after conversing a moment with some
> officers turned to Captain Baxter, assistant quartermaster, and
> ordered him to proceed immediately to Crump's Landing, and direct
> General Wallace to march with his division up the river and into the
> field on the right of our line as rapidly as possible."
Also confirming Grant's intentions for Wallace.
> Baxter: "I will give my own recollection of the event at Pittsburg
> Landing. On Sunday, between the hours of 8 and 9 o'clock A. M.,
> April 6th, 1862, Adjutant-General Rawlins, of General Grant's staff,
> requested me to go to Crump's Landing (five miles below) and order
> General Lew Wallace to march his command at once by the River Road
> to Pittsburg Landing, and joint the army on the right."
Also confirming Grant's intentions to Wallace.
> Even Grant in his article wrote: "If the position of our front had
> not changed, the road which Wallace took would have been somewhat
> shorter to our right than the River road."
And this was incorrect as Lew Wallace later found out. The road
Wallace took was not shorter, it was longer by 3-4 miles at least.
Grant was mislead by the account from Wallace, based on an error made
by the latter's cavalry regarding the distances. Why you continue to
argue, in the face of Lew Wallace's own testimony regarding this fact,
that the Shunpike was the shorter route I don't know. Grant's
statement, according to Rich, was an act of generosity on his part
after the somewhat acrimonious nature of the debate over Wallace's
march. But Grant was in error!
> He did not claim that
> Wallace made a mistake by marching to Sherman's flank; Wallace's
> only alleged mistake in this article is having marched past the
So what? Had Sherman's flank been where Wallace believed it was and
not 3-4 miles away, you would have a point. As it was not where he
though it was, you do not have a point. Grant intended for Wallace to
march to WHL Wallace's camps and await orders. That much is clear.
Why you insist on putting so much emphasis on an account written 20
yrs. after the fact, rather the more contemporary ORs I don't know.
> Therefore, how can you attempt to assert: "As stated above, Grant
> wished Wallace to march up the River Road to Pittsburg Landing.
> This is the version given by all the actors at the sending end of
> the message: Grant, Rawlins, Rowley, Baxter, McPherson." You are
> thoroughly contradicted by the evidence given by each of these men,
> the aides in particular.
All of them indicate Grant wanted Wallace to march to Pittsburg Ldg.
via the River Rd. and either move to the "right of the army" or await
orders to do so (I don't see any significant difference between the
two). I don't see how you can continue to suggest that his orders were
to march directly to the "right of the army".
And this interpretation is reinforced by what each of these men did
when they were ordered to find Wallace. All three men, Rowley, Rawlins
and McPherson, rode along the River Rd., NOT the Purdy Rd. to the
Shunpike. Why would they do that if they did not expect him along that
road? Why would Grant order troops to defend the Snake Creek bridge on
the River Rd. in anticipation of Wallace's arrival if he didn't expect
him along that road?
> Furthermore, did Rowley explicitly mention the River Road as you
> state that he did?
Rowley most definitely mentioned the River Rd. explicitly, when he
found Wallace at Clear Creek. Why else would Wallace have
countermarched to the crossroad and then to the River Rd.?
Wallace lost the only copy of the orders which ever existed, so we
cannot know what orders he originally received. But the accounts of
Rowley, Baxter, McPherson and Rawlins all confirm that Grant intended
Wallace to take the River Rd. and then await orders to be positioned on
the "right of the army".
> > > Wallace's "rear" was roughly to the north, as he was headed
> > > I would think that the fighting was never to his rear even by
> > > most liberal interpretation: that being any point behind a
> > > perpendicular drawn from the line of movement.
> > By this measure, which I think is a good one, the fighting would
> > in his rear as he got near Snake Creek. The Shunpike heads in a
> > westerly direction until it crosses Snake Creek. When Rowley
> > up with him, Wallace's rear was faced back toward the Tennessee
> > the firing was not coming from the direction he was heading.
> No map which I have seen shows the Shunpike heading west, which you
> claim it does as the Tennessee was to the east. Is there an on-line
> map or other source to which you can refer me?
The map in the article by Rich to which I have referred numerous times
shows the Shunpike heading west until Clear Creek when it turns south.
But it really doesn't matter. Look at the map in Sword. The fighting,
by 2:30-3:00 pm (about the time Rowley caught up with Wallace) is off
to his left and moving in the opposite direction to where Wallace was
marching. Grant may have been incorrect to state it moved to his "left
rear" but he was absolutely correct to state that it was moving away
from his left.
> > > The order was seen by the aides. As the aides evidently made no
> > > mention of the River Road, they would have not been telling the
> > > truth if that is what the orders actually stated.
So what? All of Grant's aides indicate that it did. It's a game of he
said-he said. That's why this argument is fruitless. The only thing
that matters is Grant's aides acted according to their understanding of
Grant's intentions. Wallace had already, as I argued above, made his
decision to march down the Shunpike PRIOR TO RECEIVING ORDERS FROM
GRANT so the actual wording of the orders he received becomes
irrelevant; he was going to use the Shunpike.
This is clear from his actions. He ordered his 1st Brigade from
Crump's Ldg. to Stoney Lonesome, after talking to Grant in the morning.
Stoney Lonesome is not on the River Rd., it requires the troops to
march along a crossroad; a crossroad of which Wallace had no knowledge
(according to his accounts) and for which he required a guide. IOW, he
intended to use the Shunpike. Orders were also issued to his 3rd
brigade at Adamsville to join up with the other brigades on the
Shunpike. But this decision was made PRIOR to Grant's orders being
> > That is not the only possibility. When their opinion on this
> > was requested, it had been six years since they saw the order.
> > had no surviving copy of the order to refer to. Do you remember
> > perfectly things that you read in the spring of 1997?
> I am pretty sure that if Grant's order mandated the use of the River
> Road and Wallace's aides realized that day that Wallace disobeyed it-
> -especially with all of the repercussions and the attention given to
> this issue--they would remember it well enough.
That's a supposition on your part and it overlooks that Grant's aides,
less than a yr. after the fact, indicated that Grant did state River
Rd. Whether that was written into the orders we will never know, so
why continue this pointless discussion? It is sufficient to say that
Rowley, Rawlins and McPherson all proceeded in a manner consistent with
the River Rd. being the expected route for Wallace's division. And
their OR accounts are consistent with their actions. They understood
Grant's intentions. Whether Wallace did or not is unknown. But he had
already made his decision to use the Shunpike. That is clear from his
> > ~Will