--- In Sartre@yahoogroups.com
, "jj.hogset" <jj.hogset@...> wrote:
I should confess that I'm fresh for both Sartre and this discussion.
But I would like to say it could be considered as bad faith for two
reasons. For one thing if 'life of the individual' rather than 'the
individual' itself is at the center, it becomes 'serious'
or 'gravitational', thus bad faith. Man should be at the core of
everything as an individual. Secondly, the futur, I think, can not
be the past for it is not finite but infinite with infinite
manifestations. This is the right point where the role of the
individual comes to the surfece. If you remember Sartre's new
dualism is of the "infinity of the finite." Thus if the future has
only one or limited manifestation/s it would be possible to say it
would authomatically belong to the past for it it is sure that thre
are no other possibilities. But in the case that there are
unlimitted ones, and each individual should chose for itself from
the multiplicity of the future, it would not be possible for the
future to recure the same. It is always different. Thus giving up
the future for the past and looking for the solidarity of human life
rather than the individual (in the sense of here and now, which is
the very basis of existentialism) are inauthentic and bad faith. The
lack remains a hole to be filled.
> For Sartre, the source of inauthenticity lies in the desire for
> being. The only being that for-itself can be said to have, is its
> facticity, that is, its past. The thing about the eternal
> is that it gives the future the same quality of facticity as is
> otherwise attributed to the past, because if there is an eternal
> return of the same, then the future is past already. This brings
> sense of solidity to the life of an individual. Not the kind of
> solidity that Sartre was so preoccupied with, for-itself's desire
> in-itself-qualities, or object-like qualities. It is not a sense
> solidity that is solidity in the here-and-now, nor is it directed
> the "ego". The solidity the eternal recurrence brings, it brings
> to the individual, but to the individual's life. Thus we may say
> it makes the story of ones life solid. In this way, the sense of
> being empty, or lacking, that Sartre saw as so prominent in the
> phenomenology of human beings, can be fended off to some extent.
> Would Sarte deem this line of thinking to be in bad faith?