Re: Stratfor / number of Kadyrovites / "civil war":
Stratfor has long been unreliable on Chechnya issues. Their "analyses"
are based on superficial reading of some media sources, and they are
taking everything coming from the Russian propaganda kitchens at face
value. It's easy to check out where they got their wisdom from by
comparing the mentioned numbers with some news stories.
Furthermore: Not only is the number of "Kadyrovites" far smaller than
claimed by Stratfor, but even the authentic numbers create a wrong
impression. The majority of these people are "regular Chechen militia",
as already mentioned here, i.e. they are subordinated to the puppet
interior ministry. Which means that they are formally under the command
of the the Kadyrov "administration", but like everything else, their
real bosses are sitting in Moscow. This unit and its "commanders" get
exactly as much leash as the occupiers find reasonable. The other major
gangs (Yamadayev, Kakiyev etc.) are subordinated to the Russian GRU
(military intelligence service), i.e. under the direct command of the
The number of real "Kadyrovites", i.e. gunmen who are under the absolute
command of mini-Kadyrov is probably in the hundreds. They are members of
his personal guard units, armed gangs consisting of his extended family
plus a few individual gangsters recruited by these groups. Most of these
people can be assumed to be personally loyal to Kadyrov.
It's different with the the "militia". The main reason for joining this
puppet gang isn't loyalty to either Kadyrov or the Russians, but the
necessity to make a living in a place with almost total unemployment,
pressure exerted on the families of former ChRI soldiers, and probably
to a certain degree the infiltration of the puppet "power organs" by the
Resistance. I think it's safe to predict that in the case of a major
confrontation, a majority of these units will not fight for the
occupation/Kadyrov, and a part of them might even turn their guns
around, just like it happened with Zavgayev's "interior troops" during
the first war.
And btw., I believe that confrontations between Kadyrov and his rival
gangs will only be allowed to the extent the occupation finds acceptable
and useful. The Russians are conducting their usual split and rule
policy also among their quislings. They are keeping all options open by
having a couple of "blood enemies" ready in case they need to retire
Kadyrov. As long as mini-Kadyrov delivers - i.e. can be talked up as
"the almost-independent leader of Chechnya", the embodiment of a
successful Chechenization - they will contain his rivals, but they
won't remove them entirely. And if the inter-quisling conflicts get out
of hand in spite of the careful orchestration, the KGB regime can at any
time replace all of them with other puppets already waiting in Moscow.
These gangs won't be able to act independently against the Russians even
if they were united; nevertheless the occupation regime does everything
to keep them separated from each other. It isn't a habit of the KGB to
leave anything to chance.
Stratfor's "analysis" seems to take place in an empty space, as if there
was no Chechen Resistance (they actually claim that there is "peace in
the republic") and as if the petty contradictions among the local
quislings were at the root of the Russian-Chechen conflict. Stratfor's
allegation that the battle-readiness of the Russian troops in Chechnya
is triggered by Russian fears of a "civil war" is almost comical, and it
proves that Stratfor has swallowed the current Russian propaganda
version which tries do redefine the Russian-Chechen conflict into an
"inter-Chechen conflict". I guess the Russian generals know much better
what they really have to fear.