Steve, At 00:35 9/1/00 EDT, you wrote: However, it was my impression that the question ... I was referring to Andy Burden s comment Funny how everyone willMessage 1 of 141 , Sep 1, 2000View SourceSteve,
At 00:35 9/1/00 EDT, you wrote:
However, it was my impression that the question
>was asked in an honest and straightforward manner. In line with theI was referring to Andy Burden's comment "Funny how everyone will call Hood
>advertised purpose of this group to come in, ask questions, and share
>opinions. Perhaps the caveat of snide replies should be added to the
>advertisement. Shame on you, Mr. Redman....and a teacher at that.
a butcher for Franklin, but no one would dare utter a sound about Lee's
Pickett-Pettigrew-Trimble debacle on 3rd day at G'burg. The difference
between these 2 assaults is that Hood's was somewhat more successful than
Lee's (in a tactical sense)". I didn't even remember who had made it. I
should have used the word "unfortunate" instead of "invidious". I get
worked up when I sense any indifference whatsoever to unnecessary slaughter.
>"I think that those who attempt to find some good in the commander Hood fromHis values were the same, but he was no longer physically capable of
>Peachtree Creek on are looking for a nitch,..."
> I'm curious. Why from Peachtree Creek on? Does that suggest that
>pre-Peachtree he was a different man with a different set of values?
fullfilling his sacred duty to his troops, that is achieve a valid military
objective while getting as many of them through the battle as possible. The
fact that he was in constant pain did not dissuade him from writing letters
to Davis about Johnston (no saint, but at least he didn't press boys and
old men into service). Worse yet, Hood wasn't capable any more, if he ever
was, of defining a valid military objective, that is one which was
achievable with the means at hand. Add this to his untrammeled ambition,
and he makes it to my short list. No, I don't think he changed just before
Peachtree creek, or even after Chickamauga. He stayed the same, and that is
the problem with romanticising him before or afterward. By the way, I am
just waiting for someone to mention him suggesting to Longstreet to not
frontally attack Little Round Top.
>A conditional "victory" there, put almost within Hood'sI think you misunderstood me here. The outcome was definitive enough. I
>reach by the incompetence and personal cowardice of Schofield (he kept
>himself far far away from the front) would have changed nothing as the
>damage to Hood's army would have been debilitating no matter what the
meant, that if Hood had been luckier or whatever and been able to do more
damage to the defenders than he did, his essential situation would not have
changed, that is, the means he had at his disposal to deal with Thomas were
not even remotely sufficient. Hadn't he learned a thing from Peachtree
Creek when he concentrated superior forces against Thomas and still got
beat? Didn't he know a thing about what had happened at Chickamauga? Could
he learn at all?
> This, in my mind, was a victory pure and simple. When two armies meeton
>a field and, at the conclusion of the battle, one army remains in possessioncitizen-soldier
>of the ground while the other has retreated, that, sir, is a victory in any
>sense of the word. Also, we have the words of that venerable
>Sam Watkins who called Franklin a "costly victory" but considered it aI enjoy reading Sam Watkins and quote him when it suits me. However, during
>victory, even after the war.
the battle of Franklin he was on "French leave" and missed the fun. More
power to him, I say, but if he had actually been there he might have judged
the outcome differently, if he had survived, that is.
>You detract from his actions by claiming that the only way he could haveThat was just a dig at Schofield.
>won was because his opponent was a coward.
So what? Who cares? He
>accomplished the mission he set out to accomplish.He was in a rage about Schofield having passed within a mile of him during
the night at Spring Hill. Rather than admit his primary responsibility for
this, he decided to teach his army a lesson and thus sent hundreds of men
to their deaths.
>Could it be thatIf this is a reference to me you should be more specific. If it is indeed a
>such personable, charming, dashing, and tactically proficient officers such
>as Cleburne and Gist were killed while serving in his command?
reference to me, then you haven't been carefully reading my other postings
or, if you have, you are indulging in a well-known and unfair debating
tactic. My primary concern is always the welfare of the lowly "pawn".
If you continue in this vein I will call you on it every time.
>"To what purpose did all those people die that day in Franklin? And whatsort
>of man in what sort of disciplinary rage brought it about? You answer theThey died to assauge Hood's wounded pride.
> They died for the purpose of defeating the enemy in the field.
>millions had died before them and as millions more have died since.That is my point. Hood and commanders like him get ordinary people killed
in the pursuit of non-military objectives. I insist on telling the truth
about him and generals like him as a warning against people like them in
our times, waiting in the wings for the public's vigilence (such as it is)
Tom; They say that timing is everything but you don t quite have it right. W.H.L. Wallace was wounded late in the day, about 5:00 pm during the withdrawal ofMessage 141 of 141 , Feb 28, 2007View SourceTom;They say that timing is everything but you don't quite have it right. W.H.L. Wallace was wounded late in the day, about 5:00 pm during the withdrawal of his troops and while they were in the process of being trapped by the confederates. There is a possibility that he may have been captured if he was not wounded. Wallace's division took position at 10:00 am in the Duncan field and the western portion of the sunken road. They held until about 4:00 pm, the retreat began first with the artillery, then the regiments started pulling back. At this time, they started to come disorganized while in the withdrawal, those still in front line positions continued to hold for a short while longer. The balance of units fighting at the front after 5:00 pm were commanded by Prentiss and he had troops from all three divisions and they were coming unglued. The surrenders started shortly, about 5:30.As to Grant and the sunken road, I believe that he had very little to do with the selection of this lane as a position. At 10:00 am, Wallace and Hurlbut ordered and put their troops in position along this lane and placed Prentiss' survivors between them. Grant only approved their choice of position. Actuall the Official Reports are mostly silent about Grant and this position.RonOriginal Message -----From: Tom MixSent: Wednesday, February 28, 2007 1:59 PMSubject: FW: [civilwarwest] Re: Shiloh
From: Tom Mix [mailto:tmix@ insightbb. com]
Sent: Wednesday, February 28, 2007 11:32 AM
To: 'civilwarwest@ yahoogroups. com'
Subject: RE: [civilwarwest] Re: Shiloh
I agree completely in what your saying about how they ended up in the lane. They sort of fell together there. But Grant did recognize something about the position that made a defense plausible then set it as the official design for defense. I have found it highly creditable as to how Will Wallaces unit maintained a degree of order after their commanders mortal wound, the heavy attack confronting them, the confusion surrounding the soldiers, the terrain limits and such and yet they stay together, re-establish order, establish a defensive line and coordinate with Prentiss. It speaks well for the more junior officers of the Division. And Grants personal involvement.
If any one walks the road one of the first things that becomes very apparent is that it is not sunken any where. The fencing, the tree line, the slight undulation kind of creating a natural rallying point, I would guess, for those who were not high tailing it to the rear. As I think about those men in blue at that specific moment, I am always impressed with their courage, clarity of purpose and ability to keep their heads while those all around them were losing theirs, literally and figuratively. I would guess that seeing Grant at the front amidst all the smoke, noise, trees, chaos, disorder and death must have had a positive effect on the men too. I think it could be equated to the response to Hancock 1 July 1863, IMO..
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