On the hills opposite Tunnel Hill, Sherman had, it seems three fresh
brigades. Cockerill's suffered three men wounded, Alexander's four
wounded, and Lightburn's had ten killed and 76 wounded. These units
were in position to attack in short order.
The reports of two regiments are not always to be trusted over the
research of historians who have gathered evidence from all sides.
To be sure, we should be careful on how we accept the writings of
certain soldiers; Hugh Ewing actually wrote that he, in effect,
captured Tunnel Hill ("On the 25th, Corse led his brigade down the
gorge and up Tunnel Hill, assaulting and carrying it with great
gallantry. We drove the enemy from his entire intrenchments, and
reduced the larger part to possession." and "[Loomis] was ably
supported by Buschbeck, a portion of whose troops, under Colonel
Taft, drove the enemy from the Glass' houses and followed them to
the summit of Tunnel Hill, where they maintained a gallant and
prolonged combat, with the loss of their gallant commander.")
Of course, Cozzens makes mistakes. They are, in general, not major
and he doesn't tend to play favorites. Ewing made major
misstatements and they are truly self-serving.
--- In civilwarwest@y..., "bjer50010" <bjewell@i...> wrote:
> --- In civilwarwest@y..., "wh_keene" <wh_keene@y...> wrote:
> > --- In civilwarwest@y..., "josepharose" <josepharose@y...> wrote:
> > > Sherman was *not* heavily engaged all day. Please refer to
> > Cozzens,
> > > Sword, McDonough, or any other responsible writer.
> > Now your demeaning the bravery of Cleburne's men and the units
> > other divisions he had gathered there.
> > Cozzens as a responsilbe writer? I don't think so.
> > > Because I state that fact,
> Two regimental accounts, the 40th IL and the 6th IA, of Sherman's
> command talk about the ferocity of the fire fight in which they
> engaged all day. Either they are lying or Cozzens got it wrong.
> hope you are not trying to make the argument that a 20th century
> writer is more knowledgeable of the events on Sherman's front than
> the participants.
> > It is noit a fact, it is your opinion.
> > > Even if, upon receiving Grant's order after Thomas' troops
> > > the ridge, Sherman put together another attack no stronger
> > > one he had commanded earlier that day, the results could have
> > > significant.
> > General Rose's speculation.
> And again, where was Sherman's attack to be launched? Give credit
> Cleburne and his men for seizing good defensive ground and
> cold a superior force. Grant's orders obviously show that he was
> unaware of how completely Sherman had been stopped.
> > > With their rear and flank in peril, the Confederate right wing
> > might
> > > not have hung on so hard, as well. Any attack would have made
> > > harder for Cleburne to have accomplished what he did in
> > > the advance along the ridge and in forming a rearguard.
> > General Rose's speculation.
> Since Sherman's troops were engaged in a heavy fire fight with
> Cleburne's all day, until after sundown, ie. after the center and
> right flanks of Bragg's army had been overwhelmed, it is
> to assume that Cleburne's men were engaged with Sherman all day.
> Therefore they could not pull out as easily as you seem to think.
> You still have not provided a reasonable scenario for how Sherman
> going to launch this attack.
> JB Jewell